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Abstract 
 
The connecting premise of this study is that the explanation of human action, much of which 
involves conflict in various forms, is distinctive. It must address the singularity of actions 
(their attachment to specific moments) and its contingency (that different actions could 
plausibly have been taken instead).  Both stem from the involvement of time in human action, 
such that its explanation must adopt the form of historiography. 
 
Part One argues that the authority of explanation in the physical sciences does not extend to 
human action as it derives from successful physical demonstration in experiment or industrial 
replication, not from special epistemological warrant, processes inapplicable to human action; 
that the distinguishing involvement of human consciousness and the will to act introduces a 
particular awareness of the passage of time that confers timeliness to actions, while 
precluding full knowledge of the consequences of actions; that the social nature of human 
action involves the emergence of diverse groups that generate complex divisions between 
‘we’ and ‘they’ that form the basis for conflict over the consequences of action; that resolving 
the conflict of warfare produces collective agreements to avoid future conflict; that this 
conflict can reach considerable levels of brutality and lethality even outside warfare; and that 
moral codes that might constrain such conflict have limited effectiveness. 
 
Part Two illustrates the relevance of perspectives in reducing the complexities of reality to 
facilitate action, referring to categories appropriate to the emergence of Scottish Jacobitism in 
the late seventeenth and early eighteen centuries: dynastic, religious, economic and military.  
It also suggests how contingency could be addressed through conjectures about the actions 
that might have been taken but were not. 
 
Part Three suggests a basis in the role of expectations for the tendency of human perspectives 
on their context of action to change radically, and for actions to change accordingly as 
situations are seen ‘in a different light’. 
 
At various points in the study use is made of an analogy drawn between the adversarial 
advocacies presented at a trial by jury and the general explanation of human action.  This 
illuminates both the fact that different perspectives on the same evidence can yield contrary 
explanations and that all explanation of human action necessarily confronts a problem of 
reflexivity: the perspectives of agents have to be represented through the perspectives of 
those seeking to explain their actions. 
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Explaining Historical Conflict 
With Illustrations from ‘Emergent’ Scottish Jacobitism 
 
 
 
Introductory Outline 
 
 
The distinctiveness of this study emerges from its basic premise: that the explanation of human action 
– as distinct from human functioning – is sui generis, of its own kind.  This is based in turn on two 
claims.  First, human actions are taken and pursued; they are not caused.  Second, while objects can 
be made to yield to objective explanations, human subjects require subjective explanations.  
Human action is intrinsically grounded in time; it characteristically creates and occupies its own 
conflicted context; this context of action is inevitably permeated by ignorance of the consequences of 
actions taken.  For these reasons, human action is contingent.  Not only does it follow that its 
explanation is necessarily historiographic; it also follows that in history and archaeology (seen as a 
form of history, not as anthropology) plural explanations can reasonably co-exist.  Given the 
substantive ontology of human action, its explanation is not subordinate to epistemological criteria 
considered, justifiably or not, to warrant scientific knowledge.  If one history, rather than another, 
should acquire the status of ‘received wisdom’ then this is ultimately driven by extrinsic 
considerations, rather than solely by the intrinsic properties of the account in question. 
The study has three sequenced objectives.  First, to examine the warrant and significance of its basic 
premise (Part One); second, to consider the component role of ‘perspective’ in historiography, using 
selected historical material (Part Two); third, to stress the propensity of human perspectives to 
undergo autonomous qualitative shifts and to anticipate endemic conflict, with consequences for 
human action (Part Three).   
In Chapter 1, the defining choice of a pragmatic and sceptical perspective reveals that received 
scientific knowledge occupies a restricted domain to which human action cannot be admitted.  Its 
domain is defined by the experimental manipulation of objects to reveal regular relationships that 
constitute answers to ‘How?’ questions, their replicability able to be harnessed effectively to human 
productive purposes.  The regularities may be represented in abstract deductive theoretical form, 
thereby acquiring persuasive force, despite inherent logical problems.  However, such experimental 
manipulation is inapplicable to the conscious actions of human subjects (including the actions of 
scientists).  Securing putative answers to ‘Why?’ questions addressed to that context involves tackling 
the explanation of singular actions, applying abductive rather than deductive inference to unreliable 
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partial evidence from the past, subject to the corresponding criterion of plausibility rather than 
conclusiveness.   
The singularity of human actions, discussed in Chapter 2, follows from their attachment to specific 
times and places and from their unavoidable entanglement with actions of other individuals, which 
ensures they are taken under conditions of partial ignorance.  Explanation is targeted on ‘events’ 
identified in this entanglement by the observer, and is obliged to confront the inevitable contingency 
of the actions involved.  A consequent need arises for explanation to address the ‘might-have-beens’ – 
the plausible alternative actions that were not taken yet influenced those that were.  The trial by jury, 
with its contested advocacies, is proposed as a paradigmatic framework for explanation of this type, 
even if in history and archaeology there are no living witnesses to testify or be cross-examined. 
The study challenges various reductionist claims: that a physicalist explanation of the operation of the 
brain renders superfluous the notion of the human will; that a quasi-physicalist representation of 
‘society’ eliminates the autonomy of the individual agent; conversely, that the concept of the isolated 
rational individual makes society redundant; and that all change is blind adaptation to exogenous 
shocks, without reference to human action in any originative or reflective sense.  However, it is 
argued in Chapter 3 that human physical functions do not determine how they may be exercised in 
action; ‘society’ is not monolithic but a complex and changing system of parts connected with varying 
degrees of tension; the intrinsic engagement of the individual in components of this system need not 
preclude the individual’s qualified autonomy – and may amplify its consequences; the human action 
for which an explanation is sought is self-evidently the source of change and of conflict.  Chapter 4 
claims that this conflict is not the means of adapting to a binding environmental constraint on human 
life.  Instead conflict is the emergent norm as tensions between ‘we’ and ‘they’ are generated by 
actions in competitive pursuit of security, status, power and goods, within contrasting relational 
contexts of a familial, social, economic and political nature.  The constitutional order by which 
conflict may temporarily be kept in check by force is itself undermined by improvements in its own 
military capability, the resultant warfare requiring new forms of political order to emerge.  
Dehumanization emerges as the ultimate degradation of the ‘they’, facilitating slavery and genocide.   
Chapter 5 considers these extreme outcomes, and other lesser forms of conflict, to be contingent on 
the failure of a general morality, driven by an acknowledgement of the sanctity of human life, to 
constrain the engagement of wills intrinsic to the social dimension of human action.  Recognition of 
the essential reciprocity of the relationship between ‘self’ and ‘other’, necessary for mitigating 
conflict, involves a subjectivity beyond the scope of rational thought, while the post-Enlightenment 
emphasis on that same limited rationality has inevitably subverted the spiritual and religious 
foundation for moral authority.  Accordingly, rather than conflict being eliminated from human life by 
application of moral precepts, social order rests on the exercise of force by the self-legitimized state.  
  Introduction 
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Thus, some human actions are taken under duress while others are pursued on a retaliatory basis.  
‘Christendom’ is then a misnomer in a literal sense. 
In Chapter 6 an explanatory historiography is distinguished from description by its focus on the 
historicity of the event in question: establishing the temporal connectedness of the specific actions 
which constitute it and addressing the changes in actors’ perspectives responsible for the 
innovativeness of their actions.  It endeavours not only to account for an event’s novel singularity, but 
also to establish its contingency, by proposing to identify the ‘might-have-beens’ – the plausible 
actions that could have been taken but which were not, this failure to act having contributed 
nonetheless to the actual event transpiring as it did, rather than in some other way.  But this exercise 
in imaginative conjecture concerning the perspectives of the participants in the event requires the 
analyst to deploy his or her own personal perspective.  This arises not exclusively from personal 
familiarity with the evidence pertaining to the event in question; it is augmented from experience of 
similar analyses, and conditioned by both personal methodological allegiances and obligations 
acquired through membership of a community of analysts.  The pursuit of this exercise can generate a 
plurality of valid histories of the event in question, each associated with different configurations of 
perspectives, real and imagined.  In addition, conjectures about the ‘might-have-beens’ need to be 
distinguished from the substantive notion of ‘counterfactual’ history, in terms of purpose and 
rationale.   
The purpose of Part Two is to apply the notion of ‘perspective’ to a specific historical context, in two 
specific ways.  First, to identify the relevant issues and evidence likely to have occupied the minds of 
contemporary actors during a specific conflict-riven period of Scottish history, employing a 
framework of four general perspectives that echoes the relational contexts considered in Chapter 4.  
Second, to offer illustrations of how ‘might-have-beens’ relating to the particular perspectives and 
actions of identifiable individuals could contribute to the explanation of specific events.  This supports 
the argument that explanation of morally conflicted, contingent human actions should proceed in the 
manner of an advocacy before a trial jury.  To enable this, historiographers’ personal perspectives, 
from which they customarily interpret and make coherent the available evidence, should also be used 
to generate plausible individual perspectives for relevant figures, to account for their actions.  Part 
Two also considers whether ‘emergent’ Scottish Jacobitism of the period from 1689 to 1715 can be 
explained in these terms. 
Chapter 7 considers the dynastic and religious perspectives together, in view of religion’s 
involvement in both the validation and assessment of monarchy.  The temporal preservation and 
exercise of monarchic power, through the genealogical vagaries of hereditary succession, forms the 
context of conflicted perspectives regarding the legitimacy and extent of kingly powers and the 
adequacy of their implementation in contemporary Scotland.  A closer examination of the personal 
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perspective of James VII/II and the significance of his Roman Catholicism creates doubts as to 
whether his restoration could credibly be a substantive objective of ‘emergent’ Jacobitism.  Two 
related illustrations of ‘might-have-beens’ are offered.  First, the failure of Graham of Claverhouse to 
generate effective constitutional opposition to William III’s assumption of the crown of Scotland 
could be attributed to his vaunting personal military ambitions; second, the failure of the French 
invasion of 1708 could cast doubts on the resolve of the French king to pursue the action in support of 
the restoration of James VIII/III. 
Chapter 8 considers the economic and military perspectives together, treating military pursuits as a 
sub-category of economic activity.  It is argued that human actions to initiate and prosecute economic 
activities must involve perspectives that admit the inevitability of economic processes taking time.  
The physical processes of production must be enabled and facilitated by the financial processes of 
credit provision, leading eventually to the emergence of an institutional framework in which markets 
in products become interdependent with markets in negotiable financial assets.  This system of 
interdependent contractual promises, managed by specialist financial institutions, is intended to 
address the inherent uncertainties of time-consuming production for sale.  But the rivalrousness of 
markets creates its own uncertainties, imbalances of economic power and sources of conflict.  The 
expanding economic base both enables and constrains the growth of the power of the ‘fiscal-military 
state’.  The financial necessities of engagement in war, in terms of state borrowing and taxation, 
extend economic interdependence widely, creating contrasts in prosperity.  However, given the 
divergent perspectives of the participants the system develops its own dynamic, creating public policy 
problems.  The development of Bank of Scotland and the Darien Scheme offer contrasting instances 
of enterprising actions to improve the impoverished eighteenth-century Scottish economy, the former 
a well-founded institutional development to augment the availability of credit within it, the latter an 
ill-conceived and politically inflated scheme to establish new outlets for Scottish produce, with 
predictably tragic consequences.  Two illustrations of ‘might-have-beens’ are presented.  First, the 
failure of either Jacobites of the north-east of Scotland or the state to prevent the determined 
enterprise of John Erskine, 6th Earl of Mar, initiating a Jacobite insurrection, albeit leading to failure 
in the Battle of Sherrifmuir; second, the failure of the state to resource adequately a timely military 
check to Mar’s initiative, under the command of the 2nd Duke of Argyll. 
Part Three develops the notion of perspective in two specific and related respects.  First, human 
actions that initiate change – as opposed to actions that are the repetitious maintenance of routine 
productive activities – are propagated by shifts in actors’ mental perspectives, shifts that are 
unpredictable in any physical sense.  Second, these changes are qualitative and disruptive, rather than 
adaptive or convergent on a balanced outcome or point of rest in some physicalist sense.  Conceived 
as appropriate to and warranted by a newly recognised problem or opportunity, the pursuit of these 
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actions disturbs relationships in other contexts, closely or even distantly related, either temporally or 
spatially.  Thus, conflict remains, only differently configured. 
Chapter 9 extends the claim that change-initiating human action emerges from subjective perspectives 
developed from the temporality of personal experience.  These perspectives possess a ‘kaleidic’ 
property, a propensity to shift abruptly in response to new mental images of what might be, or new 
comprehensions of what has been.  This property derives from the integral involvement of qualitative 
expectations, formed as the mind searches ‘backward’ and ‘forward’ in its context of partial 
ignorance.  These shifts initiate new commitments to specific current actions.  Potential volatility is 
tempered by the social, political and religious dimensions of the perspectives, with their embedded 
collective value judgements.  These support conventional stances that contribute stability to 
individuals’ perspectives in some situations, yet can give way to mass shifts in others – particularly in 
response to the perceived threat of major conflict.  The same kaleidic property is possessed by the 
perspectives that analysts – or advocates – form and adopt in response to the evidence, as the basis of 
their explanations of the past actions of others.  But they cannot avoid entanglement with their own 
perspectives on their personal experience.  It is from this experience, rather than sympathy or 
empathy, that relevant insights and values are drawn to develop the explanatory perspectives, aroused 
by value-driven actions within the explananda.  This entanglement encourages the use of rhetoric in 
presenting the specific historiography or advocacy, as persuasion targeted in turn on anticipations of 
the audience’s personal perspectives is required to fill the void left by the non-existent complete 
rational account. 
Proneness to kaleidic shifts is one property of the perspective formed in the mind’s eye of the 
individual, in respect of the imagined potential of the present.  Chapter 10 stresses a second property: 
the perspective embraces both positive and negative elements, the latter spanning perceived 
constraints on the individual’s freedom of action and self-identity, and conceivable vulnerabilities to 
future actions by others.  The composition of these complex elements into a singular perspective is not 
an order-imposing simplification.  Rather it conceals intrinsic disorder in expectational terms that, 
activated by a kaleidic shift, can manifest itself unpredictably in actions that propagate change.  These 
actions, which are not pre-determined, contribute contingency to the historical record.  At their root 
are irreconcilable and non-negotiable differences of values that may be sufficient to promote the 
emergence of open conflict.  The postscript to the chapter questions if labelling the conflict of the 
1689 to 1715 period as ‘emergent’ Jacobitism is a case of presentism derived from later rather than 
contemporary perspectives. 
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Part One: The Pursuit of Authoritative Explanation 
 
 
Chapter 1 Epistemology and Images of Explanation 
 
1.1 The Problem to be Addressed 
The explanation of human action, understood in common-sense terms as the living of human lives, 
confronts several problems that challenge the legitimacy of applying ‘authoritative’ to its conclusions.  
The overarching problem is that life is ‘in’ time, such that actions form a temporal succession.  To 
paraphrase Kierkegaard, life is lived ‘forward’ in time but must be understood ‘backward’, so an 
explanation of human action is inescapably an historiography.  From this follow several specific 
considerations.  One is the ubiquity of change, originated by action.  The object of explanation is an 
incessant ‘becoming’ that always constitutes ‘the past’, only accessible through interrogation of a 
configuration of remains, a ‘being’ in ‘the present’.  Another is that this action is anticipatory, but ‘the 
future’ is ‘not yet’ and can only be conjectured.  Alternative conjectured futures offer the individual 
choices of actions with differing imagined consequences, so any ‘present’ could therefore have been 
different on that ground alone, but is further differentiated by interactions with the actions of others.  
The object of explanation is the contingency of collective action, as distinct from its necessity, with its 
unknowable consequences.  A third concerns the capacity of a time-bound consciousness of self and 
fellow-humans to generate conflicted relationships within and between humans such that physical 
conflict, possibly involving brutality, savagery and killing, can become a central element of human 
action.  The object of explanation of human action is to address the origins, nature and implications of 
contingent, conflict-generated change. 
Two problematic presumptions stand in the way.  The first is the ontological commitment that any 
explanandum concerning the world must be purely physical in the sense of being totally 
comprehended in terms of the physical senses.  This obliges a specific equivalence to be drawn 
between the mind and the brain.  This in turn embeds a specific neutral conception of time that 
effectively eliminates the possibility of the kind of explanation noted above.  The second is the 
epistemological commitment that independent criteria exist to discriminate between authoritative and 
specious explanations of these physical phenomena.  Combined, these form the image of an 
authoritative physicalist science with its ‘… persistent claim that it is science and science alone that is 
the general measure of all reality, knowledge and truth …’ (Bernstein 1983: 46).  These presumptions 
typically exclude history and archaeology from the domain of science proper, incapable of 
contributing authoritative knowledge. 
  Epistemology and Images of Explanation 
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The alternative considered here lodges a starkly different claim.  Historical and archaeological 
explanation form the general case of authoritative – but not certain – knowledge of human action, 
while scientific explanation is the special case.  The elements of the claim are first, the domain of 
science is limited to what can be subjected to the experimental method, so scientific explanation is the 
product of experimental and technological practice.  Human action, however, with its temporal 
trajectory of human-initiated change, punctuated by conflict, lies beyond its reach.  Second, there is 
no ‘privileged epistemology’ to distinguish authoritative explanations even in science, only 
experimental success or failure.  The diachronous explanations of history and archaeology have their 
own ontological and epistemological foundations, attributing a substantive role to the human mind 
and requiring a reconsideration of what is signified by ‘authoritative’.  
 
1.2 The Claim Developed. Stage One: Experimentation and Pragmatism 
From Common Sense to the ‘Practice Turn’ 
Philosophical Pragmatism offers support for the claim that scientific explanation is the peculiar 
product of experimental and technological practice.  A foundational element in the development of 
‘American’ Pragmatism was the ‘Common Sense’ philosophy of the eighteenth-century Scottish 
philosopher Thomas Reid.  Reid opposed the a priorism of Descartes and the scepticism of his own 
contemporary Hume, emphasising instead the introspectively warranted general belief that natural 
human faculties are to be trusted.  Amongst these, the power of the human will to act or not made 
practical agency the main tool of discovery (Pakaluk 2003:159).  This emphasis on human action, or 
praxis, became the distinguishing characteristic of the earlier Pragmatists.  Charles Peirce was aware 
of the argument of Alexander Bain, a nineteenth-century Scottish physiologist and psychologist, that 
belief was integrally associated with the human will and thus with action, in the form of a ‘disposition 
to act’ to assuage doubt (Bain 1859: 573).  From this Peirce developed a theory of cognition involving 
a habit of action or active inquiry, supporting a practical struggle to escape doubt and revise beliefs 
(Fisch 1954; Engel 2004), one consistent with Reid’s views regarding the power that humans acquire 
over their circumstances through their actions (Houranski 2003: 116).  In a related vein the Pragmatist 
John Dewey expressed strong opposition to ‘… the Platonic-Aristotelian tradition [which] limited 
philosophy to a merely contemplative endeavour …’ (Gimmler 2013), and endorsed ‘… a slighting 
view of experience as such …’ (Dewey 1929: 27).  This view was embodied in Descartes’ duality 
between object and subject, and his central notion of the existence of an antecedent reality (an ‘… 
inner nature of an outer world …’ (Baert 2005: 129)) accessible only through pure reason – what 
Bernstein termed the ‘spectator theory of knowledge’ (Bernstein 1983: ix).  According to Dewey, it 
was instead active human engagement in the natural world that was the route to the creation of 
knowledge – even although it would not deliver the certainty advertised by Cartesianism – whether in 
the realm of ordinary life or scientific experimentation, for ‘… there is no difference in logical 
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principle between the method of science and the method pursued in technologies.  The difference is 
practical, … especially in [terms of] purpose …’ (Dewey 1929: 84).  Thus, the most reliable 
knowledge accessible to human endeavour is the demonstrable consequences of a repeatable scientific 
experiment or mundane production process.  Similarly, the process of discovery is driven by 
speculative, trial-and-error manipulation of the physical specification of the experiment or process, or 
the thought experiment of abstract manipulation of a deductive theoretical (or symbolic) model that 
represents the confirmed experimental results (Cartwright 1983: 103, 104).  ‘[One] of the 
characteristics of experimental thinking … [is] the direction of experiment by ideas, the fact that 
experiment is not random, aimless action, but always includes, along with groping and relatively blind 
doing, an element of deliberate foresight and intent, which determines that one operation rather than 
another be tried.’ (Dewey 1929: 110). 
Pragmatism has contributed to the ‘Practice Turn’ within contemporary social theory and philosophy 
of science, a shift of focus away from the abstract conception of objective knowledge towards the 
cognitive aspects of the practical activities which constitute the reality of human life.  Rheinberger 
summarises the historiography of the practice turn, underway since the end of the nineteenth century, 
as it affected reflection on scientific knowledge and in which positivism ‘… was merely the beginning 
of this turn, the first symptom of the crisis …’ (Rheinberger 2010: 1).  With this turn, epistemology 
could be viewed not as a theory to adjudicate on knowledge-claims but as a concept ‘… for reflecting 
on the historical conditions under which, and the means with which, things are made into objects of 
knowledge ‘(ibid.: 2; emphasis in original).  Summarising the contributions of mainly European 
scientists and philosophers from De Bois-Reymond to Foucault and Althusser, the principal means is 
argued to be scientific experimentation, so that science is represented not as a system but as a process 
– specifically a process of research, manipulating materials in procedures mediated though 
instruments and other physical equipment, as well as through discourse among researchers.  This 
remedies ‘Popper’s epistemology [which] involves a considerable impoverishment of the concept of 
experiment, which is reduced to an instance of testing hypotheses’ (ibid.: 37).  It is encouraged by 
Kuhn’s conclusions which ‘… broke down the barrier between the context of justification and the 
context of discovery … [a barrier which] Popper’s logic of scientific discovery had still accepted’ 
(ibid.: 55).  According to Rheinberger, Heidegger ‘… sees in [science] a secular process clearly bound 
up with material technology …’ while Althusser ‘… sought to conceive of scientific knowledge as an 
inconcludable process of production … [where] its products takes the form of “objects of knowledge”.  
Its practice is founded in the materiality of an experimental dispositive [i.e. settling of the issue]’ 
(ibid.: 43; 73, 74).  These perceptions invite an analogy, if not an equivalence, to be drawn between 
science and economic production (in the wider sense embracing innovation), implying the 
resemblance of the concepts of knowledge in the two areas of life.  From a different angle 
Rheinberger points out that Poincaré claimed that ‘[w]hat protects us from an overly radical 
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conventionalism [in science] is industry and its technological systems: they successfully translate 
scientific thought’ (ibid.: 13). 
Experimental process as the scientific paradigm  
The innovative historiographical approach to scientific method of Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions (Kuhn 1962) not only stressed the special significance of temporal succession in science; 
it also hinted at a problem to be considered later from a different angle, namely the possibly 
misleading perspective encouraged by the ‘benefits’ of hindsight.  As Pickering points out, a distorted 
image can be created when ‘… accepted scientific knowledge functions as an interpretative yardstick 
in reconstructing the history of its own production.’ (Pickering 1995: 3).  The ‘fragmented, disunified, 
scrappy’ nature of actual scientific practice in real time can be glossed over, in favour of a ‘tidied’ 
representation of knowledge of its object in polished conceptual terms.  In Pickering’s view this 
representational perspective must be balanced by a performative perspective that addresses the nature 
of actual scientific practice.  This he sees as diverse attempts to harness the ‘material agency’ of the 
natural world (its capacities to affect humans) through the interaction of ‘human agency’ (the 
scientists’ efforts) and ‘machine agency’ (the capacities of specially constructed equipment) that 
constitutes scientific experimentation. (ibid.: 5-9).  The imaginative intentional goals of the relevant 
community of scientists, whose profession it is to seek new knowledge, drives the design and 
construction of new machines.  The ‘resistance’ their efforts encounter when they fail to work as 
hoped and their ‘accommodation’ of failure via revised designs and new procedures together 
constitute an iterative process which Pickering terms the ‘mangle of practice’. (ibid.: 23).  Thus, the 
practice of science can be viewed as ‘… an evolving field of human and material agencies 
reciprocally engaged in a play of resistance and accommodation in which the former seeks to capture 
the latter’. (ibid.: 23).  This perspective on the nature of science as a field of practice, stressing its 
temporality, invites two parallels: first, with the mundane processes of production, reflectively 
pursued, through all ages (the proto-experiment of ordinary life); second, with the investment-based 
capital-using mode of modern economic production – indeed Pickering notes that Krieger suggested 
‘… physicists take hold of the world as if it were a factory, a site of productive equipment that needs 
to be managed’. (ibid.: 8, citing Krieger 1992). 
1.3 Stage Two: Human Action Beyond Experimentation  
The Explanation of Human Action  
Pragmatism gives primacy to human action, which is precisely the object of historical and 
archaeological explanation.  It accepts that explanation may legitimately refer to subjective reasons 
for action, accommodating elements such as belief and doubt.  It also accommodates knowledge of 
the existence of other minds with similar reflective capacities.  This admits a distinctive human 
engagement among individuals, for good or ill from their respective and substantive standpoints.  
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Accordingly, it can reasonably be claimed that the domain of historical and archaeological 
explanation is the totality of human action as it is experienced.   Indeed, encompassed within that is 
the actions of scientists themselves – as opposed to their experimental results.  The proscription of the 
subjective insisted on by strict physicalist empiricism would reduce human action to physical 
mechanism, an exclusion of any distinctive humanity.  While Descartes admitted introspection – the 
existence of ‘I’ –  to provide a necessary base from which to search for certainty of explanation, that 
limited subjectivism left in doubt knowledge of the existence of other minds, by which other 
individuals are reduced necessarily to objects. 
The ‘backward view’ of the past 
Human action and time are inseparable.  Time is the context of all that exists, whether material or not.  
Its unique nature embraces its continuity and connectedness as a non-material ‘environment’ of all 
physical states and processes; the locus of all mental activity from which human action responds to 
the perception of temporal procession.  It is a synthesis of a determinate and unalterable yet 
imperfectly recollected past, a transient and constraining present and an as-yet unformed ‘space’ for 
limitless imagined possibilities.  If it is meaningful, in that context, to talk of a discrete human action, 
it is non-repeatable, fixedly anchored in a moment – not caused by that date, as time is presumed to 
have no causal force of itself, but anchored in the sense of being timely, within a unique constellation 
of actions by others, meaningfully associated with their then-prevailing mental states, and a diversity 
of attendant physical circumstances.  The fact that it is anchored in that way at a given date, 
necessarily past, provokes the basic question that defines historical and archaeological enquiry: why 
that action emerged from its antecedents precisely when it did.  This question precludes the action 
being regarded as an entirely separable physical occurrence and instead considers it as ‘entangled’ in a 
web of thoughts and other actions.  The action so conceived is beyond reproduction except mentally, 
by recollection.  Consequently, the scientific method of experimentation has no general applicability, 
as an exclusive route to authoritative explanation.  Insistence on its use would imply either that the 
timing of the original action was immaterial (i.e. that explanation of action is fundamentally 
atemporal) or that time itself did have some causal role.  The individual would view experimental 
replication not as a re-run of a past situation but as a novel situation belonging in the intrinsically new 
present. 
1.4 Stage Three: No Privileged Epistemology  
The Cartesian Agenda: The Primacy of Reason and Deduction 
For an object to be known, it seems there must be a subject to know; the question is how certain is 
that knowledge, when thought – and not just physical sensation – is implicated in knowing and the 
meaning of language is involved in laying claim to certainty.  The Cartesian assertion that knowledge 
could not remain a matter of belief assailable by doubt, but must be certain and beyond challenge by 
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human opinion, is derived from Descartes’ envisaged body-mind duality, his distinction between res 
extensa and res cogitans.  This formed the base for the subsequent philosophical distinction between 
the objective and the subjective.  The fundamental objectivity of nature is presumed attached to its 
antecedent existence relative to humanity, to be revealed through the application of rational thought 
and to be shown to be possessed of an intrinsic rational nature by the same process.  The Cartesian 
legacy is thus a distinct conception of rationality as a uniform attribute of human thought, setting its 
specific universal standards and criteria.  These came to elevate the role of epistemology as the theory 
of knowledge; accordingly, on the presumption that certain knowledge could be acquired by enforcing 
the standards of rational enquiry, epistemology was expected to provide a set of rules to constitute the 
method of rational science, with the intention that a scientific explanation was necessarily one that 
reason could justify as necessary.  However, several issues remain problematic, not least those 
pertaining to the practical relevance of the truth-preserving logic of deductive inference as formalised, 
for example, in the Deductive Nomological Method. 
The challenges to deduction 
The distinctive truth-preservation capacity of deductive inference presumes there exists an initial truth 
to be preserved, one which is not a singular statement of fact but a proposition of universal extent and, 
for the method to have practical relevance, one which possesses an empirical reference.  However, as 
Hume pointed out, the requirement of universal extent cannot be empirically satisfied: not all 
instances of a supposed subject-predicate relation can ever be observed, denying deductive inference 
the a posteriori premises to provide practical relevance.  Moreover, the Principle of Non-contradiction 
embedded in deductive logic requires the nature of the concepts employed in the premises to be 
strictly specifiable.  If they are ‘non-arithmomorphic’ (Georgescu-Roegen 1971: 44ff) or ‘auratic’ 
(Jay 2005: 2) in nature, with vague and ill-defined boundaries (‘penumbra’, according to Georgescu-
Roegen) insufficient to ensure a clear distinction between a term and its negative, then deductive 
reasoning will be precluded.  The creation of abstract theoretical models, in which relations and 
concepts can be expressly formulated ex hypothesi to meet these logical requirements, can give scope 
for deductive manipulation.  As putative explanations of physical relationships, the creation of these 
models embodying law-like propositions relating abstract concepts became the orthodox standard of 
explanation, initially in mechanical physics, but subsequently emulated across a wide range of 
disciplines, including the humanities – particularly economics (Mirowski 1989, 2002).  The approach 
lent itself to mathematicisation, given its strictly logical deductive language, and to generalisation to 
ever-wider contexts, albeit employing at times theoretical terms or intermediate manipulations with no 
direct empirical correspondence. 
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The attempt to save deduction 
An apparent local empirical regularity may be presumed to hint at an underlying ‘law of nature’, 
assuming some logical necessity attends the observed regularity, such that the ‘law’ can be shown to 
‘explain’ it.  The detection of empirical regularities is then directed, on this presumption, towards the 
search for the appropriate underlying ‘laws’.  The latter may be sought by proposing and testing a 
possible candidate in hypothetical form, deploying the Hypothetico-Deductive Method (HDM).  
However, the logical deduction (the ‘prediction’) from a speculative hypothesis unavoidably qualifies 
the consequent of the major premise (the hypothesis); accordingly, any observed confirmation of that 
implication, in affirming the consequent, cannot deliver a definitive logical conclusion regarding the 
truth of the hypothesis.  Moreover, in so far as the accompanying auxiliary hypotheses should possess 
the same universal extension as the main hypothesis, the Problem of Induction would undermine any 
conclusiveness the argument could claim – i.e. no number of tests is sufficient.  A failure of repeated 
tests of the hypothesis to yield identical results could be interpreted as the basis of some form of 
probable knowledge, although that does not circumvent the intrinsic fallacy of affirming the 
consequent.  Popper sought to circumvent these problems, following Cartesian principles.  He placed 
ultimate reliance on deductive logic by developing a logic of justification, where his principle of 
falsification applied to hypothesis-testing was proposed to demarcate the scientific from the 
unscientific.  At one level this involved deployment of modus tollens, the negation of the consequent 
of a deductive argument, to identify correctly an unsuccessful claimant to be ‘scientific’.  At another 
level, it obliged a theory to yield a ‘basic statement’, a proposition capable in principle of being 
shown to be demonstrably false in relation to a possible body of evidence.  Otherwise the argument 
would be judged unfalsifiable and accordingly unscientific, even without test.  So, a substantive 
theoretical argument had to be developed as a sufficiently complete logical structure to undergo the 
test; if it passed, the argument could be considered at best as ‘not yet falsified’; entitlement to the 
designation ‘true’ remained blocked by the Problem of Induction.  However, the truth of a singular 
observational statement implicitly depends on inductive generalisation, so ‘conclusively false’ is also 
beyond deductive proof. (Newton-Smith 1981).  The problem of induction cannot be circumvented.  
Adjusting the auxiliary hypotheses may achieve closer match between results and hypothesis, making 
the latter ‘more probable’.  However, the Duhem-Quine problem (that as the entity under test is a set 
of conjoint hypotheses, major and auxiliary, they stand or fall together, so the substantive element(s) 
responsible for the faulty prediction cannot be unambiguously identified and then changed) means 
that modification or addition of specific auxiliary hypotheses selected with no apparent material 
rationale may lay the procedure open to the charge of ad hoc manipulation to save the hypothesis.  
There is no logic of justification, so no privileged epistemology.  Nevertheless, the Popper-endorsed 
scientific method – to generate bold conjectures, deliberately risking falsification, with increasing 
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verisimilitude becoming a matter of the successive eliminations of conclusively false accounts – has a 
relevance to later argument.  
Empirical regularity and human action 
In the physical context, an empirical regularity may suggest that an experimental set-up could be 
envisaged to replicate the relationship, showing that the composition of natural capacities was 
appropriately conceived, with no necessary reference to a ‘law of nature’.  But the notion of 
‘empirical regularity’ translates uncomfortably into the context of human action.  It might imply 
actual repetition of individual action, despite a conscious temporal difference that should qualify the 
seeming resemblance between instances (that is, the change brought by the passage of time has been 
factored out in the selective view taken).  Or it might imply interchangeability of agents, which would 
discount intrinsic aspects of their existence (that is, individual identities are defined in terms of 
differences).  Nevertheless, some specific individual human actions might be expected to be 
performed repetitively, creating a regularity spanning a period (for example, a familiar routine 
production activity).  But such regularity in terms of executive human action would not typically be 
described as law-bound.  A related aspect is the fact that regularity in terms of individual actions may 
signify a collective commitment, pointing to an intrinsic social dimension that is arguably not so 
amenable to empirical enquiry. 
1.5 Stage Four: Responses 
Conventionalism and social constructivism  
The absence of a logic of justification to award or deny the cachet of ‘authoritative’ appears to 
reawaken Cartesian fears that knowledge may always be vulnerable to doubt, with its claims possibly 
driven by arbitrary ‘taste’.  If knowledge lacks an ‘internal’ warrant, then it might seek an exogenous 
justification in some convention – and be open to a similarly exogenous rebuttal.  The question is how 
far ‘outside’ is acceptable.  An unacceptable possibility is the use of individual opinion to undermine 
an argument by impugning the motives or ethical principles of its proponent rather than the 
argument’s content (‘… the metaphysicists [among historians] have their own extreme left-wing 
political agendas … [ while others] like to see themselves as having the same status as popular 
novelists, fancying themselves as media personalities …’ (Marwick 2001: 8, 15)).  But 
conventionalism implies some measure of consensus, expressed in an accepted explicit rule or 
criterion.  This might seem equally partisan (such as the proscription operated by leading American 
economics journals against submissions on economic methodology (Mirowski 2010)).  However, it 
can have an appearance of objectivity (such as academic peer review or ‘acceptable’ threshold 
measures of statistical significance in quantitative hypothesis-testing).  However, the fundamental 
issue is whether a conventional consensus necessarily underlies any explanation in every subject area. 
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In his discussion of historical judgement Gorman notes that 
‘Collingwood …called an “absolute presupposition” a belief or assumption 
underlying the beliefs and attitudes involved in our ordinary ways of life, an 
assumption that is a historical absolute for a time, in that it is contingently 
uncriticizable at that time … because it is not entertained at that time as a conscious 
thought …’ 
 (Gorman 2007: 94, citing Walsh 1963: 160) 
This bears some resemblance to the notion of ‘perspective’ which will be considered later in this 
study.  Conventionalism can play a part in specific epistemological positions: within the Methodology 
of Scientific Research Programmes developed by Imre Lakatos (Lakatos 1978) as a ‘sophisticated’ 
version of Popper’s falsificationism, the ‘hard core’ of a discipline’s theoretical corpus (its basic 
axioms) is to be regarded as irrefutable on conventional grounds.  This warrants its protection by the 
method’s ‘negative heuristic’, whereby auxiliary components of the theory are adjusted in response to 
anomalies rather than demanding its wholesale and instant falsification. (Newton-Smith 1981: 82, 83).  
However, the most controversial category of conventionalism comprises a range of postmodern 
arguments alleging the ‘social construction’ of the methods and results of science, denying the 
relevance to it of either the concept of objectivity or the standard of truth associated with its essential 
realism.  In its place relativism emerges as the key philosophical position, but undermining the notion 
of authoritative explanation: ‘… the relativist … insists that since truth is relative, what is taken as 
true may also be false.  Consequently, relativism itself may be true and false.’ (Bernstein 1983: 9).   
Incommensurability of alternative explanations  
The innovative aspects of Kuhn’s thesis (Kuhn 1962) were first, its historiographical approach to 
science, which drew attention to the fact that science involves a process, a temporal succession of 
actions (experiments) by scientists, typically disregarded in the eventual publication of ‘cleaned-up’ 
definitive results; second, its sociological perspective on science, which acknowledged that scientists 
engaged in a specialism were located within a defined social community.  Its hierarchical authoritative 
structure, grounded on proven experience and reputation, endorses and sustains a commitment to a 
general line of enquiry (the ‘paradigm’) emergent from an acknowledged past scientific breakthrough, 
until its incapacity to accommodate subsequent puzzling results undermines belief with significant 
doubt, at which point commitment switches to a competitor explanation.  Thus, the temporal 
succession exhibited by natural science involved periods of stable ‘normal science’ punctuated by 
‘scientific revolutions’, discontinuous changes in the mind-sets (‘conversion experiences’) of the 
scientists concerned.  However, the widespread interest in Kuhn’s publication was in large part due to 
its apparent endorsement of relativism, that scientific progress was a matter of social convention 
rather than the pursuit of objective truth.  Yet the characteristic under-determination of theory by 
available data, which allows the co-existence of rival explanations and yet precludes a decisive test of 
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any one (the Duhem-Quine problem again), presents the scientists with a choice that cannot be settled 
on rational grounds.  Kuhn made the ‘incommensurability’ of rival paradigms central to his 
interpretation of the ‘… multifarious shiftings of allegiance from theory to theory …’ (Newton-Smith 
1981: 3) that constitutes the history of science.  While incommensurability can be attributed to 
significant differences in the meaning of nominally shared key terms in the respective paradigms 
(‘radical meaning variance’ according to Newton-Smith (ibid.: Chap. VI)), it is ‘… best understood in 
terms of the incommensurability of standards, problems and data …’ consequent on normative 
disagreements as to ‘… how the subject matter as a whole ought to be defined.’ (Doppelt 1978: 45, 
51).  Arguably this is an issue that pertains not to the logic of justification, but to the logic of 
discovery, generally taken to lie beyond the reach of rationalism.  Nonetheless, Kuhn’s contribution 
provoked a range of responses of varying degrees of intensity, focusing on different assessments of 
the relativism detected in it.  The Sociology of Scientific Knowledge movement drew support from it 
for their view that ‘…reasoning itself must be seen as a profoundly conventional activity …’ and a 
feature of the contemporary culture (Barnes 1985: 99), a connection that also built on the relevance of 
the contemporary political context and Kuhn’s personal career trajectory within it (Fuller 2006), 
invoking a further sense of relativism, or more particularly constructivism.   
1.6 The Pursuit of Authoritative Explanation of Human Action  
‘How?’ and ‘why?’  
The questions ‘How?’ and ‘Why?’ both presuppose change as their subject-matter and so possess an 
element of historicity.  While sometimes regarded as synonyms, they can usefully be distinguished: 
‘How?’: What sequence of changes occurred whereby the present description of the world superseded 
one which previously existed?  ‘Why?’: What reasons are there for the transformation that occurred, 
however it happened?  The former question admits an endogenous process, with change as 
spontaneous or autonomous – indeed, it does not exclude the change in question being a continuous 
process, with its ‘start’ and ‘end’ being relative to the analytical needs of the moment.  The latter 
question, however, posits some dated intervention in a prior configuration by an exogenous factor that 
initiated change; by implication, without it things could have taken a different course.  In general, 
answers to both questions may deploy the distinction between cause and effect, so it can be claimed 
that all explanation is the unravelling of the relationships between causes and effects.  But the 
reference to ‘reasons’ in the case of ‘Why?’ invokes the involvement of purpose, and so the 
originative capacity of human action.  The explanation of human action involves endeavouring to 
answer ‘Why?’ questions.  Purpose in turn invokes teleology.  If human action is intrinsically 
purposeful then an explanation citing action will be teleological.  This need only be in a micro-
teleological sense – human actions may be deliberately originative without being themselves 
subordinate to some over-arching metaphysical purpose, which would imply that history is macro-
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teleological in nature.  However, given that human agency does regularly and unambiguously bring 
about change as a ‘necessary’ consequence of action, it is plausible for human imagination to attribute 
all change to some teleological cause, even in contexts where evidently no human agency was 
involved.  But this could eliminate the freedom of individual purpose, with every action necessitated 
by its antecedents.  So, although the course of events brought change, it could not otherwise have 
been different.  Once initiated the temporal process would proceed deterministically, with human 
freedom a self-deception.  However, theologically entangled, pre-Enlightenment, conceptions of 
causality were subsequently narrowed, discarding Aristotelian forms, including the teleological, 
leaving the mechanistic conception of efficient cause.  Nonetheless, it is important for the argument 
pursued here that one defining feature of human action is the capacity to be purposively originative: 
‘Why?’ remains a meaningful, purpose-revealing question, without implying that the action to be 
explained was necessitated.  Thus, the course of events could have been different; contingency 
prevails over necessity.  Hume concluded that given the inability of inductive inference to yield 
necessary truths, any necessity to be ascribed to causality (as distinct from repeatedly observed 
contiguity, succession and constant conjunction) must be a creation of the mind.  So there is no 
obligation to attribute necessity to purposive or causal action. 
Reliable Explanation of Human Action 
Human action may be purposive, but due to the limitations of induction it must confront the certainty 
of its incomplete knowledge of its context.  The human mind senses its own ignorance.  But it can be 
persuaded to believe what is not immediately apparent to its senses.  According to Adam Smith, an 
acknowledged ignorance generated a disconcerting emotion or sentiment of ‘wonder’ that prompted 
active inquiry in search of relief.  In that respect, he followed the Greek philosophers’ endorsement of 
wonder as ‘… the first principle which prompts mankind to the study of Philosophy’ (Smith 1982 
[1795]: 26).  Wonder can be assuaged by assenting to a belief in the authority of new knowledge 
encountered, in the manner of a jury being persuaded.  Persuasion may come from a convincing 
argument or a physical demonstration of the relevant relationships (assuming the former is not simply 
a verbal account of the latter).  In the former case the range of evidence addressed is liable to be a 
relevant consideration.  In the latter case the successful repetition of the demonstration is liable to be 
influential, but success may not be guaranteed on every occasion, enhancing the appeal of the 
ostensive rational argument.  Pragmatist John Dewey blamed this weakness for the ‘… exaltation of 
pure intellect and its activity over practical affairs’ (Dewey 1929: 6), a tension that has influenced the 
interests of philosophy since the time of Aristotle.  However, the jury’s responsiveness may also be 
influenced by seemingly immaterial matters: the persuasiveness of the language in which a 
knowledge-claim is expressed or the presentation of the physical demonstration; the perceived 
authority of the proponent(s) of the knowledge claim; the jury’s own prior disposition – a matter of 
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existing beliefs and ideological pre-commitments (arising from experience, training or personality, 
including a desire to adhere to received wisdom). 
The issue of ‘truth’  
A jury could be swayed by the assertion that the knowledge-claim is ‘true’.  But while ‘… there can 
be little prospect of understanding our most important faculties in the absence of a good theory of 
truth … [s]uch a thing, however, has been notoriously elusive’ (Horwich 1992: 510).  Campbell traces 
the changing philosophical conception of truth, in support of his claim that our intellectual problems 
stem from 
 ‘… our failure to make good a distinctive conception of truth … as timeless and 
unchanging, unaffected by the particularities of context which condition those who 
seek to know and articulate the truth. … The attainment of that ideal has been 
rendered impossible by the slowly dawning realization of the historicity of all human 
existence … [thus] so long as we hanker after timeless truth we are doomed to 
scepticism, because that sort of truth is not attainable by historically relative mortals’ 
  (Campbell, R. 1992: 5, 6; emphasis in original)   
Historical and archaeological explanation may therefore confront a problem: if the attainment of a 
definitive conception of truth is blocked by the intrinsic historicity of human experience then it would 
be inconsistent to expect to obtain true statements about that historicity.  That apart, truth is 
problematic of itself: ‘For most modern philosophers, truth is to be analysed in terms of the use of the 
predicate “true” as it is applied to judgements, propositions, or sentences.  That is in sharp contrast to 
the conception of truth in the Platonic tradition, in which truth is assigned primarily to reality, and 
only derivatively to a propositional item …’ (ibid.: 120).  But if humans can only perceive the 
appearances of things and not an underlying reality, once any theological basis of reality has been 
rejected, the usefulness of the Platonic conception is questionable.  The intuitive appeal of truth as 
‘correspondence’ of a proposition to ‘the facts’ is compromised by vagueness as to the nature of this 
attribute that apparently must supplement the facts themselves.  It is also undermined by its apparent 
limitation to observational statements.  The scope for classifying the same objects in different ways, 
associated with the vague boundaries distinguishing them (noted above), impinges on the truthfulness 
of statements about them.  More seriously, propositional truth seems inapplicable to the inferential 
statements employed in much explanation, discussed below.  The alternative notion that truth equates 
with verifiability suffers from the general problems associated with verification that prompted the 
unsuccessful search for a privileged epistemology.  The heart of the problem is that scepticism 
challenges both the Cartesian presumption that true knowledge of the actual world, free from doubt, is 
accessible by reasoning deductively from universal first principles known to be true a priori, and the 
empiricist presumption that the route to reliable knowledge is by true generalizations from experience 
of the world, a posteriori.  ‘[Hume’s] arguments are intended to show that pure reason cannot 
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demonstrably prove matters of fact and that induction cannot provide demonstrably certain 
knowledge’ (Beauchamp, Rosenberg 1981: 41, 42).  Moreover, given that for Descartes ‘… the 
proposition “I exist” … is [the only] one he cannot coherently deny [in his desire to eliminate all 
doubt, consequently his] thought is driven back from [a] kind of [medieval] theocentrism towards 
egocentricity … The origin of subjectivism is thus to be located here.’ (Campbell, R. 1992: 179).   
The reliable description of human action 
A convincing explanatory argument is expected to start from a reliable description of the relevant 
state of affairs.  Three factors make this problematic.  First, the basis of any description is not sensory 
stimulus alone but crucially (albeit arguably) what an individual’s consciousness makes of it – the 
basis is intrinsically phenomenological.  Moreover, it is necessarily recollected in the mind, as the 
lived experience is already in the past.  Second, description is an expression of an individual’s 
acquired knowledge, of which only an undefinable part of it has been deliberately acquired (unlike the 
completeness of an experimental observation), the rest absorbed incidentally from a broader 
experience.  Third, to provide an explanandum this phenomenological entity must be made manifest, 
as a verbal account: an acquired natural language system must be harnessed to generate and 
communicate an external public representation of the private mental constructs.  But variation in 
linguistic skills and ambiguity of meaning of the words used will influence the impact of the 
description made upon a jury.  Nonetheless, specific documentary accounts of human experience 
constitute the basic resource for the historian, who as observer is describing the recorded observations 
of another individual – testimony, in one sense or another.  The historian is not directly observing the 
individual’s actions or their context, even although these arguably constitute the historical event to be 
explained.  These issues are discussed briefly below and further in Chapter 3.  
1.7 Inference from Evidence and the Criterion of Plausibility 
The progression from the explanandum, the body of descriptive material, to an explanans or 
explanation, involves inferential reasoning.  In other words, a process of thought effects a transition 
from the statements and propositions of the explanandum to an additional novel statement or 
proposition, attributing to it the same truth value as that possessed by the originals.  This 
psychologically founded and philosophically troublesome procedure (trying to characterize it ‘…is a 
hard and by no means nearly solved philosophical problem’ (Tragesser 1992:206)) can admit 
metaphysical elements into explanation.  There are various types of inductive inference, some of 
which are ampliative, taking the argument beyond the scope of the evidence, virtually a requirement 
in history and archaeology where the evidence is frequently sparse and fragmentary.  An abductive 
inference may offer the hypothesised ‘best explanation’, but it is not one logically warranted by the 
explanandum; it is ‘… an intelligent guess … a plausible hypothesis …’ (Walton 2001: 143; 
Fumerton 1992:207-209).  An analogical inference sees the particulars of one description to be 
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relevant to the explanation of another, descriptively quite different, as the source of a hypothesised 
explanation of the latter; but it is entirely exogenous to the explanandum.  An enumerative inductive 
inference perceives an implication in the conjunction of the meanings of two or more observational 
statements that their subjects share a resemblance, taken to define a class or type.  Their subjects are 
thus made to form a notionally homogeneous category and their predicate a well-defined common 
quality.  But the observations considered severally do not logically imply the inference: the 
resemblance or shared relation exists in the mind’s eye, so the inferences do not correspond to a 
reality that exists independent of the observer; both category and predicate are hypothetical concepts. 
By analogical inference they could be regarded as repeated observations from a notional experiment.  
With the arbitrary adoption of the a priori Principle of Uniformity, an enumerative inference can be 
given universal extension to cover as-yet-unobserved instances of the putative class, a step that 
permits the deployment of deductive inference to create an explanation such that the world 
represented could not conceivably be otherwise – fully determinate, rather than merely contingent.  
However, given the initial claim that any explanation of human action is intrinsically historical, it will 
share the same deficiency that concerns the specialist historian or archaeologist, arising from the 
defining relevance of time.  Analogical, enumerative and deductive inference are essentially 
atemporal, discarding as irrelevant not only the different timings of the occurrence of the subjects 
otherwise perceived as ‘the same’, but also the differing wider contemporary contexts of their 
occurrence which distinguish the dates.  The question is how presumed synchronous relations could 
contribute significantly to the explanation of temporal succession; this challenges the presumption 
that history and archaeology are searching for underlying ‘laws’ governing it.  However, abductive 
inference to ‘common-sense’ explanations, with their pragmatist endorsement, can accommodate the 
passage of time.  Accordingly, explanations of human action will employ that method. 
Plausibility and Pragmatism 
The irrelevance of certainty as an attribute of an explanation of the experiential world reinforces the 
relevance of belief in the judgement of an explanation’s authority.  An appropriate pragmatic criterion 
of a novel knowledge claim is its apparent plausibility.  This implies a provisional positive judgement 
of it as worthy of further active consideration while it is subjected to the test of further experience.  
Believing is no less a human time-bound action affected by change.  Evidence for a knowledge-claim 
about human action ‘… need not and often will not be decisive … [so] plausibility … prevents the 
matter from [descending into] cognitive emptiness.’ (Rescher 2005: 417).  The absence of certainty 
does not imply the total absence of knowledge.  Walton considers that plausibility ‘… is a guide to 
rational acceptance or commitment, a guide to action.’ (Walton 2001: 153; emphasis added): a gap in 
knowledge having been potentially filled, wonder having been temporarily assuaged, a specific course 
of action is seen to make – or to have made –  sense.  This connection between belief and human will 
appealed to the American Pragmatists, with their distinctive emphasis on human action as the route to 
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knowledge (Engel 2004; Fisch 1954).  The authority of knowledge becomes based on belief in its 
prospective reliability as a guide to action, whether to attempt to confirm the knowledge-claim by its 
independent replication or to employ it for some further purpose.  However, the judgement of the 
plausibility of the explanation and the belief accorded to it are mediated through the interpretation of 
the argument by a jury.  There is no guarantee that the jury’s interpretation of the language in which 
the argument is couched will coincide with the proponent’s intentions: ‘… there will always be a 
plurality of interpretations with respect to the understanding of anything.  Intelligibility is always 
plural rather than singular.’ (Bruns 1987: 245).  This aspect of understanding will acquire 
considerable significance later. 
1.8 The Bases for Historical and Archaeological Explanation 
Time and Human Action 
If all human action is time-bound, in that every action is timely, then any explanation of action is 
necessarily historical in nature.  Every living individual could provide a personal history, an 
explanation of their own actions and their own experience, combining oral and written testimony and 
physical evidence.  But history and archaeology specialise in constructing explanations without the 
element of living testimony.  Their necessary reliance on the residual physical evidence of past human 
action, including documentary evidence, obligates the historian or archaeologist to fill the gaps.  The 
intention is not simply to create individual biographies, but to incorporate the interaction among 
individuals in a collective history, which has involved both co-operation and conflict.  Accordingly, 
the explanation is expected to acknowledge disorder and lack of harmony.  The provision of 
understanding is inevitably an imposition of order in some respects, but to use explanatory forms that 
are either implicitly deductive or parallel physical experimentation seems misleading.  The nature of 
collective human action precludes the certainty implied by one and the successful replicability central 
to the other.  Accordingly, abductive inference to a plausible explanation is expected to be the most 
compatible method.  However, significant contrasts exist in that regard between history and 
archaeology. 
Historical sources and approach 
The defining evidential base of history, recovered contemporary documents, is undeniably 
fragmentary in form and substance.  Documentary survival is partly a stochastic outcome, partly a 
consequence of human action.  All (even statistical records) constitute testimonies of various kinds, 
emerging from individual comprehensions and evaluations of the relevant context, imbued with latent 
intentions and responsibilities.  Their differing scope, degree of detail and accuracy in respect of their 
subject matter reflects not only the knowledge but also the inclination and choice of the writer, as well 
as the writer’s anticipations of the knowledge and possible reactions of the recipient or audience.  
They report on action, but their creation is itself action, with its substantive purposes.  But their social 
  Epistemology and Images of Explanation 
21 
 
coverage is uneven, necessarily presenting the perspective of literate individuals and thus generally of 
those in positions of authority and influence, conditioning the range of issues covered, at the expense 
of ‘subaltern’ groups.  Their meaning may be contestable, as writers’ command of language – its 
syntactical correctness, use of contemporary vocabulary and idiom – varies with level of education.  
Their origin and authenticity need to be confirmed, using the insights of philology, palaeography and 
diplomatics (Marwick 2001: 55).  The most significant implications of the nature of historical 
evidence are first, both the content and the scope of the documentary source possess an irreducibly 
subjective aspect, grounded in individuals’ beliefs (as befits testimony); second, its meaning and 
significance as evidence are the product of the historian’s interpretative capacities, introducing a 
substantive subjective element; third, while some testimony will report actions taken or observed, 
relationships with other relevant actions recorded independently elsewhere will also have to be 
inferred by the historian.  An isolated source, even if reputable, is of limited value, so meaningful 
interpretation entails the integration of material from available contemporary sources, to show 
individuals’ actions ‘composing’ into more complex relationships which the historian designates as 
‘events’, which in turn can be meaningfully categorised into epochs or periods.  Relative to the 
process of assembling narrative accounts from the collated evidence an isolated physical act becomes 
an abstraction.  So, there is some truth in Ankersmit’s assertion that ‘… in historical inquiry it is 
impossible to clearly demarcate the subject … from the object …’, the usual prerequisite for the 
attainment of objectivity (Ankersmit 2012: 16).  This accords with the doctrine advanced by 
Collingwood ‘… that historical understanding is a matter of re-thinking the thoughts or re-enacting 
the experience of those whose actions constituted the historical past’ (as reported in Dray 1989: 8).  
This process and its limitations are considered in more detail in the following chapter.  For the 
moment, it is simply asserted that narrative is fundamentally description, not explanation.  However 
comprehensive and structured it might be, it is not directed to answering the question ‘Why?’  
Archaeological sources and approaches  
The defining evidential base of archaeology comprises the detected and (where appropriate) recovered 
material remains of past human activity – built structures, skeletal remains, artefacts, substances and 
traces of extinct lifeways. Over time, increasingly refined physical-science-based analytical 
techniques have given evidence greater specificity and detail.  Its domain ranges from the specific 
context of discovery (its site of deposition) to the topography, geomorphology and biogeography of 
the supporting ancient landscape.  The development of the discipline from its antiquarian beginnings 
to its current state has been marked in evidential terms by a transition from the collection of isolated 
‘curiosities’, through path-breaking excavations of prominent structures, to meticulous recording of 
the in situ associations among artefacts (as assemblages and patterns of use) and structures, 
particularly settlements, and modes of integration with their narrower and wider contexts. 
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Nonetheless, physical archaeological evidence remains fragmentary, constraining the subsequent 
interpretation and inference on which explanation rests.  Its incompleteness is a product of the means 
of discovery (which can be accidental or unsystematic to varying degrees); by its limited and 
fragmented form; by the limited resolution of dating techniques; by the inevitable absence of any 
complementary documentary evidence (outside of the historical period); and, crucially, by the 
inability either to witness the physical evidence in use in its original context or interrogate its users.  
The accretion of evidence has from the outset of serious study supported the formation of summary 
categories and typologies based on physical resemblance and attributed functions.  This has yielded 
patterns of artefact deposition and settlement morphology, which in turn revealed differences in 
lifeways across space, with stratigraphical succession implying further differences through time.  An 
important distinction can be drawn between evidence of the operation of physical processes by which 
specific components of the evidence were used and formed (e.g. site-specific patterns of waste 
deposition from concurrent human activities – flint knapping, meat butchering – or the taphonomy of 
human remains) and evidence which points to qualitative change in the lifeway of a population.  
Enumerative inference from the former evidence potentially supports generalised explanations 
categorised as Middle Range theory (e.g. Schiffer 1988: 462): covariance detected in the data is 
interpreted as actual empirical regularities.  Present-day reconstruction and re-enactment can provide 
some support.  From this perspective, human action is largely regarded as synonymous with ‘using 
equipment’, of which only the artefacts now remain as evidence.  This use corresponds to the category 
of familiar repetitive action or replication of a successful experiment to be given significance below.  
The latter evidence, however, implying change, presents the most contested issue within archaeology, 
the target of competing explanations that potentially question its autonomy.  Change invokes the 
human capacity to imagine novel futures and to pursue them purposively, a category of action quite 
distinct from repetitive use of equipment.  But this category of action has no evident identifying 
material signature.  The problem of change bears a relation to the term ‘material culture’.  This 
synthetic concept, wherein difference inheres, appears as a key component of virtually any 
archaeological explanandum.  Yet it is considered that ‘… “culture” is one of the two or three most 
complicated words in the English language, partly because of its intricate historical development, but 
mainly because it is an important concept in several distinct intellectual disciplines and incompatible 
systems of thought’ (Oestigaard 2001: 31, citing Williams 1980: 76, 77; emphasis added).  The 
materiality of archaeological evidence contributes objectivity.  However, critical problems are posed 
by ‘culture’ also being presumed to embrace important and arguably even definitive subjective 
elements, apart from the necessity to avoid ‘material culture’ being tautologous:  
‘[If, according to Hawkes, the] most tenuous forms of inference … concern the 
“ideational”, symbolic dimensions of cultural life … [which are] constraining of but 
unencumbered by the material conditions of life … most directly accessible to 
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archaeologists … [then paradoxically] the ground is cut from under the enterprise of 
traditional archaeology … [as] the cultural subject is conceived in precisely the terms 
that render it most inaccessible to archaeological inference.’  
 (Wylie 2002: 70)   
Diaz-Andreu notes ‘culture’s’ fifteenth-century origin and traces its metamorphosis in meaning from 
cultivation of the soil, through its acquisition of a moral and spiritual value and, by the seventeenth 
century, political qualities ‘… which made each people different from the rest’; subsequently it 
became ‘… an abstract noun referring to particular social groups’, eventually acquiring overlays of 
ethnicity and nationalism by the nineteenth century (Diaz-Andreu 1996: 51, 52).  Childe’s seminal 
contribution to what became the culture-historical approach employed a ‘… concept of archaeological 
culture [which was] an abstraction … based on the concept of Kultur-Gruppe, a coextensive 
artefactual distribution and ethnic unit, devised by Gustav Kossinna’, shorn of its Germanic 
nationalist and racial associations but without a ‘sustainable theoretical linkage of [Childe’s] own’ 
(Hides 1996: 26).  However, it is not observation but abductive inference from the material evidence 
that generates the ‘non-material’ elements attributed to a specific ‘culture’ – necessarily congruent 
with the material evidence but sufficient to demarcate the difference.  From the different perspective 
of viewing ‘culture’ as synonymous with ‘the archaeological record’, Patrik argues that there are two 
different models: one analogous to the palaeontologist’s fossil record, the other analogous to a literary 
text composed of symbols (Patrik 1985: 28).  Each model is consonant with a different explanatory 
scheme – one deployed by the New Archaeologists (or Processualists) and the other by the 
Structuralists.  That is, different uses of the term are incommensurable with each other.  Diversity of 
approach has flourished.  Talking particularly of the early advocates of the New Archaeology, Wylie 
notes that they repudiated ‘… any lingering faith that the facts of the [archaeological] record can be 
treated as empirical givens, invoking Kuhn’s contextualist arguments for theory-ladenness …’ (Wylie 
2002: 57).  More generally, archaeology ‘… has been shaped [recently] by a succession of 
[conceptual] experiments with different metaphoric and theoretical constructions of its cultural-
material domain …’ (Wylie 1999: 303).  Each has its distinctive conception of material culture – just 
as did the predecessors to the New Archaeologists, whose ‘newness’ was more perceived than real: 
‘Binford engaged in a series of vigorous polemics [which] made the New Archaeology appear to be a 
dramatic break with the past rather than a continuation and intensification of the functionalist and 
processual trends that had been developing in American and Western European archaeology since the 
1930s’ (Trigger 1989: 295).  The New Archaeology can be regarded as a belated endeavour to support 
Hempel’s claims that all scientific explanation is nomothetic, some twenty years after history had 
been obliged to address the same challenge (Hempel 1942) – claims overtaken by the practice turn in 
epistemology.  But the earlier history of archaeological theory spans not just precursors of 
Processualism, but a considerable range of substantive approaches to explanation: from unilinear (pre-
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Darwinian) evolutionism, through culture-historicism and diffusionism to functionalism, cultural 
materialism and the highly influential development of (neo-) evolutionary anthropology with which 
Processualism identified (Trigger 1989: 292-294).  The later history has involved a proliferation of 
variants under the general umbrella of Post-processualism – where it seems, according to Schiffer, 
‘there is room for a thousand archaeologies’ (Schiffer 1988: 479).  Thus, positions can reverse.  
Processualists ‘… endorse[d] an explicitly reductive materialism and functionalism according to 
which the intentional aspects of cultural systems … are ruled out of consideration … as … 
inaccessible … and …explanatorily irrelevant’ (Wylie 2002: 4), and they dismissed ‘… historical 
studies which they equated with chronology, description and a preoccupation with accidental 
occurrences’ (Trigger 1989: 301, 302).  Yet Arkush notes that by 2011 in North American 
archaeology the historical approach was ‘… the particular flavour of the time, defined especially by a 
preoccupation with agency and by the recent tendency … to view the past as historical … [and] 
shaped by the accumulated legacy of previous human action’, and cites research debates ‘… in which 
the roles played by agency and intentionality are a particular sticking point’ (Arkush 2011: 200, 203). 
This parade of conceptual schemes in archaeology, with their respective meanings of ‘material 
culture’, displays the influence of the unresolved (and conceivably un-resolvable) tension between 
two perennially conflicted schemes of abductive inference concerning human action.  One conjectures 
that the originative capabilities of interdependent agents compose into collective outcomes that were 
unknowable in advance, even if retrospectively they have apparently led in a discernible direction – in 
short, change over time is non-nomothetic, characterised by discontinuity, contingency and 
perennially driven by human conflict.  The other finds in the assumed rationality of the reactive 
individual a sufficient ground to conclude that, while individuals’ actions exhibit an intrinsic but 
inconsequential variance, they compose eventually in a continuous and connected orderly fashion in 
accordance with underlying laws of human development in its engagement with the physical 
environment, mechanistic laws of universal scope which diligent searching will yet reveal: ‘Watson, 
LeBlanc and Redman … are confident that there are determinant laws of cultural process to be 
discovered …[but] seem to acknowledge that their ideal of deductive certainty remains elusive …’ 
(Wylie 2002: 84, 85, citing Watson, LeBlanc, Redman 1984).   
The inter-animation of history and archaeology  
It might be expected that the interest in the past that history and archaeology share would guarantee 
the complementarity of their respective insights, even although they address different categories of 
evidence.  However, this expectation can be frustrated by their respective choices of approach, which 
may admit conflicting perspectives on the nature of time.  The nomothetic approach, with its reliance 
on deductive inference to pursue generalised relationships among the outcomes of actions, adopts one 
perspective on time.  A fundamentally different perspective underlies the non-nomothetic approach, 
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with its use of abductive inference to explain change-bringing events.  The crux of the matter is that 
individual social sciences – including anthropology and sociology – have arguably embraced a 
physicalist and thus a nomothetic approach, even although they are not evidently experimental in the 
usual physicalist sense.  They consequently view the archaeological record as merely a useful source 
of evidence to ‘test’ their specific hypotheses, and not as the evidential corpus of an autonomous 
discipline.  This raises the issue of disciplinary boundaries and corresponding ‘proprietorial rights’ 
over bodies of evidence, and engages the disciplines’ defining epistemological commitments.  The 
main obstacle to complementarity of insights seems to be the intersection – indeed, according to some 
(e.g. Binford 1962), the identity – of archaeology and anthropology.  This relationship has intellectual 
objectives that lead it to regard even the documentary evidence of history as coming within its 
purview, defining the sub-discipline of ‘documentary archaeology’, an ‘… approach to history’ that 
involves ‘… documentary analysis that is uniquely [its] own … [so that] documentary records and 
archaeological findings can be quilted together to understand past lives as they connect to issues of 
race, class and gender’ (Wilkie 2006; 13, citing Beaudry 1988).  But the analytical purposes of 
anthropology are not the purposes of history; the former is committed to the explanation of human 
action in terms of universally applicable and timeless concepts of power and domination within social 
structures.  In anthropology, the distinction between text and artefact is blurred, with poststructural 
and postmodern perspectives denying the possibility of gaining access to the intentions of the author 
of a text, while claiming that the meaning of objects can be read from them by the observer as if they 
were text, given this ‘…disjunction between textual meaning and authorial intention’ (Olsen 2010: 
47).  The anthropologist then derives meanings from both text and object to illuminate the relations 
within and between social groups.  The explanation of the temporal succession of human actions 
would then be at best only an incidental outcome of this approach.  However, that specific matter was 
the business of the traditional archaeological approach, where ‘… material culture [was] approached 
as carrying a final signified, to be disclosed through the act of interpretation … Central among [the 
proper methods of interpretation] was … origin-centered contextualism’ (ibid.: 47).  It is plausible to 
conclude from that traditional approach that it is discontinuities uncovered in the archaeological 
stratigraphy that could reasonably signify the kind of change that denotes temporal succession in the 
mode of human action.  An archaeology focused on these discontinuities offers a significant prospect 
of complementarity with history. 
  
26 
 
Chapter 2 Explaining the Singular: Explanation without Experimentation 
 
2.1 Setting the Agenda 
Two claims were made in the preceding chapter.  The first is that it is physical demonstration that 
justifies scientific knowledge, rather than logic.  The pragmatic ‘practice turn’ of recent philosophy of 
science concludes that physical relationships that can be reproduced at will through routine repetition 
of specific physical procedures (experiments) constitute knowledge warranted authoritative as 
‘scientific’.  These relationships may also be represented in generalised abstract summary forms as 
theoretical models, where the test of logical consistency and coherence applies.  The second claim is 
that it is the creative manipulation of the as-yet-imperfectly-known capacities of physical relationships 
that promotes the discovery of new scientific knowledge, rather than logic.  Trial-and-error 
modification and innovation of physical experimental specifications leads to the capture of novel 
consequences, although the direction of the investigative path may be influenced by the logical 
implications of existing theoretical models of received wisdom. 
Two analogies follow.  The first is between routine repetition of scientific experiment (which justifies 
knowledge) and the routine repetition of tool-aided processes in the everyday human activities of 
production – not just those explicitly scaled-up from scientific experiment but also those grounded in 
‘folk knowledge’, with comparable but informal and undocumented trial-and-error antecedents, 
demonstrably no less reliable.  This analogy supports the abductive inference that the scientist and the 
producer share a common cognitive status, in terms of their control over physical operations in defined 
contexts that achieve desired outcomes – albeit of contrasting specific natures.  But significantly 
neither the repeated experiment nor the repeated productive activity has any unique attachment to a 
specific time, place or personality. 
The second analogy is between the investigative activity of the individual scientist seeking to discover 
new knowledge within a specific physical context, applying personalised skills and creativity, and the 
general human propensity to explore their ordinary personal contexts and to express their identity in 
the discovery of new daily life.  The prosecution of scientific discovery arguably resembles a wide 
class of human actions – everything except participation in routine productive activities (where 
novelty is deliberately not the main objective).  The corresponding abductive inference is that the 
exploratory and originative nature of investigative science and much of ordinary life give them an 
attachment to time, place and personality, so that any instance is singular in character.  Accordingly, 
all possess historicity and are describable within an historiography.  In so far as their singularity 
precludes their repetition in any essential or fundamental sense, there cannot exist relevant 
experimentally acquired knowledge of them (i.e. ‘scientific’ knowledge in the above sense), or any 
theoretical model of discovery.  Just as there is no general logic of scientific discovery, there is no 
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general logic of human action.  Accordingly, there is no general logic of history or archaeology.  
Whether there can be reliable historical or archaeological explanation then turns on the possibility of 
securing reliable explanation of singular occurrences.  This requires a different approach, divorced 
from the concept of regularity and the traditional view of causality influenced by Hume’s notion of 
‘constant conjunction’.   
The significant epistemological claim made in this chapter is that the paradigm explanation of a 
singular event is to be found in the modern judicial proceedings to establish culpability for a crime, in 
that the explanation of the singular and contingent archaeological or historical event that drives social 
change resembles the legal argument delivered during a trial, sharing both its strengths and limitations. 
2.2 Three Facets of Singularity: 1.  The Temporality of Self 
Identity and the Timeliness of Action 
Historians and archaeologists regard the dating of existing evidence (textual or artefactual) as a crucial 
step in imbuing it with meaning and significance, its precision admittedly limited by technology.  
Once ‘fixed’ in time, the evidence can then be placed within a chronology, relative to other specific 
instances of material evidence or to a universal calendar.  However, the notion that a single date, albeit 
imprecisely known, can be simply ‘attached’ in a quasi-physical manner to evidence can marginalise 
the substantive timeliness of the specific human action that generated the evidence.  Moreover, 
timeliness is only one facet of a wider relationship between time and human action that is integral both 
to the identity of the individual(s) concerned and to the constitution of social groups of which the 
individual is a member.  Each specific individual can claim in some sense to remain ‘the same’ 
throughout the irregular temporal trajectory of their personal experience (the ‘re-identification 
problem’ (Davis 2003: 12)) and to retain some autonomy despite social engagement (the 
‘individuation problem’ (ibid.: 13)).  These claims direct attention to the nature of consciousness, the 
subjectivity of which presents a challenge for scientific explanation.  A plurality of views exists on the 
nature of the enduring self, extending from the intensely private, detached self-sufficiency of the 
Cartesian/Lockean conception, through the social construction of the individual initiated by Durkheim 
and Marx (Campbell, T. 1981: Chs 6, 7) to its postmodern dissolution as a protective fiction ‘… to veil 
the world’s terrifying nature as ceaseless change and endless becoming’ (Davis 2003: 8, citing 
Nietzsche).  Personal identity is frequently though controversially grounded in individual memory, 
invoking the inseparability of time and self.  Husserl’s analysis of the human consciousness of time 
involves: ‘… the sharp distinction … between [primary memory or retention] and memory in the usual 
sense, secondary memory or recollection … [whose] functions in the life of consciousness are entirely 
different’ (Carr 1991: 21).  ‘Present and past function together in the perception of time somewhat as 
do foreground and background or focus and horizon in spatial perception … [thus] the temporal is 
experienced by us as a kind of “field” like the visual field: the present is its focus and the just-past 
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forms the background against which it stands out.  Consciousness of the present always involves 
retention as the horizon-consciousness of the background.’ (ibid.: 21, 22, citing Husserl 1964).  
Because retention thus relates to the specific historical trajectory of individual perception and action, it 
constitutes a personal time-bound identity.  As Campbell puts it ‘That thought – that through our 
actions we constitute who we are – is summarized by the word “historicity”’. (Campbell, R. 1992: 1).  
The action in the present, which yields the evidence interpreted by the historian or archaeologist, has 
timeliness through it being embedded in the historicity of the singular individual. 
Time boundedness 
Husserl also posited the forward-looking horizon of protention: according to Carr, ‘As [retention and 
protention] are understood by Husserl, without past and future there can be no present and no 
experience at all’ (Carr 1991: 29).  This subjective construct of time contrasts with the abstraction of 
metric time (‘… a sequence of disjunct Nows …’ (Barrett 1968: 356)) customarily confronted in the 
dating of evidence.  It also arguably invokes the individual’s conception of an origin and a termination 
of time, linked to the recognition of the intrinsic mortality of individual existence, so that timeliness 
engages with the boundedness of time.  The contemplation of birth necessarily connects the individual 
to parents and so to more distant ancestors and invites consideration of the personal meaning and 
significance (i.e. moral value) of the individual’s engagement in the continuity of life.  The prospect of 
death raises questions about both the possibility and nature of an existence beyond death and of the 
self-evaluation of the personal life lived.  ‘As … suggested by Dilthey, it is in the face of death that the 
question of wholeness arises for the individual [according to Heidegger], not as an interesting 
intellectual problem but as an existential issue’ (Carr 1991: 81).  A self-reflective perspective on these 
issues may support the perception of a non-material or spiritual dimension to human life, to constitute 
the basis for a religiosity that can pervade actions to differing degrees.  Thus, it can be claimed, with 
Carr, that the individual ‘… faces a larger future [that] may involve both the individual’s destiny and 
that of his people and of the human race as a whole …’ (Carr 2001: 159).  It will be argued in a 
subsequent chapter that these issues can attain a special prominence and significance when the actions 
contemplated involve deliberately causing or experiencing death – a matter that occupies a focal place 
in the explanation of human conflict.   
2.3 Three Facets of Singularity: 2.  The Situatedness of Action 
Historical situatedness 
The historicity of the individual is generally not solipsistic but entangled contemporaneously with that 
of others.  Some individual actions are collaboratively or collectively pursued and, while others may 
be conceived deliberately to frustrate those of other individuals (and thus may contribute to conflict), 
others are pursued in response to opportunities generated by others’ decisions or indeed to emulate 
them.  The nexus of inter-acting, contemporaneous actions involves each being embedded in and 
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contributing to a historically situated and singular social context, defined in terms of a specific 
constellation of interconnected and timely actions.  Actions taken are likely to yield unintended 
consequences.  Any mutual inconsistency of interdependent actions is likely to frustrate the intentions 
underlying them, particularly actions undertaken in partial ignorance.  In the limit the actions of others 
may completely foreclose the opportunity for the individual to act as intended.  This has potentially 
significant implications for the interpretation of material evidence: ‘[If o]nly what is happening or has 
happened can be real … [then] the intended but unrealized consequences of action seem to have no 
claim on reality at all … [and we have] no way of distinguishing, among all the things that didn’t 
happen, those that played a role in the agent’s framing and execution of the action.  It is the agent’s 
point of view … which this … ignores. … [A]ttention to what “might be” is the essence of the agent’s 
point of view in history.’ (Carr 2001: 159, 161; emphasis in original).  Limited material evidence may 
be all that exists in the present, but it does not follow that an explanation based exclusively on the 
actions that created it will be adequate; arguably the adage that ‘the absence of evidence is not 
evidence of absence’ has a wider applicability than is generally reckoned.  As Carr observes, ‘When 
something happens, it joins a very prestigious and utterly exclusive club, one from which all might 
have beens have been rigorously banished’ (ibid.: 162; emphasis in original).  A later chapter will 
consider how ‘might-have-beens’ can be given a prominent role in the explanation of the singular 
event. 
Spatial Situatedness 
The physicality of the individual also ensures a locational anchor for existence, situating and 
contextualizing it within both a physical and a social landscape – the latter necessarily so, given that 
physicality is a shared human characteristic.  The physical landscape supports sustainable human 
activities, bounded in a variety of respects by climate, topography, soils and ultimately in terms of 
potential biomass productivity and thus human carrying-capacity.  It also influences human 
psychology, affecting the development of differing perspectives of identity in terms of ‘homeland’ and 
differing degrees of individual autonomy and social relatedness (Tilley 1994).  General concepts of 
distance and proximity possess social relevance, particularly given their intersection with 
environmental diversity, influencing individual and social actions that fix at least for a time the 
locational distribution of human activities.  The social landscape similarly provides bounded scope for 
human action.  The bounds, however, are not physical but normative, although from the perspective of 
securing the long-term continuity and identity of the community they are not repressive.  This value-
based core of the concept of culture (in the widest sense) may be expressed in tradition, custom, 
authoritative determinations, rituals and other social dimensions of lifeways.  These particularly 
concern marriage, birth and death, aesthetic aspects of life, but also have to do with conflict-resolution 
and the waging of war. 
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However, the key question is whether the physical and social embeddedness of the individual contests 
the claimed singular identity of the individual.  The biological necessity of a relationship between the 
individual’s actions and their physical context sufficient for survival has encouraged the emergence of 
the explanatory framework of ecological adaptationism within anthropological (and so archaeological) 
thought, within which to locate social change (cf. Binford’s ecosystemic model of culture (Wylie 
2002: 67-70)).  Yet physical constraints are relative to a given technology and any choice of 
technology has necessary social dimensions, a further facet of the intersection between the physical 
and the social.  Whether individuals’ actions are effectively socially generated, or whether some 
individuals act to some degree independently of the society to which they belong, is a question that 
belongs in the territory claimed by sociology and anthropology.  Durkheim conceived the ‘individual’ 
as ‘… an undifferentiated malleable indeterminate substance which social forces determine and 
transform … [this forming] a residual category in which [Durkheim] places only what is left after he 
has taken away all that is contributed to human life by society’ (Campbell, T. 1981: 147).  Marx’s 
earlier argument that the individual was a product of a capital-using mode of production gave an 
impetus to a range of approaches (including in history and archaeology) based on the centrality of 
economic relationships surrounding work and the social conflicts generated by patterns of access to 
and control over resources.  A complex plurality of accounts of the relationship between society and 
the individual has emerged during the twentieth century, united loosely in terms of a commitment to 
the social determination of human consciousness: structural-functionalist anthropology, structuralism, 
symbolic anthropology, structuration theory, post-structuralism, agency theory, and actor-network 
theory.  However, the earlier empirical claim that the social and physical embeddedness of a specific 
action contribute to its timeliness is of a different order to the claim that every action is an instance of 
a timeless general relationship, whether nomothetic or based on a Hegelian dialectical argument, 
concerning the determining power of the physical or social environment.  A more serious problem of a 
reflexive nature concerning the nature of explanation infects the principle underlying the latter claim: 
if human consciousness is socially constructed then so too is the consciousness instrumental in 
forming the explanation of that social construction, introducing a fundamental relativism that 
precludes the justification of any specific approach. 
2.4 Three Facets of Singularity: 3. The Origination of Change  
From Fictional ‘Act’ to Experiential ‘Event’ 
The notion of the ‘experiential event’ endeavours to accommodate the conscious temporality of each 
individual and the situatedness of their actions.  It seeks to replace the typical analytical model of 
human action, with its abstract concept of the isolated ‘act’, that defies temporal and spatial reality. 
The replacement is necessary to aid understanding of the action-driven temporal change that forms the 
explanandum of historical explanation.  The analytical model typically comprises a representative 
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isolated ‘act’ to be explained; a representative actor, defined as exercising a universal pre-commitment 
to respond in a specific way when presented with an appropriate incentive to act (thus ‘rational’); the 
hypothetical presentation of such an incentive, which, in combination with the preceding element, 
completes the explanans.  The contextual elements from which its representative elements are isolated 
are consigned, unspecified, to an open ceteris paribus condition.  In contrast, the experiential event is 
an intersection of the singular timely actions of specific individuals, with a temporal duration related 
to the continuation of their active engagement with one another and a spatial locus defined by the 
physical ‘reach’ of the individuals concerned; neither is capable of precise delimitation.  It explicitly 
addresses the critical fact that the actions of each individual impinge experientially on those of others, 
sometimes through acknowledged interdependence, frequently in unanticipated ways that foreclose or 
create opportunities for other individuals, inviting subsequent responses and counter-responses.  The 
prospect of unintended consequences of actions due to their mutual engagement make it implausible to 
assume that the intersection could involve an actual general realisation of the (shifting) intentions of 
the individuals concerned.  Accordingly, this intersection is not a ‘natural’ entity.  It is primarily a 
singular construct formed in the minds of observers (not necessarily participants) and is thereby a 
subjective entity, but substantive in so far as its temporal and spatial boundaries and distinguishing 
features are specifiable by the observer(s).  Different observers may conceive the boundaries and 
features of the event in significantly different ways.  Thus, the assemblage of documentary or other 
material evidence available to history or archaeology necessarily presents a specific challenge in terms 
of interpretation – not just in respect of how, when and where the evidence was physically produced, 
but of what plausible event(s) it constitutes evidence and in respect of which it offers some potential of 
contributing to an explanation.  An additional layer of complexity arises from endeavouring to 
delineate a ‘historical whole’ created in turn by the composition of events, to be discussed in more 
detail in Section 2.7 below. 
Change: creation and destruction  
The experiential event can be considered the embodiment of change, disturbing the relationships 
among participants and occasioning revisions of purposes and intentions.  From that perspective 
change is a process of ‘morphogenesis’ to borrow Archer’s term (to be considered at length in Chapter 
3 (Archer 1995)), which conveys the element of creativity that can be involved.  But it is evident, 
however, that an event can also bring destruction, when conflict becomes the driving force.  Indeed, 
events generally involve ambiguous outcomes, a process categorised by Schumpeter (in an economic 
context) as ‘creative destruction’ (Schumpeter 1943: 83).  However, it is significant that the change 
embodied in events is of endogenous origin, driven by human propensities to wonder and to create, 
analogous to the scientist’s experimental investigation. 
In contrast, analytical models typically represent change as an exogenous shock to a system in a state 
of stasis, due to their deployment of deductive explanatory schemes.  For example, the elaborate 
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structure of neoclassical economic thought, influential also within political and social theory, 
generalises from the ‘act’ of an entirely autonomous representative ‘choosing agent’, programmed to 
take opportunities for private gain, to an imagined analytical system of many such agents, driven 
towards a state of stasis, where all conceivable and attainable desired private gains have been extracted 
from the environment; once there, no further action is predicated.  Stasis does not require individual 
autonomy: ‘Social systems form specific kinds of persons, arrange them in social relations and provide 
them with the options and resources to act.  This “structural power” … creates people; our desires, 
responses and strategies derive from a particular historical cultural order which as natives we never 
see in totality’ (Robb 2010: 498; emphasis added).  Giddens’s structuration approach, with its 
dialectical relationship between structure and action, or Bourdieu’s concept of habitus, view 
individuals’ actions, in aggregate, as effecting and being affected by the reproduction of the social 
entity, in relation to which the token individual may be an integral and contributory constituent, but is 
incapable of autonomous existence (ibid.: 495).  In this context, the system-wide stasis involves the 
reproduction of the social system, hierarchically and unequally structured by the pursuit of power.  In 
the timeless neoclassical scheme, there is no explicit role for intention; in the structural scheme, it is 
equated with the will to act, although it ‘… cannot result in action until [it is] localized within 
recognized rule-bound genres of behaviour’ (ibid.: 498).  The neoclassical approach in economics and 
the ecological adaptationist approach in anthropology also share a resemblance in that both conceive 
the possibility of a general state of stasis as a balance struck between human optimising behaviour and 
given resource constraints.  Accordingly, both attribute change primarily to ‘external shocks’, 
projecting a fundamentally reactive (‘adaptive’) image of humanity.  A change of tastes or technology 
may disturb the analytical economic system temporarily, the necessary readjustments restoring stasis.  
However, endorsing the endogeneity of change does not mean denying that external shocks do occur, 
as Parker documents in respect of the seventeenth century (Parker 2013). 
The progressiveness of qualitative change 
It is not contradictory to assert both that there is no ‘law’ covering change and that some change is 
endogenous.  The singularity of originative change, involving a discontinuity in respect of 
conventional understanding and practices, implies contingency, not necessity.  Viewing change as an 
‘uncaused cause’ denies its dependence on any ‘constant conjunction’ conception of causality, while 
alluding to its subsequent impact in its own context, but does not mean there are no ‘reasons’ for the 
change.  But that there are ‘reasons for’ does not mean that there are no ‘reasons against’.  Both the 
origin of change, and the opposition to it, are to be found in human practice.  Its origin could lie in 
continuing reflection on the effectiveness of repetitively pursued activities, which may lead to 
questioning focused on puzzling problems, prompting in turn the exploration of diverse solutions, 
leading to emergent innovation.  Other individuals might seek to hinder it or to copy it, once its 
effectiveness is established – as in the case of diffusion of a new technology or cultural practice where 
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first adopters are followed, after some time, by less innovative and more conservative members of the 
community, ultimately in a rush to emulate.  The intensity of opposition to change is unpredictable, 
but plausibly dependent on the ubiquity of the problem the change addresses, the demonstrated 
effectiveness of the practice promoted and the extent of the perceived threat posed to vested interests.  
But, equally, awareness of the social value of perpetuation of existing practices might exclude 
contemplation of innovation.  However, critical assessment of current practices need not be confined 
to physical processes; it can equally be turned on social structures and processes. Yet opposition is 
liable to be greater in respect of what is considered as peculiarly a common asset or practice, rather 
than an individual activity.  Social or constitutional change is conceivably more difficult to effect than 
changes in private production systems – a difference which has a significant bearing on the emergence 
and perpetuation of conflict, discussed in Chapters 4 and 5. 
The relation between becoming and being 
The adoption of the dialectical method in philosophy was necessary, according to Hegel, because of 
the historicity of the truths with which it was concerned: ‘… they are what they are because of the way 
they have come about’ (Campbell, R. 1992: 15, 16).  And they have come about through the resolution 
of a tension inherent in the development of knowledge of the world and of the self: between logic 
driven by reason, which demands unambiguous concepts, clearly distinguishing what they represent 
from what they do not, and reality which proves to be more elusive and yields contradictory or 
ambiguous meanings, forcing a reconsideration of what was thought to be known – but, as has been 
noted already, without any assurance that what comes to be known is closer to reality.  However, 
notwithstanding the incompleteness of any reasoned justification of past action, and an anticipated 
future which is at best a figment of the present imagination, the circumstances of the present oblige 
action to be taken that propels the individual – and thus its society – along a trajectory that is neither 
determinate nor random, but contingent.  The trajectory can only be viewed in retrospect – never in 
prospect – as a temporal succession of events, although their separate delineation is a matter of 
judgement in which abductive inference plays a critical part.  This temporal succession may leave its 
own material objects, ‘beings’ that retrospectively tempt conclusive explanation when at best they are 
the physical adjuncts of ‘becomings’ that will necessarily elude such accounts. 
2.5 Singular Explanation 
The Inapplicability of General Explanations of Human Action 
Singular events generated by human action do not yield to generalised deductive explanations.  First, 
being timeless, deductive explanations cannot address the timeliness of the action, an essential part of 
the explanandum.  Second, a generalised explanation, by definition, discards as irrelevant ‘noise’ other 
specific facts defining the singularity of the event.  Third, a confrontation between a general theory 
and a specific instance is not intended to explain the instance, but, viewed as a prediction of the 
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theory, to reinforce (‘test’) the theory.  Fourth, if deductive inference were exclusively definitive, then 
major premises that drive explanatory schemes should themselves be deductive conclusions from 
some independent reasoning.  This requirement leads into a regression to whatever is deemed to be the 
axiomatic foundation – a problem with which Descartes struggled.  In the case of a physical 
relationship the required foundation would be the fundamental constituents of matter.  However, it is 
materials in the mass and in extension that are of practical relevance to life, properties that cannot be 
deduced from knowledge of only the fundamental laws of physics but require to be empirically 
established. 
The main problem, however, is that the objective of deductive explanation differs conceptually from 
that of historical explanation.  Consider the unexpected collapse of a castle wall under bombardment.  
A deductive explanation requires that this be an instantiation of a class of occurrences, the basis for a 
general law.  The collapse could be viewed as a member of a class formed by repetitions of the same 
conjunctions of circumstances, the repetition (the regularity, not the instance) itself forming the 
explanandum and an appropriate specific law being found to complete the deductive account.  Thus, 
this kind of structure in these kinds of circumstances always collapses, as a matter of necessity.  But 
the envisaged repetition is a fiction.  Alternatively, it could be regarded as an instantiation of a much 
wider class (to capture real cases) to be covered by a more fundamental law – all ‘falling things’ and 
the ‘law’ of universal gravitation.  But in so far as the structure in question was built in the knowledge, 
however basic, of the operation of relevant natural ‘laws’ (including the ‘law’ of gravity), the 
sufficient explanation of its subsequent collapse in accordance with them must hinge on the failure, in 
this specific case, of provisions intended to prevent their operation.  An inadequacy of understanding 
of loadings and stresses or of artillery firepower and ballistics, or a deficiency in the execution of the 
construction – in short, a singular shortcoming of human action – seems the more plausible and 
apparently sufficient account of the frustration of the original human intention.  The general objective 
is not to explain how the structure collapsed, but rather why its collapse was not avoided, that 
avoidance being implicit in the intention to build a sound structure.  There is a ‘might-have-been’ to be 
explored. 
Forensic enquiry and evidence 
The key presumption introduced at this point is that a constructive analogy can be drawn between 
explanation of a singular event and judgement of culpability in law.  To commit a crime raises 
questions of responsibility and culpability (to be discussed further in Chapter 3).  A criminal act is 
intrinsically singular, specific to a time and place, and to a set of participants, prior circumstances, and 
outcomes(s).  The event is non-reproducible in principle, so experimentation is not a route to its 
explanation.  The nature of the enquiry, in terms of its scope, formality and thoroughness, as well as 
the weight attached to its findings, is likely to reflect the seriousness of the crime; a trial by jury is 
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presumed here.  While the defining objective of a trial is to dispense justice, at the heart of the 
proceedings is a concerted attempt to explain the event, necessary to identify responsibility and 
attribute individual culpability (either in terms of commission or omission) and to establish the weight 
of any extenuating circumstances.  This requires the reconstruction, in the minds of those charged with 
judgement, of the event in terms of the actions of all the individuals involved.  
Laws of evidence 
The analogy is instructive in several respects.  The first concerns the delimitation of the event.  A 
preliminary objective of judicial proceedings is to assemble relevant evidence: testimony (oral and 
documentary) from nominated witnesses, defendant and plaintiff, and material exhibits.  The evidence 
is employed in the first instance as the basis of a ‘proof’ of the ‘facts’ of the case – the relevant 
singular observational statements –to establish a reliable base for inferences as to aspects of the 
consciousness of relevant persons, the presumed ground of the specific human actions in question, 
ultimately to attribute culpability in terms of the applicable laws.  But it is also essential to uphold 
laws governing the admissibility of evidence – to distinguish between ‘relevant’ and ‘irrelevant’ 
evidence, thereby defining the boundary of the event.  It is believed that an impartial judgement of 
culpability may be compromised if evidence from a previous incident or hearsay evidence pertaining 
to an individual’s actual past or putative culpability (or ‘character’) is not ruled inadmissible.  The 
general presumption that a judgement cannot be trusted to be independent of ‘irrelevant’ possibilities 
reflects the kind of judgement required: drawing abductive inferences regarding intentions, motives, 
purposes, beliefs and other aspects of the consciousnesses of the individual(s) concerned.  However, 
the alleged crime is a substantive act and the state of mind of the accused (or of a victim) is only 
relevant in respect of that act.  But the human capacity to draw these inferences does not by itself 
recognise the necessary distinction between ‘relevant’ and ‘irrelevant’ evidence, so it has to be 
imposed.  The issue is markedly different in a bench or summary trial, in contrast to a trial by jury, 
where a single judge is responsible for both determining the admissibility of evidence and the 
substantive judgement in the case.  Damaška makes the point that ‘[w]here the individual deciding on 
the admissibility of evidence is also the ultimate decision-maker, it is unrealistic to expect him to 
sponge from his mind the imprint of persuasive information he acquired in deciding the admissibility 
issue.’ (Damaška 2006: 262).  In the historical or archaeological context, the researcher is similarly 
unhindered by exclusionary rules and free to select the evidence, and thus the definition of the ‘event’, 
as well as to ascribe motives to the agents concerned. 
The purpose of evidence 
A second instructive insight concerns the purpose driving the compilation of evidence.  A priority in a 
judicial context is avoidance of a miscarriage of justice.  The ‘proof’ of the facts of the case must be 
conducted in as rigorous a manner as possible, even if the evidence led will support no more than a 
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plausible conclusion.  But the procedure is intended to deliver first and foremost a legal adjudication, 
and ‘…the best method of achieving fact-finding accuracy is not always identical with the best method 
for reaching legally appropriate outcomes’ (Damaška 2003: 117).  The adjudicative purpose is served 
by evidence which possesses probative force and not just epistemic significance; accordingly, this 
narrowed focus of fact-finding is on ‘… discrete conduct, or sequences of events, with the view of 
deciding conflicts over rights.’ (ibid.: 127).  The core of the procedure is the examination of witnesses 
(and their cross-examination in the adversarial setting of trial by jury), where oral testimony relating to 
previous experience is offered and challenged under (nowadays) only the duress from the threat of a 
charge of perjury.  The testimony of expert witnesses inevitably introduces a distinct and explicitly 
epistemic perspective, but only in respect of physical elements of the event that fall within the purview 
of science.  In historical and archaeological explanation, the judicial priority of culpability may be of 
no relevance, yet its objective is nonetheless to establish ‘probative force’ in respect of responsibility 
for the human actions that constitute the experiential event, not merely seeking ‘epistemic 
significance’. 
Incompleteness and incoherence of evidence 
A third insight concerns the quality of evidence.  The objective of reconstructing the event in court in 
a manner which yields a justifiable attribution of culpability, is elusive.  The primary problem is that 
the testimony of different witnesses reveals that recollections of the event are both dependent on 
individual perspectives (personal; social; differing perceptual capabilities) and incomplete.  At best the 
reconstruction itself may be fragmentary and lacking acuity.  The secondary problem is that the 
testimony is largely in the form of responses to interrogation by counsel, the provision of answers to 
specific questions.  The choice of question, in form and substance, influences the reconstruction of the 
event in both the weak sense – incidentally stimulating or pursuing the recreation of some aspects 
while ignoring others – and in the strong sense, particularly in an adversarial context – deliberately 
stressing those selected aspects which will contribute most to the case counsel wishes to make, 
whether for the prosecution or defence.  Moreover, in that context subsequent cross-examination, 
intended to undermine or at least reduce the probative weight of the testimony, can contribute a degree 
of incoherence to the reconstruction of the event.  The confusion of seemingly inconsistent testimony 
presents a challenge to the jury.  It is left to its members’ eventual discourse, guided by the judge’s 
summing up or subject to the judge’s direction, to establish a sufficient coherence to support a 
consensus (or majority opinion, as appropriate) in respect of a determination of guilt or innocence.  
Indeed, it is this pressing need to arrive at a judgement, even based on a potentially deficient 
reconstruction of the event, which clearly differentiates this procedure from one with a primarily 
epistemic objective.  According to Haack, ‘As Peirce says, the idea of science is to keep working at a 
question … until the truth is reached. … [while] preparedness to revise even the most entrenched 
claim in the face of unfavorable evidence is essential to the scientific enterprise… In the law, however, 
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a judgment must be reached – a “quick, final and binding judgment” in Justice Blackmun’s words – 
however weak or defective the available evidence may be.’ (Haack 2003: 207-8, citing Daubert  v 
Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc., 509 US 596-7, 113 S Ct. at 2798).  It might be thought that this must 
undermine the claim that the judicial procedure could be the paradigmatic form of explanation of a 
singular event.  However, first, there is no independent standard of consistency and coherence of 
evidence outside of laboratory experimentation, which is inapplicable to the explanation of human 
action.  Second, it is implicit that human recollection of past lived experience is not a warrantable 
observational record, but is unaccountably selective and necessarily vulnerable to doubt and error, not 
to mention deliberate distortion or falsification and liable to change under the influence of subsequent 
reflection.  In historical and archaeological explanation, available evidence will be even less consistent 
and coherent, given the absence of living testimony. 
2.6 The Quality of Argument 
The pursuit of explanation of a singular event requires a persuasive argument to be constructed from 
available evidential statements, but its persuasiveness cannot rest on deductive closure.  From a 
different perspective, an explanatory argument is a linguistic structure, which must meet not only 
syntactical standards but also criteria of meaningfulness.  The argument must be congruent, clearly 
corresponding to the circumstances adduced and with its parts in agreement with each other.  It must 
be consistent and not self-contradictory.  It must possess coherence, its strands holding together in a 
way which leads to a final plausible narrative and conclusion.  It must be sufficiently complete or 
comprehensive, not revealing material factual gaps or lacking answers to obvious questions.  Finally, 
the argument must display connectedness, in that its elements must be linked to or entangled with each 
other in such a way as to leave no obvious loose ends.  However, in a judicial context, a plea of 
innocence against a charge of guilt is tested through an adversarial presentation of two meaningful but 
contrary advocacies based on the same uncontested evidence.  The jury is apparently asked to judge 
which advocacy is ‘true’, notwithstanding the problematic nature of truth, noted in Chapter 1.  But 
there is no standard measure of ‘proximity to truth’ with which to compare the truthfulness of the two 
advocacies.  While the probability of truth seems useful, the classical concept of probability as a 
measure is relative frequency, but it is derived from the repeatability of an event and so must be 
inapplicable in this context.  ‘Subjective’ probability tackles how to render an essentially qualitative 
judgement in quantitative terms.  However, indices of this kind merely signify how convincing, 
persuasive or plausible an argument has already been found, yet lack any criteria for those judgements.  
But it is important to consider how the one body of uncontested evidence could support two 
conflicting and equally sound arguments. 
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Rhetoric and the Imagination 
The possibility of the coexistence of differing advocacies arises from the necessity to infer meaning 
and significance from witness statements.  This is primarily due to the presumed relevance of their 
states of mind to an understanding of their actions and secondarily due to an appreciation that 
‘witnessing’ is not the ‘observing’ of scientific experimentation and so what was reported as seen or 
heard may not have been accurate.  Thus, ampliative inference can yield different interpretations of the 
one event.  But that the advocacies should not just differ but be contradictory is a substantive matter, 
independent of the fact that the judicial process, with its antithesis between guilt and innocence, 
requires it.  The starting-point is the claim that the best explanation of a contingent event is one that 
gives reasons why a plausible alternative event did not happen.  Thus, the counsel for the defence may 
advance good reasons why the action that would have unambiguously established the accused’s guilt 
did not happen; accordingly, the accused is innocent.  And conversely in the case of the counsel for the 
prosecution.  The jury must decide.  However, these abductive inferences, by their nature, are merely 
plausible in the light of the uncontested evidence.  So, they are empowered not by the evidence but by 
the rhetoric of the respective arguments to appeal to the empathetic element in jurors’ consciousness.  
This rhetoric provides the matrix into which the tesserae of the evidence are set, to form in the mind’s 
eye potentially convincing mosaics.  The final stage, in a trial by jury, involves a discourse in which 
its members participate to form a collective adjudication.  To the extent that this involves significant 
engagement of its members regarding the final judgement, various argumentative forms are used to 
give primacy to one or the other judgement (or, indeed, to conclude that neither case amounts to 
‘proof’, as in the verdict of ‘not proven’, under Scots law).  No form of argument at that stage can 
create or destroy evidence, but the perspectives which individual members had adopted in response to 
the advocacies heard can be altered, again through the deployment of rhetoric, this time by individual 
jurors in promoting their personal interpretations of the opposed arguments.  Thus the singular and 
contingent event is explained in terms which are persuasive and plausible, relative to the perspective 
adopted by the spectator. 
2.7 Historical and archaeological explanation 
Singular explanation and the past 
The explanation of the temporal succession of human events must contend with their related 
singularity and contingency.  It has been suggested in that regard that a useful analogy can be drawn 
between the distinctive form of explanation employed in the judicial process and that in history (taken 
to embrace archaeology).  Consideration is now given to one insight this analogy provides: in the 
judicial process the explanation of the relevant incident – an historical event itself – is a necessary 
means to its end but while the presentation or narration of evidence is necessary, it is insufficient.  The 
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distinction between narration and explanation requires to be considered.  Both involve a composition 
of particulars of evidence, acquired purposefully through the use of ampliative inference.  But it is in 
explanation that the singularity and contingency of the event are tackled. 
However, the applicability of the judicial approach to the historical context depends on its substance 
being unaffected by dispensing with three of its features: first, the testimony of living and interrogable 
witnesses, instead depending exclusively on documentary and artefactual evidence left by the dead; 
second, its specific instrumental value orientation, the determination of culpability, instead adopting 
an epistemic purpose; third, its prominent adversarial framework, instead operating within an 
academic structure. 
Narrative: Viewing the Past from the Present 
In the judicial context, witnesses provide the direct bridge between past action and jurors’ current 
awareness and understanding of it, via their freely given testimony (albeit under oath), subject only to 
their unreliability or willingness to commit perjury.  Living testimony also contextualizes material 
exhibits, without which these could remain of purely circumstantial significance.  Testimony bridges 
from the past to the present.  However, where the passage of time has extinguished all living testimony 
and the possibility of its cross-examination, it falls to the historian and/or the archaeologist to perform 
that bridging function using their respective categories of evidence.  This appears to give them 
significant freedom to choose both the explanandum, defining the scope and content of the ‘event’, 
and its explanans, creating the possibility that the past is represented to make it fit a prior explanation, 
rather than the reverse – with some resemblance to the previously mentioned problem of a single judge 
in a bench trial both deciding which evidence to admit and making the final judgement.  In so far as 
the work of the historian or archaeologist is subjected to peer review and public scrutiny, then abuse of 
that freedom is expected to be detected.  However, a substantive matter common to the judicial and 
historical contexts, is the necessity for counsel or researcher to make a prior choice of perspective to 
frame the narrative of the event, a step which significantly influences the nature of the explanation 
which is offered.  This aspect is considered in the introductory section of Part Two.  In the meantime, 
the distinction between narrative and explanation is considered further.  
The incidental and limited nature of evidence 
The evidence available to a court of law, in both quantity and quality, is generally the outcome of a 
deliberate process initiated because a potential crime has been reported.  In contrast, the evidence 
available to the historian or archaeologist is entirely incidental, both in the sense of existing largely 
independently of the pursuit of explanation and in so far as knowledge of the occurrence of the event 
was incidental to the discovery of the evidence.  However, archive search and archaeological 
prospecting can contribute purposefully to the discovery of evidence.  Furthermore, in a court of law 
witness testimony takes the form of answers to (in the main) premeditated questions intended to span 
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the totality of the alleged crime, open to challenge under cross-examination.  In contrast, historical 
documentary evidence of a textual nature may be construed as answers to unknown questions, with no 
indication as to how complete or truthful (and if not, how intentionally deceitful) these 
unchallengeable answers might be.  In so far as the objective is to explain an experiential event, a 
specific category of evidence might be sought, focusing expressly on change over time and its 
initiation by human action.  But there is no guarantee that it will be found.  In general, recovered 
evidence need not seem germane to the event as presently conceived, nor complete in any sense.  An 
important difference seems to exist between physical (non-documentary) objects collected from the 
scene of a crime specifically for use as material exhibits during legal proceedings, and archaeological 
artefacts – particularly those of a prehistoric age.  The former objects are complementary to witness 
testimony; the latter constitute the only available evidence.  Thus, in court the exhibit of a weapon 
may support an oral account of physical assault, whereas the excavation of an anthropogenic object 
initiates a series of questions about its nature, purpose and actual use – which it cannot of itself 
answer; any resemblance to a weapon is an ampliative inference, not part of its physical description.   
Material Evidence of Events 
For the ‘temporal succession of human action’ to be unpacked into a sequence of singular ‘events’, 
these have to be identifiable in the archaeological record, particularly in the prehistoric period when no 
dated historical documents exist to identify specific occurrences.  The basic premise underpinning 
interpretation of the archaeological record is the analogical inference that the succession of deposits of 
the residues of human activity resembles the succession of geological deposits, justifying ‘principles’ 
or ‘laws’ of archaeological stratification (disregarding geological processes that can invert layers of 
deposits).  Later deposits are unequivocally positioned above earlier deposits (the Law of 
Superposition and the Law of Stratigraphical Succession – if these are indeed different (Harris 1989: 
34)).  A material chronology can be assembled on that basis, even without more elaborate dating 
techniques. 
The consequent question is whether or not changes that denote the ‘events’ of temporal succession are 
revealed by the relationship between identified contexts and their respective artefactual content 
identifiable in the stratigraphy.  If a hypothesised event is presumed to have involved an abrupt 
discontinuity, then the presence of substantive layers (the analogue of geological strata), the evident 
intercutting of earlier contexts by later contexts and marked contrasts in the nature of indigenous 
domestic artefacts, could plausibly indicate the occurrence of a change that would denote an event.  
Thus, the establishment or the destruction of a settlement; an apparently sudden change in building 
style; the replacement of one ceramic assemblage by another; an alteration in funerary practices; or 
evidence of violent conflict would suggest the occurrence of experiential events in the sense used here. 
  Explaining the Singular: Explanation without Experimentation 
 
41 
 
But the absence of evident discontinuity is more problematic.  The material evidence of the ‘lifeway’ 
of a specific community reproducing itself uninterruptedly over time is likely to display gradual 
change.  It will plausibly reflect development and elaboration of the knowledge of physical production 
processes and construction techniques, spanning design capability and dexterity, familiarity with the 
properties of the relevant materials and, by implication, with the sources of raw materials of the 
appropriate qualities.  Intra-site comparisons may support interpretations of emerging specialisations 
and changing social organisation.  It is also plausible to suppose that, first, development was made 
possible by learning through trial and error – that is, investigative experimentation – over time, 
involving a succession of cognitive abilities; second, the priority of this investigation was immediately 
practical, seeking more precise control in terms of consistency of results, greater effectiveness in terms 
of the utility of the end product, economies of effort or material content or the better expression of 
aesthetic values.  However, it is entirely possible that the improved knowledge and technical ability 
originated elsewhere.  This invokes the processes of migration (of individuals) and/or diffusion (of 
ideas).  These previously played a central role in the culture-historical approach to archaeological 
analysis.  Its problematic association with ethnicity and the emerging dominance of later generalising 
methodologies, particularly anthropological, within archaeology led to its eclipse.  But singular events 
do not call for generalised explanations.  It is conceivable that the recent resurgence of interest in the 
historical approach will refocus attention on change (Arkush 2011). 
3.2 Narrative Construction: The Biography of Action 
In the present argument, the narrative account (or simply ‘stories’) created from the evidence from 
documentary or artefactual sources – inferential reconstructions of the temporal succession – takes the 
place of the ‘proof’ of evidence within the judicial context.  It is a preliminary to forming the 
explanatory advocacies.  This distinction is not always maintained in debate about the narrative 
conception of history.  Carr notes the advocacy of the narrative approach in the 1960s and early 1970s 
by such as Gallie, Morton White, Danto, Hexter and Mink, defended by Ricoeur in the 1980s (Carr 
1991: 7, 8); Carr’s own particular endorsement rests on his conviction that humans ‘… have a 
connection to the historical past, as ordinary persons …’ and thus narrative ‘… arises out of and is 
prefigured in certain features of [human] life, action and communication … [Narratives] are not 
distortions of, denials of, or escapes from reality, but extensions and configurations of [life’s] primary 
features’ (ibid.: 2-3, 16).  But subsequent debate into the 1990s revealed concerns (Day 2008: Chapter 
10).  The intrinsic subjectivity (on the part of object, subject or both) of narrative entertained the 
possibility that ‘… different historians [would give] quite different narrative accounts of ostensibly the 
same past happenings …’ (ibid.: 132, citing Mink 1966).  So, there could be no definite cognitive or 
epistemic value – that is, explanatory role – in a given narrative: any one ‘story’ might have been ‘… 
imposed … by the exigencies of story-telling [and so need not offer] different parts of a 
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comprehensive truth about a single human past’ (ibid., emphasis in original).  Moreover, the literary 
form of a narrative, with its typical insistence on a beginning, middle and end, might conceivably 
impose a non-existent congruency, and coherence, even a direction, on a past better represented as 
unavoidably chaotic, due to the interaction of independently pursued and mutually inconsistent human 
actions.  This ‘distortion’ of the facts could be compounded by the necessary deployment within the 
narrative of the author’s chosen forms of expression and figures of speech, giving it a rhetorical thrust.  
Hence Hayden White’s critical view, influenced by Barthes and Foucault, that narrative ‘… far from 
being a cognitive instrument, is an instrument of moral and political persuasion, and represents its 
subject matter accordingly’ (Dray 1989: 133).  Nonetheless, human actions are always constrained or 
alternatively given scope by the real legacy of past actions, so an experiential ground does exist for a 
temporal connectedness that could be rendered in narrative form.  But much more fundamentally, as 
Carr claims, ‘… the narrative explanation [sic] is satisfying precisely because it never strays from 
ordinary discourse’ (Carr 2008: 21), this appeal not resting on literary form but on its consonance with 
a basic human dimension: ‘… it seems to me obvious that we have a connection to the historical past, 
as ordinary persons, prior to and independently of adopting the historical-cognitive interest’ (Carr 
1991: 3).  This awareness of the past ultimately derives from the intrinsic self-conscious temporality of 
human experience: so ‘… the key to [the overall temporal structure of experience] is its narrative 
structure … demonstrating the inaccuracy of the claim that at some fundamental human level events 
are “merely” sequential in their temporality’ (ibid.: 44).  And again: ‘Life can be regarded as a 
constant effort, even a struggle, to maintain or restore narrative coherence in the face of an ever-
threatening, impending chaos at all levels, from the smallest project to the overall “coherence of life” 
spoken of by Dilthey’ (ibid.: 91, emphasis in original), where ‘life’ is seen as having an intrinsic 
social, especially familial, dimension and therefore continuity beyond the individual.  This perspective 
has an important bearing on the subsequent discussion of the role of conflict.  Yet while narrative in 
general gains plausibility from the human sense of temporality, it does not alter the fundamental 
hypothetical status of a given ‘story’, as abductive inference from the physicality of the historical or 
archaeological record.  Nonetheless, it is argued here that the connectedness conveyed by presenting 
evidence as a historical narrative is a necessary but not sufficient step towards offering an explanatory 
account of an event. 
‘Chapters’ in the Narrative? 
Dray represented Walsh’s concept of ‘colligation’ as the ‘…placing of events in their contexts by 
tracing a myriad of connections between them and other events with a view to discovering and 
characterizing the larger historical wholes which they jointly compose’ (Dray 1989: 38; emphasis 
added).  This notion that ‘larger historical wholes’ may be identified, composed from singular events, 
has an enduring currency in both archaeology and history, frequently set within a stadial framework 
that may also be given a narrative connectedness.  Hesiod’s eighth-century BC mythical creation-
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account involving the moral degeneration of humanity through ages of gold, silver, bronze, heroes and 
iron (March 2008: 126, 127) may have been the first, although lacking explicit archaeological 
inspiration.  Lucretius offered a first-century BC tool-inspired but un-researched temporal sequence of 
stone, bronze and iron.  On this the early nineteenth-century Dane Thomsen constructed his 
systematic, artefact-supported hypothesised scheme (Trigger 1989: 60, 75).  The subsequent finer-
grained subdivision of the Stone Age, the insertion of the Chalcolithic and ‘settled agriculture’ offer 
prominent examples of ‘historical wholes’ that provide a framework for classifying archaeological 
remains.  History provides examples in the form of the Middle Ages, the Renaissance, the 
Reformation, the Enlightenment and the Industrial Revolution: relatively isolated yet frequently 
deployed ‘wholes’ differentiated by their religious, intellectual, aesthetic or scientific features, with 
distinct material cultures as well.  However, for the concept of the ‘whole’ to have explanatory 
relevance it must have a reality beyond either a literary figure adopted purely for rhetorical effect 
(‘scientific revolution’) or a heuristic or didactic device (the ‘Dark Ages’).  It could be argued that, as 
the ‘experiential event’ cannot exist in isolation from a wider human context, this may plausibly be the 
locus of other events with which, given their timeliness, some synergy is established, such that their 
composition can be experienced as a substantive ‘event’ in its own right.  The accompanying change 
of perspective prompted by this discontinuity may stimulate or provoke further events, giving 
momentum to an emerging transformation in some general dimension of life and thus driving the 
transition from one ‘whole’ to another.  The source of the synergy may be a change of material 
relations, such as a physical innovation, or a change of mental perspectives.  The latter concerns 
subjective innovation, with intellectual, religious, political and social dimensions affecting aspirations, 
apprehensions and values.  Subjective innovations could be either voluntarist or involuntarist.  The 
former spans both the Gestalt-shift type of change in perspective (important later in the argument) and 
the response to convincing argument or demonstration; the latter spans the imposition of alien mores 
and beliefs and the unreflective response to authoritative views.  Given these are intrinsically 
subjective, they are paradoxically both more and less easily achieved.  Mental perspectives relate with 
the nature of personal belief and the extent of freedom to believe permitted within the prevailing 
social, political and legal context – summed up in the ‘Spirit of the Age’.  Free to change at will 
(though whose will is an issue), equally they can be retained determinedly against opposition.  A 
change of mental perspectives could be sufficiently rapid and pervasive to provide a plausible 
foundation for a new ‘historical whole’, but by its nature its permanence is not guaranteed.  On the 
other hand, the irreversible knowledge base of technological change offers permanence, yet its 
particular deployment is subordinate to the mental perspective.  Bobbit illustrates how the particular 
composition of the material and the subjective expressed in military conflict contributed to the 
successive war-delimited epochs – or ‘historical wholes’ – which characterise the post-sixteenth-
century development of the state (Bobbit 2002).  Bobbitt’s approach also offers a convincing narrative 
connectedness that will be considered later, in Chapters 4 and 5. 
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The Direction of the Narrative 
In addition to the properties of a sound argument, narrative possesses a defining temporal dimension. 
However, it is frequently also given a quasi-spatial dimension, a ‘directionality’, such that ‘later’ 
somehow signifies ‘nearer’ to something other than merely a date in the future.  But temporal 
succession does not in itself imply directionality, even coupled with connectedness.  The claim that the 
differences that the narrative records ‘lead somewhere’ is an analytical addition to the argument – 
whether from merely presenting the narrative in a literary form that requires the story to have an 
‘ending’ or from embedding in the narrative some relation that pervades its connectedness, 
constraining the consequences of action in a steadily accumulative way to ‘arrive’ at an outcome 
whose difference from the past has a special significance or ‘finality’.  Current actions do have lasting 
consequences, which constrain future actions, thereby influencing the temporal trajectory; and its 
endpoint may well be unique.  But attributing direction to narrative is to import an explanatory 
element into a descriptive construct, something the present argument seeks to avoid.  The importation 
has the potential to generate several problems.  The most familiar problem, a perennial risk of the 
‘backward’ formation of narrative, is ‘presentism’, attributing influence to anachronistic elements 
derived from the benefit of hindsight (Gorman 2007: 3; Spoerhase 2008: 49).  More generally, an 
underlying commitment to a general deterministic principle governing action may give an apparent 
directional orientation to a narrative.  The assumption that humans act purposefully (teleological in a 
weak sense) might warrant the ‘ending’ of the narrative as also having been purposed (teleological in a 
stronger sense); organising the changes to be recounted by the narrative within an evolutionary 
framework could introduce a convincing coherence that endorses the apparent direction; some external 
and ineluctable purpose – which some (but not all) theologies would attribute to God  as providence– 
may be assumed to underpin each and every narrative in all their detail.  None of these supposed 
explanations can be excised on empirical grounds.  Moreover, the common-sense notion of purpose is 
quite consistent with the outcomes of actions being generally not in accordance with intentions; 
environmental constraints are not insuperable to human purpose; the existence of differences in belief 
in non-human purpose implies some details are not determinate, while different actions are driven by 
different beliefs.  A separate and serious issue concerning the formation of a narrative is raised by 
Husserl’s analysis of the human consciousness of time, in which the relation between past (retention, 
the backward-looking horizon), present, and future (protention, the forward-looking horizon) is such 
that when surprised by unintended consequences, ‘…the past is changed.  That is, earlier, now-
retained phases have become parts of a different whole and thus change their significance for us 
altogether’ (Carr 1991: 29).  This carries the troublesome implication that earlier-dated documents 
may be rendered redundant, relating to a purpose overtaken by circumstances rather than to what 
actually transpired.  A narrative incorporating them could fail to capture this subjective re-assessment 
and transformation of past, present and future.  While there is nothing inherent in narrative that 
precludes it being entirely descriptive in nature, it need not be complete or faultless. 
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Chapter 3 Explanation and Human Agency 
 
Preamble 
The previous chapters have implicitly distinguished between, on the one hand, ‘knowing 
how’ – knowledge that is atemporal, independent of place and agents’ personal identities, and 
summarily expressible with the help of natural ‘laws’ as ‘scientific’ – and on the other, 
‘knowing why’ – knowledge that is historiographical, ‘timely’ in the broad sense of being 
attached to specific dates, places and persons.  This latter knowledge of singular events that 
engage human action has no claim to general validity and presents a challenge to the search 
for an authoritative explanation as to why one singular state of human affairs was succeeded 
in time by another, discernibly different.  Historical and archaeological explanation fall into 
this ‘non-scientific’ category and complicate the challenge.  The human actions to be 
explained were originated by the dead and are beyond direct observation; they must be 
inferred from available sources, documentary or artefactual. 
 
But this distinction is contingent on assumed human capacities to act as a detached observer 
of the non-human world and as an independently reflective agent in respect of human affairs.  
It is vulnerable to the possibilities either that all human action could itself be reduced to some 
common account warranting the label ‘scientific’ or that individual human capacities are the 
product of social engagement.  Human consciousness is central to both these cognitively 
differentiated categories of action.  Consciousness may be amenable to scientific explanation 
or it may be a social construct. 
3.1 The human mind and will 
Consciousness and understanding  
The foregoing requires consideration of the reality of thinking minds, as well as the validity 
of a first-person perspective from which to initiate an adequate explanation of human action.  
The focus falls on human experience and consciousness. But ‘experience’ is ‘… one of the 
most obscure [terms] that we have’ (Gadamer 1975: 316, cited by Jay 2005: 2), while 
‘consciousness’ ‘… poses the most baffling problems in the science of the mind … There is 
nothing that is harder to explain’ (Chalmers 1995: 200, cited by Robinson 2008: 211n1).   
The problems posed by neuroscience and cognitive science 
The argument so far has its vulnerabilities.  The intuition that a mental disposition is the 
driving force behind human action, including the search for and discovery of knowledge, does 
not command universal assent: ‘… the causal power of the mental is at once pervasively 
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presupposed in our common-sense thinking and widely disputed among philosophers’ (Audi 
1993: 53, cited in Robinson 2008: 78).  The problem with consciousness is its non-
physicality, beyond the ambit of the physical senses.  ‘“Consciousness” is a problem … to the 
extent that there is widespread agreement that reality is exhaustively constituted by 
physicality’ (Robinson 2008: 15) and, specifically, ‘[it is its] phenomenological manifestation 
… that is problematic’ (ibid.: 24).  Descartes advocated a stark duality between mind and 
body as a common-sense counter to scepticism generated by doubt about human perceptions 
of the physical world.  Yet the first-person introspective dimension of consciousness of 
experience could yield personal knowledge of ‘unmatched clarity and distinctness’, in respect 
of which the individual ‘has the last word’ (ibid.: 66, 18).  But even more philosophically 
problematic than the achievement of certainty through subjective introspection, rather than 
via reason alone, was the prospect of two-directional interdependence between the mental and 
the physical.  Thus, mental events could originate bodily actions and bodily experience could 
change mental states – hence Kim’s conclusion ‘… that under Cartesian dualism there can be 
no complete physical theory of physical phenomena’ (Kim 2000: 189, cited in Robinson 
2008: 53). 
But Cartesian dualism has been challenged by varieties of physicalism or naturalism – for 
example, eliminativism or reductivism: that there is no such thing as mind, only the physical 
brain, or that explanation employing mind-implicating terms may be restated more precisely 
by its reduction to language using only physical notions.  One physicalist perspective is 
provided by neuroscience, the study of neurological structures and processes in brain tissue.  
Aided by brain imaging and other experimental techniques, this potentially undermines the 
entire notion of consciousness (‘… consciousness is [an epiphenomenal] by-product of the 
brain’s activity … [and] epiphenomena have no causal efficacy on the body, but are mental 
after-effects produced by bodily events’ (Jacquette 2009: 19)).  On this reckoning thoughts in 
themselves are passive. 
A different perspective was offered by cybernetics, later cognitive science, whereby thought 
was conceived and modelled (that is, simulated) as a form of neuron-based computation.  This 
effectively represented the complex neural network of the brain as a self-regulating 
automaton, spontaneously reaching stable states of ‘self-behaviour’.  ‘The “life” of a network 
can … be conceived as a journey through a “landscape” of [self-behaviours], passing from 
one to another due to perturbation or shocks from the external world.  [But] … the meaning 
… the network attributes to [the shocks] is primarily the self-behaviour … that results from 
them [which is] purely endogenous and not the reflection of some “transcendent” objectivity’ 
(Dupuy 2000: 104, 105).  The complex non-linearity of the neural models gives the network 
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‘emergent properties’ that resemble human capacities, such as autonomy, intentionality and 
directionality (ibid.: 7).  This conceptual mechanization of the human brain has exerted a 
considerable effect on the development of economic theory particularly, with the individual 
being conceived as an always-optimising cyborg (Mirowski 2002).  However, these attempts 
to eliminate Cartesian duality by offering physicalist accounts of cerebral activity appear to 
have little to contribute to the explanation of the temporal succession of singular events.  
Viewing any constitutive action as the optimal accommodation of external shocks – possibly 
an unfalsifiable claim – seems an unsatisfactory conclusion from a common-sense, 
humanistic point of view. 
Thought and interpretation 
An instance of scientific knowledge of a physical relationship is in effect a recipe for its 
efficient replication.  But it is questionable if a physicalist account of the operation of the 
brain could make an equivalent contribution.  In Ricoeur’s words ‘… when you tell me what 
happens in my brain, you add to my knowledge of the … underlying neural reality; but does 
this knowledge help me in trying [to use my brain]?’ (Changeux, Ricoeur 1998: 102).  It 
seems more plausible to retain the concept of the mind and consider the role of thought as its 
active correlate.  This need not demand a commitment to the notion of mind as an ‘immaterial 
spirit’ (Jacquette 2009: 201) attributed to Cartesian (or substance) dualism; ‘property dualism’ 
can accommodate both the common-sense notion of the determinative capacities of the mind 
and developments in the understanding of the physical properties of the brain (ibid.: 22-45).  
According to Jacquette, the distinguishing primitive concept of property dualism is the 
intentionality of thought: experiential thought is intentional in so far as its content ‘… is or 
derives from sensation, and sensation is always of or about something’ (ibid.: 181); 
consciousness is intentional in so far as it is a ‘higher-level awareness of sensations’ while 
self-consciousness is the highest-level awareness of consciousness – ‘consciousness of self … 
[and] of conscious and sentient thoughts, binding them together into a unity so as to constitute 
a person, self or ego’ (ibid.: 183).  It seems entirely plausible that the acquisition of scientific 
knowledge (including knowledge of the brain) does involve the self-conscious engagement of 
thought processes on the part of the researcher, directed to the perceptions generated by 
actions in the laboratory.  In contrast, however, the acquisition of much non-scientific 
knowledge (e.g. in respect of the explanation of singular events) involves primarily the 
interpretation of the thoughts of others, as made manifest in the language of testimony.  But in 
the case of history and archaeology the interpretation must be applied respectively (and 
retrospectively) to texts or structures and manufactured objects lacking contemporary verbal 
keys to their meaning.  Nonetheless, the explananda of history and archaeology are at root 
constellations of thoughts made manifest in explicit or implicit testimony. Not only does this 
  Explanation and Human Agency 
 
48 
 
lead to contested issues about the relationship among mind, thought and language and 
between objects and thought; it also confronts the fundamental question as to how one 
individual can bring to mind the thoughts of another.  This will be considered below.  This 
subjectivity, inherent in mind-body dualism, could in principle be entirely avoided by a 
commitment to a reductivist monism, such as physicalism.  This may suffice to represent the 
scientist’s results, but regarding the preparation of an historiography, the burden of Ricoeur’s 
comments above remains relevant: physicalist accounts of neurological processes may 
elucidate the nature of brain activity involved in human action while being superfluous to the 
decisions taken – while conceivably claiming the actions to be fully determined.  Perhaps in 
this approach the form taken by thoughts – their packaging and transport around the brain – is 
given priority over their substance – their specific self-conscious action-directed content.  A 
trial jury would be unconvinced by a physicalist defence. 
3.2 The historical inheritance of culture 
Traditional social modes of thought 
The physical distinctness of an individual and its corresponding brain imply the putative 
existence of a private ‘brain language’ engaged in the conversion of neural impulses from 
sensory experience into specific coherent, co-ordinated and directed actions.  But the isolated 
individual may be an abstraction, as the very existence of any human individual is contingent 
on the nurture provided in birth and upbringing by other individuals, while its continuing 
vitality requires an engagement with others.  This interpersonal relationship involves inter 
alia the acquisition of and then reliance on a natural language for much interpersonal 
communication.  Assuming individuals are endowed with minds, whether this learned 
language integrates with or displaces some prior mental language to become a language of 
thought is a debated issue (Chisholm and Sellars 1958, cited by Jacquette 2009: 145-150).  
But from the outset language is a shared vehicle for the social expression of thoughts, 
involving the common perception and naming of not only the elements of objective 
experience but also contestable subjective dimensions such as sentiments and morals.  The 
awareness of the value-permeated or normative basis of social life, communicated through 
language, is arguably definitive of the human state.  As Olafson notes, ‘… the humanities … 
are interested in man primarily as the possessors of certain powers … supposed … [to] come 
together in the generic capacity of human beings for making and recognizing distinctions of 
values, including moral value’ (Olafson 1979:6).  The prevailing complex of social values, 
integrated with the contemporary physical nature of existence, constitutes the social culture of 
the moment, the complex multi-stranded web which can both contain and be re-woven by 
human action.  The complications associated with the concept of culture have already been 
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noted.  These have arguably resulted from the analytical deconstruction of the notion of 
culture, related to the fragmentation of the study of human action due to substantive 
disciplines’ pursuit of scientific status.  Anthropological archaeology’s concept of ‘material 
culture’ is a case in point, from one point of view a superficially incoherent alliance of an 
objective predicate with a subjective (at least in large part) object.  Fukuyama notes that 
Geertz offers 11 definitions of culture in his anthropology textbook, while Jamieson surveys 
160 definitions he identified among the social sciences (Fukuyama 1995: 33, citing Geertz 
1973: 4, 5; Jamieson 1980: 9). 
The fusion of past and present 
Viewing this polyvalent culture from an appropriate subjective perspective, it can be regarded 
as an ensemble of (to borrow a phrase slightly out-of-context) ‘evaluative presuppositions’ 
(MacIntyre 2007: 4): extant attitudes, implicit mores and traditions, rules, regulations, laws 
and constitutional commitments embedded in institutional responsibilities and procedures.  
These normative parameters reflect the contemporary differentiated and layered pattern of 
authority, ranging from parental and wider familial influences, through community 
involvement and leadership to more extensive social and political relationships. Their 
domains intersect in complex ways in the learning experience of the individual, some 
parameters conceivably having a subliminal influence.  There can be no presumption of their 
coherence given their diverse evaluative premises, spanning emotional commitments, 
reciprocal obligations and relations of subordination.  Nor can there be a presumption that this 
web of parameters weighs impartially on all members of the relevant community; it may 
discriminate against ‘others’ based on some specific characteristic, such as age, sex, ethnicity 
or religion.  But it can plausibly be claimed that the origins of specific strands will seldom be 
within living memory, where a substantive origin might be conceivable. 
Significantly, then, any cultural warrant afforded to present action is anchored in the past.  
The inherent conservative influence of culture, in this particular sense, can be viewed in 
anthropological terms as perpetuating (‘reproducing’) the contemporary social structure, as an 
instance of stasis.  The concept of habitus developed by Bourdieu performs this role within 
his elaboration of the structuration approach initiated by Giddens.  Jordan usefully 
summarises the concept as ‘… a set of acquired and durable dispositions … expressed (and 
reproduced) through embodied and routinized social practices’ (Jordan 2004: 114).  
Changeux endorses habitus as a ‘bridging concept’ to link anthropology to neuroscience: 
‘[Bourdieu’s] system of acquired dispositions, practices, and representations … I understand 
… in terms of a model of language acquisition, where learning plays a decisive role in 
mobilizing innate neural structures that are peculiar to the human species’ (Changeux, 
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Ricoeur 1998: 160, 161).  However, this interpretation does not mitigate the criticism that 
habitus over-privileges habit and routine, consequently posing ‘… a risk of losing any 
potential for innovation, either with respect to existing social norms … or … novel and 
potentially problematic situations that actors may confront’ (Gardner 2004: 6).  A broader 
concept of culture, embracing commitments to attitudes of mind favouring inquiry, critique 
and creativity, would support the pursuit of philosophy, science and technology, and the arts.  
These could entail the origination of social change and disequilibrium, rather than stasis, 
while retaining and strengthening the general relation between culture and thought.  Indeed, 
from his avowedly physicalist perspective Changeux speculates that the brain supports ‘… a 
disposition … exceptionally developed in humans and … of great importance – creativity 
[that] results from epigenetic combination at the level of the evolution of individual thought, 
involving the highest cognitive and/or affective representation’ (Changeux, Ricoeur 1998: 
140). 
The subjective image of present reality 
Ricoeur, from a contrasting phenomenological position, commends a first-person perspective 
grounded in reflective personal experience.  He concurs with Canguilhem’s assertion that 
‘[t]he peculiar characteristic of human beings is that they make a milieu for themselves [so 
that their environment is] centred, ordered by a human subject … To live is to spread 
outward, to organize the milieu from a centre of reference …’ (Canguilhem 1965: 143, 145; 
cited by Ricoeur in Changeux, Ricoeur 1998: 204).  Ricoeur offers, in opposition to the 
neurobiological concept of a physical disposition, the notion of the active subjective capacity 
of the able man, expressed in what he calls an ‘attestation’ of self-confidence ‘… that I can do 
this or that, that I can learn, remember, think, wish …’ (Changeux, Ricoeur 1998: 214).  Thus, 
the creativity of the individual involves the active pursuit of personal answers to the questions 
‘What can I do? What can I not do?’ (ibid., emphasis in original), directed at the bounded 
potential of the prevailing physical and socio-cultural context.  Historical documentary 
evidence can provide personal accounts of individual and collective action of this type, 
embedded in the contemporary cultural matrix.  The situation is less clear-cut in the case of 
archaeology, where only physical evidence exists.  The notion of agency potentially offers a 
link.  Barrett offers an account of agency which shares an affinity with the views of 
Canguilhem and Ricoeur: 
‘Agents make themselves with reference to a world.  They build a 
recognition of that world and [thereby] make themselves known to others.  
They find a way of reading the significance of the world through their bodily 
experiences, [and] of locating themselves in that world … expressing their 
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own security within it.  They read the world according to certain traditional 
prejudices which they share with others …’  
 (Barrett 2000: 66).   
Barrett also argues that agency in this sense is not subordinate to functionalist and 
structuralist anthropological interpretations, which ‘… divert attention away from historical 
explanations …’ which he considers to be ‘… the object of our study’ (ibid.: 64, 62).  This 
argument accords with the position adopted from the outset here.  Moore encouragingly notes 
that recent work on agency in archaeology has an ‘…implicit and explicit orientation towards 
creativity, innovation and resistance’ (Moore 2000: 260), the last pointing towards the issue 
of conflict, to be considered below. 
3.3 Human action: originative and causal  
The human will and imagination 
So far, it has been claimed that physiological and neurological analysis of the brain, involving 
clinical investigation of its functions, has not established that human action is physically 
determinate in the same sense as is revealed in experimental manipulation within the physical 
sciences.  Nor is human action, with its irreducible first-person property, determinate in 
respect of social structures to which anthropology and sociology have attributed, 
contentiously, an analogous materialist status.  These claims neither deny that disabling the 
functionality of specific cortical areas will determine very specific pathological behaviours, 
nor that an organismic entity, formed by the social composition of interdependent individual 
actions, can determine some specific action by a specific individual.  Instead, the burden of 
the claims is to assert the qualified autonomy of the individual, together with the existence of 
a distinctive openness in respect of the individual’s thoughts and actions.  This provides scope 
for consciousness, the will to act and the mental perception that a measure of freedom of 
choice exists with respect to the individual’s actions.  Indeed, in the main, action is choice, if 
only between that and inaction.  But in so far as choice is in respect of outcomes yet to be 
realised, its forward-looking nature also requires the exercise of the individual’s imagination.  
Robinson, considering the challenge for scientific explanation represented by human 
consciousness, writes that its crucial feature is ‘… the manner in which knowledge, desire, 
belief, and judgment come to be integrated into action plans …’ (Robinson 2008: 207; 
emphasis added) – compare Shackle’s comment: ‘Choice can be only choice of thoughts of 
deeds’ (Shackle 1979: 2; emphasis in original).  
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Ideas, actions and experiment 
Granted the qualified autonomy of the individual, justified by a commitment to property 
dualism that admits the relevance to explanation of non-material entities accessed by 
introspection rather than observation, the activity of the mind assumes primary place in 
constructing any explanans of action.  Two sources of the origination of thoughts, their 
development into ideas and their ultimate expression in novel actions or choices, may be 
distinguished.  The first is an extra-personal, exogenous source involving social engagement 
of a cultural and linguistic nature, as well as objective interaction with the material 
environment, the two constituting what is likely to become the eventual context or locus of 
future action.  The second is an intra-personal, endogenous source involving consciousness of 
experience, its reflective interpretation and evaluation.  Together these supply the necessary 
knowledge, desire, belief, and judgment that could provide the eventual warrant for future 
action. 
However, conscious experience involves a mental composition of interdependent strands, 
which is both incomplete and formed under the persuasive pressure of the rhetorical language 
of social contact.  Accordingly, the knowledge base which prompts action is irremediably 
partial, although to an unknowable degree.  In addition, the perception that action will 
impinge on others, given economic and social interdependence, raises an issue as to its 
morality, which in turn may engage firmly held religious beliefs that are considered to 
adjudicate on the matter.  The mental evaluation of how the prevailing situation is currently 
being exploited in the individual’s interests may not only create a present inclination to act 
but also present some potential to change the situation to advantage.  However, any choice of 
action imagined as being possible will lead to consequences which are unknown: ‘… the 
chooser of action … is bound to suppose that the sequel of any choice … will be partly 
shaped by choices made, by others or by himself, in time-to-come, and thus … such a sequel 
cannot be seen as a unique path of events … [rather it involves] a skein of plural, rival, 
sequels of any present choice of action’ (Shackle 1979: 9).  ‘If choice is effective, its effects 
can be only most uncertainly, vaguely and elusively foreknown, and beyond some near 
horizon … cannot be foreknown at all.  This is the paradox of choice: if effective, we cannot 
know what it will effect’ (ibid.: 19). 
This argument carries significant implications.  In so far as the eventual outcome of an action 
cannot be known in advance, action is in effect an exercise in discovery; in that sense actions 
resemble the practice of investigative science.  It follows that not only is any eventual 
outcome of an action (to the extent that the circumstances that prevail at a later date can be 
identified as its outcome) inherently contingent, but also it cannot be claimed that the state of 
  Explanation and Human Agency 
 
53 
 
affairs prevailing at the moment of choice is as it was intended previously to be – the only 
plausible exception being the routinely repeated, unchanging activities necessary to sustain 
life with the existing technology.  However, the fact that the consequences of past action are 
not what had been intended and are thus potentially a source of current dissatisfaction, could, 
in appropriate circumstances, provoke a determination to use force to ensure currently 
intended objectives are indeed attained, leading to an outcome involving conflict – an issue to 
be considered in the following chapter.  While the argument has implied an individual’s 
choice, it could just as readily be by a collective of some kind, albeit that may question the 
extent to which its members share a common imagined prospect of the outcome of their 
collective decision – or even a common appreciation of the currently prevailing 
circumstances. 
The ‘creative destruction’ of innovation 
It was pointed out at the outset that the determinacy of explanation in the physical sciences, 
whether theoretical or experimental, yields a predictability that gives the illusion that the 
future is knowable.  If change is conceived as merely a revaluation of independent variables, 
the given parameters of explanatory models, then the models will generate new solutions 
which can in turn be represented as ‘the future’.  However, their explanatory context is 
fundamentally atemporal.  While determinism is implicit in that context, its transfer to the 
context of explanation of human action is arguably fallacious, in so far as human thought and 
time are fundamentally inter-related.  ‘Determinism deems time an illusion of human thought, 
and must deem that thought itself in some sense an illusion … [while c]hoice in the 
determinist view can be nothing but the name of an illusion’ (ibid.: 4, 6).  Arguably it is the 
contingency of present circumstances (and thus of historical and archaeological explanation) 
which prompts thoughts about the future: the present need not have been like it is.  Moreover, 
far from being necessitated, the future is, in Shackle’s words, the ‘void of time-to-come’ until 
it is ‘created’ by the action of human choice, motivated by undetermined, originative and 
imaginative thought.  While deterministic models of human systems (arguably a contradiction 
in terms) can conceive of novel action being absorbed smoothly by the system, in the manner 
of a re-equilibrating adjustment to an ‘exogenous shock’ (a conception of considerable 
influence in orthodox economic explanation), in a world of contingencies the creative action 
will have destructive consequences.  Resources must be captured from existing uses and 
vested interests within social structures will be harmed; change will create gainers and losers, 
the latter through the destabilising of contemporary allocations, processes and procedures.  
Schumpeter’s ‘creative destruction’, introduced in the preceding chapter, applied to new 
industrial competition ‘destroying’ previously created fixed capital by occasioning its 
redundancy (Schumpeter 1942), but the principle applies to any established situation 
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overtaken by purposeful change.  Accordingly, the nature of change initiated by imagination-
empowered choice is potentially a source of conflict between gainers and losers.   
The sequence of change 
The foregoing representation of choice dealt only with its general form, not with its content, 
that being a matter of its specific temporal, material and social manifestation.  However, 
considering content in broad terms, it is possible that a succession of choices over time by a 
choosing agent (whether individual or social group) will display a connectedness, 
irreversibility and directionality in terms of its outcomes.  In respect of productive activities, 
it is plausible that a choice to try out new-found technical knowledge (for example, regarding 
food production, storage or processing, or lithic, ceramic or metal production) would prove to 
be irreversible once its effectiveness had been demonstrated.  These new methods (as the new 
routine) would then become the base from which subsequent choices could lead in the 
direction of further related technological change, provided the human propensities to inquire 
and to create found appropriate scope and results.  The connectedness and irreversibility of 
these choices derive from the agent’s presumed perennial interest in increasing the 
productivity of work, although the directionality could ultimately collide with the boundaries 
set by the local ecology and material resources (Berry 2011: 168, 169).  In short, the sequence 
of change of this type is driven, in part, by utilitarian principles.  This contrasts with the 
choice of actions that require new relationships to be formed with other individuals or 
communities (for example, engagement in trade, migration and alterations to the social 
organisation and structure of authority – and indeed the development of collaborative 
methods of production, such as irrigation schemes).  These social choices are more complex 
and ambiguous in terms of outcome, mainly because a reconciliation of differing human 
interests must be sought.  The prospect of conflict arises, the subject of the following chapter. 
But ignoring conflict for the moment, successive choices in this area could, for example, lead 
to an increasingly hierarchical social structure to achieve coordination of interdependent 
activities, with an accompanying skewed distribution of power and influence – as well as of 
consumption and wealth – involving the alienation of particular groups.  The specific nature 
of the social and political structure could affect the possibility of it becoming self-
perpetuating, particularly its ability to ensure succession (given the mortality of the 
individuals concerned) – another potential source of conflict.  Collapse of such a system is 
certainly conceivable (Diamond 2005).  In short, the sequence of change of this type is driven 
by moral principles, not necessarily mutually consistent. 
However, the consequences of the temporal succession of choices become much more 
complex once the uncertainty noted above as being integral to the nature of choice is 
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considered.  Given deviation of the actual outcomes from what was intended by the actions 
taken, whether in respect of production or social relations, the historical succession might be 
expected to possess an intrinsic contingency.  Yet, as noted in the preceding chapter, the 
broad sweep of human history, from prehistory to the present, is frequently represented as 
systematically structured, often ordered in stadial terms or periodization.  Material and 
documentary evidence appear to testify explicitly to a progression in the exploitation of 
natural capacities (technological change) and in the reorganisation of social relationships into 
more complex if not more robust forms.  Both involve increasingly specialised roles for 
individuals and thereby increasing mutual interdependence (involving social and political 
change).  This evidence appears to indicate a clear directionality of change, seemingly at odds 
with the implied contingency of the outcomes of choices.  However, Ben-Menahem suggests 
that necessity and contingency need not be considered as a binary opposition, but rather a 
matter of degree ‘in terms of stability, that is, sensitivity or insensitivity to initial conditions 
… [so that] an event will be considered (more or less) necessary, not if it takes place under all 
circumstances, but it is relatively insensitive to small changes in the circumstances in which it 
takes place … [Accordingly] necessity is different from determinism’ (Ben-Menahem 2011: 
123; emphasis in original).  Thus, events that severally are thoroughly contingent – not what 
the principled originative actions sought to create – nonetheless in their respective wider 
contexts compose at their own rate into retrospectively discernible patterns over the long 
term, under the influence of the self-same principles.  This could correspond to Braudel’s 
‘longue durée’, the fundamental component of his extended marine metaphor, ‘the 
“anonymous, profound and almost silent” domain that covertly determines everything above 
it’ in the ‘surface agitation’ and swifter currents of social change (Carr 2008: 25).  This 
apparent order over the longer term could variously be interpreted as the consequences of a 
‘law’ of history (although ‘dialectical process’ would be more accurate), a teleological 
movement from the perspective of religious faith or a self-organising and adaptive 
evolutionary process.  In the following chapter the role of the chaos of conflict in propelling 
this process in a particular direction will be considered. 
The problem of methodological individualism 
The individual has a substantive physical existence expressed in the exercise of bodily 
functions – most publicly in independent movement.  However, to conceive individual 
movement as action, directed by an implicit subjective intentionality, involves abandoning the 
prospect of knowing whether the observed action is solely and entirely the inspiration of the 
individual concerned.  From a different perspective, the preceding consideration of choice – 
which emphasised the role of the human imagination in transcending the objective ignorance 
of the future – did not exclude the choosing agent being a group.  Moreover, the earlier 
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discussion of the notion of an event as a composition of actions (themselves choices) did not 
rule out different individuals’ actions being interdependent.  But even although, on the one 
hand, the complete autonomy of the individual is beyond proof and, on the other, the essential 
plurality of the origins of human action is evident to common sense, the conception of the 
isolated individual has been awarded an important ontological status in much theoretical 
analysis.  The concept of the unitary agent did facilitate theoretical analysis in the same way 
as an extension-less or point mass facilitated Newtonian theoretical mechanics.  General 
equilibrium analysis within neoclassical economic theory is a persuasive example of the 
notion of harmonisation of independent multi-agent action, without cooperation.  But 
elsewhere in economic theory an early result showed the instability of a coalition of unitary 
agents (a cartel, for example), which suggested that the explanation of observed stable and 
enduring social relationships requires a quite different base.  Nonetheless the presumed 
ontological validity of the individual helped underwrite the construction of a de-personalised 
model individual, represented by a well-specified objective function and an attached 
solipsistic conception of rationality.  Allied with a non-empirical maximand (generally 
‘utility’, more recently ‘happiness’), human action was represented as the computable 
solution to a maximisation problem.  Features of this representation have contributed to its 
adoption in specific parts of anthropological archaeology: its already-noted attribution of 
change to the impact of exogenous factors, its seemingly endless capacity for elaboration – 
for example, to incorporate risk and strategic interaction with other agents in small-number 
contexts, as in game theory – and its insulation from falsification.  The reach of 
methodological individualism was significantly extended by the analogy drawn between the 
‘blind’ biological process of evolutionary speciation and the process of human action in its 
ordinary business of living.  For example, Shennan notes, ‘… natural selection provides the 
basis for [a] kind of universal logic [such that] people always … act in ways that an outside 
observer can recognise as conducive to their survival and reproductive success – to their 
fitness, in other words’ (Shennan 2004: 20).  The conceptualisation of natural selection in 
cost-benefit terms, as (unconscious) maximisation of ‘fitness’ subject to an environmental 
constraint, is formally equivalent to the standard model of microeconomic theory.  Like it, it 
is endlessly flexible in its capacity to represent the wide range of actions inferred from the 
disposition of the material evidence, including forms of social relationship – for example, 
social hierarchies and hereditary social inequality – as evolutionarily efficient (Boone 1992; 
Maschner, Patton 1996, cited in Clark 2000: 94-97).  An alternative approach, equally 
individualistic and rationalistic, develops the inherent computability of optimising decisions 
in a cognitive science direction by utilising artificial intelligence methods to simulate multi-
agent interaction and model the emergence of a form of social structure (Lake 2004: 191-
209).  However, while methodological individualism has supported a range of theoretical 
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developments, two problems have not been resolved: the individual appears as a reactive 
mechanism – according to Clark, ‘a wind-up toy’ (Clark 2000: 105), to Dupuy, ‘an 
automaton’ (Dupuy 2000: 143) – while society is reduced to a determinate configuration of 
compatible multi-agent actions, a ‘stripped-down’ version of Archer’s ‘Upward Conflation’ 
(Archer 1995: 4) discussed below, from the individual to the social. 
3.4 Complexity, order and disorder in human affairs 
Natural capacities and the presumption of order 
From the standpoint of history and archaeology (to the extent the latter also seeks to explain 
temporal succession of discrete events) the abstract timelessness of methodological 
individualism robs it of relevance.  Their focus on the explanation of endogenous change, 
requires a richer conception of the individual, one which explicitly admits the individual’s 
relationship with others – that is, society at large, since that inevitably forms the distinctive 
context within which human action is pursued.  At the very least the inescapable biological 
nature of the individual entails relations with others.  Thus, the family and the kinship group 
are unavoidably basic elements of society, so that ‘…  actions attributable to various 
individual persons are performed by them in their capacity as members of a specific family 
and represent intentions in which they share precisely as members of that family (Olafson 
1979: 124).  But these groups are not themselves homogeneous; they are structured internally 
by age, gender and personality.  However, the objective is to explain specific trajectories of 
actions over time, not to develop a general theory of temporal change – from the outset of this 
study considered to be a contradiction in terms.  Insights into the diverse nature of the springs 
of human action and their inter-relationship with society are required, these to be used 
selectively in the explanation of singular events.  Nonetheless, a key issue is whether the 
social context can reasonably be represented as a rationally ordered real structure, in the 
manner of a determinate and stable physical state.  From Archer’s realist perspective, order is 
unlikely: ‘[T]he human condition [is] to be born into a social context (of language, beliefs and 
organization) which was not of our making: agential power is always restricted to re-making, 
whether this is reproducing or transforming our social heritage’ (Archer 1995: 72); ‘Society is 
that which nobody wants, in the form in which they encounter it, for it is an unintended 
consequence’ (ibid.: 165).  This is in accord with the earlier-stated emphasis placed on the 
propensities to inquire and to create – i.e. to change.  However, the possibility is not ruled out 
that successive changes could prove, ex post facto, to be directional. 
The prospect of spontaneous order in human life 
An influential concept particularly within mainstream analytical economics is that of 
‘spontaneous social order’.  It has intellectual origins in Adam Smith’s ‘invisible hand’, 
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which was imagined to bring about beneficent external consequences that were not the 
intention of the initiating agents.  In essence, it is a system-wide generalisation of the simple 
notion that freely conducted bilateral exchange is to the mutual benefit of the participants.  
Promoted by von Mises and von Hayek it effectively presumed that ‘… the following two 
propositions [were] noncontradictory…: first, that human beings bring society into existence 
through their actions; second, that society is beyond their control, because it is (infinitely) 
more complex than they are’ (Dupuy 2000: 157).  No agent possesses the information 
necessary to attain order; it may be implicit in the structure, but the structure itself is not an 
agent.  ‘It is knowledge without a subject’ (ibid.; emphasis in original).  Order is thereby an 
emergent property of the social system.  Nonetheless, the underlying ontology is still provided 
by methodological individualism, wherein ‘… social phenomena are subjective and exist in 
the minds of individuals. … This goes for all human creations, artefacts as well as social 
institutions’ (Udehn 2011: 211).  However, Searle defends the claim that ‘…entities that only 
exist because we think they exist’ nonetheless possess objective reality, which need not be 
limited to observer-independent features of the material world but is inclusive of ‘observer-
relative’ features (Searle 1998: 144).  The latter include the social and institutional reality, the 
ontology of which involves assigning what Searle calls ‘status functions’ to individuals or 
groups of individuals occupying defined positions in the social structure.  These functions are 
unrelated to the physical nature of the individuals concerned and express a ‘collective 
intentionality’ (in first-person plural terms).  This is warranted by ‘constitutive rules’ defining 
rights and obligations, which generate interlocking structures and so form the institutional 
reality (ibid.: 148-153).  While these are structures ‘… whose point is not just to empower 
other institutional structures, but to control brute reality’ (ibid.: 155), they not only establish 
an integral normativity but also thereby admit the prospect of its abuse: rules can be broken.  
Accordingly, this approach intimates the possibility of conflict within the social structure, 
which the concept of spontaneous order effectively excludes. 
Functionality and structure as order 
A more appropriate preparation for the treatment of conflict in the following chapter can be 
extracted from Archer’s advocacy of realist social theory (Archer 1995), in which the concept 
of the ‘emergent property’ acquires considerable significance and relevance. The adoption of 
a social realist perspective on the relationship between the individual and society, i.e. between 
agency and structure, has a particular relevance for this study as it explicitly focuses on the 
passage of time.  ‘The central argument is that structure and agency can only be linked [as 
opposed to conflating one with the other] by examining the interplay between them over time, 
and that without the proper incorporation of time the problem … can never be satisfactorily 
resolved …’ (Archer 1995: 65; emphasis in original).  The underlying problem to be resolved 
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is the putative ontological dualism between structure (society) and agency (the individual), an 
issue located in the contested intersection of sociology and psychology.  It effectively poses a 
question of autonomy: regarding structure (of society) and agency (of the individual), does 
one, neither or both possess autonomy in respect of the initiation of change? Methodological 
Individualism ascribes it to the individual; Methodological Holism to the structure; Giddens’s 
Structuration Theory, with its Ontology of Praxis, to neither.  By their respective deployments 
of (using Archer’s terms), Upward Conflation, Downward Conflation and Central Conflation 
(the last eliding the distinction between structure and agency), the problematic philosophical 
dualism is side-stepped.  However, Archer distinctively argues that both structure and agency, 
considered ‘radically different in kind’ (ibid.: 15) and viewed dynamically over time, give rise 
to emergent properties (structural, cultural and personal), a consequence of the stratified 
nature of both structure (in an institutional sense) and agents (as individuals), in terms of 
function and physical circumstances.  ‘Emergent properties are relational, arising out of 
combination … [T]he stratified nature of social reality … [ensures] different strata possess 
different emergent properties’ (ibid.: 9).   This mutual interplay of individual and society 
involves ‘morphogenesis’, by which Archer intends ‘… to capture both the possibility of 
radical and unpredictable re-shaping [of both structure and agency] (which renders misleading 
all those traditional analogies – of society being like a mechanism, organism, language or 
cybernetic system) …’ (ibid.: 75).   Its antonym is ‘morphostasis’, essentially the maintenance 
of the status quo.  At the core of morphogenesis is the notion that related changes in structure 
and individual action occur over different time periods: ‘… structure necessarily predates the 
action which transforms it … [and] structural elaboration necessarily post-dates those actions’ 
(ibid.: 90).  Significantly, Archer’s ‘analytical dualism’ is not derived from an intention to 
identify a ‘solution state’ in the manner of a deductive theoretical model. 
Human activity as an open system  
Archer’s approach essentially develops the distinction set out above, between science and 
non-science, which is in effect a very specific partition of human action – or, better, human 
projects, to stress the focused intentionality that is presumed to be involved.  Scientific 
projects involve the construction of unnatural closed physical systems within which human 
action manipulates objects of study in a controlled manner to warrant conclusions (albeit 
provisional) grounded in the determinateness of the experimental results demonstrated within 
the containment of the systems – observed regularities which support Humean causal 
explanation.  The corresponding theoretical models achieve deductive closure by the 
incorporation of abstract law-like premises.  In stark contrast, non-scientific projects are 
pursued in a natural, open human system where individuals’ actions impinge on others, 
disturbing their contexts and perceptions, thereby instigating subsequent second- (and higher) 
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order responses, some of which feed back subsequently on the initiator of the original action.  
Archer claims that ‘… the social system is open, open because peopled, and therefore of no 
fixed form due to human powers of unpredictable innovation’ (Archer 1995: 194) – what 
earlier was identified as human creativity.  But this poses a significant question, as to whether 
any meaningful propositions at all can be advanced about this process of human action, in the 
light of its non-scientific nature.  Archer’s ‘morphogenetic’ approach offers a useful 
framework that not only gives structure to this uniquely human process but also helps locate 
within the trajectory of human life the kind of substantive events identified earlier as of 
peculiar interest to history and archaeology, including the emergence of conflict, as a specific 
category of significant event.  As noted above her approach explicitly addresses the passage 
of time and accordingly is not directed to the development of an atemporal equilibrating 
model to mimic the products of the scientific approach.  Instead it offers a distinctive 
schematic treatment of the dialectical relationship between social structure and human agency 
that acknowledges the heterogeneity and fluidity of the social world.  Archer states that ‘… it 
is my view that only by rejecting the terms of … traditional debates and completely revising 
them on a different ontological basis can we get away from one dimensional [upward or 
downward] conflationary theorizing and replace it by theories of the interdependence and 
interplay between different kinds of social properties’ (ibid.: 8). 
Conjunction and disorder in human life 
The locus of innovative human action is an inherited social context, to be remade by the 
agent.  Accordingly, action takes place within the perceived confines of an involuntaristic 
placement in a specific stratum of society, one created by diverse emergent properties, their 
necessary direct and indirect consequences mediated by past human action.  These emergent 
properties are both structural – relations with material resources and people – and cultural – 
relations with ideas and beliefs (‘culture as a whole is taken to refer to all intelligibilia, that is 
to any item which has the dispositional capacity of being understood by someone’ (ibid.: 
180)).  The appropriateness of any substantive human action is framed by the vested interest 
associated with the role involuntaristically acquired along with the individual’s personal 
social placement.  Opportunity costs attend various expressions of that interest.  These costs 
are not necessarily material or commensurable, nor is it presumed that normative motives 
would not be influential: ‘just as material reasons [for action] derive from the structural 
context and objectively both encourage and discourage certain judgements about courses of 
action, so too, normative reasons emanate from the cultural context and have the same effects 
upon situational evaluations’ (ibid.: 212).  Individual evaluation leads to action either to 
maintain the status quo and preserve current advantages (morphostasis, reproducing the 
existing structure), or to pursue change and attain perceived improvement (morphogenesis, 
  Explanation and Human Agency 
 
61 
 
transforming the structure), depending on the imagined balance of costs and benefits – ‘… to 
perpetuate rewarding situations and to eradicate frustrating ones’ (ibid.: 250).  But there is no 
pre-determined order implicit in the situation. 
3.5 Change in human affairs: contingency versus necessity 
Purposeful activity 
Archer’s generalisation of this argument is of special relevance.  First-order emergent 
properties bring about those of a second order (and subsequently those of a higher order), 
given the inter-relatedness that characterises a social system.  These second-order emergent 
properties, structural or cultural) involve a larger number of individuals.  As they are 
essentially unintended consequences of the direct effects of the original action, it cannot be 
presumed that they will all be mutually complementary.  Instead there can exist ‘strains and 
incompatibilities’ or ‘incongruences’ that ‘… represent a systemic fault line running 
throughout the social structure.  Whether it is split open remains unpredictable, but its 
existence will condition strategies for its containment versus its actualization among different 
sectors of the population’ (ibid.: 215).  This in itself will provide a link with the emergence of 
conflict, as will be considered below.  But in addition to this possible complementarity versus 
incompatibility, the relationship between different second-order emergent properties may 
reflect necessity or contingency.  The four possible configurations of emergent properties 
thereby generated will carry different implications for different sections and strata of the 
population, given their individual roles and associated vested interests, in terms of the losses 
and gains to be incurred, depending on which change takes place.  This will impact on their 
choice of action.  In Archer’s terms ‘… quite different situational logics, which predispose 
agents towards specific courses of action, are created by relations within and between various 
[emergent properties]’ (ibid.: 216; emphasis in original); accordingly, depending on their 
specific circumstances, ‘… different sections of the population [are predisposed] to see their 
interests served by defensive, concessionary, competitive, or opportunist modes of interaction 
with other groups [the pursuit of which generates] either morphogenesis or morphostasis. … 
[Which eventuates is] conditioned by the relative [bargaining] power of the interacting social 
groups’ (ibid.: 217; emphasis in original).  Archer’s argument undermines the plausibility of 
the notion that purposeful human action is necessarily directed towards the reproduction or 
perpetuation of the given social system in which it occurs, conceived as an orderly structure.  
However, it more fundamentally questions any presumption that human action necessarily 
provides an equilibrating tendency within the socio-cultural system, grounded in rational 
choice. 
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Composition of human capacities 
Archer argues that it is fundamentally mistaken to treat the human person, the agent and the 
actor as synonymous.  ‘I am not merely arguing that personal and social identities are not 
synonymous but [also] that our humanity is prior to our social identity and that social identity 
is emergent from personal identity’ (ibid.: 284).  ‘… the morphogenetic perspective … [is 
distinctive] in presenting the human Person as fathering the Agent, who in turn fathers the 
Actor, both phylogenetically and ontogenetically’ (ibid.: 254, 255).  A general aspect of this 
distinctiveness is the plural nature of the Agent, which is defined as ‘collectivities sharing the 
same life chances’ within the stratified social structure, thus agents are ‘agents of something’, 
resembling the distinction between agent and principal deployed within a part of economic 
analysis.  The Actor, like the Person, is singular, defined in respect of a specific role within 
the social structure.  But the special aspect of this distinctiveness is the introduction of two 
categories of agent: ‘corporate’ agents and ‘primary’ agents.  The former are ‘[o]rganized 
interest groups … who are aware of what they want, can articulate it to themselves and others, 
and have organized in order to get it, can engage in concerted action to re-shape [as 
morphogenesis] or retain [as morphostasis] the structural or cultural feature in question [and 
include] social movements and defensive associations’ (ibid.: 258).  The latter are similarly 
interest-defined collectivities but they lack, for the time being (which may be a long time), 
‘… a say in structural or cultural modelling … [and] in systemic organization and 
reorganization …’ (ibid.:259).  Nonetheless, merely by their continuing existence and pursuit 
of their interest they may frustrate action by corporate agents and occasion deviation.  As 
Archer points out, ‘The major systemic effect of Primary Agency is purely demographic … 
[via] dumb numerical pressure’ (ibid.: 262) – suggestive of the notion of the ‘silent majority’.  
Indeed, it is the interaction between plural corporate agents (reflecting different interests) and 
similarly plural primary agents, that results in the ‘morphogenetic cycle’ by which agency at 
large is seen to be a structural and cultural emergent property. 
Archer distinguishes three phases of the cycle: first, the identification and conditioning of 
groups of agents, their separation into corporate and primary in response to the initial 
distribution of their interests, with the corporate agents taking the initiative in the pursuit of 
change; second, the interaction between groups of corporate and primary agents, the former 
organized and the latter not, the categories being ‘redefined over time through interaction in 
pursuit of social stability or change’; third, elaboration in the form of the achievement of 
organization by some primary agents, thus becoming corporate agents, thereby influencing 
the resultant social change which ‘… does not approximate to what anyone wants’ (ibid.: 264, 
265), setting up the situation for perpetuation of the cycle.  It is not difficult to argue along 
these lines to the conclusion that, in specific circumstances, this interaction of interests and 
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roles can lead to a build-up of tension among groups and their members and a violent 
collision of intentions and eruption of the type of event noted in the preceding chapter – or the 
types of conflict to be considered in the following one. 
3.6 Human agency, reflexivity and explanation 
The explanation of human failure 
Archer’s approach has been considered at length because it offers a framework that could 
helpfully bring order to the seemingly inchoate succession of human actions over time.  
Archer certainly intended her contribution to be of immediate practical value, as an aid to 
interpretation of specific historical contexts.  Accordingly, her scheme is not analytical, in the 
sense of an abstract model summarising experimentation or based on purportedly a priori 
principles.  It does employ generalised categories that might be construed as analytical and at 
odds with the practical intention – such as ‘structure’, ‘groups’, ‘vested interest’, ‘role’ and 
‘bargaining power’.  But these are in accord with a representation of the human person that 
stresses his/her objective social nature rather than as a hypothetical isolated entity: human 
relationships are a real and integral dimension of humanity.  Moreover, none of these 
categories is given explicit form or content, that being an empirical matter pertaining to a 
specific context. 
Two implications follow.  First, it is not a predictive scheme, in contrast with, for example, 
the treatment of bargaining presented by neoclassical economic analysis, a model whose 
stringent and abstract assumptions relegate it to an atemporal world and renders the model 
irrelevant to historical and archaeological explanation.  But that might warrant the corollary 
that the real consequences for human affairs (outside the realms of science and technology) of 
all human action in real time are perpetually ‘sub-optimal’ or simply unintended.  In short, the 
explanation of human action is essentially the explanation of failure, even if the spring of 
human action is the innovative and hopeful pursuit of a better world (often inspired by what is 
viewed as evidence of past failure).  There is, however, no paradox: action is always a move 
in what has some features of a zero-sum game: where one group’s gains, real or perceived, 
are offset, in broad but incomparable terms, by another group’s losses, real or perceived.  
Given this inevitable re-distributional dimension of human action, the key question is whether 
the value-laden charge, that human action is unavoidably theft, in some sense, can be avoided 
or evaded – or at least ameliorated.  It is plausibly a matter of rules and values. 
Second, the actual relationships between individuals are not physical in any mechanical sense 
but are essentially matters of claims and obligations, rights and duties, rules and conventions, 
laws and freedoms.  In short, they are moral in nature (in a broad sense), and not capable of 
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exhaustive specification in terms of substance, albeit their form might be capable of 
definition.  Moreover, as noted previously, there can be no presumption that, in a specific 
historical context, all the operative relationships are consistent with each other; tension could 
be endemic.  But it can be presumed that respect for any one is a matter of a personal 
commitment that in principle can be rescinded at a stroke – albeit with consequences in terms 
of Archer’s costs and benefits.  Indeed, it may be that the succession from one state of affairs 
to another includes an abrupt realignment of the prevalent moral positions that define 
relationships among individuals.  Accordingly, consideration should be given to the moral 
dimension of human action. 
3.7 The social and moral dimensions of human action 
Constituting society: The rules of the game 
The general problem of presentism affecting history and archaeology has been noted already: 
the possibility that a retrospective assessment of the past will be influenced by awareness of 
what subsequently happened.  However, a substantive variant is the possibility that the 
present understanding of the category of moral knowledge is markedly different from what it 
was in the past, corrupting present interpretation of past action.  The moral category can 
change spontaneously, unhindered by materiality.  As MacIntyre points out, talking of the 
contemporary situation, ‘[W]e have – very largely, if not entirely – lost our comprehension, 
both theoretical and practical, of morality’ (MacIntyre 2007: 2).  Such knowledge as we have 
of what has been lost is partial, very largely dependent on interpretation of past documentary 
sources, supplemented by abductive inference from archaeological artefacts – although that is 
the least reliable category of inference (Hawkes 1954).  MacIntyre suggests that ‘… to a large 
degree people now think, talk and act as if emotivism were true … [embracing its] 
obliteration of any distinction between manipulative and non-manipulative social relations’ 
(ibid.: 22, 23; emphasis in original).  That is, other individuals are currently treated as 
manipulable means, not ends.  ‘Questions of ends are questions of values, and on values 
reason is silent; conflict between rival values cannot be rationally settled. … All faiths and all 
evaluations are equally non-rational; all are subjective directions given to sentiment and 
feeling’ (ibid.: 26, citing Macrae’s assessment of Weber (Macrae 1974)).  From that 
perspective, it would seem that moral principles, now denied the authority of objectivity, 
cannot have a role in rational explanation of human action, which otherwise reduces to an 
expression of human will driven by personal preference, in the ordinary sense of feelings, if 
not genetic determination.  However, this reduction can be challenged from three 
perspectives.  First, the point has already been laboured that much human action is beyond the 
scope of ‘rational explanation’ if, strictly conceived, that amounts to atemporal 
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generalisations about natural capacities, unsupported by experimental results.  Second, it is 
questionable if the currently dominant explanation of human social organisation in terms 
derived from evolutionary biology actually is ‘rational explanation’.  That apparently depends 
on the contestable appropriateness of various analogies (for example, between long-term 
speciation and short-term intra-species behaviour, between the behaviour of different species 
– particularly between humans and other primates – and between biological process and 
socio-economic process), plus the applicability and adequacy of ‘fitness’ as a testable (i.e. 
falsifiable) universal maximand.  Third, as noted earlier, significant human actions are 
premised on commitments to moral evaluations considered to be true in specific contexts 
rather than simple preferences (Etzioni 1988: Ch. 5), while the historical record shows that 
actual human conflict frequently stems from an opposition of moral commitments – to be 
discussed in the following chapter.  Anticipating that argument, the distinctiveness of a moral 
(or, generally, normative) premise does not turn, in principle, on a matter of physical fact, so 
the co-existence of contrary moral premises is conceivable and beyond resolution through 
practice.  Accordingly, the freedom of different individuals to commit themselves to such 
premises belongs not in the realm of the inflexible practical necessity of sustaining life – in 
the household – but in the social and political realm (Arendt 1998 [1958]: 31).  In turn this is 
where violence can be justified (ibid.).  It follows that the emergence of social collectivities, 
defined in terms of distinctive normative commitments as much as physical properties, 
together with associated political structures, establishes contexts in which human 
relationships acquire a substantive capacity to employ violence either to originate or to 
suppress change. 
Social dynamics as causal 
As noted above, Archer intended her inductive scheme to have practical value, applicable to 
contemporary society.  Two important questions follow.  First, her view of society is of an 
essentially dynamic, heterogeneous structure, not amorphous but comprising stratified groups 
and substantive specialised individual roles: does this have relevance to archaeological and 
historical explanation?  Second, her analysis specifically emphasises structural and cultural 
emergence: can these processes yield insights into the occurrence of the kinds of events that 
constitute the explananda of archaeology and history, in particular, the role in them of 
conflict?  These are essentially empirical questions, to be considered in the final section of 
this chapter.  However, there is a parallel with the detailed scheme of ideal types developed 
by Weber: it too involved the identification of differentiated groupings within society, was 
intended to facilitate the empirical analysis of actual contemporary and historical societies 
and was not a deductive model.  He developed a comprehensive interpretative scheme of 
potentially wide applicability based on intersections of substantive types of human action, 
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social relationships and authoritative order, involving diverse syntheses of personal, religious 
and legal factors.  Weber’s classic interpretation of the emergence of ‘capitalism’ as an 
unintended consequence of the outworking of Puritan religious commitments is, according to 
Campbell, a fulfilment of his sociological aim of ‘… explaining a transition from traditional 
to [instrumentally] rational society without assuming a fixed, universal and unilinear 
evolution of social types’ (Campbell 1981: 185).   
However, archaeological and historical thought was strongly influenced by the contrary 
presumption in favour of unilinear evolution.  They have employed a stadial framework from 
the mid-eighteenth century, with, at least initially, limited weight being given to the internal 
structure of the constituent societies.  This framework has supported the emergence of the 
concept of social evolution (Pluciennik 2005: 11-13).  Analogies drawn with evolutionary 
biology contributed to the development of the neo-evolutionary approach within archaeology.  
The constant life-preserving human struggle against the physical environment resulted 
unconsciously in adaptive responses in the form of specific progressive changes in the nature 
of social collectivities, as well as technological change.  In this progression, the role initially 
performed by kinship supposedly diminished, in a transition from a simple isolated family to 
a complex political system.  The accepted unilinear sequence is from family to band, to tribe, 
to chiefdom, to state (Service 1971), mapping roughly onto the similarly unilinear change of 
exploitative mode from hunting-gathering through settled agriculture and subsequently to the 
fine division of labour characteristic of industrialised, capital-based production.   
The implied social homogeneity of each stage can be challenged, as can the impression of 
irreversibility of the sequence that arises when it is viewed as evolutionarily successful 
adaptation.  More important than the ‘stage’ at which society is said to be at is the 
contemporary nature of its internal group structure.  Societies are contemporaneously 
heterogeneous, and change is contingent, frequently in conjunction with conflict.  For 
example, as Fukuyama puts it, ‘Tribalism in its various forms remains a default form of 
political organization, even after a modern state has been created’ (Fukuyama 2011: 145, 
emphasis added).  There is manifold scope for social diversity, driven by the genealogical 
promiscuity underlying kinship; demographic differences; differential access to physical 
resources and differing effectiveness of their utilisation; and, specifically, the extent of 
reliance on competition or cooperation, raising sensitive issues of entitlement to output 
personally created or ownership of resources.  The accompanying potential for conflict raises 
problems requiring reference to some concept of justice, which in turn necessarily involves 
the presence of a hierarchical authority to give judgement where required, either secular or 
spiritual.  Fukuyama argues that it is ‘… [confessed] belief in the power of dead ancestors 
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over the living and not some mysterious biological instinct that causes tribal societies to 
cohere’ (ibid.: 60).  Despite the potentially unifying capacity of the individual monotheistic 
religions, between them they have generated animosities and conflict (to be considered in the 
following chapter).  These sources of social difference are not directly related to any stadial 
scheme.  However, the reductive commitment of present-day evolutionary theorists prompts 
their unfalsifiable claim that religious belief and socially directed capacities such as 
cooperation and aggression are genetically encoded, and have value in terms of evolutionary 
fitness.  Thus, their hypothesis is saved. 
Agents’ abilities to further or protect the vested interests associated with their group within 
this heterogeneous structure have the potential to promote qualitative change within both it 
and its culture, in accordance with the situational logic they encounter.  Whether, and if so 
when, that potential is realised involves ‘… the basic notion … that exchange transactions and 
power relations are both involved … The resources which are exchanged are varied (i.e. 
wealth, sanctions and expertise) [while power is a matter of] the initial bargaining positions of 
the groups … [and the] group bargaining strength’ (Archer 1995: 296-297).  A uniform 
shared culture combined with a highly-skewed distribution of resources – e.g. concentrated in 
the hands of a structural élite – points to social stasis, at least for the time being (which may 
be a long time), reproducing rather than transforming itself.  The critical issue is that while 
the necessity to subsist drives human engagement with the physical environment – the 
fundamental basis of the possibility of evolutionary adaptation – the operative constraint in 
many contexts is social, defined in terms which fix the boundary of the group within which 
the individual exists.  The human imagination may have the potential capacity to envisage 
new social scenarios that transcend contemporary boundaries, but the reality may be of tightly 
prescribed opportunities involving discriminatorily controlled access to resources, both 
physical and human (in the form of permissible relationships).  This may be effectively self-
enforced by resigned acceptance of a culture that censors the imaginings of the disadvantaged 
as illegitimate and encourages the privileged to see the present outcome as their just 
entitlement.  Cultural morphogenesis can exert a causal influence in that context, but with 
unpredictable consequences. 
3.8 The composition of actions 
Unpredictability of outcomes 
The outcomes of individual action, beyond any immediate physical impressions it may make, 
are in practice fundamentally unpredictable, outside of an abstract model of individualistic 
decision-making.  It has been argued from the outset that a significant distinction can be 
drawn between repetitive human actions committed to replicating some known physical 
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relationship (a scientific experiment or a routine production process, for example) and the 
plurality of all other originative actions.  In the latter case, there is an inevitable absence of 
knowledge both about the full context of the action or of its possible consequences – in that 
respect they are essentially exploratory actions.  In addition, it was claimed that the continuity 
of time gave a connectedness to actions such that it was impossible to ignore the connections 
of an individual’s action to those before and those after, particularly as both recollection of 
the past and anticipation of the future entered current acting.  To this now needs to be added 
the fact that human action is invariably initiated within the context of involvement in one or 
more social groups: agency, following Archer, is a collective concept; the self is social.  This 
implies that individual action is not only likely to impinge on other individuals in the group(s) 
but is also likely to be conceived with a social relationship in mind, with the same being true 
of the actions of others in the group(s) – actions may be to emulate, forestall or impress other 
individuals or, importantly, engage with others in a cooperative activity or reciprocal 
transaction.  Consequently, it is not possible to specify precisely what the immediate 
consequences of the action will be, despite the presumption that the individual has acted with 
‘due diligence’.  But only in the case of an isolated replicable scientific experiment or routine 
production process does an approximation to the necessary and sufficient knowledge of the 
means-end relationship exist.  Otherwise contingency prevails.  In the social context, the 
action by one individual affects others and they in turn affect yet more, due to the intrinsic 
interdependence of social life.  Indeed, this supports the concept of emergence emphasised by 
Archer.  But what is true of subsequent actions must equally have been true of the prior 
actions: they are plausibly dependent on what preceded them, qualifying their status as 
originative.  Consequently, from this perspective there is neither beginning nor end to the web 
of exploratory actions and no possible mapping from these actions to ‘eventual’ outcomes. 
Ignorance of unintended consequences 
Human action, outside of well-rehearsed technical situations, is unavoidably conducted within 
a context of pervasive ignorance.  This contextual property enters consciousness to varying 
extents in different circumstances.  In so far as the individual is a reflective social animal, 
engagement with others can help form a shared perspective on this ignorance – a collective 
imaginative conceptualisation – which may counter its potential capacity to destroy entirely 
any resolution to act or, conversely, prompt activation of that capacity.  At the same time this 
engagement is the process by which, in a similar way, a perspective is placed on the 
normative dimensions of the proposed course of action – that is, a judgement arrived at, in 
relation to interpretations of the prevailing social mores and conventions.  Thus, a synthesis 
can emerge of both the positive and the normative aspects of prospective action.  
Furthermore, the engagement is fundamentally reciprocal, with the individual contributing to 
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these processes as well as benefiting from them, with the extent and effectiveness being 
possibly dependent on age, gender and social status.  The effectiveness of this engagement is 
plausibly grounded on the individual’s conscious ability to adopt and perform the empathetic 
role of the ‘impartial spectator’, not only in respect of others but also reflexively.  This human 
capacity occupied a crucial role in the development of Adam Smith’s moral philosophy, 
indeed it has been considered ‘… the most important element of Smith’s ethical theory’ 
(Raphael 2007: 11).  Accordingly, contemplated action, following Archer’s notion of 
collective agency, can be conceived as an expression of ‘group feeling’ or ‘collective will’, 
Rosenthal’s translations of Ibn Khaldûn’s aṣabîya, which is given prominence in Turchin’s 
analysis of warfare (Ibn Khaldun 2005 [1370]: xiv, xv; Turchin 2007: 91; in the latter, it 
appears – perhaps subtly differently – as ‘group solidarity’ or, simply, ‘cooperation’).  From 
this emerges a conception of what could and ought to be done in the circumstances, entangled 
with a similar conception of the undesirable outcomes of inaction, both plausibly influenced 
subjectively by the personal charisma of leaders of the collectivity. Equally plausibly, the 
emotional strand in the assessments of the potential benefits and costs (incommensurable in a 
strict objective sense and thus non-comparable on that basis) of action seems likely to be 
prominent in specific contexts, particularly fear where potential physical conflict could be 
anticipated. Hence, ignorance of unintended consequences is addressed collectively and need 
not involve the immediate presumption that the lack of certainty will itself warrant inaction. 
The inaccessibility of past minds 
The foregoing argument supports two conclusions.  First, society is a system of contiguous 
groups, each defined internally in terms of a shared broad genealogical origin, traditional 
practices, activities and ‘group feeling’, and externally in terms of relationships with its 
neighbouring groups, varying in degree of friendship or animosity and its inclination towards 
cooperation or competition, reflecting the intensity of the perceived polyvalent distinction 
between ‘we’ and ‘they’.  Complexity is contributed to each group by the diversity of 
individuals, with their personal histories, their membership of more than one group and 
differences in their standing and roles within each.  Second, this social system is the perennial 
locus for the discontinuous emergence of change, both structural and cultural.  The orderly 
and routine repetition of activities necessary to sustain life is overlain irregularly by 
disorderly change, of both endogenous and exogenous origin, generating the complex events 
that form the explananda of history and archaeology.  These result from the exercise of 
autonomous, albeit interacting, human wills, and the expression of individuals’ creative 
consciousness, qualified by contextual group feeling.  An evident consequence is the absence 
of any simple mapping between the physical evidence of the events and individual actions.  A 
reliable explanation of these events would seem to require access to minds, but personal 
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testimony is the only evident route.  The apparent lack of intrinsic reliability of testimony is 
attributed to the impossibility of it being corroborated, as inter-subjective agreement can 
address only the physical features of the event in question.  But to set corroboration as a 
criterion is to insist on a physicalist explanation.  So testimony has to be taken at its face 
value, as a matter of belief.  It is thereby subject only to belief’s tests of consistency, 
coherence and congruency with other evidence.  However, this evidence includes the 
testimony of others, so inconsistency may be anticipated to characterise the states of minds of 
the individuals concerned and thus be a part of the explanandum.  This seems to offer support 
for the suggestion in Chapter Two that a trial by jury, with its cross-examination of 
inconsistent testimony and its presentation of opposed advocacies could supply the archetype 
of explanation of human action.  However, as previously pointed out, the critical problem in 
history and archaeology is that the human witnesses are dead; all that is accessible is physical 
evidence they have left behind, presenting the problems of interpretation and inference 
considered at some length in Chapters One and Two.  Accordingly, the advocacies of why 
what might have happened did not have to be assembled from imaginative reconstruction. 
The prospect of social conflict 
This chapter began by identifying the importance of the human mind and will in the 
explanation of human action.  The will of the individual has now been firmly positioned 
within an active social structure, without reducing either one to the other.  However, the 
internal relationships need to be considered further.   To regard an action as in essence an 
exercise of the human will seems to imply that the will has been totally ‘discharged’ in the 
action, leaving the actor ‘exhausted’ in a sense.  However, if the action has involved 
engagement with another party, whose will is similarly activated, it cannot generally be 
assumed that the outcome will be harmonious, though it may be in some instances.  And if a 
conflict of wills is involved it cannot be assumed that both parties will be left ‘satisfied’ as 
though it were an economic trade where appropriate price negotiation could lead to mutual 
satisfaction.  Thus, on either part, or indeed for both, there may be a ‘carry-forward’ of 
dissatisfaction, resentment or other negative feeling, consequent on the clash of wills.  It is 
argued here that conflict of wills is ubiquitous in social relationships.  This was indeed 
implicit in the preceding account of the emergence of structural and cultural change, with its 
reference to stratified groups and vested interests and the significance of benefits and costs 
associated with contemplated change.  It seems implicit in the nature of social engagement 
that conflict is the default position, rather than the harmony that a particular analytical form 
might import.  Reference has been made on several occasions to the human propensity to 
bring about change or to innovate, that being one of the main motivations behind the search 
for knowledge.  While technological advancement is one consequence, social change is a 
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target also, and arguably one which is more difficult to secure, precisely because it involves 
relationships among individuals and groups, rather than between humans and the natural 
capacities of their physical environment (though the issue of ownership of resources 
complicates even that).  As Archer puts it (in words similar to a previous citation) ‘… 
generically “society” is that which nobody wants in exactly the form they find it in and yet it 
resists both individual and collective efforts at transformation …’ (Archer 1995: 2).  Thus, the 
achievement of social integration – and, in particular, the replacement of one form of 
integration (or one régime) by another – is a potential source of conflict.  While it can be 
presumed that each individual pursues change and the attainment of some imagined future, it 
is only within a collectivity of agency that it can also be presumed that agreement exists as to 
the nature of the change sought and so some commonality of will exists to act in a specific 
way. Other groups may well have different shared intentions and wills.  The relevant 
questions concern how that conflict can be resolved when it becomes activated, and in 
particular whether the use of physical force or moral suasion is more likely to prove 
appropriate in the circumstances.  These issues are considered in the following chapter. 
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Chapter 4 Explanation and Human Conflict 
 
Preamble  
 
It has been argued that, although human actions originate in individual wills, the 
embeddedness of individuals in complex social groups precludes the separability necessary to 
attribute autonomy unambiguously either to the individual or to the group.  Accordingly, 
explanations of action that presume such autonomy are inadequate.  Moreover, the essential 
subjectivity of perception, will and social relationship preclude explanation in terms of a 
mechanical analogue, despite the engagement of humanity’s innate drive to survive with its 
objective environment.  Human action demands an historical explanation, to address the 
singularity imposed by the passage of time.  The claim to be considered in this chapter is that, 
from the necessary holistic perspective, humanity constitutes an open system that is 
intrinsically and permanently conflicted.  Its conflicts do not necessarily and spontaneously 
resolve themselves to a harmonious stasis, although the outcome need not be perpetual 
physical violence: its absence from a given time and place signals the operation of effective 
constraints; its presence signals their collapse.  The conflicted relationship between 
individuals and social groups is multidimensional, with social, psychological, economic, 
political, religious and legal aspects.  The composition of these offers no assurance that 
deadly violence will be suppressed. 
4.1 The Sources of Conflict 
Relational Contexts 
Human conflict is a form of opposition, ‘… a process by which social entities function in 
disservice of one another’ (Wright 1951: 197).  At its root are cognitive states involving a 
perceived incompatibility of individuals’ motives, purposes and intentions (Berkovitch et al 
2008: 4), in respect of either a choice of means, by way of specific actions, or a choice of 
ends, as to which values or belief system should prevail over the other (ibid.: 6).  Conflict can 
thus be viewed as a relational quality.  Yet the role of conflict is frequently neglected: ‘[t]he 
prevailing normative picture of humankind held up by the social sciences … portrayed … 
rational creatures who could be expected to relate to and treat fellow humans with basic 
empathy, kindness, respect and decency’ (Waller 2002: 11).  Evidently a different perspective 
is needed to accommodate conflict explicitly, in its different aspects.  Several substantive but 
intersecting relational contexts can be distinguished: the familial, the social, the economic and 
the political.   The familial is the biologically driven context of immediate kin – which 
necessarily defines non-kin ‘others’; the social, the wider notions of community, ethnicity or 
culture, which define members and non-members; the economic, the productive activities 
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necessary to generate a standard of living, which defines ‘rich’ and ‘poor’; the political, the 
hierarchically structured, power-permeated context of collective decision-making, which 
defines the empowered and the disempowered.  Each of these occupies a dynamic temporal 
milieu, conditioning the relational contexts.  The passage of time fosters individuals’ 
awareness of the progression of life and the significance of birth and death.  The former draws 
attention to origin in a union of individuals of different kin, relatedness within a genealogy 
and an awareness of identity; the latter forces the inheritance and divestment of responsibility.   
Conflict and development 
This temporal continuity is ruptured discontinuously by the initiation of and response to 
developmental change, disturbing each of the relational contexts.  At the most basic self-
sufficient stage of development the contexts can all be tightly integrated so that the kin group, 
the community, the productive unit and the collective decision-taking body are one and the 
same.  Conflict might be anticipated to be minimal except between different kin groups, 
primarily around the procurement of wives and the maintenance of group autonomy.  But as 
development proceeds, driven by individuals’ inherent propensity to pose questions, 
investigate, and to do things differently to fashion their own identity and future, different 
forms of innovation and specialisation emerge.  This defines each of the contexts more 
sharply, a process accompanied by qualitative changes within the relations themselves.  It 
may be surmised that alliances of the like-minded achieved power over others, from which 
emerged hierarchical organisational structures, increasing in complexity and formality over 
time, to realise shared objectives.  With no reason for the actions of different groups to be 
mutually compatible in advance, developmental change might be expected to provoke conflict 
within each context, which constantly resolves in contingent outcomes perceived unequal and 
inequitable in terms of the social standing, economic value and political influence of specific 
groups.  Any given individual becomes concurrently a member of different sub-groups within 
these relational contexts – a member of an élite or a subordinate social group, materially rich 
or poor, politically influential or disempowered – complicating allegiances.  Kinship, 
elaborated as ethnicity, can generate less-easily eradicable or even deliberately fostered 
differences within and between groups, which add to the potential for conflict.  Cutting across 
these interfaces are differences in religious commitments.  Through their inherent subjectivity 
these are not only in principle able to be adopted or rejected independently of the existing 
objective context, but they also involve assenting to an authority, spiritual and human, 
exogenous to that context.  This adds a further dimension to conflict, as potentially indelible 
and sensitive as ethnicity – albeit in principle relinquishable.  Finally, the spatial 
redistribution of people, individually or in groups, driven by the development process, 
introduces yet another degree of diversity.  Marked social, economic and political differences, 
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and particularly different languages, are brought into close proximity by the promiscuous 
processes of industrial development and urbanisation. 
The norm of conflict 
Thus, the nominally homogeneous ‘humanity’ is characterised by internal diversity.  The 
complex range of relational differences diminishes the prospect of reaching mutual 
understanding or fostering the ‘empathy, kindness, respect and decency’ quoted above.  
Instead this diversity increases the prospect of conflict.  The members of one group are likely 
to know less about the members of another and their likely actions than they know about 
themselves.  So, they depend on rumour, impression and memory of past interaction to 
generate a subjective and conjectured image of the ‘other’ as a basis for action.  Accordingly, 
the incompatibility between ‘us’ and ‘them’ is subjective, driven ultimately by strongly held 
evaluative prejudices.  Conflict, then, is the norm.  If humanity exhibits a quiescent state, this 
may be due not to any intrinsic tendency towards harmony, but to the presence of sufficient 
endogenous controls (kin-related, social, economic, political, religious or legal) to ensure that 
conflict remains in check, until circumstances allow this control to fail. 
4.2 Conflict and ‘Scarcity’ 
These relational contexts could simply be overlooked, in favour of a reductive and physicalist 
approach.  Human conflict could be viewed as a natural and necessary consequence of a 
living (and thus procreating) species adapting reactively to the binding constraints set by its 
physical environment.  The species’ instinctive fecundity within its ecological niche 
perennially generates a surplus of individuals over the replacement requirements of the 
species supportable by the environment.  Some individuals necessarily perish through the 
operation of a selection mechanism that ensures the long-term fitness and survival of the 
species.  However, given the position of the human species in the food chain, various forms of 
conspecific lethal human conflict take the place of the control mechanisms of inter-species 
predation and starvation.  Individuals compete to survive, using diverse means to secure 
advantage.  Thus, for example, the Holocaust has been argued by some to be a politically 
conceived instance of surplus population removal (Rubenstein 1978: 288; Roth 1987: 84).  
Whether the potential unfalsifiability of this general account, or the way it interprets the 
predator-prey relationship, is acceptable is not central to the current argument.  But its 
Malthusian attribution of lethal conflict to the parsimony of the environment can be 
questioned.  The claim has two strands: first, that the zero-sum economic problem that 
confronts humanity – one person’s gain entailing another person’s loss – is the inevitable 
consequence of scarce natural resources; second, that the human response to this consequence 
necessarily involves lethal conflict, for humans will not co-operate.  The first strand is less 
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convincing if it is recognised that labour is itself a resource: the goods needed to support 
human life are not freely available; work has first to be combined with the natural resources, 
to produce useful goods.  The effectiveness of this effort – how hard the work is, or the 
‘scarcity’ of goods relative to labour – can be augmented by complementing labour with 
technological knowledge and improved organisation, obtaining gains from specialisation and 
the division of labour.  But these ‘anti-Malthusian’ measures originate in human 
innovativeness, require co-operation and involve destabilising, temporal processes of change.   
An understanding of any resultant conflict requires consideration of the previously mentioned 
relational contexts, rather than a simplistic attribution to ‘scarcity’.  The second strand – that 
humans will opt for conflict rather than co-operation – very clearly raises issues involving the 
relational contexts, if it is to be more than an a priori proposition.  Voluntary co-operation 
may be expected within cohesive social contexts, but not spontaneously between other 
groups, although authoritarian political régimes may enforce collective forms of production. 
Reductionist accounts 
More elaborate physicalist accounts of conflict can be conceived, explicitly incorporating, in 
some sense, the passage of time, as well as the existence of co-operation.  Two that do, in a 
sense, are Pinker 2011 and Turchin 2006.  Both presume that patterns detected in real-world 
data can support nomothetic explanations, in the manner of experimental observations.  
Pinker’s approach is individualistic and underpinned by evolutionary biology, and focuses on 
a selection of data from the thirteenth century onwards showing a world-wide monotonically 
declining trend in the numbers of violent deaths – as a measure of conflict.  An explanation is 
offered in terms of the balance established between opposing human psychological capacities, 
popularly described as ‘inner demons’ and ‘better angels’, implicated respectively in the 
acceptance or rejection of the use of violence towards fellow-humans.  The ‘demons’ are 
predation, the pursuit of dominance and revenge, an inclination to sadism, and ideology; on 
the side of the ‘angels’ are empathy, self-control, morality and taboo, and finally reason.  
Pinker primarily attributes the apparent trend towards a more pacific world to the gradual 
ascendancy of rationality over ideology.  But this is reinforced by states’ calculated exercise 
of their monopoly over legitimate violence, an issue of relevance to the later argument.  
Similarly, although this conclusion does not appear to depend directly on the internal contest 
of psychological natures that is given prominence in his account, the possibility of shifts of 
mental perspectives is of later relevance. 
Turchin focuses on a perceived cyclicity in the historical record of empires up to the sixteenth 
century, the apparent periodicity of conflict warranting the use of non-linear dynamics to 
order this material in terms of the ‘laws’ of history (‘cliodynamics’).  Statistical physics and 
  Explanation and Human Conflict 
 
76 
 
evolutionary theory are used analogically to avoid the otherwise troublesome issue of human 
freewill and to warrant group co-operation and self-sacrifice in conflict: ‘At some point [in 
human evolution], warfare became the most important force in group selection’ (Turchin 
2006: 129).  The central argument is that ‘Within-group co-operation is the basis for inter-
group conflict, including its extreme versions such as war and even genocide’ (Turchin 2006: 
5).  In addition, primogenitary inheritance and Malthusian mechanisms are used to underpin 
the decay and recovery that characterise the relevant overlapping cycles.  In short, both Pinker 
and Turchin address issues that feature in relational contexts, but endeavour to place them 
within explicitly nomothetic structures. 
Alternative approaches 
Resources do have considerable relevance for conflict, but not primarily in the sense involved 
in adaptive response to an environmental constraint.  As previously noted, it is not material 
resources per se that confer benefits, but what labour can make with them. And it is how these 
benefits are distributed that is the potential source of conflict, particularly if linked to an 
implicit normative presumption that whoever applies labour to material resources is thereby 
entitled to the resulting goods – an elemental form of ownership and justice.  The critical 
issue is that those unwilling to labour always have the option of plundering those who have 
laboured, or of enslaving others at subsistence rates or, indeed, employing them at minimal 
wage rates – all one-sided ‘trades’, resolving by force a deliberately engineered rather than 
‘natural’ conflict.  No different in principle is the maintenance of an army by taxation or 
requisition, or ‘foraging’ by troops themselves (effectively a form of plunder).  In short, by 
plunder or by taxation an ‘agricultural surplus’ is being forcibly extracted, whether it is to 
support a parasite tribe, a social élite or military manpower.  As Armstrong points out, by 
3000BC the Sumerians ‘… had devised the system of structural violence that would prevail in 
every single agrarian state until the modern period, when agriculture ceased to be the 
economic basis of civilization’ (Armstrong 2014: 19).  However, a different manifestation of 
‘structural violence’ emerged with the advent of industrialisation, consequent on the 
specialisation of labour, facilitated by technological and organisational innovation.  Industry 
was no less dependent on extraction of an agricultural surplus, itself augmented by 
technology.  The mutual dependence of specialisation generated problems of sharing the 
product, raising issues of equity, while co-ordination problems created unemployment – a 
‘surplus’ of a ‘scarce’ resource – raising issues of justice and security.  These distributional 
consequences, through which specific groups suffered scarcity – some labouring hard but 
with little return, others unable to find work – connected the economic relational context with 
both the social and political relational contexts in contrasting ways to those that facilitated the 
institutional changes in the first place.  This produced conflict between workers and owners, 
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between classes or ethnic groups with identifiable involvements in specific economic 
functions.  It has been argued that merchants or ‘middlemen’ generally occupy a position of 
social vulnerability, aggravated when they are of a different ethnicity from those with whom 
they trade.  This may have been a significant factor in the Holocaust and other instances of 
genocide (Zenner 1987: 254-260).  The general conclusion is that an adequate account of 
economic conflict requires an exercise in historical explanation; it is not something 
universally inevitable merely because of the nature of the physical environment. 
Ethnological perspectives 
Ethnological sources suggest that drawing a simple equation between resource scarcity and 
conflict has in part been a matter of interpretation.  According to Clastres, ‘[I]n the nineteenth 
century … the belief that primitive life was a happy life fell apart.  There was then a reversal 
… [and] the world of savages … became … the world of poverty and misery.  Much more 
recently … the founders of economic anthropology … [have asserted that] primitive economy 
is a subsistence economy which only allows savages to subsist’ (Clastres 2010 [1980]a.: 246).  
However, ‘The most recent, and most scrupulous, research in economic anthropology shows 
that the economy of the savages … in fact allows for the total satisfaction of [this primitive] 
society’s material needs, at the price of a limited period of productive activity at a low 
intensity’ (ibid.: 249, 250).  As Fry puts it ‘… foragers have a great deal of leisure time. … 
Rather than warring, typical responses to resource scarcity among simple hunter-gatherers 
are to move to a new area or else share resources’ (Fry, D.P. 2006: 175, 176; emphasis in 
original).  Within the primitive society food is produced communally and distributed 
cooperatively and, it would seem, equitably.  Keeley has noted from a different perspective 
that although ‘… the idea that the intensity of warfare is a function of human numbers has 
become widely accepted … cross-cultural comparisons do not support this proposition. … In 
the broadest view, the frequency of warfare and violence is simply not a consequence of 
human density or crowding.’ (Keeley 1996: 118). 
The supposed equivalence between predation and homicide can also be contested.  The 
archaeological record shows that primitive fire weaponry – bows and arrows – was apparently 
used both against game and humans, so that at one level it can justifiably be said that 
‘[h]unters only have to change their targets to become warriors …’ (Ferguson 1997: 325); ‘… 
warfare is merely … an “equivalent” of hunting.  War, like hunting, is “natural”; essentially it 
is “man hunting”’ (Guilaine, Zammit 2005: 19, citing Leroi-Gourhan 1965: 236, 237).  But at 
another level the choice of human targets involves a distinct element of aggression and 
violence that are absent from hunting for food and which, accordingly, presumably engages a 
different part of the brain.  Conversely, according to Clastres, ‘… even among the cannibal 
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tribes, the goal of war is never to kill the enemies in order to eat them … [P]rimitive war owes 
nothing to the hunt … and is rooted not in the reality of man as a species but in the social 
being of the primitive society’ (Clastres 2010 [1980]a: 246; emphasis added) – that is, a non-
individualistic consideration. 
4.3 The Interdependence of Contexts 
The social and political relational contexts appear from the outset to be more evidently human 
constructs, lacking the exogenous physicality that tends to dominate interpretation of the 
economic context.  Biological kinship is generally presumed to be the original, primary and 
incontrovertible basis of human social relationships.  This indelible relationship, necessarily 
structured by age and sex, is anticipated to display a greater freedom from conflict than other 
human contexts, with a higher level of empathy, mutual interest, respect and trust providing a 
ground for a potentially concordant, egalitarian, communal or group life, the ‘undivided we’ 
(Clastres 2010 [1980]a: 267).  This relationship seems to offer a basis for reproductive 
success.  An acquired awareness of familiar persons within the kinship group can promote a 
sense of belonging, a perception of shared experience and an immediate consciousness of 
motives of others, which could underpin an inherent reciprocity.  Differing levels of 
dependence, in terms of age, sex and physical capacity, and similar bases for functional 
specialisation in production activities, generate further internal bonds.  Of necessity kin 
simultaneously defines non-kin, an ‘other’ or potential ‘they’, an external source of potential 
conflict.  Nonetheless, the fratricide that is introduced early in the Jewish origin myth at the 
beginning of Genesis, or the instances of patricide in mythology, may be evidence of an 
ancient understanding that kinship is not guaranteed to be conflict-free.  Moreover, the 
dynamic nature of kinship precludes its complete closure or autarky: it is a product of 
procreation and the long-run survival of the group depends on its continuance through that 
process.  First, procreation itself requires relationships to be forged with non-kin, to avoid 
infringing the ubiquitous proscription of incest: wives may have to be obtained, by exchange 
or by force, from ‘outside’, until the group is sufficiently extended by multiple families to 
support acceptable endogamy.  This incorporation of non-kin may have divisive consequences 
if priority is given to either patrilineal or matrilineal (rather than bilateral) descent, in terms of 
where partners are expected to reside and how the ‘incomer’ is treated.  Second, the fecundity 
of procreation can generate a ‘centrifugal’ factor which may drive maturing male siblings, 
‘surplus’ for a time in respect of the group’s production activities, to seek independence 
beyond the kinship group – or to be the basis of a ‘warrior’ class within it.  This may be a 
reaction to the ‘tyranny of cousins’ that may stultify individual initiative within the group as it 
grows in size (Fukuyama 2011: 54, citing Gellner 1987: 6-28).  These two factors generate 
the possibility of conflict between and within kin.  ‘Intermarriage is … no guarantee of peace; 
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like trade, it can be an inducement to war.’ (Keeley 1996:  125).  On that view kinship as such 
offers no guarantee of harmonious relationships. 
Fry considers a range of ethnographic data on other possible discordant relationships arising 
within primitive kinship groups.  First, homicides (mainly by males) do occur, due, for 
example, to the breakdown of personal relationships through jealousy or rage in reaction to 
adultery or theft.  But while in some cases the community’s response may be to exact revenge 
through the execution of the perpetrator, in other cases the root problem may be ameliorated 
at an early stage by appropriate activation of anger- or conflict-management procedures, 
defusing the situation and avoiding the homicide. (Fry, D.P. 2006: Chs 3-6).  According to 
Fry, ‘Human aggression is a facultative adaptation, somewhat like the capacity to learn a 
language, not a rigid, obligate adaptation like bipedal locomotion’ (ibid.: 223).  Whether or 
not adaptation and capacity – to which could be added inclination or propensity – are properly 
synonyms could be debated, but this does emphasise the contingency of the particular event, 
that is, the occurrence of the homicide itself. 
Second, Fry stresses the plausible relationship between the emergence of social complexity, 
political power and war.  Citing Reyna, a critical factor is the degree of centralisation of the 
group, coupled with its size in terms of numbers, which is also associated with the degree of 
segmentation within the larger group along lineage or clan lines (ibid.: 100-113; Reyna 1994).  
Centralisation implies authority and its maintenance in the face of opposition, based on the 
display of superior difference and the exercise of force – internally to achieve a redistribution 
of income and wealth in its favour, externally to pursue war against neighbours.  The 
chiefdom is generally presumed to be the first emergent centralised political system, with its 
own militia providing a capacity to engage in battle (ibid.: 101). 
Supported by ethnographic evidence from diverse locations in Peru, Hawaii and Denmark, 
Earle argued that ‘[t]o build political institutions, chiefs shape their positions from three 
primary power media – economy, military, and ideology –  … sources of power which may 
be universal to the political process … [but which possess] quite dissimilar internal dynamics 
for change [giving rise, in differing combinations, to] distinctive power strategies 
represent[ing] different routes to (and from) social complexity’ (Earle 1997: 193, 194).  It is 
plausible to claim universality and interdependence of these media, as together they concern 
the totality of human concerns – freedom to secure a livelihood, freedom of movement and 
freedom to believe.  The chief’s centralized power rests on the capacity to constrain these, if 
necessarily using one to leverage the others.  Economic coercion allows requisition of a 
surplus – as noted previously – to fund military capability and the materialization of ideology 
(in monuments, temples, burials and ceremonies); military coercion enables the seizure of 
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both economic and ideological power; while ideological coercion legitimizes the exercise of 
the others.  Thus, a pattern of rights and obligations is enforced, effecting the distribution of 
income and wealth from the production process.  ‘This success [of the chief] corresponds 
directly with the failure of individuals to retain their independence through resistance’ (ibid.: 
208).  It is this political zero-sum game, related to the attainment and exercise of power, 
which has significance.  
Conflict and Constitutional Change 
Earle’s reference to resistance is in accord with Clastres’s conclusions, which point forward to 
a later argument.  The basic objective of primitive war is not to kill or conquer as an end in 
itself, but to defend the autonomy and egalitarian identity of the group by preventing its 
absorption into subordination in an emergent inegalitarian ‘state’ (Clastres 2010 [1980]b: 
164).  Moreover, the antecedents of warfare are located not just in the specific relationships 
existing between the protagonists, but also in relationships with their allies.  An ‘essential 
property of international life’ found even in primitive societies, is that ‘… war relates first to 
alliances; war as an institution determines alliances as a tactic’ (Clastres 2010 [1980]a: 267).  
In short, the objectives of warfare are intrinsically political and not simply the pursuit of 
material gain, as in spasmodic raiding for plunder.  These alliances with ‘others’ are a matter 
of circumstantial expediency, not contractual but subject to revision as time passes.  The 
upshot is a perpetual state of war (although not of constant violent engagement), a persisting 
tense and uncertain balance of power among the relevant groups.  The tipping of this balance, 
due to the unexpected victory of one group, would generate a radically new and hierarchical 
constitutional context for both the victor and the rest of the society of communities.  This 
becomes a step in an erratic process of qualitative change driven inexorably in the longer run 
by unpredictable innovation in military capability.  The maintenance of the primitive status 
quo was a vain hope: ‘Primitive conservatism … seeks to prevent innovation in society; it 
wants the respect of the Law to assure the maintenance of non-division; it seeks to prevent the 
appearance [i.e. emergence] of division in society’ (Clastres 2010 [1980]a: 273).  But the 
propensity to innovate is a basic human capacity – notwithstanding the implicit ignorance of 
its consequences and their potential divisiveness.  Innovation provokes conflict and political 
change; accordingly, ‘… the dividing line between archaic societies and “western” societies is 
perhaps less a matter of technical development than of the transformation of political 
authority’ (Clastres 2010 [1980]c: 90).  However, this need not mean that significant change 
could not occur without conflict – as, for example, the rapid spread of settled agriculture 
through eastern and central Europe, at the expense of hunter-gatherer groups, apparently 
without violent confrontation (Dennell 1985: 127; Dolukhanov 1999: 81).  Yet the 
relationship between technical development and political transformation appears symbiotic, 
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and warfare seems instrumentally entangled with both.  But the search for a general or 
theoretical explanation of these processes is likely to fail: ‘… the closed conception of these 
levels of social complexity [i.e. bands, tribes, chiefdoms and states] makes it difficult to 
model change from one level to another.  Each is defined unto itself, hence evolutionary 
openness is logically frustrated’ (Green, Perlman 1985: 6).  Despite the contemporary 
presumption that an evolutionary approach can achieve the explanation of change, all theories 
impose closure and in so doing fail to capture its elusive nature.   
Conflict and Constitutional Order 
The main thrust of the present argument is that change in the human context is embedded in 
the temporal succession of events, so a persuasive explanation of its open and contingent 
nature requires the adoption of an historical perspective, one which acknowledges the 
singularity of historical events.  It is the antithesis of the deterministic, nomothetic 
perspective.  The constitutional law historian Philip Bobbitt offers a distinctive contribution to 
this in The Shield of Achilles (Bobbitt 2002): ‘Fundamental innovations in war bring about 
fundamental transformations in the constitutional order of states, while transformations in the 
constitutional order bring about fundamental changes in the conduct and aims of war’ 
(Bobbitt 2008: 23).  The individual transformations are mutually stimulating and progressive 
(but not necessarily smoothly so), changing both the internal relations between inhabitants 
and their respective states and the external relationships among states.  His thesis involves the 
paradoxical entanglement of two contrasting trajectories of human innovation, one objective 
and one normative.  The former is humanity’s continuing pursuit of technological innovations 
to enlarge and refine its capacity to inflict lethal violence on itself; the latter is humanity’s 
perpetual search for constitutional innovations both to warrant and to restrain the 
consequences of that same capacity.  The evidence places the former beyond doubt.  The 
utilitarian driver of human technological innovation is to make work more effective, or 
‘easier’.  This is applicable no less to the military context than to civilian manufacturing, even 
if its eventual ‘output’ is killing – although, as warfare is a bilateral relationship, military 
technology must consider both offensive and defensive capability.  By the synthesis of 
mechanical, chemical and subsequently electronic means, aided by organisational and 
managerial changes, the ‘productivity’ or effectiveness of military action has been vastly, if 
episodically, and irreversibly increased.  Bobbitt’s thesis focuses on the constitutional 
implications of conflict between states conducted by these increasingly effective military 
means.  This engages the second trajectory of human innovation: to reduce the undesirable 
consequences of this burgeoning human capacity for self-directed deadly violence not by 
physical means (since these changes are irreversible) but by entering into mutually binding 
agreements – in short, by relying on ‘… the human capacity to make and keep promises’ 
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(Canovan 1998: xix).  The result is the contingent emergence of sovereign states that are 
pragmatically involved in continuing and evolving relationships with similarly positioned 
neighbours.  These emerge together, incidentally, as a ‘society of states’ – a substantive social 
structure with its own dynamic.  Bobbitt’s sequence commences with princely states of the 
sixteenth-century, which metamorphose through the constitutional forms of kingly states, 
territorial states, state-nations, nation states to, by the twentieth century, market states.  He 
traces the geographical reach of this constitutional succession through Western Europe, to the 
western hemisphere, eventually attaining global significance, largely by exportation of 
constitutional forms through the exploration and colonising activities of the western European 
states and the eventual American hegemony.  The significant constitutional changes were 
driven by five substantive epochal wars within this 500-year period: the Habsburg-Valois 
wars, the Thirty Years War, the wars of Louis XIV, the wars of the French Revolution and, 
finally, the ‘Long War’ (Bobbitt’s conception of the combination of the two World Wars, the 
Bolshevik Revolution, the Korean War, the Cold War and the Viet Nam War, treated as one 
‘… because they were all fought over a single set of constitutional issues’ concerning 
emergent rival political philosophies (Bobbitt 2002: 24)).  The corresponding formal 
constitutional events in which the epochal wars culminated and which brought about key 
transformations in the state’s relationship both with its own inhabitants and, importantly, with 
other states, were the Peace of Augsburg (1555), the Peace of Westphalia (1648), the Peace of 
Utrecht (1713), the Congress of Vienna (1815) and the Peace of Paris (1990).   
Bobbitt located the key constitutional innovation in late-fifteenth century Italy.  Rich but 
small fortified city states had been rendered vulnerable by the earlier development of 
gunpowder and siege artillery (Hall 1997: 42).   This led their ‘… princes and oligarchs [to 
make] a pact with … the idea …of the State … [as] a permanent infrastructure to gather the 
revenue, organise the logistical support, and determine the command arrangements for the 
[mercenary] armies [required]’ (Bobbitt 2002: 80).  However, this pragmatic bureaucratic 
structure outlived the princes themselves, gaining a permanent constitutional identity that 
would undergo significant transformations, discontinuous but cumulative, over the ensuing 
centuries, typically focused on the peace negotiations marking the conclusion of a period of 
warfare.  According to Bobbitt, the Peace of Augsburg effectively laid the foundation for 
international law, establishing recognition of a society of equal sovereign states, irrespective 
of religion, whose shared laws were concerned to maintain peace among them and who 
accepted the principle of non-interference by one state in the (internal) affairs of another 
(ibid.: 487-489, 500, citing Jordan 1965: 37, Watson 1984: 15).  The Peace of Westphalia, at 
the end of the Thirty Years’ War, added limited intra-state religious freedom to minimise 
conflict and insisted that no state would be subordinate to some higher secular or 
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ecclesiastical authority.  The Peace of Utrecht ensured that ‘… the word state … became the 
name of a territory, not a people …nor a dynastic house’ (523); the integrity of its borders had 
become all-important, and it ‘… viewed the balance of power as the fundamental structure of 
the constitutional system itself’ (523; emphasis added).  Following Napoleon’s defeat, the 
Congress of Vienna of 1815 made provision for any state initiating aggression to be militarily 
opposed by a coalition of the others and for an emergent ‘collective security force’ (ibid.: 
163) of the great powers, the Concert of Europe.  It was also accepted that, although the 
society of states lacked sovereignty, the legitimacy of collective decisions to carve up the 
Napoleonic empire could be based on individual states’ acceptance of the principle of giving 
precedence to the pursuit of the society of states’ common interest in peaceful coexistence. 
From the mid-nineteenth century, widespread revolutionary upheavals and emergent popular 
nationalism brought about the transformation from the imperial state-nation, able to direct the 
entire resources of the state in furtherance of its ambitions, to the nation-state.  Its 
characteristic objectives were, internally, to enhance the welfare of the people that constituted 
the nation; externally, to pursue, if necessary, total, rather than limited, war: ‘If the nation 
governed the state, and the nation’s welfare provided the state’s reason for being, then the 
enemy’s nation must be destroyed’ (ibid.: 196).   The development of the ‘industrial-military 
complex’ contributed to both objectives, generating employment and wealth out of the 
creation of the capability of industrialised warfare.  However, if a nation’s people collectively 
assume the right of self-government and give priority to seeking their own welfare, then they 
have also to decide which political system to adopt to achieve this end.  This established the 
basis for the next epochal war, Bobbitt’s ‘Long War’: at stake was which of the 
fundamentally incompatible political systems of communism, fascism or parliamentarianism 
should prevail in the European society of states.  Fascism was defeated and wholly discredited 
by its resort to genocide.  Communism patently could not serve the objective of the nation-
state, to enhance the welfare of its inhabitants.  Parliamentarianism remained, to be enshrined 
as the legitimate basis for the society of states in the Charter of Paris in 1990.  The concurrent 
emergence of transnational institutions charged with both reducing international conflict and 
enhancing international economic development contributed to the elaboration of the society of 
states. 
But the pursuit of a primarily economic objective cannot be disengaged from the operation of 
markets, so that the nation-state’s independence becomes constrained by transnational forces 
emerging in the markets – forces incidentally given greater power by the states themselves in 
pursuit of improved welfare for their populations.  Consequently, the continuing development 
of the global economic system undercut the ability of individual nation-states to deliver 
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improvements in welfare to their own populations and so engineered the next transition, to the 
market-state of the present period.  The residual capability of the market-state is primarily to 
maximise the opportunities of its inhabitants – leaving the global market to deliver the 
welfare, apart from some state provision of public goods and limited redistribution of income.  
It remains to be seen where subsequent constitutional change in response to continuing 
conflict, now in the form of terrorism, will lead. 
4.4 The Evidence of Conflict and its Interpretation 
Archaeological evidence 
The purely archaeological evidence associated with human violence comprises specific sub-
categories of the standard groups (skeletal material, artefacts, structures and rock art) 
distinguished inferentially, based on presumptions about the specific kinds of physical 
evidence that would signal violent action.  Some ambiguity exists, as the same outcome could 
arise from quite different events not always involving violent intentions (e.g. not all deaths are 
homicides and not all homicides are murders).  The sub-categories include osteological 
evidence of violent trauma, suggestive of homicide; artefacts open to construal as offensive 
weapons; settlement structures with external ‘walls’ of varying form implying defensive 
intent; pictorial representation of figures apparently engaged in acts of violence.  The physical 
evidence is more persuasive when different types are found in conjunction: projectiles 
embedded in human skeletal material (e.g. Heath 2009: 55, 56; an Early Neolithic example) 
or scattered around a defensive structure (e.g. Mercer 1999: 151; the Crickley Hill Neolithic 
causewayed camp, its supposed defensive form consistent with the adjacent presence of over 
400 leaf arrowheads attributed to ‘… intensive and probably tactically marshalled archery’); 
weapons employed as grave goods (e.g. Sánchez-Moreno 2005: 114-120; Iberian Iron Age 
graves identified as those of warriors) – or when it is difficult to envisage a specific artefact 
type having an innocent purpose as a tool (swords and shields, and, in a later period, musket 
balls).  Rock art depicting scenes of armed combat, interpreted as a pictorial record, can 
provide insights into the application of violence, the context of weapon use and its outcomes 
(e.g. Nash 2005: 75-86; Neolithic painted panels in Levantine Spain).  However, from a 
forensic point of view, in the absence of witness testimony this physical evidence is basically 
circumstantial (Keeley 1996: x) and fragmentary.  Some circumstantial evidence may now be 
lost: ‘The image of Stone Age warfare … hinges on the fact that a considerable part of the 
weaponry of that time is not archaeologically visible (such as stones thrown by hand, wooden 
javelins and clubs, or sling projectiles)’ (Carman 1999: 65), or tools unidentified as weaponry 
– Carman’s ‘dual tool-weapon’ category relevant to the Mesolithic and Neolithic. (ibid.: 66, 
67).  In general, the extreme paucity of skeletal remains in relation to the total number of 
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human deaths that have taken place – estimated at one hundred billion over just the last 
10,000 years (Davies 1994c: 24) – must raise doubt as to the general representativeness of 
recovered skeletal remains, as well as to the significance of the proportion displaying trauma 
(Chapman 1999: 102).  Moreover, violent death need not yield osteological evidence and may 
be under-detected on that criterion: soft tissue injury can lead to fatal blood loss, organ failure 
or sepsis.  The thinness of the skeletal evidence leaves open the question of whether or not 
violent conflict generally engaged large numbers: ‘… the weaponry of the earlier [Bronze 
Age] period is often more suited to the fighting of champions … using weapons such as 
daggers and later rapiers … [an action possibly] quite carefully choreographed’ (Osgood et al 
2000: 34), a possibility perhaps supported by the ‘… emergence of “warrior graves” in the 
Early Bronze Age [reflecting] a new era of symbolism and status for the warrior, although it 
does not necessarily imply that fighting had escalated’ (ibid.: 41).  The possibilities that, in 
particular circumstances, weaponry was used primarily for purposes of display (or even 
produced to serve as grave goods (ibid.: 50)) – or to achieve local intimidation and coercion – 
rather than actual violence; or that the construction of enclosed settlements was to foster or 
reinforce social cohesion through cooperative activity or even to impose centralised control 
on the inhabitants and enhance the status of the social hierarchy, point to the weakness of 
reliance on too specific a presumption as the basis for an appropriate classificatory scheme.  
The polemical content of Keeley’s assessment of prehistoric warfare does acknowledge the 
presumptive basis of archaeological evidence, whereby ‘… glib speculation, the caprices of 
intellectual fashion, and the deeper currents of secular mythology’ (Keeley 1996: 4) and ‘… 
the current Western attitude of self-reproach’ (ibid.: 179) can influence the typical 
representation of prehistoric conflict constructed from the circumstantial evidence.  The 
anthropologically sanctioned use of ethnographic material to interpret prehistoric evidence is 
standard practice – even if the direction of the relationship is sometimes unexpected: ‘… 
archaeological evidence strongly supports ethnographic accounts concerning the conduct, 
consequences and causes of prestate violence’ (ibid.: 39).   
Historical evidence and Inter-state Conflict 
The evidence of historical conflict is dominated by documentary material, with archaeological 
material performing at best a subsidiary role.  (However, it was noted in Chapter 1 that a case 
has been made for a ‘documentary archaeology’, treating documents as a category of material 
artefact to be considered from an anthropological perspective, with due regard for its 
materiality (Wilkie 2006: 13-33), while equally material artefacts may be interpreted as texts 
– a postmodern perspective).  Indeed, a significant proportion of historical documentary 
evidence is devoted to accounts of warfare.  This is partly because much of the evidence is 
generated by the apparatus of governance (initially also the domain of literacy) in respect of 
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which the possibility of warfare is a real threat or a useful tool – hence Gibbon’s opinion that 
‘Wars, and the administration of public affairs, are the principal subjects of history’ (Gibbon 
1776-88: 9.1.252, quoted by Marwick 2001: 58).  But privately originated material is also 
significant, particularly as literacy became more widely established, because events involving 
warfare are of considerable personal concern to those directly involved, destroying lives and 
property or generating intellectual turmoil, by challenging a customary way of life and 
received values. 
The prevalence of war during the historical period also warrants the volume of documentary 
material to which it has given rise: ‘As a theme, war was central to the written culture of the 
middle ages’ (Allmand 2000: 17).  This volume continues to increase in the present, even in 
respect of wars of the past – a fact that raises the important historiographical distinction, 
previously noted, between primary and secondary sources.  The authority of the former over 
the latter (‘… without the study of primary sources there is no history’ (Marwick 2001: 156)) 
derives primarily from its presumed standing as contemporary witness testimony, considered 
as the guarantor of qualified objectivity.  Although a contemporary account should be free of 
any accretion of later and irrelevant content (and of the presentism already noted as a 
complication), contemporaneity itself offers no guarantee of authority.  Given that the authors 
of annals and chronicles recording warfare in the Middle Ages were clergy, reflecting the 
contemporary distribution of literacy, these accounts were not necessarily witness statements 
either.  Certainly, the authors’ unavailability for interrogation, even if they had been 
witnesses, means the accounts’ forensic value is limited, particularly if other documentary 
corroboration is lacking.  Unit war diaries of the twentieth century are unquestionably 
contemporary documentary records, but their narrow official scope does not adequately 
embrace the full nature of the conflict event. The spatial and temporal extent of a military 
engagement places the totality of the action beyond the perception of a single participant: too 
much is happening simultaneously at different places, while at every place – of which there is 
an infinity – there is taking place a unique sequence of occurrences.  With every combatant a 
potential witness, there is scope for a plethora of differing accounts – which contributes to the 
diversity of published accounts of even the most recent military engagements.  Even for a 
single battle a simple assemblage of such diaries and accounts, necessarily from both sides of 
the conflict, does not spontaneously compose into an account of it as the coherent unitary 
event it is subsequently conceived to have been.  In some circumstances military engagements 
have been written up and sketched by individuals overlooking the action from a vantage 
point.  But an onlooker from a distance cannot distinguish the detail and observes at best only 
the broad sweep of the engagement (or at least that part not obscured by the smoke of 
discharging guns and exploding ordnance), while there remain the general problems of faulty 
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recollection (as the account was probably not written in the field but later) and partiality (as 
the onlooker probably supported one side rather than the other).  More significantly, it is 
questionable if a spectator who lacks the experience of the combatant can properly be 
regarded as a witness.  If not, then such accounts, too, would fall short of the evidential 
standard.  However, this standard must be not only appropriate to the event being considered 
– and warfare is patently more complex than, for example, an isolated homicide – but also not 
subordinate to the concept of the true singular observational statement (which in isolation tells 
very little).  This notion is limited in its applicability to the carefully circumscribed 
relationships of experimental science.  Instead, judgement and interpretation are integral to 
accounts of warfare (and indeed of human action in general), whether on the part of witnesses 
or of historians.  This perspective was gradually adopted towards the modern period: before 
the twelfth century annals stated merely that battles and wars had taken place and recorded 
the outcomes; more detailed chronicles followed but only offered, as White put it, ‘… a mere 
sequence without beginning or end or … sequences of beginnings that only terminate and 
never conclude’ (White 1981: 23, quoted in Carr 1991: 12).  Only by the fourteenth century 
was it possible to ‘… perceive a greater willingness [among writers of accounts of conflict] to 
question why events turned out in the way they did.  Jean de Bel, for instance, not only 
described but analysed too [the battle of Crécy, in 1346]’ (Allmand 2000: 28). 
The expectation that archaeological and historical evidence will be complementary is perhaps 
greater in respect of battlefield encounters.  In some cases, the discovery of artefacts has 
refined the available documentary accounts, but in others physical evidence to support 
specific historical narratives has proved elusive, failing to confirm the location of 
engagements through detection of projectiles or the scale of casualties via appropriate skeletal 
evidence. 
Interpreting the evidence 
Explanation seeks answers to questions addressed to some putative evidence, so preparatory 
interpretation is required to specify the appropriate questions and to separate relevant 
evidence from irrelevant background.  This requires the prior adoption of a perspective from 
which to view or frame a specific ‘curiosity’ (or example, the presence of violent conflict in 
the human record).  The anthropological precommitment can be contrasted with the historical 
precommitment.  The former anticipates that the extraction of empirical generalisations from 
interpreted patterns in selected evidence will prompt questions that will yield deterministic 
and essentially atemporal theoretical explanations.  In effect the approach reductively seeks 
support for hypotheses about intrinsic human capacities, particularly those inspired, on 
analogical grounds, by biological evolutionary theory.  The latter anticipates that a search of 
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the particularities of singular events will prompt questions that will establish a plausible 
contingency in the temporal succession of such unique events.  In effect the approach seeks to 
understand the past in terms of the emergence of extrinsic human capacities to structure their 
collective engagement with each other in a sustainable way.  These contrasting 
precommitments limit their capacity to be mutually supportive, quite apart from the 
asymmetry in the temporal reach of their respective bodies of evidence: while there exists 
archaeological evidence contemporary with all literary sources, only archaeological evidence 
exists for the longer pre-literacy period.  Consequently, it may be conceptually impossible to 
graft the conclusions from anthropological/archaeological research onto those from 
(historical) research in the literacy period.  However, there is no practical impediment to the 
adoption of the substantive historical perspective to view archaeological evidence from either 
the pre-literacy or the literacy periods – so long as the former evidence points to the same 
kind of formative events that emerge from the documentary record.  In short, the historical 
perspective views archaeological evidence differently, because it lacks the positive/physicalist 
commitments claimed to be essential by the anthropological perspective.  Nonetheless, the 
anthropological perspective can be directed to the historical period, framing its own particular 
category of evidence, as the following illustrations indicate. 
4.5 Violent Conflict beyond Warfare 
An explanation of human conflict focused exclusively on warfare is partial.  It ignores other 
manifestations of the human capacity to perpetrate violent action against its own species.  
Two further categories requiring consideration are slavery and genocide, the former not 
necessarily lethal in its intentions, the latter distinctively selective in its lethality.   
Slavery 
The institution of slavery possesses a ubiquity and persistence that establishes it as a dominant 
form of conflict within human society.  Its existence relates to the earlier observations that the 
essence of economic activity is the use of labour and that in general the way in which the 
burden of work is distributed has no necessary connection with the way in which the benefits 
of its product are shared.  The institution of slavery is the means whereby one group forces 
another group to bear the burden of work and then appropriates the benefit for its own use.  It 
is by no means exclusively a by-product of organised warfare, though it can be.  Defeat in war 
potentially robs prisoners-of-war and civilians of their inherent human autonomy and self-
determination and substitutes total subjection and vulnerability.  They become no more than a 
physical resource to be exploited at will by the victor, who assumes ownership and power of 
disposal – just a spoil of war, no different from material plunder.  Although some captives 
might be ransomed, survivors formed an initially costless and expendable labour supply, 
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easily divorced from its homeland and self-transportable, a feasible object of trade – so long 
as a demand existed.  The defining human dimension of the resource means that, potentially, 
slavery could perpetuate indefinitely the loss of individual autonomy, being heritable on 
descendants: ‘Slavery is, in the last analysis, only a kind of substitution for actual death’ 
(Fisher 1972: 575, citing Elwahed 1931: 183).  Not only survivors of warfare need be 
involved: non-belligerent populations have also been deliberately targeted for enslavement 
and the forcible extraction of their economic value – typically communities that lacked 
adequate defence and could be easily overrun.  This practice shares the same underlying 
values as warfare, in viewing ‘other’ humans (because of their different ethnicity, religion or 
socio-political allegiance) purely as objects.  But trade requires that both sellers and buyers 
share such values and that an appropriate and accommodating institutional structure exists to 
set terms of transfer, convey formal title and meet whatever conditions a condoning authority 
may impose to legitimise or facilitate such transactions. In short, the practice is socially 
endorsed. 
This practice, treating humans as chattels, seems to have become established over much of 
Europe and Asia, from the third-millennium BC onwards in Mesopotamia.  In Greece and 
Rome, it formed an essential part of the economic foundation of their civilizations.  The 
Greeks regarded ‘… those tasks necessary to sustain life and make it pleasant … as a form of 
bondage precisely because of the necessity involved’ (Cuffel 1966: 337) so the tasks ought to 
be performed by slaves.  Admittedly, ‘… the possibility of becoming a slave was one of the 
ever-present facts of Greek life [as] warfare, whether on a large or small scale, was almost 
continuous’ (ibid.: 325, 326).  The Roman demand was stronger for males than females 
(Harris 1999: 67), and lands beyond the periphery of the Empire were regarded as ‘… not 
densely enough populated to fulfil [their] need for slaves’ (ibid.: 72, citing Scheidel 1996).  
But the Vikings’ slaves ‘… included many women – [and] indeed may have been 
predominantly female’ (Karras 1990: 141).  Sexual exploitation was a primary motive, 
supporting the practice of concubinage in Scandinavia.  However, the Vikings were also 
selective: ‘Raids made specifically for the purpose of capturing slaves would concentrate on 
the age and sex the raiders expected to bring the highest price, not necessarily on women; 
[but] enslavement after battle tended to victimise women and children predominantly, since 
many men would already have been killed’ (ibid.: 158 n3, citing Karras 1988).  Similar sea-
borne raids, seeking slaves inter alia, were carried out from the chiefdoms of the North 
American Northwest Coast, over a longer period of 3,000 years. (Fry 2006: 102, citing 
Ferguson 1984: 272).  The Vikings sold European slaves in Byzantium, indicative of the 
elaborate development of markets in slaves internal to Eurasia.  Established specialised 
markets emerged in thirteenth-century Italian trading colonies in the Crimea.  By the fifteenth 
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century the trade was focused on Muslim-controlled Caffa; by the seventeenth century 
markets in Istanbul – monopolised by Jewish merchants – Venice and Alexandria had become 
outlets for large numbers of Tatar-captured Muscovite Russians and Poles.  The mounted 
incursions of the Tatars precipitated the Russo-Crimean wars in the late sixteenth centuries 
and the construction of fortified towns and abatis defences.  According to Fisher, ‘… most of 
the Tatar raids do not appear to have had any military purposes [and] were rather an integral 
part of the Crimean economy, a “harvesting of the steppe”’ (Fisher 1972: 575); ‘For the next 
220 years [from their first raid in 1468], the Tatars raided either southern Poland or Muscovite 
Russia about annually, and on at least sixty-five occasions returned to the Crimea with a large 
number of captives’ (ibid.: 576).  The slaves were sold to a variety of customers: governments 
(seeking crews for naval galleys), local administrations, Muslim social élites (involving the 
acquisition of a proportion of women and boys for sexual exploitation) and buyers from 
Western Europe, North Africa, Abyssinia and Iran.  Fisher notes that ‘In France, Spain and 
Italy … Slavic slaves … became parts of dowries, were purchased by priests and performed 
domestic service for almost every noble family’ (ibid.: 577).  The slave trade also became an 
important source of tax revenue for the Ottomans. 
Concurrently slavery developed in North Africa (including Christian slaves from southern 
Europe), sub-Saharan Africa (exported via Zanzibar to the Middle East), and West Africa, the 
principal source for the burgeoning trans-Atlantic slave trade associated with the imperial 
activities of the European powers.  Its defining association with terrorisation of one group by 
another has continued into the twentieth century – in, for example, Chechnya (Turchin 2007: 
344).  The divine sanction afforded slavery by both Islamic and Hebraic law possibly 
contributed to the persistence of values that accommodated slavery, the Hebrew position 
being problematic for Christianity’s opposition to it, given their relationship; this contributed 
to the intensity of arguments in Britain surrounding its abolition (see, for example, Davis 
1975: Ch. 11).  Thus, it has taken at least 900 years for a world-wide de jure prohibition to be 
established, although human trafficking continues as a matter of fact.  According to Taylor 
‘There are more slaves today than at any other time in history – 27 million at a conservative 
estimate’ (Taylor 2005: 225). 
Massacres and Genocide 
Discovery of a mass inhumation presents an interpretational challenge for archaeologists, if 
osteological analysis suggests that, on the one hand, a mass killing has occurred (evidence of 
violent death), but on the other, the individuals were not combatants in armed conflict 
(assumed from age and sex).  If more detailed analysis points to the relatedness of the victims 
in the same kinship group or community, then the possibility arises that this relatedness had a 
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bearing on their deaths and that it was the group as such that had been targeted, for some 
reason.  This could provoke the further inference that the event had been perpetrated by a self-
consciously ‘different’ group.   It could then be interpreted as an instance of genocide, 
Lemkin’s neologism (Lemkin 1944) to denote an intentional killing of an entire group of 
civilians on grounds entirely independent of their own actions, due instead to their different 
ethnicity, religion, ideology or culture.  But crucially this perceived difference has in addition 
been endowed with a normative significance, sufficient to motivate the group’s elimination – 
thereby ‘annihilating difference’ (Hinton 2002). 
However, interpretation of prehistoric skeletal evidence is not straightforward and can 
therefore be contested.  Apparent Neolithic massacres include the collective inhumations at 
Talheim (in Germany), Schletz-Asparn (in Austria) and Roaix (in France), respectively of 34, 
66 (from partial excavation; possibly up to 300) and more than 100 individuals, most 
apparently having suffered violent deaths from head injuries (Golitko, Keeley 2007: 333, 334; 
Keeley 1996: 38, 39).  Yet not all collective inhumations definitely denote massacres: those at 
Ofnet (34 individuals) and Herxheim (450, projected to possibly 1300-1500 for the whole 
site) could possibly be discounted as, respectively, successive rather than concurrent 
depositions (Orschiedt 2005: 68) and secondary burials of ritually manipulated remains over a 
period of 50 years or so, collected from a wider area to a common location, and that possibly 
not a fortified site (Orschiedt, Haidle 2006: 161-163).  However, their conclusion that ‘… the 
argument for a violent war-like conflict has to be rejected’ (ibid.) is contested, by claims that 
the ‘… “culturally modified” human remains … are most plausibly explained as indirect 
evidence of inter-group conflict’ and that ritual practice is ‘… strongly related to other 
evidence for warfare’ (Golitko, Keeley 2007: 333, 338).  Frayer claims the Ofnet remains 
denote a massacre, but the preponderance of sub-adults (two-thirds under 20 years of age), the 
over-representation of adult females and the selected nature of the deposited skeletal material 
invite special explanation (Frayer 1997).  Neither site does seem to offer convincing evidence 
of a mass killing, even if warfare were implicated.  The fourteenth-century Crow Creek 
village site, however, does.  It involves the skeletal remains of at least 486 individuals, 
estimated at rather more than half of the village population and from all age groups and of 
both sexes – teenage girls and young women and older adult males were possibly 
underrepresented, plausibly attributed to the abduction of some of the former and the prior 
deaths of some of the latter in earlier violent action (Zimmerman 1997: 83, 84).  The 
conjectured cause, however, is physicalist: internecine inter-village warfare among the 
chronically malnourished, precipitated by competition for food supplies made inadequate due 
to adverse climatic changes (ibid.: 89) – a Malthusian check. 
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Instances of mass killings drawn from the overlapping historical period seem to defy the 
search for a similar physicalist explanation and to have genocidal features – for example, the 
already-mentioned Athenian massacre of the population of Melos (415/6 BC), the Roman 
slaughter of the inhabitants of Thessalonica (390 AD), Charlemagne’s massacre of pagan 
Saxons at Verden (782), the Muslim killing of the Jewish population of Granada (1066) and 
the massacre of Roman Catholics by an Orthodox mob in Constantinople (1182).  Later 
centuries provide occurrences that have varied widely in nature, challenging the use of the 
word ‘massacre’ as a category, and not always suggestive of genocide.  Beyond involving 
some unspecified number of violent deaths, a ‘massacre’ is neither a natural kind nor a well-
defined concept, with entangled objective and subjective features.  Thus the several-hundred-
thousand victims in Yangzhou in 1645, the 38 deaths in Glencoe in 1692 and the Utøya 
shooting of 69 in 2011 by a solitary gunman have each been placed in the category of 
‘massacre’.  The nature of the perpetrators also varies.  In some cases, they are soldiers with 
access to weaponry, appropriate training, possibly already inured to killing; sometimes they 
were acting outside of the scope of their orders (for example, Praga, Warsaw, in 1794) but 
sometimes on the command of their immediate superiors (as at Mỹ Lai, Vietnam, in 1968) or 
senior staff (as at Hama, Syria, in 1982).  Some massacres were the result of military attempts 
to suppress civilian unrest, such as at Bogside, Londonderry, in 1972 and Tiananmen Square, 
Beijing, in 1989.  In these cases, the ultimate responsibility apparently lay with the respective 
governments, but as Bellamy points out governments can evade blame by ‘… establishing 
militia groups that perpetrate atrocities but stand outside the formal control of the state’ 
(Bellamy 2012a: 46): ‘In Rwanda, genocidal militias [the Interahawe] conducted most of the 
massacres.  … By 1994 [they] had as many as 30,000 recruits … all well-versed in anti-Tutsi 
hatred’ (ibid.).  Civilian mobs have been responsible for other massacres – such as on St 
Bartholomew’s Day, Paris, in 1572, or the killing of Sikhs in North India in 1984. 
In respect of later-acknowledged instances of genocide, it has been claimed that, over the 
twentieth century as a whole, the ratio of people killed by their own governments to deaths in 
all wars is five to one (Semelin 2003: 194, citing Rummel 1994); and ‘… genocide and 
politicide – purposive state-sponsored massacres – have claimed over twice as many victims 
as have wars and natural disasters since 1945’ (Fein 1993: 81, citing Harff, Gurr 1988).  The 
six million attributed to the Holocaust may have been surpassed by the number of victims of 
Japanese war crimes in the Far East during the Second World War, the forced-labour-based 
colonial activities in the Congo Free State between 1885 and 1908 (ten million apiece), and 
the Holodomor famine of Ukraine of 1931-3 (possibly as many, possibly a third less).  
However, while the Holocaust is without doubt the archetypal genocide, doubts exist in 
respect of these others. The Japanese government continues to contest the extent of their war 
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crimes.  Despite the European Parliament’s resolution that the Ukrainian famine ‘… was 
cynically and cruelly planned by Stalin’s regime [and] an appalling crime against the 
Ukrainian people, and against humanity’ (European Parliament 2008), albeit the word 
‘genocide’ was not employed, the culpability of Stalinist agricultural policies is still debated.  
Wheatcroft concluded that the famine’s causation ‘… remains even more highly disputed than 
the famine’s scale’ (Wheatcroft 2004: 108) and while it may have been the outcome of 
criminal negligence, it may not have involved criminal intent (ibid.: 109).  According to Roes 
the ‘Congo Atrocities’ were a product of a ‘… culture of violence as a multicausal, broadly 
based and deeply engrained social phenomenon’ (Roes 2010: 635) driven by economic 
exploitation, rather than genocidal intention, pursued ‘… through a process of copying, 
adapting, extending, and intensifying the economic organisation of the Eastern [African] slave 
frontier’ (ibid.: 639).  Not unexpectedly, the classification of particular past mass deaths as 
genocides remains to this day a contestable matter in the view of some authorities (for 
example, Turkey currently in respect of the Armenian massacre).   
4.6 Explaining killings of innocents 
The insecurity of ‘humanity’ 
In warfare deaths are expected as an intentional outcome of its prosecution, but deaths of non-
combatant victims – having no moral liability to be attacked, in McMahan’s words 
(McMahan 2009: 8) – cannot be justified in terms of the principle of self-defence.  However, 
from the perspective of their respective value judgements, the perpetrators of a mass killing of 
innocents could cite the principle of punishment as justification: the differences between their 
victims’ value judgements and their own could be viewed as warranting retribution.  As Staub 
notes, ‘The heresy of religious divergence and the heresy of even minor political difference 
can both lead to violent fury’ (Staub 2000: 374) – an issue considered in Chapter 5.  The 
explanation of atrocities – the massacre or rape of innocents or the execution of prisoners 
taken in combat – requires reference to the minds of the perpetrators, whether acting 
individually or in concert.  It would appear that a necessary, but insufficient, condition for a 
massacre is the emergence of a stark, perceived difference in religious belief, political 
ideology or social identity that clearly partitions a ‘We’ (or even an ‘I’) from a ‘They’ – or an 
in-group as opposed to an out-group – in such antithetical terms that ‘They’ become an 
anathema to the other (and thus an evil meriting excision) or a significant potential threat to 
the in-group’s fundamental self-beliefs (and thus to be pre-emptively eliminated).  Thus, the 
out-group can become the scapegoat (Staub 2013: 183) or the sacrificial victim (Taylor 2002:  
139).  But the nature and origins of the difference are contingent matters.  Also necessary, and 
again insufficient, is an equally stark difference in power in the relevant context, such that one 
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group can act with impunity against the other, supported by an advantage in access to 
weaponry.  But the origin, nature and distribution of the power difference are again contingent 
matters.  Relationships between indigenous peoples and colonialists from the seventeenth to 
the nineteenth centuries provide a wealth of typical instances.  Finally, again necessary but, in 
conjunction with the others, sufficient for the occurrence of an atrocity is the commitment of 
the individual perpetrator to act accordingly: actually to exercise the power advantage over 
‘Them’, in the various roles of executioner, mutilator or sexual predator – and other less 
violent actions.  The individual’s decision to act may be endorsed or even generated by the 
collective dynamic of group membership, given a shared knowledge of its mission and the 
possibility to claim subsequently that he had been coerced to act by its own internal power 
structure.  Particular psychological factors are typically associated with uninhibited physical 
action, such as animosity and hate, lust and sadism, apart from a presumed superiority to the 
victim group.  However, Kelman reported that ‘There is no evidence to support the notion that 
the majority of those who participate in [sanctioned massacres] … are sadistically inclined … 
[Indeed] much of the sadistic behaviour observed in massacre situations can be understood as 
a consequence of participation in mass violence with its dehumanizing impact [on 
perpetrators] rather than as a motivating force behind it’ (Kelman 1973: 35, 36, emphasis 
added). 
Dehumanization 
In the considerable related literature in social psychology and neuro-psychology, 
dehumanization features significantly in reports from laboratory-situated micro-simulations of 
social interactions.  At the heart of the victimisation of innocents – the out-group – is their 
dehumanization in the mind of the perpetrator, that is, their objectification.  Nussbaum 
identified seven distinct components of objectification.  They are ‘“instrumentality” and 
“ownership” [that] involve treating others as tools and commodities; “denial of autonomy” 
and “inertness” [that] involve seeing them as lacking self-determination and agency; 
“fungibility” [that] involves seeing people as interchangeable with others of their type; 
“violability” [that] represents others as lacking boundary integrity; and “ denial of 
subjectivity” [that] involves believing that their experiences can be neglected’ (Haslam 2006: 
253, citing Nussbaum 1999).  These have a general relevance beyond the original context of 
the treatment of women as sexual objects.  There can be a general and subtle form of 
deprecation of an out-group even without significant intergroup antagonism: 
‘infrahumanization’.  Two respects can be distinguished in which that human difference is 
conceived: lacking in the traits which set humans apart uniquely from other animals (the 
acquired characteristics of ‘cognitive capacity, civility, self-control and refinement’) and 
lacking those which distinguish humans naturally from inanimate objects (the embedded 
  Explanation and Human Conflict 
 
95 
 
characteristics of ‘emotionality, vitality, individuality and warmth’).  To assert that 
individuals lack the former is an ‘… “animalistic” form of dehumanization [that] captures 
phenomena ranging from the most blatant genocidal labelling of people as vermin through to 
the subtlety of infrahumanization’, while lack of the latter (lacking human nature) is a 
‘mechanistic’ form of objectification. (Haslam, Loughnan 2014: 402, 403, citing Leyens et al. 
2001; Haslam 2006: 258, 259).  The basis for the dehumanization, however, is the lack of 
intimate contemporary familiarity with the other: ‘… many dehumanizing perceptions are 
rooted in stereotypes and intergroup relations that have long histories … [and] are often 
unconscious and automatic’ (Haslam, Loughnan 2014: 417).  As Fairbairn puts it, ‘… it is at 
least partly through the stories that we are told about “the other” that as human beings we may 
be prepared to fight them’ (Fairbairn 2009: 194).  Thus dehumanization has been defined as 
‘… the failure to spontaneously consider another person’s mind’ (Haslam, Loughnan 2014: 
403, citing Harris and Fiske 2006).  This significantly restricts the scope for the feeling of 
sympathy towards the ‘other’.  The objectification of the other will also be considered in 
Chapter 5. 
The actual perpetration of an atrocity raises a different set of issues.  ‘Explanations [of 
genocide] that remains entirely at the psychological level of analysis or invoke a single 
overarching psychological principle are less than helpful … [This] is necessarily a multi-
faceted quest for understanding’ (Kelman 1973: 29).  The nature of the planned atrocity 
defines tasks to be carried out by individual perpetrators; not all need be directly involved in 
killing, mutilating or violating their fellow-humans.  As Kelman pointed out, ‘[The] 
extermination [of the Jews] was accomplished on a mass production basis through the literal 
establishment of a well-organized, efficient death industry’ (ibid.: 30); as in any mass-
production industry many functionaries performed minor roles remote from the point of 
execution.  In contrast, at Mỹ Lai, the site of an un-planned atrocity, all were face-to-face with 
their victims.  Focusing on ‘sanctioned massacres’ (which included Mỹ Lai), Kelman argued 
that ‘[t]he major instigators for this class of violence derive from the policy process, rather 
than from [psychological] impulses [of functionaries] toward violence as such’ – that is, from 
the atrocity being sanctioned – and that ‘… we need to focus not so much on factors 
increasing the strength of driving forces towards violence, as on factors reducing the strength 
of restraining forces against violence’ (ibid.: 38).  The first of the three critical factors 
identified by Kelman was ‘authorization’.  Superiority in power is necessary for the 
occurrence of a mass killing – not only power of perpetrators vis à vis victims but also leaders 
vis à vis functionaries. The former is implicit in the sanction, the latter in the delegation of 
implementation to the functionary who, as merely agent, need recognise no personal 
responsibility for what has to be done.  Normal moral constraints are supplanted by either a 
  Explanation and Human Conflict 
 
96 
 
moral obligation to the leadership of the organisation that demands total obedience – a 
response strongly fostered by military training – or a commitment to some ‘transcendental 
mission’ which is claimed to make the mass killing necessary (ibid.: 44, 45).  Kelman’s 
second factor was ‘routinization’, whereby absorption in the details of tasks to be done 
repetitively allows the moral dimension that would normally attend dealing with an individual 
victim to be disregarded, made easier by each one being regarded as just an instance of a 
condemned category.  The routine might involve an elaborate procedure, such as the 
recording of detailed ‘confessions’ obtained under torture from those destined to be executed 
anyway, photographing them before or after the event, as at the Tuol Sleng Prison in Phnom 
Penh during the Kampuchean genocide (Dy 2007: 50-53).  Finally, there was 
‘dehumanization’: ‘… coming to believe that the victims are subhuman and deserve to be 
rooted out’ (Kelman 1973: 50) – the concept developed subsequently on a more systematic 
basis by Haslam and others (as previously noted).   But Kelman pointed out that it is not only 
the victim that is dehumanized: ‘the action of the victimizer makes his own dehumanization 
an inescapable condition of his life [and he] loses both his sense of personal identity and his 
sense of community’ (ibid.: 57).  While brutalization of the victimizer may resemble the 
experience of military combatants in warfare, the confrontation of equivalently prepared and 
mutually committed combatants contrasts with the one-sided brutality of genocide.  Pinker 
implies that a key role in the savagery may be performed by the already-brutalized: the 
700,000 deaths in the Rwanda genocide of 1994 are attributed to ‘… about 10,000 men with 
machetes, mostly drunkards, addicts, ragpickers, and gang members’ (Pinker 2011: 339).  But 
the fact that they were apparently recruited for the purpose, not acting spontaneously, 
underlines the role of a central authority in initiating genocide, such that it is ‘… usually a 
police force, military unit, or militia, [that] actually commits the murders’ (ibid.: 331).  These 
are precisely those elements of government that ordinarily deploy its monopoly of physical 
force to maintain internal order and protect the domestic population.   
The political perspective 
In Harff’s study of 37 ‘significant’ genocides and politicides (victimisation on the basis of a 
group’s political opposition) starting between 1955 and 1998, all but one ‘… occurred during 
or immediately after political upheaval … a concept that captures the essence of the structural 
crises and societal pressures that are a precondition [for genocide/politicide]’, either in the 
form of ‘élite succession struggles’ or ‘violent political conflict and regime change’ (ibid.: 61, 
62).  This view that ‘political upheaval’ is a natural kind could be contested no less than 
massacres or genocides, but its association with war complicates analysis – particularly in the 
case of civil war, which would generally count as political upheaval.  In that context civilians 
may well be active combatants, whose deaths in the course of offering resistance or rebellion 
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cannot simply be attributed to an entirely genocidal motive.  As Fein wrote, reflecting on the 
killing of Hutus by Tutsis in the Burundi civil war of 1972, ‘… we should examine the 
planning and pattern of attack and intent in each case [of mass killing] to discriminate war 
crimes from genocide’ (Fein 1993: 102; emphasis added).  In short, contingency enters the 
picture.  Thus a mass killing constitutes an event necessarily located in a historical trajectory 
and whose explanatory reconstruction – including, if appropriate, the apportionment of 
culpability – requires the interpretation of inevitably ambiguous and incomplete evidence.  A 
further dimension arises from the active engagement of the governments of states in the 
perpetration of mass killings, as a consequence of the interests which states have in the 
internal affairs of each other.  This arises partly because international boundaries at a given 
date need not be coterminous with ethnic, religious and social divisions so that international 
sympathies and interests may transcend the boundaries – and indeed, in a period of war-
driven state-building or imperial competition, may influence their eventual location.  
However, for all the complicity of states in the perpetration of massacres of innocents, the 
experience of these events – in particular the Holocaust – mobilised specific constitutional 
changes in the society of states designed to bring perpetrators to justice.  These involved 
specific additions to the corpus of international law, an element of Bobbitt’s overall scheme.  
The creation of the legal concepts of ‘crime against humanity’, to protect the right of 
existence of the individual, and the ‘crime of genocide’, to protect the right of existence of 
entire human groups (Sands 2016: 377), was affirmed by the United Nations General 
Assembly in 1946.  The former had been recognised by the Charter of the Nuremberg 
Tribunal, encouraged by Hersch Lauterpacht; the latter was the result of the persuasive efforts 
of Rafael Lemkin (ibid.: Part X).  The International Criminal Court was not created until 
1998, the long struggle to find an international consensus being brought to a focused 
conclusion by the need to respond to the events in Yugoslavia and Rwanda. The preamble of 
the enabling statute contains another of the promises that extract direction out of the 
contingent chaos of human action: ‘the duty of every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction 
over those responsible for international crimes’ (ibid.: 379).  Successful prosecutions 
followed. 
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Chapter 5 Human Conflict and Self-restraint 
 
Preamble 
The negative consequences of human conflict – the destruction of life, property and productive 
capacity, together with the infliction of physical and mental suffering and distress – would appear to 
commend self-restraint from the prosecution of violent conflict.  Moreover, it seems plausible to 
presume that self-restraint is within the scope of human action.  Consequently, any adequate 
explanation of conflict must address why this capacity is not mobilised effectively, whether to prevent 
warfare between states or one-sided state violence directed at defenceless non-combatant populations 
– or simply violent individual behaviour.  However, the preceding discussion has established that 
explanations of human action must be singular and particular in nature, tied to specific events – that 
is, historical (Chapters One and Two) – as the role of time in human perceptions and accordingly in 
human action frustrates any expectation of deducing relevant universal generalisations.  Moreover, the 
individual is intrinsically social, acting in engagement with others and so the explanation of conflict 
must consider the relevance of social and political relationships, some of which are themselves the 
product of past violent conflict (Chapters Three and Four).  However, the failure of self-restraint 
requires substantive consideration.  
5.1 Restraints on Conflict  
Moral Authority 
Implicit in self-restraint is acceptance of the distinction between the positive ‘what can be done’ and 
the normative ‘what ought not to be done’, the latter being unambiguously proscriptive.  Humanity at 
large has obviously failed to exercise self-restraint – failed both to judge systematic killing (and 
maiming, torturing, raping, abusing and enslaving) of each other as morally repugnant and to desist.  
Various interpretations of that failure could be offered: moral censure of killing (and the rest) may be 
denied validity; it may be acknowledged but over-ruled by expediency; some other moral principle 
may be considered superior.  Any intention to act raises the distinction between means and ends.  But 
could killing be an end in itself?  To what end could killing be the means?  While it is commonly 
assumed that humans are naturally endowed with preferences to inform choices of material means and 
ends, the similar notion that humans possess an inherent intuition whereby they simply know what is 
moral seems not only contestable but also, on its own, evidently insufficient to restrain the freedom to 
act otherwise.  Immediate answers are lacking to conflict-related moral questions such as ‘Ought you 
to have acted towards me in the way you did?’, with its correlate ‘How ought I to act in response to 
what you have done?’; and specifically, ‘How ought I to act given the threat you apparently pose?’.  
Etzioni’s emphasis on a deontological or duty-like conscious commitment as the basis for a moral act 
not only relates moral action to the human will, but links it both with actual human experience and 
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with social contexts that involve prescribed duties (Etzioni 1988: Ch.3).  The latter can present 
individuals with moral dilemmas, when substantive personal duties conflict: duties as a combatant, a 
citizen, a patriot, a practitioner of a faith, a family member and as a human individual.  The notion 
that moral commitments emerge from experience, rather than exist ab initio, invokes Hegel’s notion 
of Geist, or spirit.  Hegel envisages individuals engaged in ‘… what he calls historical “formation of 
consciousness” … [that is, individuals] develop practices for reflecting on and evaluating the 
authoritativeness of their grounds for belief as to whether these practices achieve the aims they set for 
themselves, [which] become … spirit: a self-conscious and reflective form of life’ (Pinkard 1995: 35, 
36).  The shortcomings revealed by judgemental inference from the quality of life as personally 
experienced generate scepticism which, in turn, prompts revision of beliefs, as the individual 
continually seeks for self-justification and self-legitimation.  Indeed, according to Hegel ‘…history 
itself is possible only by virtue of the way in which spirit, Geist, reflects on what is taken as 
authoritative for itself and [on] the ways in which … later developments can be seen to be the 
completions of earlier forms, as fulfilling the aims that the older form of life within the terms it set for 
itself could not accomplish’ (ibid.: 37).  This teleological perspective supports the possibility that 
moral commitment is a dimension of human life that emerges and changes as an integral element of 
the personal history that unfolds – and which may encompass the personal experience of warfare and 
atrocities.  Moral authority may have to be developed reflectively from experience, rather than 
adopted as a pre-existent absolute. 
Reflecting on death 
Eliade argues, from an ethnographic basis, that, for ‘archaic’ societies, experience involved a 
‘sacralisation’ of human existence in the world, such that ‘… the whole of life is capable of being 
sanctified’ (Eliade 1959: 167).  This immanence of the spiritual permeated routine life: both the birth 
and development of the individual and the human relationship with the physical environment 
(compare modern archaeology’s concern for landscape) had a ‘cosmic’ equivalence or homology.  
This was manifest in ceremonies associated with various rites of passage, with individual initiation 
seen as ‘… death to the profane [prior] condition, rebirth to the sacred world, the world of the gods’ 
(ibid.: 197), and the consecration of important collective developments such as the occupation of new 
territory (ibid.: 30).  It can be conjectured that moral authority applicable to human actions emerged 
from the experience of this ‘sacralisation’.  As Armstrong notes, ‘The word “myth” has lost its force 
in modern time and tends to mean something that is not true, that never happened.  But in the pre-
modern world, mythology expressed a timeless rather than a historical reality and provided a 
blueprint for action in the present’ (Armstrong 2014: 20; emphasis added).  Yet personal ‘reflective’ 
experience of one’s own death, violent or not, is impossible – ‘for dying, which is the greatest task we 
have to perform, practice cannot help us. … [W]e can try it only once.’ (de Montaigne 1965: 267; 
cited by Jay 2005: 27).  Ordinarily, the inevitability of death – coupled with ignorance, in most cases, 
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as to its timing – could be contemplated detachedly ‘from a distance’.  But it seems implausible that a 
merely personal spectre of a possibly violent and agonizing death could determine an entire group’s 
prevailing beliefs and commitments, such that they would then never force that death on their fellows.  
The actual experience of violence destroys the familiar reference points that support reflective 
speculation about the nature of life and existence; following Arendt, it is important to acknowledge 
the impact of the ‘… all-pervading unpredictability, which we encounter the moment we approach the 
realm of violence’ (Arendt 1970: 5).  Admittedly, outside the domain of regular and routine 
behaviour, it is ‘… the function … of all action … to interrupt what otherwise would have proceeded 
automatically and therefore predictably’ (ibid.: 30, 31).  But the specific ‘interruption’ of violence, 
with its possibly fatal consequences, does concentrate attention on the significance attached to death 
by every individual and accordingly by the group. 
There will necessarily be some experiential familiarity (in the observational sense) with non-violent 
death, both as the inevitable and thus expected culmination of the ageing process and as the premature 
and thus unexpected outcome of illness and accident.  This experience occasions a personal and 
collective response to the intimation of mortality: death presents a ‘making sense’ challenge, even in 
the ordinary course of events.  An objective and de-personalized perspective identifies the 
‘naturalness’ of the life-cycle and its indispensable role in perpetuating the ecological balance among 
species, so death – which is essentially individual – can be considered as broadly ‘sacrificial’, most 
explicitly in the predator-prey relationship.  A specifically human and engaged perspective involves 
the subjective recognition that deaths mark a linear succession of biologically related, nameable 
individuals, each having made a personal progression within specific social relationships from 
physical and emotional dependence to independence and back to dependence.  This will have been 
accompanied by the transfer, development, employment, withering and loss of abilities, those that 
were learned being communicated at an appropriate stage to a subsequent overlapping generation.  
Concurrently both a moral and a spiritual dimension are added to the individual life.  The former 
possibly arises in respect of the duty of care, first experienced then assumed, the latter from the belief 
that the individual’s physical death merely permits its fundamental ‘being’ to part company with its 
material yet superficial human form, to migrate ‘toward the unknown region’ (Whitman 2006: 328) – 
a transition generally marked by significant ritual involving the disposition of the physical remains 
through mortuary and funerary practices – in the case of burial, perhaps accompanied by material 
objects which may express the community’s prevailing beliefs regarding the particular nature of that 
‘unknown region’.  As Davies puts it, ‘… the life of a community is comprehensible, subjectively and 
objectively, only when it is understood as grounded in a covenant of mutual loyalty between the living 
and the dead.’ (Davies 1994b: 12, 13, citing Warner: 1959).   ‘So strong is the need to die properly 
within the life of the living that … the living need the dead if the culture is to survive and perhaps 
flourish’ (ibid.: 18).  These assertions lack experimental foundations, so science, as conceived in this 
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study, cannot offer its atemporal mode of explanation in support.  An alternative perspective must be 
sought – but ideally one which admits no critical incoherence between Davies’s assertions and the 
evident human propensity deliberately to cause or to court violent death. 
Death and Dasein 
One possibility is offered by Heidegger, who conceived ‘Dasein’ as a distinctively human ‘way of 
being’, a key element in his ‘…lifelong meditation on the phenomenon of truth’ (Campbell R. 1992: 
305).  This phenomenological notion played a central role in his development of ‘… the most radical 
challenge yet to appear to what has become the traditional concept of truth’ (ibid.: 306) – that truth is 
a property of assertions uttered by a subject about a substantive object.  For Heidegger truth is instead 
a matter of the special consciousness of humans, who are ‘… self-aware in such a way that their own 
existence matters to them’ (Thomas 1996: 39).  But this has been overlooked, as tradition ‘… has 
passed down a certain way of thinking about Being, one that makes the meaning of Being appear self-
evident and obvious to all’ (Piercey 2009: 77); this needs to be reassessed to identify what 
possibilities it has concealed.  Dasein is grounded – ‘entangled’ (Olsen 2010: 66) – in a temporal 
social and material context, involving shared language use and symbolic representation of significant 
human concerns.  Dasein ‘uncovers’ the true temporality and thus historicity of the Self, which 
inherits a constitutive legacy from its own past that conditions its possibilities for the future and 
contributes to its continuing identity in time.  However, Dasein also discloses ‘… the single 
possibility which is at once its most intimate, non-transferable and unavoidable … [namely] the 
certainty of its own death’ (Thomas 1996: 51, citing Heidegger 1962: 304).  This truth that Being is 
finite directs action, under normal circumstances, towards conscious, not instinctive, self-
preservation; under abnormal circumstances, however, Being may be willingly surrendered.  But the 
realisation of personal self-identity must be matched by the awareness of the existence of similarly 
conscious Other(s), whether distinguished in personal or social, ethnic or political dimensions.  The 
nature of the relationship between ‘self’ and ‘other’ is considered below, as it is central to conflict; but 
viewed from this special perspective, the premeditated and inescapable destruction of Being becomes 
a matter of the utmost gravity and immorality.  Responsibility for its destruction is generally regarded 
as subject to moral censure, though legal censure may be qualified.  Ethnographic studies have 
established that preparation for and survival from such consequences of war can be accompanied by 
specific rituals, either to steel individuals to kill or, having killed, to cleanse them from the action 
taken (Keeley 1996: 143-147); by analogy this may well have prehistoric applicability.  In a much 
later age the memorialisation of the dead resulting from military action signals the distinctiveness and 
weight attached by society to that form of surrender of Being, such that it is represented as sacrificial 
in meaning and thus morally commendable. 
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5.2 Morality, Kinship and State 
It seems plausible to claim, based on ethnographic analogy, that the basic ‘we-relationship’ 
characterising the kinship of the prehistoric band or tribe and expressed in members’ mutual support 
and reciprocity, rests on the ‘idealist’ notion that its constitutive blood ties acquire ‘collective’ moral 
significance: what the kin group does is good – or, as Keeley puts it, ‘… it is usually a matter of “my 
relatives, right or wrong”’ (Keeley 1996: 145).  Moral authority may be drawn from the hallowed 
memory of ancestors, the continuing traditions of the group and the elevation of perpetuation of its 
lineage – and subsequently that of the emergent tribal polity and chiefdom – over survival of the 
individual.  Thus, death in combat to help preserve the kinship group is honourable.  Just as positive 
moral force is attached to the blood relationship, so is negative moral force attached to its absence, 
establishing an enduring antithesis between the ‘good’ and ‘bad’, ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ of kin and non-
kin – it is right to kill non-kin.  Keeley identifies features of primitive warfare that expose the 
collective conception of morality upheld by participant social groupings in respect of conflict.  All 
members of the enemy ‘they’ are considered alike as legitimate targets, including women and 
children; the dead are mutilated and trophies made of body parts; prisoners are tortured and executed; 
the rout or rampage following a successful attack involves the slaughter of both combatants and non-
combatants; occasionally entire communities are slaughtered, with some resemblance to genocide. 
Yet there is also reference to the presence of a more individualistic moral perspective.  Prowess in 
fighting by individual dead enemy warriors is acknowledged and individual acts signifying personal 
bravery and valour are valued even more highly than numbers of enemy killed.  There is also 
ethnographic evidence of a higher valuation of peace over war, regrets about war’s apparent 
inevitability and individual feelings of revulsion, if not guilt, towards killing.  ‘Evidence … suggests 
that combat is just as psychologically traumatic for tribal warriors as for their civilised counterparts’ 
(Keeley 1996: 147).  The focus on warfare need not mean that kin are never killed: the practice of 
infanticide (typically of females or twins and involving ritual) is a deliberate termination of life no 
different from a killing in combat (e.g. Divale, Harris 1976; Girard 2013 [1972], 10, 62-64).  Nor are 
kin groups free from internal conflict, response to which reveals awareness of and sensitivity to 
concepts of justice.  From ethnographic studies Fry identifies various responses to anti-social actions, 
ranging from sensitive conflict resolution to execution of the guilty party (Fry, D.P.: 2006).  
Emergence of the state and the associated concept of sovereignty presents a more complex picture.  
Early textual material from China, India and the Middle East dating from the first millennium BC – 
including the influential writings of Sun Tzu – contains discussions and prescriptions concerning the 
conduct of war, as well as recording its contemporary scale and brutality. 
Systematic analysis of the morality of warfare is provided by the Greek philosophers and of its 
legality by Roman writers, revealing different ‘realist’ perspectives.  For example, Thucydides’ 
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contemporary history of the Peloponnesian War of the fifth century BC, between Athens and Sparta, 
presented the extreme realist position, that morality has no place in the pursuit of political power.  So, 
with the fall of the siege of Melos, its entire population was either slaughtered or enslaved, and the 
island colonised by Athens.  The subsequent criticism of the slaughter was grounded on the equally 
realist assessment that it had in fact failed to deliver the expected advantage to the Athenians.  The 
definite social interface between the ruling cadres and the general population, which accompanies the 
advent of the hierarchically structured state, creates an intra-state locus of potential conflict and 
therefore a context where significant moral issues arise.  In the inter-state context, the perspective on 
the morality of conflict may be politically pragmatic.  From a realist point of view, law is an 
expression of political power vested in the individual sovereign state and not in any ‘society of states’ 
of which it is circumstantially a member.  So, the legitimacy of international law is always open to 
challenge, since the society of states has no sovereign, allowing the sovereign state to abrogate any 
commitment to the peace and to embark on war, without regard for the ‘other’.  Consequently, peace 
between states remains insecure and its continuation a matter of expediency rather than morality. 
5.3 The Limitations of Morality 
According to MacIntyre, ‘the difference between a human relationship uninformed by morality and 
one so informed is precisely the difference between one in which each person treats the other 
primarily as a means to his or her ends and one in which each treats the other as an end. … [But 
q]uestions of ends are questions of values, and on values reason is silent; … Instead one must simply 
choose – between parties, classes, nations, causes, ideals’ (MacIntyre 2007: 23, 26).  There is an 
apparent ambivalence in humanity’s attitude to life.  On the one hand, human life is claimed to 
possess a fundamental, intrinsic and unique value according a special priority to its preservation and 
reproduction, sufficient to distinguish it in value terms from all other things – a sacrality that fully 
warrants life’s preservation as an end in itself.  On the other hand, humanity has demonstrated its 
preparedness to engage actively, persistently and apparently without significant remorse in the 
deliberate killing of members of its own species, systematically achieved in war and one-sided 
massacres.  Not only has some contrary end acquired precedence over preservation of life; the 
destruction of life has become the means to it, apparently abandoning morality.  This ambivalence 
may exist because at root an individual places a higher value on their own life than on someone else’s 
life.  Knowing ‘what ought not to be done’ does not physically force adherence, so it may be 
disregarded when it is expedient to do so – particularly if it is a question of ‘my life or thine’.  A legal 
system could supply the necessary force, by codifying the relevant moral principles, embedding them 
in specific requirements applicable to individual circumstances of life and establishing mechanisms of 
enforcement and punishment.  The sovereign state can then legitimately apply physical force to ensure 
obedience to moral principles, the legal system being part of the state’s institutional framework.  But 
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the legal system may not have constitutional independence from and jurisdiction over the actions of 
the state itself, while the laws themselves may not give priority to moral principles.  The state may 
reject peace in favour of war, prosecuting major conflicts and promulgating the deliberate killing of 
fellow-humans.  The state may reject universal moral principles but apply moral discrimination to 
favour one group over another, or even the survival of a group over selected individual members.  The 
law may force citizens to take up arms on the state’s behalf, conceivably without regard to their 
personal commitments not to engage in deadly violence, and even to die.  But not all combatants are 
conscripts or under a feudal obligation to take up arms when required.  Mercenaries and professional 
soldiers (the former distinguished by having no political allegiance to their paymaster), viewed as 
rational economic agents, appear to be willing to sell their services as killers and to choose to risk 
their own death.  From an idealist point of view, however, the general issue of morality cannot be so 
easily discarded in response to realist claims.  A key question is the contestable basis of the state’s 
claim to rule independently and legitimately on issues involving life and death, even if arbitrarily – for 
example, condemning murder yet enforcing capital punishment; protecting enemy non-combatants or 
prisoners-of-war yet executing traitors and war criminals; enlisting willing combatants to harness their 
aggressive intent (at the risk of their committing war crimes) yet executing deserters.  According to 
McMahan, ‘The prevailing view is that it can make a difference to the moral permissibility of killing 
another person whether one’s political leaders have declared a state of war with that person’s country 
… therefore political leaders can somehow cause other people’s moral rights to disappear simply by 
commanding their armies to attack them.  When stated this way, the received view seems obviously 
absurd’ (McMahan 2009: vii).  Whether the state will act morally or not may reflect the nature of its 
sovereignty.  Bobbitt has shown this to be a malleable concept, changing in response to conflict itself 
but also under influence of the ‘membership’ of the society of states, where the emergence of a 
putative international legal system – including laws of war – seeks to give a wider reach to moral 
principles and their enforcement.  A further consideration is whether the individual’s personal 
identification with a specific state (and thus being politically ‘led’) carries moral force or is purely a 
matter of personal realist expediency, with no obligation to modify or surrender personal moral 
convictions.  Hence the conduct of the state can provoke internal conflict and insurrection, potentially 
breaking down the rule of law.  This is illustrated in Chapter 8.  The moral issues associated with 
killing have been analysed in depth throughout the historical period; in the prehistoric period, there 
was probably awareness of and sensitivity to the same complex issues.  The primary problem is the 
potentially unresolvable ontological conflict between the realist and the idealist. 
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5.4 The Elusiveness of Self-restraint 
The problematic relation between the ‘Self’ and the ‘Other’ 
Olafson stresses the fact that ‘… human societies are always dealing with a fundamental and universal 
… moral problem of defining the relationships in which their members are to stand to one another’ 
(Olafson 1979: 234, emphasis in original).  He suggests that ‘Hegel contributes … an account of just 
that obscurity and fragmentariness that characterize our moral understanding of other human beings 
… attributing a conceptual basis to the failures of moral understanding that violate the fundamental 
condition of reciprocity which … governs the relationship of one human consciousness to another’ 
(ibid.: 241, emphasis added).  This concerns the distinction between the ‘self’ and the ‘other’, 
fundamental to the genesis of conflict.  Hegel’s ‘crucial insight’ was that these concepts of ‘self’ and 
‘other’ are interdependent and can potentially evolve together to the point at which ‘… the underlying 
identity of the one with other is grasped’, not just as a ‘cerebral activity’ but involves ‘… the 
penetration of a society’s institutions and practices by a conception that reconstrues the relationships 
between the humans who live under them [thereby modifying] the conditions defining public 
discourse and communication’ (ibid.).  However, this shifts the burden onto explaining why it appears 
so difficult to achieve this and for the ‘person’ – ‘in its full range of moral implications’ (ibid.: 242) – 
to emerge as a synthesis of self and other.   In Olafson’s view, Hegel attributed the problem to a 
tension between the capacity of the human consciousness to conceive objects as existing independent 
of the act of knowing them, and the subsequent attempt to apply that same conceptual approach to the 
self – trying to objectivize human subjectivity.  This is ‘… hardly … an adequate model for the 
understanding of selfhood’ (ibid.).  Consequently, ‘… because the self is unable to conceptualize its 
own functions and status satisfactorily, it is shut off from a recognition of the complementarity 
inherent in its relationship with the other and can understand that relationship only at the level of a 
conflict between being animated by competing desires and lacking any principle of rational 
mediation’ (ibid.: 243).  At the root of the ambivalent attitude to life noted earlier lies this deficiency 
in human consciousness.  It may be less problematic the simpler (and smaller) is the social group of 
which the self is a part, where ‘discourse and communication’ can more readily encourage reciprocity 
between the self and the other.  The emergence of larger, more complex and necessarily more 
authoritarian group structures is liable to engender conflict within and between groups. 
5.5 Religion and Conflict 
Religion, ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ 
The notion that the laws of the state could achieve the identity between ‘self’ and ‘other’ necessary to 
eliminate conflict appears incoherent, if it is reduced to using force to eliminate force.  However, the 
adoption of appropriate moral principles as the basis for life itself may achieve the necessary 
transformation of individual consciousness.  A key question is whether religion can offer both a 
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convincing diagnosis of the impaired consciousness and an effective cure in the form of voluntary 
commitment to the required moral principles.  Humanity, reflecting on its natural existence, has 
indeed contemplated the presence of a power greater than and beyond itself – bodily, temporally and 
spatially.  A contemplation of an eternal spiritual dimension has been expressed in ways that have 
generated both material and textual evidence across the entire human temporal record.  Prehistoric 
mortuary practices point to a phenomenological awareness of this dimension in relation to the 
meaning of death – and by implication, of life and the way it is lived.  Textual sources reveal the 
presence of ideas that relate this dimension to the totality of creation on the one hand, and to the 
conduct of the individual life on the other.  A personification of that dimension, expressed in terms of 
god or gods, generates the possibility of relationships between humanity and god(s) and specifically 
between the will of god(s) and the will of man.  The presumed superior power of god(s) admits the 
possibility of the will of man being overruled, possibly capriciously, as represented in Greek 
mythology.  But it also introduces the possibility of man carrying out whatever is believed to be the 
will of the god(s). 
The emergence of Hebraic monotheism brought an elaboration of the character of that God and of the 
relationship between God and Man, emphasising the unchanging supreme virtue and power of the 
former, the qualified autonomy and fractured morality of the latter, and the disjuncture between them.  
The subsequent emergence of Christianity and Islam from that stem created three monotheisms 
presenting distinct conceptions of God and different understandings of Man’s obligations and 
opportunities in his relationship with God.  However, the historical trajectories of these three faiths 
became strongly entangled in geopolitical considerations that fostered conflict between them, despite 
their common ground.  This could be expressed in Thomas Aquinas’s concept of religio, a component 
virtue of justice which ‘… pays the debt of honor to God’ (Thomas 1974: II-II, 80, 2; cited by 
Johnson 2009: 47) and, as a natural universal ‘moral virtue’, may be distinguished from the 
‘supernatural moral virtue’ of a specific faith (Johnson 2009: 48). 
While Christianity’s adoption by the Roman Empire contributed significantly to its westward 
geographical spread and to the emergence of frontiers with Judaism and Islam, the manner of its 
adoption initiated a lasting association between the Christian church – primarily in its Romanised 
institutional form – and the exercise of political power.  As Johnson notes: by the twelfth century, the 
‘Catholic Church … enjoyed a legal monopoly of religion, one that could be enforced by civil powers.  
The Constantinian model of church-government relations required not only the state’s enforcement of 
one religion for all its citizens, but the elimination of any theologically incorrect or heretical version 
of that religion’ (ibid.: 39).  Christianity became complicit in political ambitions pursued through 
military violence – arguably no different in principle from the invocation of the will of an all-
powerful Jehovah and Allah in the military activities of the Hebrews (and the later kingdoms of Israel 
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and Judah) and the Islamic empire.  An adjunct of Bobbitt’s argument – that the origins of the 
constitutional development of a large part of the world are to be found in Christendom (rather than 
from Islam) – is the similar resort to violence in the name of Christianity, in the colonial expansion of 
the European powers from the fifteenth century onwards, against the indigenous peoples of the 
Americas, Asia and Africa, that preceded the imposition of Christendom’s forms of political 
administration.  Any identity achieved between ‘self’ and ‘other’ by religion was severely selective, 
certainly so far as national policy was concerned, limited to those who shared similar self-interested 
political, social and cultural views, albeit believed to carry divine endorsement.  Such a conception of 
religion seems incapable of addressing the deficiencies of human consciousness identified by Hegel as 
the root of the antagonism driving conflict.  But as similar antitheses between ‘self’ and ‘other’ were 
manifest in the internal relationships of the states comprising Christendom, the problem was not 
peculiarly associated with external colonialism and imperial expansion. 
Religion and Virtue 
Members of humanity seem to be intrinsically unable to relate with one another in the manner 
necessary to achieve the reciprocity of shared values.  The continuing coexistence of different and 
contrary moral principles, implicated in the resort to violent conflict, both in the past and the present, 
might be attributed to their metaphysical nature, beyond the reach of conclusive adjudication by 
physicalist empiricism.  But the fundamental conflict is between the claims that, on the one hand, the 
spiritual authority underpinning morality also has authority over the physical world (even to the extent 
of having historically engaged with it, revealing its nature); on the other hand, knowledge is 
coterminous with the conclusions of physicalist empiricism, so that religious knowledge is an 
oxymoron and values are arbitrary, to be displaced inevitably by rational thought.  From the latter 
point of view virtue is an undefinable concept and the predicate ‘good’ meaningless in any sense other 
than ‘functionally efficient’.  However, MacIntyre argues that ‘… only in the later seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, when [the] distinguishing of the moral from the theological, the legal and the 
aesthetic has become a received doctrine that the project of an independent rational justification for 
morality becomes not merely the concern of individual thinkers, but central to Northern European 
culture’ (MacIntyre 2007: 39).  Prior to this period several distinct conceptions of virtue were at 
different times well-developed in intellectual contexts (e.g. Homeric, Aristotelian, New Testament).  
He concludes, significantly, that this Enlightenment project failed.  This had serious consequences: 
‘…the breakdown of this project provided the historical background against which the predicaments 
of our own culture can become intelligible’ (ibid.).  Given the project’s presuppositions, it had to 
follow that ‘… the gap between any set of reasons which could support unconditional adherence to 
general and unconditional rules and any set of reasons for actions or judgment which could derive 
from our particular, fluctuating, circumstance-governed desires, emotions and interests’ would prove 
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to be ‘logically unbridgable’ (ibid.: 49) – so from the perspective of these presuppositions the 
question ‘Ought I to act as I intend?’ is not rationally answerable. 
It is the project’s presupposed concept of the individual, that ‘newly invented social institution’ (ibid.: 
228), shorn of social relationships, without a history and perpetually in pursuit only of ‘utility’, that in 
MacIntyre’s view must be abandoned, in favour of a restoration of the Aristotelian notion of the 
human telos, but now with a social rather than biological foundation (ibid.: 196, 197).  This radical 
change of perspective dispenses with the analytical concept of the isolated individual action and 
substitutes ‘… a concept of self whose unity resides in the unity of a narrative which links birth to life 
to death’ – so actions express intentions which are only intelligible in social settings, which have 
singular histories.  The relevant telos has a social scope: man’s purpose as a species, to be served by 
the engagement of individuals with each other.  Given this, the virtues are the means by which that 
telos is served.  MacIntyre argues that these means are not ‘external’ to human practices or actions – 
like the money, goods, power and status which characterize institutional activity – but are ‘internal’ in 
the sense of the qualities of performance of the practices.  ‘A virtue is an acquired human quality the 
possession and exercise of which tends to enable us to achieve those goods which are internal to 
practices …’ (ibid: 191).  These virtues ‘… define our relationships to those other people with whom 
we share the kinds of purposes and standards which inform practices’ (ibid.).  MacIntyre identifies the 
virtues of justice, courage and honesty as essential elements of any substantive practice, while that of 
integrity or constancy concerns the wholeness of a human life (ibid.:203).  Therefore, it is the 
commitment to a given perspective on the purpose of human life, in a specific social context (a time 
and a place), that anchors the practices of life and involves the expression of the virtues.  In the 
specific case of the New-Testament conception of the good life, the key virtues are faith, hope, love, 
patience and humility, as well as integrity.  But the telos in this case is ‘… a supernatural and not only 
a natural good, but supernature redeems and completes nature’ (ibid.: 184).  The change of 
perspective involving the adoption of the Christian telos is thus a spiritual conversion and renewal – a 
substantive change of consciousness. 
MacIntyre’s Aristotelian approach offers the prospect of providing an answer to moral questions, and 
helps to resolve the apparent ambivalence towards human life signalled by warfare.  The normative 
force of the virtues derives not from their intrinsic values but from the force of the spirituality that 
drives their instrumentality.  A key question is the extent to which the encounter with the new belief 
system of Christianity, anchored in specific historical events – and thus claiming a ‘revealed’ 
foundation – prompted specific identifications of personal shortcomings and related revisions of 
beliefs amounting to a spiritual change, including the adoption of the quite distinct set of New-
Testament virtues, as effective guides to life.  Christianity’s teleological integration with Jewish 
history and religion, from origin myth through tribal and ethnic experience to Roman occupation, 
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followed by its proclaimed universal relevance and eschatological implications, gave it significance in 
terms of world history (Lӧwith 1949).  However, as Christianity may be categorized as a ‘religion of a 
book’, the inevitable issues of identification of canonical text and its interpretation – ‘… inescapably 
subjective, necessarily provisional, and … inevitably disputatious’ (Brueggemann 2011: 26) either 
from the point of view of its meaning or its practical implications – became matters of immense (and 
indeed continuing) significance.  This raised in various forms the question of authority, whether of 
those claiming to offer definitive interpretations or of the scriptural text itself.  In addition, the 
diffusion of awareness of scripture, its meaning and implications was closely tied to its availability in 
different languages and accessible formats, and to the specific developmental trajectory of the 
institutional church and effectiveness of its specific proselytizing activities.  Only by the fifteenth and 
sixteenth centuries had printed versions of the Holy Bible become available in German, French and 
English.  From the outset, Christianity, fully comprehended or not, had evident relevance to the 
pursuit and application of religious or political power and authority, transcending the domain of any 
particular social or national institutional structure.  The crux of the matter is the fact that Christian 
virtues are arguably inimical not just to the use of violence but more generally to any treatment of 
individuals as means to an end, rather than ends in themselves – a moral criterion previously 
identified.  However, for these virtues to have a material effect on the actual conduct of social, 
political and even ecclesiastical affairs, supposes that the deployment of force need have no 
instrumental role within them – an apparently unrealistic supposition.  The consequence has been the 
maintenance of an ambiguous relationship between the secular and ecclesiastical authorities, in which 
the practice of the virtues has seldom been a defining element. 
Religion and Secular Authority 
From Hegel’s perspective, a transformation of self-consciousness is required to create an identity 
between ‘self’ and ‘other’, so that a relationship grounded on reciprocity replaces conflict.  Without 
that, the ‘other’ may become an object of hatred and the conflict of individual interest lead to the use 
of physical force.  In specific circumstances, it escalates to the extreme limits of savagery and 
brutality, in indiscriminate slaughter and the humiliating perversion of the human procreative capacity 
in mass rape.  The required transformation is fundamentally subjective.  However, the relation of 
reciprocity is plausibly integral to the objective concept of community, with the elemental community 
being the family.  As Olafson observes, ‘… the family is an intentional community … [in which] 
actions attributable to individual persons are performed by them in their capacity as members of a 
specific family and reflect intentions in which they share precisely as members of that family’ 
(Olafson 1979: 123, 124, emphasis added).  In short, there is an implicit agreed constitution uniting 
members.  In the absence of pathological dysfunctionality, the experience of birth, life and death 
within the overlapping generations of the family may deliver the interweaving of intentions that is 
intrinsic to the achievement of an identity between the self and the other.  Returning to the perspective 
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of Thomas Aquinas, a key element in this process may be a pursuit of the virtues of justice in respect 
of personal relationships: ‘The essence of justice consists in fully rendering to one another the debt 
owed him’ (Thomas 1974: II-II 80, 1; cited by Johnson 2009: 47).  Two of the identified virtues of 
justice are filial piety and gratitude: ‘filial piety gives to parents what is owed to them and gratitude 
gives to a friend or benefactor what is owed to her’ (Johnson 2009: 47).  This perspective identifies 
important moral grounds for the ties of kinship, rather than mere physical and (insufficient) 
consanguinity.  The successful coalescence of family groups into larger communities, with their 
accepted hierarchical orderings, may inculcate reciprocity in the form of a group ethos and telos 
grounded in tradition and ancestral authority.  However, it is just as plausible that, within the enlarged 
community, the emergence of inequality and perceived injustice associated with social difference will 
constitute new circumstances that differentiate ‘others’ with whom the self is unable to identify.  
Conflict may threaten the stability and existence of the group.  Social cohesion might be preserved by 
a formalisation of just rights and duties, with the underlying threat of physical violence if reciprocity 
failed.  But the main problem concerns inter-community relationships, where intentions are likely to 
be at variance in the absence of a shared history. 
The matter is exacerbated by economic development based on division of labour, specialisation, the 
use of capital and trade, which generate discrete communities that are functionally and eventually 
spatially separated.  Paradoxically, the consequent technical economic interdependence (with its 
substantive instrumental reciprocity) is grounded on social separation and independence, and 
constantly changing categories of distinction between the self and overlapping and intersecting 
‘others’, generating rival allegiances.  The inherent instability of such an economic system, in which 
innovation and change are both actively sought and unexpectedly encountered, compounds the 
problem.  Challenges to senses of justice of outcomes and security in respect of the future undermine 
human self-consciousness and fracture the relationship between self and increasingly impersonal 
others.  The necessary accompanying development of more elaborate institutional structures, 
supported by corresponding complex civil and criminal legal codes, constrain agency by enforcing an 
expanding distinction between permissible and impermissible actions, supplemented by 
spontaneously originated conventions of conduct.  These can be interpreted as forestalling the resort 
to violence that the perceived separation of the self from the others could otherwise engender, but 
conditional on a contrived identification between the self and the collective other. 
Whether these constitutions and institutions that formally compose the individual state, broadly 
construed, are agreed to by many or imposed by a few is a significant matter.  They are inherently 
normative, although the underlying principles need not command universal assent – they may be 
partial, discriminatory and selectively destructive of specific human interests, and involve elaborate 
bureaucratic controls monopolising these functions.  And as Arendt puts it, ‘In a fully developed 
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bureaucracy there is nobody left with whom one can argue, to whom one can present grievances, on 
whom the pressures of power can be exerted.  Bureaucracy is a form of government in which 
everybody is deprived of political freedom, of the power to act; for the rule by Nobody is not no rule, 
and where all are equally powerless we have a tyranny without a tyrant’ (Arendt 1970: 81).  The ‘self’ 
is thus effectively anonymized within the state, which in turn loses the personalised identity sufficient 
to be the ‘other’ with which the desired identity can be achieved; accordingly, engagement with others 
is restricted to relationships – not all reciprocal – within component communities which comprise the 
state in a purely structural or functional sense and which can be latently in conflict with one another. 
5.6 The State and Christianity 
A reliance on rules plus force to contain the derivative problem of violent conflict seems unlikely to 
stimulate the transformation of self-consciousness necessary to achieve the required identity between 
the ‘self’ and the ‘other’.  The question is whether a more enduring resolution of the core problem of 
the self can be found.  As Bobbitt specifically identifies Christendom as the origin of the process of 
change that affected the constitutional arrangements of much of the world, so it is appropriate to 
consider the relationship between Christianity and secular authority.  Three sets of issues characterise 
the partial and ambivalent ways in which the Christian virtues were pursued over the centuries by 
those in positions of political or ecclesiastical power.  Each involved violent conflict and failed to 
uphold these virtues: the conflict within Christianity generated by heresies and schisms; the conflict 
between Christian belief and other religions; the conflict between Christian rule and ‘reasons of state’. 
Heresy 
The war against heresy concerned ecclesiastical and political authority versus individual freedom of 
interpretation and association.  The defining elements of the Christian faith concern what are believed 
to be unique, historically located intersections of the physical and spiritual worlds: Christ’s birth (as 
the incarnation of God), actions, death and resurrection; the baptism of the Holy Spirit on individuals 
as they come to faith, the gift of God’s grace.  Each of these presents ‘making sense’ challenges, 
involving (like history) the interpretation of recorded testimony of personal revelatory experiences, as 
well as generating core theological differences beyond empirical resolution, all embedded in articles 
of faith.  The ascription of authority to one interpretation rather than to another presumes the prior 
emergence and general acceptance of an organised hierarchy empowered to make this judgement.  
Persistent adherence to an unauthorised interpretation – an un-repented heretical belief, contradicting 
the orthodoxy – presented a challenge, not only to ecclesiastical leadership but particularly to those 
secular authorities that had formally adopted the religion and took seriously their defence of the 
orthodox faith as a significant warrant for their own power.  A challenge could lead to a potentially 
disruptive social division into a ‘we’ and ‘they’, with serious political implications.  As Armstrong 
points out, ‘In Western Europe “heresy” had always been a political rather than a purely theological 
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matter and had been suppressed violently because it threatened public order [and] state violence was 
regarded as essential to public order’ (Armstrong 2014: 222, 224).  Problematic differences of 
interpretation and corresponding practices, varying in theological weight, started to emerge from an 
early date in the experience of the Christian church and continued spasmodically through the ensuing 
centuries as it encountered pagan belief systems.  These drew disciplinary responses from the 
ecclesiastical authorities, differing in rigour, both in terms of the punishment imposed and the zeal 
with which the search for heretics was prosecuted – leading to the specialist Roman Catholic courts of 
the Inquisitions of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries and later in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.  
From the eleventh century onwards, the typical penalty for heresy was to be burned alive at the stake, 
a punishment already employed for a wide range of non-religious crimes, significantly including 
treason (crucifixion having been proscribed in the fourth century).  Indeed, ‘[Although] heresy was 
not an offence specifically punishable by burning [it became such through a] conflation of heresy with 
treason’ (Roach, Angelovska-Panova 2012: 150, 151).  Accordingly, numerous, but not all, burnings 
‘… were carried out by the secular government at the behest of the churchmen’ (ibid.: 169), once the 
latter had delivered their ecclesiastical judgment.  The later Spanish and Portuguese Inquisitions were 
instigated by the respective states (with Papal consent), hence had wider social, cultural and political, 
not just religious, agendas – including anti-Semitic and anti-Islamic priorities.  Some clerics were 
aware of the inconsistency between the claims of their professed faith and the severe punishments that 
were being administered in respect of heresy, seeking an alternative solution to the problem through 
instruction, repentance and penance.  The significant schisms between the Roman Church and 
Orthodoxy, between Protestantism and Counter-reformation Roman Catholicism, and the many 
divisions of the Reformed Church, provided the basis for prolonged social division and warfare.  
Accordingly, the Christian virtues did not prevail over force as the basis for the resolution of religious 
conflict within European Christendom. 
Christianity and other faiths 
In respect of the conflict with other faiths, the Crusades illustrate the same moral dilemma in a 
geopolitical context.  Initiated largely by Papal authority as just wars, the principal crusades were 
justified by Islamic incursions into the Holy Land, North Africa, Spain and elsewhere in southern 
Europe; persecutions, slaughter and enslavement of the Christians there, were considered an 
unwarranted attack on Christendom at large.  Aggressive retaliation from Christendom at large was 
thereby assumed justified.  But participants were also granted in advance the spiritual indulgence of 
forgiveness as the reward, with death itself to be judged as virtuous sacrifice.  However, the suspect 
theology of the indulgence – that forgiveness could be bought by human action of an appropriate type, 
out of which grew concerns that contributed to the eventual schism between the Church of Rome and 
the founders of the Protestant Church – offered no assurance that the Christian virtues would be 
pursued by the proposed action.  Indeed, subsequent actions undertaken were quite contrary to the 
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pursuit of these virtues – and to the jus in bello (to be discussed below).  The massacring of large 
numbers of Jewish and Muslim civilians during the Crusades, particularly the First, was purposive 
and scarcely incidental ‘collateral damage’.  The general conclusion is that the Crusades were not 
conducted in accordance with values significantly different from those of wars initiated out of entirely 
secular motives. 
Reasons of State 
The key question is whether the adoption of Christianity by the rulers of the ‘kingly states’ of the 
early modern period significantly influenced their conduct or merely reinforced their personal 
positions.  A faith which presumed an intrinsic and fundamental equality of its members and was 
prone to express itself in communal if not communistic modes of social organisation presented a 
significant challenge to strictly stratified and inegalitarian political systems.  Nevertheless, by the 
sixteenth century ‘Europe’s monarchs saw themselves, without exception, as representatives of God. 
… This gave them an appearance of formidable power’ (Monod 1999: 26).  Their shared absolutism, 
albeit varying in form from one state to another, was warranted by the general belief that they were 
appointed by and directly responsible to God, grounded implicitly on specific theologies regarding the 
nature and power of God and the relationship between God’s will and human will.  From one 
perspective, an analogy drawn between this relationship and that between ruler and ruled allowed the 
former to share in the omnipotence and omniscience of God and thus be a mediator between God and 
man.  Monod documents the decay of this conception of the ‘divine’ monarch between the late-
sixteenth and the mid-eighteenth centuries in Europe (considered further in Chapter 7). 
The implied unique ‘sacrality’ of the royal body was reinforced by the apparent possession of healing 
powers exercised in the ‘Royal Touch’.  Introduced by French kings in the eleventh century and 
continued to the reign of Queen Anne in England, it ‘… bestowed on monarchs a divine aura that 
adhered to the royal body itself’ (ibid.: 40) and was ‘… the ultimate expression’ of that body (ibid.: 
312).  The late-sixteenth-century emergence of a legal concept of sovereignty, inherited smoothly by 
the next-in-line to a deceased monarch, contributed the immortality that the monarch quite evidently 
could not claim, albeit an institutional creation.  However, the matter of the public perception of the 
monarch required separate attention, an image of ‘virtue’ being cultivated among the élite through the 
monarch’s representation in the visual and performing arts (‘the theatre of royal virtue’ (ibid.: Ch. 3)).  
Subsequently, in the context of reformed religion, there emerged a ‘… different justification for 
[monarchs’] earthly powers [by them becoming] representatives of the reformed Christian self 
[through] confessionalization’ (ibid.: 53).  This not only aligned a monarch and thus, in principle, his 
subjects, to a specific religious confession or denomination, it also generated two additional problems.  
First, ‘Submission to the sovereign is an act of surrender of the self [in a] pact … not made just with 
the king [but also with] the collective entity that the king represents – that is, the state.  … [This] laid 
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the groundwork for the subjection of the Christian self to the rational state [and even] the extinction of 
Christian selfhood through its submersion in a state based on human reason … involving a rational 
covenant whose [Hobbesian] foundations are fear of death and desire for security’ (ibid.: 200, 201) – 
scarcely Christian sentiments and a ground for conflict.  Second, confessionalization could be used as 
a device to achieve religious reform in order to promote the attainment of secular and political 
objectives (ibid.: 141).  Indeed, the projected sanctified image of the monarch need not match the 
reality, where ‘reasons of state’ prevailed – Monod’s ‘doing bad deeds for good ends’ (ibid.: 85).  
Promoting the love and admiration of the people ‘… might involve deceit as a means [but] the king 
should be guided in his ends by Christian morality’ (ibid.: 130).  However, the pursuit of expansionist 
imperial ambitions and the associated warfare betrayed an allegiance to a different ideology, with 
serious consequences for the nature of the self.  The place of the theology of grace, irrelevant for state 
governance, was taken by the process of ‘… moulding the Christian self into the political personality 
of the responsible subject or citizen … concerned with civic duty, not spiritual purity’ (ibid.: 271).  
Whatever the personal stance and faith of specific individuals (and Christianity has no necessary 
monopoly of the Christian virtues), the Christian virtues could not generally eliminate or mitigate the 
conflict generated by competitive relationships among states – with unfortunate implications for the 
individuals involved as combatants.  But Christian virtues may well have had some indirect influence 
in the negotiated settlements which brought each epoch to a close, as they did on the framing of 
domestic legislation and judicial systems. 
5.7 The Limits of Self-restraint 
Selective Restraint 
Christianity displays a clear disposition in favour of pacifism – with its key moral injunctions in 
favour of valuing others as highly as oneself (as ends), against retaliation for wrongs experienced and 
in favour of loving one’s enemies – and, in so far as it transcends ethnic, social, political and national 
identities, it entertains the possibility of a universal peace.  Nevertheless, Christianity was 
subsequently interpreted as warranting the application of force against whatever was judged to be evil 
– thereby stoking conflict.  Thus, ‘[with the advent of Christianity] the Roman legal notion of Just 
War is gradually replaced with a moral or religious notion where the forces of good combat the forces 
of evil.’ (Christopher 1999: 23).  However, the elevation of moral responsibility from the personal 
commitment of the individual believer to an entire state necessarily involved its ruler.  Augustine’s 
interpretation joined the notion of ‘war as an instrument of God’ with the presumption that ‘… one of 
the duties of rulers is to carry out God’s will, [so] wars they initiate become ipso facto God’s wars.  
[They] are not formally or objectively just, as they were under the Roman system, but became just 
based on the command of the ruler … [Moreover, war] became more than just a legal remedy for 
injustice; it became a moral imperative’ (ibid.:37, 38).  Nonetheless, a succession of ecclesiastical 
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efforts, commencing in AD 600 and spanning virtually a millennium, produced a corpus of thought on 
the nature of the just war, and introduced protections for non-combatants caught up in conflict, 
extended to the entire twelfth-century church.  The systematic studies of Thomas Aquinas, Vitoria, 
Suárez and Grotius followed.  Vitoria significantly recognised ‘an international society of independent 
states, each with reciprocal obligations and prohibitions on their conduct vis-à-vis one another’ (ibid.: 
54) and revoked the ruler’s sole right to initiate war.  The distinction is traditionally drawn between 
the jus ad bellum – principles pertaining to the decision to go to war – and the jus in bello – principles 
pertaining to the conduct of that war.  While the former require a just war to have a just cause, this is 
not sufficient: war must be necessary for the attainment of the intended object; proportionate – i.e. not 
the cause of ‘… expected harm that is excessive in relation to the value or importance of achieving the 
just cause’ (McMahan 2009: 5); and not to conceal the simultaneous pursuit of an unjust objective.  
Following Grotius, the ‘just cause’ is some injury previously inflicted by the other party, of a 
seriousness to warrant armed conflict.  But a formal declaration of intent must be given prior to 
acting, allowing adequate time for redress to be offered: just war is a last resort.  The main 
presumption, however, is that justice lies on the side of the originally injured party: its declaration of 
war is just, while the aggressor’s action is unjust.  Thus, as McMahan points out, World War II was 
neither just nor unjust, but Britain’s involvement in it was just while Germany’s was unjust (ibid.: 5).  
However, this conclusion presumes that justice is a matter of morality, not political expediency: 
McMahan finds it ‘extremely implausible’ that ‘… if people are attacking and killing each one 
another, whether they are acting permissibly or are guilty of murder may depend on whether their 
conflict amounts to war [decided on ‘political realist’ or ‘reasons of state’ grounds alone]’ (ibid.: 36). 
The main jus in bello principle is that war, in its choice of targets, must discriminate between 
combatants and non-combatants – a moral principle long defended, an early application to protect the 
innocents being St Adomnain of Iona’s Cáin Adomnáin of AD 697.  From an objective legal 
perspective, a combatant may be distinguished – at least in the first instance – from a non-combatant 
in terms of dress and presence of arms; the combatant is a legitimate target, the non-combatant is not, 
in not posing a threat.  Such a perspective applies equally to both sides in the conflict.  But even if 
there is a legal equality between respective combatants, there is no moral equality between them, 
despite frequent claims to the contrary, given the moral distinction between a just and an unjust 
protagonist.  McMahan argues that the combatants of the unjust protagonist are morally liable to 
attack, whereas those of the just protagonist are not, so ‘… when unjust combatants attack just 
combatants, they are violating the latter’s moral rights not to be wrongfully attacked and are thus 
acting impermissibly.  Yet they are acting within their legal rights’ (ibid.: 107).  While the just 
combatant’s innocence is derived from the fact that he is ‘… neither morally responsible for nor guilty 
of wrong’ (ibid.: 34), an innocence shared with the non-combatant on either side, the unjust 
combatant is not innocent – provided he knows his actions are unjust, which is not necessarily the 
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case.  He may have an excuse for his actions, such as acting under duress, but an excuse provides no 
expiation. 
A second jus in bello principle, the proportionality of means employed, is also affected by this 
entanglement of the moral and legal, as the resulting asymmetry between the just and the unjust must 
enter the computation.  One aspect of the matter is that while the means employed will result, possibly 
inevitably, in ‘collateral damage’ involving the death of non-combatants on both sides, the unjustness 
of one side’s action must carry some weight.  The steadily increasing technical nature of the means of 
war, affecting its lethality, has implications both for combatants and non-combatants.  For example, 
the proportionality issue in respect of combatants is raised by using large-calibre, high-explosive 
artillery shells and sapping techniques, appropriate for the reduction of substantial defensive 
structures, against the ‘human wall’ of infantry trenches.  The development of nuclear armaments 
could be considered the final step in the trend towards maximising the destructive impact on the 
enemy while minimising the exposure of attacking combatants – but at the loss of any discrimination 
between combatants and non-combatants in terms of casualties.  Moreover, the increasing scientific, 
technical and industrial dimension of military capability raises an important question as to where 
precisely the line should be drawn between combatant and non-combatant: the development and 
manufacture of matériel encourages research laboratories, industrial plant and transport facilities and 
their staffs to be judged as legitimate targets and increases considerably, albeit incidentally, the 
probability of unquestionably non-combatant deaths. 
Justification of retaliation 
The notion of the just war (in the jus ad bellum sense) is contingent on an understanding of justice: 
according to Cicero, retaliation in retribution for an initial act of aggression is just if that act were 
unjust.  Retribution is punitive in purpose, but to ‘… tame retribution and render it respectable’ in 
terms of justice it is necessary that the punishment fit the crime and that only the guilty are punished – 
hence the other conditions that define the just war (Lichtenberg 2001: 5).  But the aggressor may have 
believed his act was in retaliation to some previous action by the erstwhile offended party, whose 
subsequent retaliatory violence the former can then reasonably judge to be unjust.  The ensuing state 
of war between them derives from conflicting value judgments, arising possibly from the 
contestability of the moral and legal grounds involved.   ‘Men always find it distasteful to admit that 
the “reasons” on both sides of a dispute are equally valid – which is to say that violence operates 
without reason’ (Girard 2013 [1972]: 51).  Any formal resolution could require the involvement of 
some third-party sovereign arbitrator.  A similar ambiguity arises in respect of the jus in bello 
perspective.  It may be difficult to implement the principle of non-combatant immunity in the heat of 
battle, when individual combatants cannot distinguish clearly between individuals who pose a threat 
and those who do not.  From a different perspective, the distinction is conceptually blurred by some 
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combatants having been conscripted or ‘forced’.  From yet another, combatants may be effectively the 
agents of non-combatants, who, as voters under a parliamentary system of government, are active 
principals in a nation’s prosecution of war.  As Mavrodes puts it, ‘It is more proper to say that the 
nation is at war than that its soldiers are war … [so] moral responsibility may not be distributed 
between combatant and non-combatant as between a criminal and his children’ (Mavrodes 1975: 
123).  If so, non-combatants should perhaps not be regarded as innocents swept up in a tide of 
violence.  Their complicity may warrant the expedient of terrorising the civilian population into 
withdrawing its forces, on the instrumental principle that it will hasten the end of hostilities and 
involve lesser casualties than a long-drawn-out but ‘just’ engagement – the (possibly ex post facto) 
justification of the strategic decision to drop an atomic bomb on Hiroshima in 1945 (McMahan 2009: 
128-131).  Similarly, expediency could justify neither taking prisoners (to avoid incurring costs of 
accommodating and feeding them) nor offering succour to enemy wounded (who may return as 
combatants at some time in the future).  But here retaliation shifts its ground from ‘backward-looking’ 
retribution to ‘forward-looking’ prevention (Lichtenberg 2001: 4), losing at the same time the 
association with justice that constrains the measures taken, admitting the influence of revenge or 
vengeance. 
5.8 The response to violence 
At the heart of the concept of the just war is the judgement that the initial unprovoked act of 
aggression is a crime that warrants punishment, as it has violated innocents’ rights to life – hence the 
declaration of war.  Bradley argues that, with respect to criminal action in general, retribution is the 
only convincing justification of punishment; moreover, that the appropriate retributive agent is the 
impersonal community at large, since the unilateral action has breached its legal boundaries, so ‘… it 
is clear that the entire community … is victimized by crime’ (Bradley 2003: 19-31).  But retribution is 
liable to be distorted by personal emotions of revenge or vengeance, stimulated in part by ‘… our 
basic instinct towards self-preservation and the psychological and moral horror we experience when 
faced with death’ (Moreno-Rian͂o 2007: 121); accordingly, the intention of action becomes reprisal.  It 
may be claimed that ‘… there is no real difference between [men’s] principle of justice and the 
concept of revenge’ (Girard 2013 [1972]: 26).  But there is one between ‘undoing the criminal’s bold 
and unjust assertion of his own will’ (Bradley 2003: 23) – repelling an invasion or supressing an 
insurgency – and inflicting suffering in retaliation, even although a military response will cause 
suffering.  However, death can be caused either by an unprovoked act of military aggression or the 
actions of an individual criminal, yet only in the latter case is retribution directed at the person(s) 
actually culpable and only after due legal process; in the former case, it is directed at anonymous 
combatants at large, deemed vicariously culpable.  But this distinction is arguably a late emergence 
from gradual socio-politico-legal development of measures to restrain lethal violence within the 
community.  The starting-point within the pre-state community of tribe or clan was a distinctive view 
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of the fundamental sanctity of life and the corresponding importance of religious ritual: ‘The essential 
religious concern … is ritual impurity.  And the cause of ritual impurity is violence’ (Girard 2013 
[1972]: 30).  Social cohesion is vulnerable to the spread of violence among its members, propagated 
by a resort to vengeance in response to a homicide or besmirched honour, by way of self-redress (Fry, 
D.P. 2006: 108).  Vengeance prompts reciprocal retaliation and becomes ‘… an interminable, 
infinitely repetitive process … [which] threatens to involve the whole social body’ (ibid.: 16).  In 
short, vengeance is an unreliable constraint on violence.  Yet the socially acknowledged blood feud or 
vendetta can constitute ‘… a social mechanism that serves to prevent violence from spreading in all 
directions’ (Grutzpalk 2002: 117), by perpetuating the threat that revenge will be taken at some stage 
on a substitute member of the kin group of the perpetrator of the original offence.  This ‘social 
substitutability’ (Fry, D.P. 2006: 111, citing Kelly 2000) imposes the cost of perpetuating power-
related divisions between kin groups or clans that segment the larger community (Grutzpalk 2002: 
121; Fry, D.P. 2006: 111). 
The blood feud is arguably based on the principle that ‘only blood may wash away blood’ (Grutzpalk 
2002: 121, citing Corso 1930); but so too is the concept of surrogate sacrifice, of animals or humans.  
This is conceived as a socially endorsed propitiatory rite to cancel the social impurity of violence and 
‘… restore harmony to the community, to reinforce the social fabric’ (Girard 2013 [1972]: 9).  Its 
efficacy is conditional on the fact that ‘… between [sacrificial] victims and the community a crucial 
social link is missing, so they can be exposed to violence without fear of reprisal.  Their death does 
not automatically warrant an act of vengeance … since he lacks a champion’ (Girard 2003 [1972] 14) 
– a condition readily satisfied in the case of animal sacrifice.  Propitiatory sacrifice is a central ritual 
in several religions, particularly in Judaism where various animal sacrifices are prescribed to make 
atonement for different infringements of the religious code (set out, for example, in the Torah, in the 
book of Leviticus); but it is also a critical theological interpretation of the specific execution of Christ 
and thereby definitive of Christianity.  Sacrificial rites depend for their potency on the underpinning 
religious commitments; if these are undermined then the rites lose their capacity to purify, dissolving 
the essential distinction between killing a human as a ‘sacred obligation’ and killing as a criminal 
activity.  This allows recourse to be made instead to self-redress or blood feud as the default measure 
to contain intra-community violence. 
However, for Weber the blood feud had a specific significance as the foundation for the eventual 
emergence of society’s capability to police its own conduct, through establishing the appropriate legal 
codes, juridical institutions and enforcement agencies necessary for an effective political monopoly of 
(legitimate) physical violence – in short, the law becomes society’s self-defence against internal 
violence.  ‘The tendency is to shift the privilege rights of prosecution and imposition of legal 
sanctions from the individual [as in self-redress] and his kin-group [as in feuding] over to clearly 
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defined public officials representing the society as such [viz. the police and courts of law] (Fry, D.P. 
2006: 110, quoting Hoebel 1967: 327 and adding emphasis).  Weber did claim, however, that 
although the blood feud was ‘…a universal institution [that belonged] to the logic of all peoples and 
all cultures’, the ‘straight path from blood feud to policing’ had been peculiar to western civilization, 
in contrast to Hindu and Chinese continued reliance on the blood feud within their kinship-structured 
societies (Grutzpalk 2002: 120, citing Weber 1980 [1925]).  A factor contributing to the development 
of policing in the West was the antagonism of the Christian church towards vendetta, both from the 
standpoint of opposition to its dependence on violence and from the more fundamental theological 
and ethical perspectives of valuing ‘the brother in faith’ more than ‘the brother in blood’ and 
emphasising the equality of all before God, irrespective of the differences of kin that were a necessary 
element in the tradition of blood feud (ibid.: 123).  At the same time, Christianity had rendered wholly 
redundant the practice of blood sacrifice.  Weber thus offered a rationale for the emergence of a 
political monopoly of legitimate violence, the existence of which Bobbitt took as the precondition for 
the constitutional developments associated with the specific sequence of epochal wars considered 
previously.  The connectedness of the qualitative historical changes is provided by the process of 
violence being met with violence, differentiated necessarily by conflicted values that label one 
violence as legitimate and another (inevitably) as illegitimate. 
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Chapter 6 Authoritative Historical Explanation? 
 
Preamble 
At this juncture in the present argument it is necessary to consider what might be meant by 
‘authoritative’ historical explanation, as it is not self-evident.  The relevant perspective takes its 
orientation from Carr’s claim that an adequate explanation of human action cannot ignore the agent’s 
point of view, as without it there would be ‘… no way of distinguishing, among all the things that 
didn’t happen, those that played a role in the agent’s framing and execution of the action’ (Carr 2001: 
159, emphasis added).  This resembles Shackle’s general representation of an agent’s choice, whereby 
a course of action is chosen on comparative grounds from within a ‘skein’ of imagined rival 
possibilities, those not chosen nonetheless indirectly contributing to the action taken because of their 
conjectured inferiority (Shackle 1979).  It is this contingency of human action – that with other 
possibilities on the horizon a different course of action could have been taken – that carries 
implications for the meaning of ‘authoritative’.  An adequate explanation (as opposed to description) 
of an historical event must endeavour to penetrate this contingency, yet without holding the 
incoherent expectation that this will somehow reveal the event’s necessity.  More significantly, the 
relevance of the past – in what could have happened but did not – and the future – in the conjectured, 
rival possibilities that might – for action in the present, requires the explanation to incorporate a 
conception of time significantly different from the one routinely employed to permit the articulation 
of different agents’ actions or to measure duration, a conception described metaphorically as ‘linear’ 
(or metric).  This is considered further below. 
Contingency must be addressed squarely, if human action (as distinct from movement) is to be 
explained adequately, if not authoritatively.  Chapter 1 argued that human action is resistant to the 
experimental method of the physical sciences, which is implicitly limited to contributing an 
explanation of the body’s physical functioning.  Neuro-biological accounts of the functioning of the 
brain arguably do not address what common sense denotes as the mind and the will and regards as 
central to the ordinary business of conscious and deliberative action, with their implicit normative 
dimensions.  Nor can these accounts increase the efficacy of action.  In addition, the results of the 
experimental method cannot claim special epistemological warrant, beyond the persuasive utility of 
their replicability.  These apart, the explananda of interest are not classes of human actions but the 
singular, timely human events that comprise history, while the corresponding explanantia are 
expressed in terms of the responsibility of specific agents whose actions jointly or severally, at 
specific times and places, populate these events – and not certain (deductive) conclusions of general 
validity. 
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Once Cartesianism is abandoned, the fact that historical explanations do not yield deductive 
conclusions need not prevent them being authoritative, provided appropriate criteria can be found.  
But a significant complication must be considered, once contingent human action is identified as the 
category of concern for historical explanation.  Both the creation of an historiography and the 
audience’s judgement of it are human actions in their own right, albeit different in nature.  There 
appears to be nothing implicit in either to indicate that they are not contingent in precisely the same 
respect as the historical actions that appear in the explananda.  This issue is also considered below. 
6.1 From chronology, via narrative, to explanation 
The challenge facing historiography 
A chronology is a temporal ordering of ‘events’.  It privileges a ‘linear’ conception of time, 
encouraging the popular caricature of history as ‘one damn thing after another’.  However, there are 
no natural ‘things’ in the ontology of history.  Instead the ‘things’ are the product of some observer’s 
(not necessarily historians’) interest: substantive ‘events’, believed to have sufficient singularity and 
identity to be worthy of detached consideration, by deliberately severing some antecedents and 
consequents.  Events are formed through the observer’s specific, necessarily retrospective and 
subjective framings of segments of time, ‘containing’ dated and located component actions.  
Historiography offers an advance on chronology, which it fills out by assembling the available 
evidence.  It sets boundaries to the chosen event; employs abductive inference to forge the ‘best’ 
hypothetical significances of selected disparate items of evidence, and it imposes considered 
interpretations.  The outcome is then presented in a plausible narrative.  However, the claim made in 
Chapter 2 that a narrative account is descriptive rather than explanatory, warrants further 
consideration.  The narrative approach continues to privilege the ‘linear’ conception of time.  
Arguably it also privileges the ‘plot’ of the narrative and specifically its conclusion.  The backward-
looking perspective on the arrayed evidence imparts a teleological nature to the account: no longer is 
‘after’ strictly equivalent to ‘later’, while the conclusion becomes the ‘end’ to which the agents’ 
purposes led.  However, continuing the spatial metaphor of ‘linear’ time, an important distinction 
must be drawn between contiguity, on the one hand, and connectedness, continuity and discontinuity 
on the other.  This distinction directs attention towards the constitutive historicity of the event and so 
to the nature of time peculiar to the agent’s point of view.   
Historicity considered 
The significance of historicity is explored by Olafson in The Dialectic of Action (Olafson 1979).  
‘Historicity is … a form of intentionality that is social in the sense of being shared … by all the 
members of some human community and that is directed upon the past actions and passions of that 
community which it typically construes in such a way as to relate them to the present situation of that 
community’ (ibid.: 109).  Thus, historicity is a quality of the connectedness between past and present.  
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However, the event being observed is also characterised by its novelty and extraordinariness, which 
‘… require an individualizing rather than a typifying mode of treatment’ (ibid.: 143).  Olafson 
contrasts his ‘linearity’ (specifically, directionality, equally metaphorical) of the changes that 
constitute the event with the ‘cyclicity’ of the engagement in routine life-sustaining activities in a 
specific environmental setting, which forms the context in which the event is embedded and thus 
anchored in time and place.  Events contribute discontinuity.  As Arendt put it, ‘Events, by definition, 
are occurrences that interrupt routine processes and routine procedures; only in a world in which 
nothing of importance ever happens could the futurologists’ dream [of predictive success] come true’ 
(Arendt 1970: 7).  In Olafson’s view it is group action, of a collective and institutional nature, that 
drives qualitative change (Olafson 1979: 114-116) and which in turn requires a dialectical and 
teleological account of human action: ‘… history owes its teleological character in the first instance to 
the central place of human action, especially in its collective form, within it [which] makes all the 
distinctively teleological modes of conceptualization –  those of ends and means in particular – 
applicable to historical processes’ (ibid.: 130).  In turn, the historical narrative, provided it has an 
intrinsic temporal connectedness and not merely contiguity, becomes the appropriate mode by which 
human action needs to be recounted, through which the process of change can be talked of in terms of 
an identifiable beginning, middle and end: ‘Narrative in the more usual and interesting sense is 
reserved for those singular events …for which there is not the alternative of a non-narrative treatment 
because they create new situations’ (ibid.: 142, emphasis added).  However, the origin of this novelty 
remains obscure.  Moreover, while the novelty provides momentum for the change, there is no 
assurance whatsoever that the eventual outcome, and specifically the consequential responses to 
change, new situations in their own right, will match what was originally intended.  The origin could 
lie in an exogenous factor – an external shock to the system – necessarily so, were it to be assumed a 
priori that, implicit in the ‘cyclicity’ of the background routine, agents are wholly engaged with 
(‘adapted’ to) their given physical situation (‘environment’).  As previously noted, such shocks are 
not impossible.  But no less plausible are endogenous changes in agents’ intentions and purposes.  
Olafson suggests ‘… it may be something in the factual situation – an action by another party in that 
situation – which first creates the need for action’ (ibid.: 149).  Lundy, summarizing an argument of 
Althusser, states that ‘The encounter [with some experience] acts like a tipping point, itself brought 
about by what Althusser refers to as a “swerve”, shattering that [pre-existing] equilibrium and 
eventually bringing about a new system … [which] in turn redefines necessity, specifically what is 
necessary for it’ (Lundy 2016: 68, citing Althusser 2006: 193, 194).   
The role of perspective 
In the context of the present argument this ‘swerve’ is conceived, with a change of metaphor, as a 
switch of perspective in the consciousness, such that the previously familiar becomes seen differently 
and incomparably, now endowed with hitherto unanticipated possibilities.  This switch activates the 
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capacity of agents to initiate change, to explore these novel possibilities and then to pursue one, 
thereby generating the contingency of the course of events.  Indeed, Lundy proposes the notion of 
‘continual contingency’ to capture a fundamental aspect of the nature of history, the connectedness of 
which is ‘… full of abruptness and unpredictability’ (ibid.: 71).  Thus, connectedness encompasses 
both continuity and discontinuity.  Further implications accompany the trajectory, as those affected by 
it respond, possibly experiencing similar switches of perspective and exercising their own initiatives 
as they see fit, with similarly contingent consequences.  These reactions ‘… are likely to be even more 
unpredictable and uncontrollable [than those to environmental shocks] and their effects can compel 
[choice] between alternative courses of action, all of which are deeply unwelcome.  In this way, 
human beings can and do imprison one another’ (Olafson 1979: 160).  The prospect emerges of 
conflict and the possible resort to force, but on contingent grounds.  The ubiquity of contingencies 
suggests that exploration of the ‘might-have-beens’ – the possible actions considered but not pursued 
for whatever reason, discussed further below – offers a route to a deeper understanding of any change 
that did transpire, casting light on the inferential activities of the agents, individual or collective.  
Accordingly, for an historical narrative to attain an authoritative explanatory status it must reconstruct 
the dialectical process of interaction of inferences and intentions embedded in the selected period.  
This can present a problem in respect of the interpretation of available evidence, as it may not be clear 
whether an individual piece of evidence relates to some foreclosed ‘might-have-been’ or contributed 
to the eventual culmination of the event.  Thus, it could be misleading to presume that all 
contemporary evidence must be assimilated into the narrative of the latter. 
6.2 Perception of time 
The spatial metaphor and its limits 
According to Runia, ‘We moderns … have disciplined and straightened time so thoroughly that it 
requires an enormous, almost Proustian, effort to “unthink” the linearity to which we have 
accustomed ourselves’ (Runia 2006: 9).  In particular, this makes envisioning ‘… continuity and 
discontinuity in its temporal sense so hard as to be virtually impossible’, not to mention ‘… 
experiencing time as “planar”, let alone “spatial”’ (ibid.).  As noted in Chapter 2, Carr endorsed 
Husserl’s conception of time, involving retention (as distinct from recollection) and protention, to 
denote the perception of past and future respectively, that coexist in the experience of the present.  
Thus, according to Husserl, ‘… the temporal is experienced by us as a kind of “field” like the visual 
field … Consciousness of the present always involves retention as the horizon-consciousness of [the 
recent past, while] an expectation of the future is as much a part of the horizon …of the present’ (Carr 
1991: 21-23, emphasis in original).  Human action can then be conceived as occupying a ‘temporal 
landscape’: ‘… history, in so far as it deals with time, must borrow its concepts from the spatial realm 
as a matter of principle … [and] we are unable to escape from [this metaphor], for the simple reason 
that time is not manifest … and cannot be intuited’ (Koselleck 2002a: 7).  Through their location in 
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that landscape agents possess what Runia terms ‘presence’, which, in his view ‘… is “being in touch” 
… with people, things, events, and feelings that made you the person that you are … [It is] being in 
touch with reality’ (Runia 2016a: 5); ‘… as presence, the past is terribly close, though it can never be 
reached’ (Runia 2016b: 316).  The agent’s temporal landscape is formed through experience, not in 
the restrictive physicalist sense of sensory perception, but in its ‘active, inquisitive dimension’ 
(Koselleck 2002b: 46), spanning the ‘primal experience’ of moments of surprise; the accumulated 
experiences of periods of life; and the long-run reflective and transcendental experience ‘summed up 
in mythical images’ (ibid.: 50-54).  This temporal landscape of consciousness will include both 
prominent negative and positive features, the former particularly where conflict has been experienced, 
including perhaps the lasting prominence of past trauma.  As to action in the present, ‘[humans] can 
either (passively) let themselves be overwhelmed by what has been written or done before, or they can 
(actively) overwhelm what has been done before by fresh words or actions’, both responses consistent 
with humans’ ‘… inordinate ability to spring surprises on themselves’ (Runia 2016a: 6,7).  From the 
agent’s perspective on time, an action is an invention, ‘fundamentally discontinuous’ with the past, 
creating ‘… the beginning of a context that as yet does not exist, a bridgehead to the unknown’ (ibid.: 
21).  Yet according to Bergson, the temporal landscape is changed by the action, in that 
notwithstanding its novelty, after the event the action is seen to have been possible previously: ‘As 
reality is created as something unforeseeable and new, its image is reflected behind it into the 
indefinite past; thus it finds that it has from all time been possible … The possible is therefore the 
mirage of the present in the past’ (Bergson 1998: 82, cited by Lundy 2016: 69).  Such a 
phenomenological conception of time negates the expectation that the action in question can be shown 
to have been necessary – that is, logically consequent.  In turn this has implications for the sense in 
which an historical account can be explanatory.  It cannot appeal to ‘necessity’ as that is limited in its 
scope to the cases of ‘necessary for’, specifically the actions required to reproduce the known – the 
‘cyclicity’ of routine activity; the practice of experimental demonstration, the maintenance of 
constitutional procedure, the keeping of promises. 
6.3 Counter-historicals and authoritative explanation 
Explanation as connectedness 
The present argument generates two significant considerations.  The first is that any reduction of 
human action to an atemporal generalised model of ‘rational decision-making’, whether deterministic 
or probabilistic, individualistic or game-theoretic, cannot inform historical explanation.  The reason is 
that such modelling discards ex hypothesi the very features that constitute the historicity of human 
action.  Second, those models’ deductive conclusiveness – logical necessity – has neither an 
applicability outside of such models nor a special epistemological warrant; accordingly, it does not 
provide a standard to which historical explanation need adhere.  Given that the purpose of history is to 
explain the temporal succession of actions, it would be incoherent to disregard the human experience 
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of time or the qualitative change that human action initiates.  The emergence of conscious intentions 
and purposes is integral to acting.  However, both intentions and human action are in part resultants of 
an engagement with others, individually and collectively, due to the intrinsic social nature of the 
individual.  Chapters 4 and 5 have argued that this engagement is by no means necessarily a 
harmonious business, but can result in frustrated – and frequently modified – intentions and actions.  
The engagement may well be conflicted, given not just the degree of autonomy of individual minds 
and wills, but also the differences in perception of the power available to the individuals and groups 
concerned and in the scope for action which these perceptions suggest.  However, although whatever 
actually transpires will be the resultant of divergent interests, that dimension may be overlooked by 
focusing exclusively on the physical outcomes at successive moments in the temporal trajectory.  
From this perspective archaeology and history then confront an explanatory challenge at two levels; 
first, to reconstruct from available evidence what really was happening, then and there, in order to 
constitute the event in question, as it transpired; second, to propose what thereby had failed to happen 
but plausibly could have happened instead.  The operative premise is that the essential connectedness 
of the explanation will not otherwise be fully secured.  In short, without consideration of Carr’s 
‘might-have-beens’, even a ‘tight’ reconstruction of what happened, in narrative form, offers limited 
explanatory insight and remains merely ‘… the sequential “… and then… and then …” in which 
narrative history often exhausts itself’ (Olafson 1979: 134).  Mere contiguity – temporal proximity – 
would have taken the place of connectedness.   
Reconstructing the event 
The challenge at the first, reconstructive, level is to confront the incompleteness of the evidence, a 
point that has already been sufficiently stressed: the crucial deficit is in respect of evidence of agents’ 
inferences, intentions and beliefs, considered here to be the fundamental grounding of action and 
essential to a teleological account of it.  However, its associated dialectical method does not share 
with the deductive method a demand for completeness and closure of premises presumed necessary to 
underpin causal explanations.  Goldstein claims ‘… Hegelian dialectic … is retrospective in its 
application, and … there is no way to apply it from the beginning forward’ (Goldstein 1981: 48).  
Historical explanation proceeds similarly, working back from the circumstances that have been 
chosen to define the terminus of the event in question, constructing the explanation by incorporation 
of available inferences drawn from earlier evidence.  Indeed, this characterises in general the 
explanation of singular events – hence the proposal in Chapter 2 that the mode of argument in a court 
of law was a particularly appropriate paradigm of historical explanation.  This retrospective mode of 
argument contrasts with the seemingly prospective order of first setting up initial premises from 
which to deduce logical conclusions or first constructing a physical experiment from which to gather 
results.  But Goldstein continues: ‘Once the retrospective reconstruction is completed, it is presumed 
that we can see that every stage follows from its predecessor from a form of necessity which is neither 
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deductive nor organic, but, rather, dialectic’ (ibid.: 49, emphasis added).  Its dialectic nature, building 
on the implicit contradictions of a specific context, makes a difference.  ‘What from one view point is 
merely the outcome of contingencies is, from another, something which had to be what it came to be’ 
(ibid.: 56, emphasis added).   
The ‘might-have-beens’ 
The second-level challenge emerges from this approach: to consider the ‘might-have-beens’ relating 
to the earlier stages of the account.  Whereas the dialectical argument imparts the reconstruction of the 
event with a temporal trajectory, consideration of the ‘might-have-beens’ is required to give it 
relevant substance, through endeavouring to uncover and examine the intrinsic conflicts from which 
historical change emerged.  However, the notion of the ‘might-have-beens’ requires some 
clarification. 
The term ‘might-have-beens’ used in the present study differs in meaning from the ‘might-have-
beens’ that feature in what is variously termed ‘counterfactual history’, ‘virtual history’, ‘history as it 
never was’ or ‘what-if’ history.  In the present study, the term signifies a course of action, individual 
or social, which was conceivably contemplated but was not pursued, or if initially pursued was 
abandoned, a conflicted change of direction that nonetheless became part of the antecedents of the 
subsequent event under consideration.  In virtual history, the term signifies an imagined yet plausible 
alternative event which, from its hypothetical initiation, could conceivably have happened in place of 
the event that did occur.  Critically, these terms relate to different understandings of contingency and 
engage contrasting approaches to causality, betraying their attachment to different epistemologies: ‘… 
the fundamental point at issue in the matter of counterfactual history is the character of historical 
explanation’ (Megill 2007; 154).  
On a theoretical plane, the causality implicit in a law-bound deterministic abstract system admits no 
contingency, with no deviation permitted from the transformations of its state defined by the 
specification of its elements and relationships, under the influence of known laws of transformation.   
Given intrinsically probabilistic relations then contingency can enter, in the form of chance variance.  
On an empirical plane, direct intervention in a physical relationship invokes the Humean conception 
of causality – contiguity; constant conjunction; temporal priority of cause over effect and imputed 
necessity – while contingency attaches, inter alia, to the degree of control exercised over the 
intervention.  Alternatively, a statistically estimated multivariate model implies a form of causality in 
its solution, with contingency embedded in its error term.  However, the critical question is whether 
these notions of causality have any bearing on the explanation of the temporal trajectories of human 
action.  It was argued in Part One that they do not, in part due to the inapplicability of the 
experimental method beyond the confines of the physical sciences, given the involvement of the 
human will.  So, in that context contingency prevails in the substantive sense that any actual human 
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action taken could have been different from what was in fact pursued – that is, a might-have-been was 
involved, to be reconstructed in the course of seeking to explain the event in its defining singularity.   
In contrast, counterfactual history appears to be underwritten by a commitment to a physicalist 
conception of explanation and cause, despite its human context.  Much of the expressed enthusiasm 
for it is to be found in similarly orientated social-science disciplines rather than in history itself.  For 
example, in Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World Politics the editors state that ‘… 
counterfactual reasoning is unavoidable in any field in which researchers want to draw cause-effect 
conclusions but cannot perform controlled experiments’ (Tetlock, Belkin 1996: 6; emphasis added).   
In the same volume, the belief is expressed that ‘… social scientists, who generally cannot conduct 
true experiments, may have no choice but to rely on counterfactual assertions in one way or another’ 
(Fearon 1996: 40).  However, although the inappropriateness of physical experimentation is 
acknowledged, its replacement by hypothetical ‘thought experiments’ is nonetheless assumed 
subordinate to theoretical models, presumably of an a priori origin: ‘… counterfactuals are best seen 
as supplements and/or substitutes for direct empirical analysis when data availability is limited … In 
order to use counterfactuals to full advantage, it is necessary to begin with general deductive theory 
with clear microfoundations and scope conditions’ (Kiser, Levi 1996: 188; emphasis added).  Yet the 
prognosis is not always optimistic: ‘How can we know with any confidence what would have 
happened if the hypothesized causal factor had been absent?  I argue that for most social science 
problems we simply cannot know and, moreover, we cannot know in principle’ (Fearon 1996: 40).  
On the other hand, Bulhoff argues that, even so, ‘merely abstract worries’ should not detract from the 
achievements of the counterfactual approach (Bulhoff 1999: 160). 
Ferguson’s edited volume Virtual History (Ferguson 1997) has achieved some prominence in the 
recent ‘flood’ of publications of this type.  ‘Many times more books and essays on … counterfactual 
history have appeared since 1990 than in the whole of real history before then’ (Evans 2014: 47).   
Their characteristic focus on events with a strong public resonance, associated sensitivities and 
strongly held value judgements, has given them a popular appeal.  In Evans’s view, they are primarily 
the product of wishful political thinking, of a right-wing orientation, as the genre seems to emphasise 
the freedom of the individual agent, as against a determinism claimed to be implicit in orthodox 
historiography.  But Ferguson himself is no less dismissive of some earlier instances, as ‘… very 
obviously the product of the authors’ contemporary political or religious preoccupations’ (Ferguson 
1997: 11), their implausibility sufficient to discredit the very idea of counterfactual history (ibid.: 19). 
Ferguson’s substantive intention was to assist historians – ‘… among the most untheoretical of 
scholars’ (Megill 2007: 13) –  to ‘catch up’ with the fact that ‘[i]deas about causation in the sciences 
have changed so much in recent decades’ (ibid.: 89), as the ‘chaotic’ implications of non-linear 
differential relationships were better understood.  ‘Virtual history is a necessary antidote to 
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determinism’ of simple law-like relationships (ibid.).  So, a plausible alternative history and the actual 
course of history could be regarded as equally warranted in causal terms, both being within the 
compass of the unpredictability now implicit in causality: ‘… chaos theory … reconciles the notions 
of causality and contingency’ (ibid.: 79).  Counterfactuals belong in this chaotic world.  ‘We can 
avoid counterfactuals only if we eschew all causal inference and limit ourselves to strictly non-causal 
narratives of what actually happened’ (Tetlock, Belkin 1996: 3).  However, in Ferguson’s opinion, 
this would lead to ‘… the nonsensical world of the idealists … where there is no such thing as a cause 
or an effect’ (Ferguson 1997: 79).  But idealism is not the only option; as noted previously, this study 
pursues a pragmatic alternative. 
Ferguson’s approach embodies the orthodox social-science physicalist presumption that an abstract 
formal model is integral to any explanation of human action.  He does accept that ‘… the difference 
between chaos in the natural world and chaos in history is that man, unlike gases, fluids or lesser 
organisms, is conscious … and seeks, prior to acting in the present, to make sense of the past and on 
that basis to anticipate the future’ (ibid.: 88).  Moreover, this consciousness ‘… cannot be expressed 
in terms of equations’ (ibid.: 89).  Yet Ferguson asserts that ‘… the theories on which [man] generally 
based his predictions have so often been defective … exaggerating his ability to make accurate 
predictions’ (ibid.: 88; emphasis added).  Consequently, ‘… belief in [defective] deterministic 
theories made all the great conflicts … more rather than less likely.  Ultimately … those who died in 
these conflicts were the victim of genuinely chaotic and unpredictable events which could have turned 
out differently’ (ibid.).  In fact, a chaotic dynamical system is in principle no less deterministic, even 
if its theoretical trajectory is unpredictable – that being the basis of its specific form of contingency. 
However, Ferguson appears concerned only with the property of sensitivity to initial conditions, in 
order to justify imagining a departure from what happened to initiate the counter-historical trajectory.  
He offers no specific justification for regarding human history in general as a dynamical system and 
one with chaotic properties.  Indeed, it could be argued that since he offers a counterfactual historical 
trajectory as such, he is disregarding the unpredictability that typifies such systems.   Furthermore, if 
human history were really such a chaotic system, it is not obviously coherent to imagine that its 
underlying formal specification could ever be identified and employed as a guide to action and thus to 
avoid the great conflicts he mentions.   Even if it were, it is questionable if the parameters of that 
specification would remain stable over any real temporal trajectory.  Rather than impassively 
enduring the inevitable, if unpredicted, consequences stemming from some past ‘initial condition’, 
human action continually generates new initial conditions from which emerge novel trajectories, 
themselves to be superseded thereafter by yet further human intervention.  Thus, ‘… in the social 
world, where human actions constantly interfere in the progress of events [deterministic chaos theory] 
is more a step backwards’ (Mordhorst 2008: 8) – nonetheless ‘… most counterfactual historians make 
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the free will of the actors the primary source of contingency and chaos’ (ibid.).  Ironically, human 
action as conceived in this study, not trapped in permanent formal relationships, yet not random 
either, and linking past and future to form a dynamic system, may be the basis of a more fundamental 
non-physicalist conception of chaos in history. 
Evans concludes his critical assessment of counterfactual history (Evans 2014) with the observation 
that this ‘… very voluminous literature with hundreds of case studies in print … is of little real use in 
the serious study of the past’ (ibid.: 176), ‘… designed as much to entertain as to inform, if not more 
so’ (ibid.: 175).  However, his line of criticism is itself of interest.  His consistent equation of 
contingency with chance supports his assessment that ‘… the “what if” question has often threatened 
to put historians out of a job by reducing everything to a matter of chance’ (ibid.: 35).  In his view, 
chance outcomes would prevent the generalisation that he considers integral to historical explanation.  
Yet Ferguson’s broad claim – that history is the trajectory of a chaotic dynamical system – is in 
principle a generalisation, while its lack of predictability need not signal an intrinsic stochastic 
property of its elements: a reduction to ‘a matter of chance’ in a strict sense is not necessary, although 
it remains possible.   But Evans’s perspective on the nature of historical generalisation appears to 
accommodate contingency in more than just the form of chance. He states that ‘[h]istorical 
explanation generally involves a concept of historical necessity – in other words necessary causes – in 
which converging causal chains lead to a certain type of result without determining the particular 
form it takes’ (ibid.: 169; emphasis added).  Earlier he had claimed that ‘… conditional statements of 
… hard-edged certainty are foreign to the historian’s way of going about explanation … 
“Monocausal” explanations make historians uneasy; we prefer to pile up causes until events are 
overdetermined … with so many causes that if one did not operate the others would and the event in 
question would still have occurred’ (ibid.: 82; emphasis added).  The presence of putative ‘causes’ 
that fail to ‘operate’ – as though it had a substantive existence – or influence the ‘type of result’ but 
not its particulars, suggests the involvement of ‘might-have-beens’ that qualify their efficacy.  Or 
perhaps the term ‘cause’, with its physicalist association, is being used in a rhetorical manner merely 
to reinforce historians’ subjective judgements.  Evans appears to rank ‘massive historical forces’ 
(ibid.: 32), ‘… economic, power-political, cultural, social, intellectual, geographical, or whatever – 
that constrain the operation of the human will’ fairly high in his own ‘hierarchy’ of ‘causes’ (ibid.: 
82).  On the one hand, if these are in fact merely due to the unpredictable composition of the actions 
of many interdependent human wills, then, despite the physicalist overtones (in ‘force’) in the use of 
causal language, this is close to the position adopted in this study.  On the other hand, if it is a 
substantive factor, then the nature and causal efficacy of ‘historical force’ needs to be clarified, 
particularly if the actions of ‘Great Men’, teleology and Providence are to be discounted on grounds 
of principle.  Significantly, perhaps, several virtual-history case studies involve imagining the 
consequences of ‘Great Men’ acting in counter-historical ways. 
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Megill usefully distinguishes between ‘exuberant’ counterfactual history and ‘restrained’ 
counterfactual history; the latter ‘… involves an explicit canvassing of alternative possibilities that 
existed in a real past’ (Megill 2007: 151).  Evans observes that Megill ‘… starts out from the actual 
event and looks back in time … explaining why … alternatives [to what actually happened] did not 
come to pass’ (Evans 2014: 162).  Megill’s restrained counterfactual history comes closer to the sense 
of ‘might-have-been’ employed in this study, except it is argued here that the very fact that the 
alternative did not come to pass was not merely incidental, but actually contributed to what did come 
to pass. They are alternative plausible courses of action whose failure to shape the event in one way, 
contributed to it being shaped in another.  While at the time they had a reality in terms of agents’ 
intentions and attempted actions, their frustration and failure became part of the subsequent temporal 
landscape against which new intentions were conceived – or, in Bergson’s sense, realised to have 
been already present – leading to new actions.  However, the observer’s reconstruction of the ‘might-
have-beens’ is fundamentally a personal exercise in imagination, subject to the criterion of plausibility 
(both in terms of what could have happened and why it did not).  Moreover, it cannot be presumed 
that only one plausible might-have-been will emerge from this imaginative exercise – a matter of 
considerable significance.  A plurality of contenders may be imagined to fill the ‘absence’ of what did 
not happen.  Available textual evidence may hint at some rather than others, but in the absence of 
corroboration it cannot be conclusive; the polyvalency of artefactual evidence may render it consistent 
with various rivalrous schemes of action; the abductive inference employed may accommodate both a 
plurality of counter-historicals, and a plurality of conceivable reasons for any one of them not to have 
transpired.  But these might-have-beens have ‘played a role’ (Carr 2001: 159) in the event that did 
occur. 
It seems inescapable, then, that different explanations for the same event may co-exist, despite there 
being agreement as to ‘what actually happened’ – merely as the corollary of taking historical 
contingency seriously.   As Lawson has put it, ‘… there are as many histories as there are points of 
view, [despite] our conviction that certain events cannot be denied as having taken place’ (Lawson 
2001: xiv).  Which of the alternative explanations, each deemed plausible and with its own 
teleological and dialectical warrant, gains acceptance as authoritative ‘common knowledge’, is itself a 
judgement, but one which an audience must make based on the persuasiveness of the case offered by 
the historian for having chosen one and excluded (an)other particular counter-historical(s).  In short, a 
proffered historical explanation is an advocacy of the soundness of a judgement – just as in court 
proceedings the jury will be confronted with opposed advocacies, one of which it will be persuaded to 
adopt as the sounder.  But some doubt must remain, as contingency prevails.  From the standpoint of 
the physical sciences the plurality of possible historical explanations, if not also the residual doubt, 
might be thought a weakness, in so far as it contrasts with the apparent conclusiveness of the results of 
physical science.  In Chapter 1 it was argued that, from a sceptical point of view, this conclusiveness 
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is not wholly secure, while from a pragmatic perspective only physical demonstration could be 
regarded as persuasive – even if not entirely conclusive.  But possibly the relevant analogy to draw is 
between the originative human actions in history in general, essentially trial and error, and the 
specifically originative activity of scientific discovery, involving Pickering’s ‘mangle of practice’, 
similarly a trial and error process.  This perspective may lie behind Lundy’s speculation that ‘… 
although the history of the French Revolution could be described as a singular trajectory … it can 
equally be said to be composed of nothing other than accidental encounters (in varying degrees of 
accidentality)’ (Lundy 2016: 71). 
6.4 Contingency, Explanation and Authority 
Explaining action by action, perspective by perspective 
It must be stressed that the negation of might-have-beens – their ‘not happening’ – does not clear the 
way for ‘what actually happened’ to proceed unimpeded.  Instead, their negation is an integral part of 
its emergence: otherwise the course of history would be different.  Accordingly, its explanation would 
be incomplete if their influence were ignored.  Once this is accepted, however, a more fundamental 
complexity noted earlier arises, at two levels.  First, might-have-beens largely acquire form and 
substance in the historian’s mind (alongside inferences and interpretations, although these are 
evidence-based to some degree).  That is, the historian’s actions are materially involved.  But there is 
no obvious basis for a claim that these actions are logically necessitated and good reason to suppose 
they are contingent.  There is in effect a close conceptual parallel between the actions of the historian 
and those the historian is endeavouring to explain.  In short, action is being explained by action.  The 
choice of a specific, backward-looking, subjective framing to constitute the ‘event’ required to 
construct an historiography is in effect a commitment to a unique and personal perspective from 
which to ‘view’ the past.  This becomes the basis of the subsequent actions of the historian in 
addressing and handling the evidence, culminating eventually in what is written – and what is not 
written – in the historical explanation offered as an authoritative account.  This parallels the general 
account of historical human action previously offered.  They have in common their dependence on 
human consciousness with its distinctive conception of time; where they differ is in terms of the 
nature of the contingencies involved: in the case of the historian they will derive from experience 
totally unrelated to the event in question.  The corollary, however, is that a different historian would 
have offered, legitimately, a different explanation.  This leads to the second level of the complexity 
noted above.  Whether the historians’ explanations of the event are found to be persuasive or not by 
their audiences is a matter of their actions in response, similarly involving their consciousness and 
perception of time and thus are similarly contingent but in respect of quite different experience.  But 
these actions are likely to be responsive not just to the substance of the respective accounts but to the 
form in which the historians present them – essentially a matter of language, as the audiences need 
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have no direct acquaintance with the evidence.  Which account may be regarded as authoritative is an 
act of subjective judgement on their part, and different members of the audience may well arrive at 
different conclusions.  The crux of the matter is that in the explanation of human action the distinction 
between subject and object no longer applies.  Thus it can be argued that ‘authoritative’ commends 
the judgement exercised rather than the explanation offered. 
Perspectives in advocacies 
It was proposed in Chapter 2 that the adversarial presentation of opposed advocacies in a trial by jury 
is conceivably an exemplar of historical and archaeological explanation.  This process functions at 
both levels noted above.  First, neither counsel could perform the required role without having 
adopted from the outset the appropriate perspective concerning the culpability of the defendant, either 
guilt or innocence.  They employ the same proven evidence to advance contrary explanations of the 
actions of the defendant, congruent with their adopted perspective.  This is possible given the inherent 
contingency of the defendant’s actions and the conceivable contributions to that of various possible 
might-have-beens.  But as it also incorporates the counsel’s personal skill and judgement in exploiting 
this quality of the evidence, actions that are also contingent on their own contextual experience.  
Second, the members of the jury assess the form and substance of the respective advocacies and arrive 
at their personal conclusions, contingent on their differing experiences, that being a necessary 
requirement of the judicial system.  The other requirement – that they confer and reach a common 
judgement, thus in some sense balancing the different contingencies – does not apply in assessing 
historical explanations. 
The initial choice of perspective therefore has considerable significance in both contexts.  This applies 
not only in terms of the general field it covers, but particularly in respect of its specific focus.  The 
thematic relational contexts introduced in Chapter 4 indicated broad fields that are likely to have 
general relevance, but in a specific context a narrower focus is appropriate.  In Part Two various 
substantive perspectives are considered, in relation to specific illustrations of historical explanation. 
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Part Two: Perspectives, Interpretations and Illustrations 
 
 
The Rationale 
The general purpose of Part Two is to illustrate several of the implications of the argument developed 
in Part One, within a chosen historical locus marked by significant conflict.  The chosen place and 
period is Scotland of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, a time of considerable social, 
political and economic flux, within which the emergence of Scottish Jacobitism was a salient 
contributory factor.  The particular purpose of Part Two is to pursue instances of the ‘might-have-
beens’ discussed in Chapter 6, leading to possible pluralities of explanation of this emergence of 
Scottish Jacobitism. 
A Review of the Argument of Part One  
The argument involved two components, one epistemological and the other moral.  The former 
concluded that the explanation of the temporal succession of human actions is sui generis.  Its 
distinctiveness stems from the understanding that human actions express human wills grounded in 
consciousness, with its unique perception of time.  Human actions and their social composition are 
thus essentially contingent.  The latter component concluded that these actions typically involve a 
conflict of wills, generating moral choices as to how to treat the ‘other’, a potential threat who 
nevertheless shares the same consciousness and capacity for responsive action.  Conflicted social 
engagement can involve lethal violence.  There is no implicit mechanism to guarantee social 
harmony: a subordination of the will to the force of any harmonising moral principle requires a prior 
commitment to it, to warrant appropriate action; but the occurrence of this autonomous act of will is 
not assured.  Thus, while the explanation of the physical world may employ the presumption that it 
possesses an implicit and necessary order, the world of human action may be presumed to possess 
moral disorder, compounding the contingency of outcomes.  A corollary is that any semblance of 
social order apparent in the actual temporal trajectory of human action is circumstantial, a 
manipulated composition of wills that ordinarily lack pre-reconciliation. 
The crux of the matter, then, is that the explanation of historical conflict is in essence the explanation 
of contingent, morally conflicted human actions.   
It was argued (in Chapter 2) that adversarial advocacies of contrary accounts of an event in a trial by 
jury, intended to persuade lay opinion of the culpability or innocence of a defendant, provide an 
exemplar of the explanation of contingent, morally conflicted action.  Its acknowledgement that the 
primary insight available to the court is the evidence of the individual witness accords with the 
argument of Part One that the agent’s point of view, with its distinctive consciousness of the passage 
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of time, offers the basic perception of the temporal trajectory of human action.  However, explanation 
of a contingent event, with its unique temporal trajectory, requires the creation of an integrated 
narrative account of it that extends beyond the experience and perception of any one witness.  Some 
third party must consciously weave together the different evidences of the relevant witnesses.  In a 
judicial context, the advocate discharges this function, but does so with the deliberate value-driven 
intention that the account so created will command a sufficient probative force, in terms of culpability 
or innocence, to dominate the contrary one.  Moreover, it is done in the knowledge that the common 
body of proven evidence before the court may support either account.  The crucial step is the 
advocate’s adoption of a particular perspective as the basis of the account of the event, one which will 
present the evidence (or a subset thereof) in a particular light that accords with the intention, to 
establish culpability or innocence.  But it is the contingent and conflicted nature of the actions under 
scrutiny that both requires and permits this approach to their explanation and accommodates contrary 
perspectives.  However, the significant issue is that the final judgement of the jury must turn on the 
persuasiveness of the substantive advocacy, as in general the evidence cannot independently deliver 
an unambiguous and certain conclusion in a context of contingent outcomes.  It is claimed, as an 
analogical inference, that an historical narrative is the equivalent of an advocate’s account of an event.  
If so, then a given historiography is similarly the creation of a specific choice of perspective on the 
event in question – the chosen ‘plot’ of the narrative. 
In short, the explanation of contingent outcomes in judicial and historical contexts takes the form of a 
persuasive discourse derived from a specific chosen perspective on the event in question and which 
plausibly accommodates presently available evidence. 
The primacy of the subjective judgement of the advocate or historian in the forging of an explanation 
of contingent and conflicted action precludes a definite separation of subject from object.  This carries 
the ontological implication, that there can be no objective reality to which historical explanation 
refers.  ‘The past does not exist independently of the historian’ (Runia 2006b: 306).  The historian’s 
particular selection of perspective, of interpretation of evidence and exploration of conjectured might-
have-beens (considered in Chapter 6) constitutes a fundamentally creative process.  Particularly, it has 
no intrinsic claim to be the only conceivable selection.  It follows that historical explanation cannot 
reasonably have epistemological ambitions, as there is no knowledge of an underlying reality to be 
secured.   Thus, it possibly misses the point to observe that ‘[the] consensus regarding narrative as the 
predominant form of histories [left analytical] philosophers … to find unworkable any suggestion that 
narrative form … could be disciplined so as to yield any epistemic insights’ (Roth 2016: 270, 271).  
Human action unquestionably leaves physical traces, while a spectator to an event would certainly 
witness specific movements by identifiable agents and would be able to provide a physical description 
of it.  But as socially engaged individuals act and interact, they have no consciousness of their actions 
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composing contemporaneously into something coherent and of uncontestable objectivity, with its own 
independent temporal trajectory.  They are engaged in responding with relief, surprise, frustration or 
anger to the consequences of their own actions and the reactions of others; revising their plans, out of 
self-interest, malevolence or altruism in the light of their personal histories; entering, respecting and 
breaking commitments to act in concert with others; and throughout, acting necessarily out of 
ignorance as to the consequences of their own and others’ actions in the short, medium and long term.  
The available evidence, the remaining physical traces, must be interpreted in terms of the chosen 
perspective on this complex of actions, not assumed to have independent and self-evident meaning.  
‘[Artefacts and texts are] remarkable things … designated by a remarkable metaphor, the metaphor of 
sources’ (Runia 2006b: 306, emphasis in original), a figure of speech that can invest evidence with an 
uncontaminated, originative, spontaneous and objective nature.  However, in a court the evidence of 
all witnesses is liable to be tested under cross-examination, to be related to the agents’ points of view.  
The fact that mute evidence cannot undergo this treatment does not improve its epistemic standing; 
rather it makes its interpretation both less constrained and more contestable.  Moreover, in so far as 
the historical and archaeological record is acknowledged to be distinctively fragmentary and 
ambiguous, it cannot qualify as evidence without interpretation and inferential elaboration.  Yet the 
evidence itself is of secondary importance.  In a judicial context, a lay jury is empowered to pass final 
judgement on the relative persuasiveness of rival advocacies, in their entirety.  However, the audience 
of an historical explanation ordinarily lacks that comparative context of judgement and instead must 
assess it otherwise.  The discourse can be judged as a substantive argument in terms of the criteria 
considered in Chapter 2, such as consistency and coherence.  But given the explanation is necessarily 
subordinate to a choice of perspective, an objection to a given interpretation of the evidence is a 
challenge to that choice, as it would be if the entire discourse were dismissed as partial or arbitrary.  
Criticism of this kind has an origin in a latent alternative perspective.  This raises fundamental 
questions regarding how a specific perspective is chosen and how one perspective may come to 
supplant another.  These are considered later in Chapter 9. 
Accordingly, illustrations of these implications drawn from a specific historical conflict should be 
able to isolate the perspectives from which explanations of it have been developed and to establish 
that they cannot claim special epistemological warrant. 
The Illustrations 
The chosen illustrations are drawn from a short period of Scottish history, from the truncation of the 
reign of James VII/II in the Revolution of 1688 through to the Battle of Sherrifmuir in 1715.  The 
period encompassed significant constitutional and institutional change – the passage of the Bill of 
Rights of 1689 and the Treaty of Union of 1707; domestic conflict affecting most aspects of society: 
social, political, religious and economic; military involvement throughout virtually all of the period, 
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through the Nine Years War and the War of the Spanish Succession.  Distinctive within the domestic 
conflict, through involving arms being taken up against fellow-citizens, were the civil insurgencies 
that came to be known as the Jacobite Rebellions.  The emergence of Scottish Jacobitism is the 
ground of the illustrations.  This covers the generation-long period from the siege of Edinburgh Castle 
in March of 1689, shortly before the Scottish Convention concluded in April that James VII had, by 
his own actions, forfeited (‘forfaulted’) the Scottish crown ‘by doing acts contrary to the law’ (Cowan 
1991: 165, 166), until the indecisive battle of Sherrifmuir in 1715.  Excluded from consideration are 
the subsequent failed Spanish invasion of 1719 and, a further generation later, the insurgency of 1745 
and its definitive set-piece resolution at the Battle of Culloden in 1746.  The justification for this 
exclusion is the intention to avoid an appreciable risk of ‘presentism’ or, what may be the same thing, 
the possibility that what ‘Jacobitism’ signified for later generations differed substantially from what it 
did for the contemporary one.  However, the prevention of presentism cannot be guaranteed.  In 
keeping with the foregoing argument, historical explanation of the events of the selected period has 
been and continues to be contested from novel perspectives unavoidably conditioned by anachronistic 
insights, particularly of a value-laden nature.  The contributions of Whatley and Macinnes are 
important exemplars of this continuing process (Whatley 2006; Macinnes 2007b).  They offer 
contrasting advocacies of the contingent actions that resulted in the transformation of the relationship 
between Scotland and England in the selected period, in which the emergence of Jacobitism was a 
prominent feature. 
Scottish Jacobitism 
Scottish Jacobitism, in common with other terms employing the suffix ‘-ism’, has a questionable 
ontology.  Arguably, it lacks sufficient clarity of meaning to distinguish what it is from what it is not, 
a property necessary to denote a concept able to be deployed in rational argument (an issue introduced 
in Chapter 1).  It follows that any ‘objective’ existence is questionable.  As Macinnes notes, 
‘Jacobitism as a political movement has been presumed rather than substantiated’ (Macinnes 2007a: 
228).  However, given the claims previously made about the nature of historical explanation, that may 
not be problematic.  In context Jacobitism is a source of diverse perspectives on the conflict of the 
period.  At its most literal it signified a commitment to the restoration of the Stuart dynasty in the 
specific person of James VII/II and thereafter his direct heirs ‘of the body’, by constitutional means or 
by force.  This has several plausible justifications: a desired end in its own right, motivated simply to 
restore an entitlement wrongly usurped; an appropriate means to secure some specific public 
advantage, whether positive, delivering some expected benefit, or negative, precluding some greater 
evil; a source of private advancement for his supporters.  At a minimum, it signified a rejection of the 
substantive reasons for the monarch’s deposition, or at least of the legality of the means employed.  
But implicit in Scottish Jacobitism was involvement in the antagonisms between different Christian 
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confessions, since the person of James VII/II could not be detached from his personal religious 
commitment.  In addition, Scottish Jacobitism acquired a further dimension due to the failure of the 
Treaty of Union to deliver economic gains swiftly enough to quell doubts about its conceivable long-
run effects.  Stuart restoration became entangled with moves for the Union’s dissolution and the 
constitutional change necessary to restore economic sovereignty.  Other perspectives are possible: 
widespread opposition to the Williamite and Hanoverian monarchies linking the different forms of 
Jacobitism across the British Isles; broader geopolitical considerations involving the ambitions of the 
French and the Dutch.  Finally, Jacobitism can be considered as a ‘cause’ (in a non-epistemological 
sense) or a ‘movement’.  Ordinarily the ideological dimensions of the former would empower the 
agency constituting the latter.  However, Macinnes seeks to disarticulate one from the other, asking: 
was Jacobitism in Scotland a sustained political movement or merely an episodic cause?  (Macinnes 
2007a: 227, emphasis added).  The matter is clouded further, by his claim that as Union approached 
‘[p]atriotism no less than dynasticism was becoming the driving force for Scottish Jacobitism’, their 
‘differing priorities’ becoming ‘glaring inconsistences’ which nonetheless ‘were part of the 
continuous process of redefinition’of Jacobitism, signalling ‘that territorial nationhood should take 
precedence over dynastic statehood’ (ibid.: 239, 242) – that is, nationalism emerges as a further 
perspective.  It could be concluded that ‘Jacobitism’ ultimately signifies a value-driven, imprecise and 
shifting assemblage of ideas, mental associations, cultural expressions and sentiments, perspectives 
differing from one person to another and capable of acquiring an anachronistic relevance to current 
debates surrounding nationalism and independence.  The common denominator of these diverse 
perspectives is conflict. 
The Illustrations in Perspective 
The illustrations that follow consider the conflict of the selected period from four different 
perspectives, considered in two pairs due to the ways they intersect: dynastic and religious (Chapter 
7); economic and military (Chapter 8).  The dynastic perspective recognises that the concentration of 
power and authority in a specific line of descent can generate a fundamental and persistent division, 
rooted in the immutable familial blood relationships of kinship.  This perpetuates distinctions in social 
standing, political influence and wealth that can generate conflict.  The religious perspective focuses 
on the framing of personal identity and thus difference in terms of sets of interdependent beliefs and 
practices.  In principle, unlike kinship, beliefs can be changed at will (or under duress), but their 
award of normative priority over kinship can be used to reinforce dynastic power, combining internal 
validation (a specific lineal descent) with external validation (a specific religious confession).  This 
can intensify potential conflict.  The economic perspective applies to every significant human event, if 
only because survival through it necessitates economic activity, invoking the inescapable human 
conflict with an environment that demands work must be done.  But this is overshadowed by various 
  Perspectives, Interpretations and Illustrations 
138 
 
contingent conflicts, within and between groups, over who must do the work and how its fruits will be 
shared – the latter described, with an allusion to implicit conflict, as the ‘… tearing into portions, of 
the product of man’s collaborative effort’ (Shackle 1972: 5).  ‘Exogenous shocks’, spanning 
discoveries of new resources and technologies, climatic variation and pestilence and wars, generate 
conflicts communicated widely through the characteristic interconnectedness of economic activity.  
However, the adverse impact of public policy choices on the freedom of individual efforts to secure 
future personal economic benefits can also generate intense conflict.  The military perspective 
recognises that military action is a special form of economic activity, extending the impact of conflict 
beyond the combatants.  While military action is customarily the acknowledged instrument to apply 
legitimate lethal force in war against an external enemy, the actions conducted in the name of 
Jacobitism constituted armed insurrection within a sovereign state, so its participants were not 
belligerents but rebels, seeking to achieve a régime change by force, exploiting internal divisions of a 
political and religious nature. 
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Chapter 7 Dynastic and Religious Perspectives 
 
Preamble 
The first part of this chapter examines several general issues concerning dynastic succession and its 
entanglement with religious commitment, to establish a context within which then to assess the 
contribution made by James Stuart, as Duke of York and subsequently King James VII/II, to the 
collapse of the Stuart dynasty. 
The second part of the chapter considers two specific initiatives directed towards Scottish 
Jacobitism’s objectives: the actions of Graham of Claverhouse in 1689 and the actions of the 
commanders of the invading French fleet in 1708.  These are treated as presenting ‘might-have-
beens’, where plausible alternative actions could have materially altered the outcomes, but where 
equally plausible though necessarily speculative reasons can be offered as to why these alternative 
actions were not taken.  This supports the view that the ascendancy of one explanation over another 
owes much to the persuasiveness of argument grounded on a chosen perspective on the event. 
7.1 Dynastic Issues 
The vehicle of power 
A dynasty involves heredity driving the temporal trajectory of socio-political power.  If, as is claimed 
in this study, inherently conflicted actions of members of a large group will not spontaneously reach 
compatibility, then the centralised exercise of power by a king (for example) will be necessary to 
achieve it.  Without it, the group cannot act as a unity and conflict will be unchecked.  While a 
totalitarian monarch can enforce compatibility – essentially the case of slavery – more generally a 
compromise is achieved between ruler and ruled, the nature of the power retained by the ruler 
qualified by their mutual dependence.  The security of the monarch depends on ecclesiastical 
validation, military manpower and taxation revenue, provided by three constituent elements of 
society: the church, the nobility and the commercial sector.  The balance of power depends on the 
ability of the monarch to control these elements, as against their ability to acquire countervailing 
power, through the emergence of an appropriate institutional framework of negotiation and 
compromise – in short, a council or parliament.  The replacement of James VII/II by William III 
marked a decisive step in the irregular but apparently irreversible decay in the executive power of the 
monarch, as the respective dynasties of the princely and kingly states (in Bobbitt’s terms) yielded 
power to the parliaments of nation states. 
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Genealogical uncertainty and religious dogma 
The involvement of heredity contributes a characteristic dynamic, which operates at two distinct 
levels.  One is at the basic genealogical level, where the socio-political power is irrelevant and the 
issues differ little from those that concern familial relationships in general.  The other is more 
complex and involves the monarch’s right to power, which confronts an entanglement between 
concepts of divine right and absolute power.  It is this which gives substance to the nature of dynasty.  
Hereditary succession appears to offer a simple solution to the problem of the mortality of the 
monarch.  However, genealogical process cannot guarantee the expected straightforward lineal 
succession, whether male or female.  The line can be broken by barren marriage or premature death.  
The latter can also result in a minor being thrust into a position of headship of a family.  Marriage of 
siblings can generate collateral lines remote from the original familial context but which may be 
brought into the succession due to a break in the main line.  The existence of illegitimate offspring, 
changing attitudes to primogeniture and variation in the laws of inheritance can present further 
complications.  The history of the Stuart dynasty provides examples of most of these factors. 
However, while heredity provides genealogical continuity, albeit convoluted at times, it cannot initiate 
a dynasty.  Some exogenous factor must provide the originating endowment of power, such as 
military prowess in successfully defending the community against a significant enemy.  But this 
internal validation was augmented by the claim that the success was providential, thus the external 
validation of religion was sought.  Since the time of Constantine, the victor’s consecration by the 
Christian Church had been a sign of divine appointment.  With external validation symbolically 
conferred by religion’s representatives in an appropriate ritual, the chosen individual acquires the 
supreme and uncontestable authority to implement God’s will; accordingly, the king rules, through his 
determinations, by divine right.  The consequent autocratic actions may constrain individuals’ 
personal freedom of action, but this imposition could be voluntarily discounted by their shared 
commitment to the divine plan, to which the king is privy and to whom obedience is therefore offered.  
However, while military prowess might establish a monarchy it ‘…did not … rule out the possibility 
that kings might be elected or chosen by their people’ (Burgess 1992: 841) or resolve the question of 
succession. 
Right and power 
The relation between divine right and absolute personal power requires consideration.  Daly notes that 
‘absolutism’ even yet lacks a precise meaning so it is not straightforward to pin-point the particular 
sense to be associated with divine right (Daly 1978: 227-233).  And there might be none: ‘[t]he divine 
right of kings and the theory of royal absolutism were not the same thing … [and while] most theories 
of royal absolutism may have incorporated a divine-right element … the reverse was not necessarily 
true’ (Burgess 1992: 841).  Indeed, Daly has argued that the general view was ‘… hostile to the idea 
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that kings had any substantial latitude for discretionary exercise of sovereign will’ (ibid.: 839, citing 
Daly 1979: 21-31).  The crux of the matter is whether the king’s determinations are exclusively in 
furtherance of God’s will or in pursuit of a personal interest.  Certainly, if only the king knows God’s 
will then there is no independent public criterion by which a particular royal determination can be 
confirmed as God’s will.  But if such a criterion exists then royal decisions could be put to the test: 
absolutism need not equate with personal tyranny.  As Burgess points out, ‘The tyrant was 
distinguished from the true king primarily in moral rather than constitutional terms’ (ibid.: 843); the 
tyrant ‘… misused his authority by ruling selfishly and contrary to the natural principles of morality’ 
(ibid.: footnote 2).  Only from a position of being above the law could the king impose a law on the 
people without their consent; but being in that position did not authorise the king to act contrary to 
that or any other law. 
The divine right of the king had a bearing on the allegiance of the ruled towards the ruler.  Reynolds 
notes Hallam’s claim, based on French evidence, that ‘[t]he feudal relation fostered “the peculiar 
sentiment of reverence and attachment towards a sovereign, which we denominate loyalty”’ 
(Reynolds 1997: xxi, citing Hallam 1818: 228).  But divine right involved a stricter and reciprocal 
relationship, as it amounted to ‘… a theory of obligation, concerned primarily with the need to 
demonstrate to both rulers and subjects their duties before God’ (Burgess 1992: 839, citing Allen 
1938: 99-101).  This ‘rule[d] out the possibility that the people could resist or actively disobey their 
kings, whether they had elected them or not’ (ibid.: 841, 842); its ‘…ideological point …was to 
condemn disobedience, or more particularly rebellion, not to remove the king from all need to observe 
his own laws’ (ibid.: 847).  But as well as precluding opposition stemming from local or personal 
interests, more significantly it constituted a defence against systematic opposition from ‘resistance 
theories’.  These offered argued justifications for wholesale disobedience against monarchs on the 
grounds of ‘foreign’ religious principles – that is, contrary conceptions of how the will of God should 
be expressed in political terms, current elsewhere, whether Roman Catholic or Calvinist.  The divine 
right of the monarch could also be used ‘to condemn the idea of an independent secular authority 
resident in the Church and not derived from the king … and to suggest more loosely the dependence 
of the Church on the secular power’ (ibid.: 860, 861).  Thus, divine right was interwoven with 
concepts of sovereignty of the nation and effectively guaranteed a strained relation – ironically – 
between Church and state. 
The nature of kingship 
Hereditary monarchy obliges reconsideration of the metaphysical concept of divine right, as expressed 
in the ‘language of kingship’.  Monod traces its metamorphosis through to the seventeenth and early 
eighteenth centuries in Western European Christendom (Monod 1999).  The starting-point is sacred 
kingship: the ecclesiastically recognised sacrality of the physical person of the monarch, who is 
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elevated thereby to the corpus mysticum in company with ordained clerics and saints, and thereby set 
apart from the laity.  But the concept of sacral kingship was problematic, if only given the tension 
between the evident mortality of the ruler and the eternal nature of God.  In France and England, the 
notion emerged by the end of the fifteenth century that the ruler’s natural body hosted a transcendent 
entity corresponding to the crown that he wore, the dignitas, which was immortal.  But an adequate 
solution to the problem of royal mortality had to await the emergence of the abstract notion of 
sovereignty in late sixteenth-century France.  Sovereignty gave ‘… legal substance to sacral 
kingship’, thus detaching the majesty of the ruler from both personal charisma and fallibility: ‘… the 
king [as sovereign] must never die’ (Monod 1999: 35, 36).  But critical changes in the language of 
kingship were prompted by the Reformation, contributing to a demystification of the royal body.  
Protestantism, with its rejection of bodily holiness, gave impetus to the ‘confessionalization’ of rulers 
– the warranting of secular authority and political identity on the basis of the monarch’s self-
proclaimed, reformed spiritual standing –  to which Counter-Reformation Catholicism also 
contributed (ibid.: 51-53, 141).  The final change was towards the notion of natural kingship, seen in 
terms of a ‘… rational contract [between ruler and ruled], not one made by sympathetic identification 
of the subject with the monarch’ (ibid.: 226), yet focused on ‘… the natural body of the monarch, not 
a spiritual persona’ (ibid.:227).  This was an element in the eventual transition to the rational state in 
which negotiation between ruler and ruled would play a greater, and religion a lesser, role, altering the 
basis of the external validation of the monarch.  These changes had a bearing on the demise of the 
Stuart dynasty. 
7.2 Aspects of the Stuart Dynasty  
Complexity of succession 
The Stuart dynasty illustrates clearly how genealogical factors force departures from an idealised 
lineal sequence of descent.  James became king through the death, without issue, of his elder brother 
Charles II (monarch by constitutional restoration, after the regicide of Charles I, also a second son).  
This propelled him onto the thrones of England, Ireland and Scotland, previously united under his 
grandfather, James VI/I.  This accretion of kingdoms resulted from the conjunction of the failure of 
Elizabeth I (and before her Mary I) to provide issue, and the marriage one hundred years earlier 
between James IV of Scotland and Margaret Tudor, elder surviving daughter of Henry VII of 
England.  This had been an integral part of a political measure, the Treaty of Perpetual Peace, 
intended (in vain in the short run) to prevent further hostilities between Scotland and England.  Earlier 
dynastic links also had significant political ramifications, in particular those involving France, for a 
time Scotland’s ally but England’s continental rival.  The sixteenth-century option, however, was ‘… 
almost certainly as a French colony’ (Whatley 2006: 94).  However, the very existence of a Stuart (or 
Stewart) dynasty and its considerable political strength in Scotland were also due to the vagaries of 
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human procreation and contemporary conflict.  The death without issue of David II, the sole surviving 
legitimate heir of Robert the Bruce, allowed the hereditary monarchy to pass via David’s stepsister’s 
marriage with Walter Stewart to their son, who in 1371 became Robert II, the first of the Stuart line.  
That brought within the royal ambit the many descendants of the preceding six generations of 
influential Stewards to the King of Scotland, for a time the largest land-owners in Scotland after the 
king.  This was reinforced by Robert II’s own ‘philoprogenitive tendencies … [whereby from] two 
sets of legitimate (or at least legitimised) children – more than twenty in total – his sons dominated 
the list of Scottish earldoms and almost monopolised the senior offices of state, while his daughters 
had married almost everyone else who mattered’ (Thomson 2009: 64).  Illegitimate sons also 
benefited in terms of lands and titles.  
The Union of the Crowns brought under a single monarch, not only erstwhile enemies, but kingdoms 
with contrasting relations to France.  The contrast also applied to their respective responses to the 
Reformation, involving theological, doctrinal and governance (both civic and ecclesiastical) 
differences.  The primary seventeenth-century religious tension in Scotland was that between the 
Protestant confessions of Calvinist Presbyterianism and Episcopalianism (Roman Catholics had 
become a minority in Scotland, as in England), over the involvement of bishops in secular 
government and, at a local level, issues concerning patronage, which involved a controversial 
subordination of the church’s ministry to the prevailing social hierarchy.  But the radical difference 
concerned the nature of kingship. 
The Declaration of Arbroath 
However, the Scottish hereditary monarchy had arguably been compromised a half-century before the 
genesis of the Stuart dynasty, through the composition in 1320 of the Declaration of Arbroath, by a 
substantial group of Scottish nobles, including Walter the Steward, subsequently father of Robert II.  
Composed to obtain Papal dispensation to help resolve the political intrigues of the later reign of 
Robert the Bruce, its signatories declared themselves free, in defined circumstances, to ‘… choose 
another king who will defend our liberties’.  This so-called ‘deposition clause’ appears to assert the 
superiority of the principle of consent over that of hereditary kingship.  Antecedents may be found in 
the early Scottish and Pictish institution of tanistry, whereby a ruler’s successor could be elected for 
the duration of his life from among those deemed sufficiently able, typically members of the dominant 
social group.  Its replacement by hereditary monarchy was apparently a practical expedient to escape 
internecine conflict among rival factions.  This ‘deposition clause’ has been interpreted by some as an 
early and limited form of social contract.  It may only have been intended to address specific 
contemporary issues (that is, the actions of Robert the Bruce or either John Balliol or Edward Balliol 
that might prejudice Scotland’s sovereignty): Brown argues, ‘… the radical aspect … can be 
explained in the light of immediate political concerns’ (Brown 2003: 1, footnote 2).  Whether the 
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‘deposition clause’ was a contemporary innovation or an explicit statement of a commonplace ancient 
principle of tanistry is not clear; either way, its general language may suggest that its composers 
anticipated it would have some continuing (albeit non-statutory) force.  That the Declaration was not 
invoked for three hundred and sixty years may reveal a general acquiescence to the actions of 
subsequent Stuart monarchs, bolstered by the solidarity of the wider Stuart dynasty, and the later 
elimination of the English military threat due to the Union of the Crowns.  But as a substantive form 
of conditional external validation of monarchy it remained a pragmatic threat to both divine royal 
warrant and hereditary succession.  Macinnes attributes the Scots’ ‘claimed right to resist an ungodly 
monarch’ to a distinct Scottish reception of Calvinism in the Reformation, perpetuated through the 
National Covenant and Solemn League and Covenant, with its limitations on the monarchy in respect 
of the Kirk and State ‘… essentially secularised through the Claim of Right in 1689’ (Macinnes 
2007b: 257). 
The religious threat 
With its focus on the conduct of the monarch, the deposition clause had some affinity with the notion 
of natural kingship, initially expounded in England by the Earl of Clarendon, Charles II’s chief 
adviser and James’s father-in-law (Monod 1999: 226).  The divergence of the monarch’s conduct 
from the standards implicit in any of the warrants offered for kingship became a sensitive matter.  If 
God were the epitome of the virtues, then virtuous personal conduct was expected of the monarch.  
Some discordant, un-God-like royal decisions might be justified in terms of ‘reasons of state’ 
(discussed in Chapter 5) or the ‘national interest’.  But questionable personal behaviour that could not 
be kept out of the public domain, particularly generally unacceptable sexual excesses, was another 
matter.  Accordingly, ‘Charles II’s popularity … quickly waned, … Natural kingship increasingly 
seemed to provide a license for passions that were anything but edifying [and] publicity finally made 
a mockery of natural kingship’ (Monod 1999: 229, 230).  However, giving offence to general moral 
sensibilities was of a lesser order compared to offending strongly held religious commitments.  The 
post-Reformation emergence of divergent and antagonistic confessions within the Christian faith, with 
distinct differences among the three kingdoms, presented the Stuart dynasty with a problematic 
context.  In Scotland, Charles II’s Episcopalian Settlement, following closely behind the act rescissory 
of 1661 which had the effect of ‘… exploding the foundations of presbyterianism’ (Raffe 2012: 32), 
was in marked contrast to the assurances he had previously appeared to give – assurances welcomed 
by a country that had not long before embraced Presbyterianism via the National Covenant (with its 
anti-Catholic antecedents) and promoted it in England with the Solemn League and Covenant.  It was 
scarcely propitious for Charles II then to be conceivably succeeded by a king who had become 
‘…persuaded that only the Roman Catholic faith could secure salvation [and] convinced that he had 
been singled out by Providence to be the means of bringing his benighted countrymen back to the true 
[Roman Catholic] faith’ (Speck 2002: 24, 27) and who had been quoted by a Jesuit as having said  
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‘…that he would convert England or would die a martyr’ (Pincus 2009: 152, citing a letter from a 
Jesuit of Liege, 2 February 1687).  Parliament’s Test Acts already provided a legislative obstacle 
against Catholics holding public office and these had brought James’s own Catholic conversion to 
public knowledge, forcing his demission as Lord High Admiral in 1673.  However, given that the 
Catholic populations of Scotland and England were very small minorities – not so in Ireland – the 
depth of feeling against Catholicism seems paradoxical.  This could be resolved by distinguishing 
between it (as a system of religious belief) and popery: ‘Roman Catholicism appeared to many not as 
a religion, but as a repressive political system [involving] a single-minded desire for temporal 
obedience and a marked intolerance of any form of dissent’ (Callow 2000: 139).  The fear of popery 
which was ‘… a permanent part of opposition rhetoric in Stuart England’ had undergone a resurgence 
in response to the savagery of the Irish Rebellion of 1641-2 (Parker 2013: 357). 
The Stuart dynasty had formed international relationships through astute politically-driven marriages 
to gain strategic alliances, extending its geographical reach and wealth.  But it also entangled lines of 
descent.  Reversion to a collateral line given a break in the primary hereditary line could then place a 
‘foreign’ monarch on the throne (as it had done, effectively, in the case of James VI).  Although 
James VII himself did not pursue – on the first occasion – a ‘dynastic marriage’, earlier instances had 
already created blood relationships with France (Charles and James were cousins of Louis XIV), the 
Netherlands (William Prince of Orange was nephew to Charles and James, and subsequently son-in-
law to James) and Hanover (Electress Sophia was cousin to Charles and James).  Accordingly, 
delineation of the Stuart dynasty was complex, so ‘restoration of the Stuart dynasty’ was potentially 
an ambiguous notion once the throne had been declared vacant and Roman Catholics and their 
spouses had been disqualified.  Thus Claydon could reasonably say ‘William was a Stuart … [which] 
identity was clearly important to him in 1688’ (Claydon 2002: 14, 31).    
7.3 The Actions of James VII/II 
The warrior prince 
The rules of dynastic succession are blind to the personal qualities, inherited and acquired, of any 
successor, while genealogical accident can thrust the ill-equipped individual unexpectedly into prime 
position.  ‘Monarchy was no guarantee of competence …’ (Black 2011: 156).  The early years of 
James Stuart, the future James VII/II, were traumatic and unstable, marked by domestic upheaval; 
brief imprisonment; witness to lethal military engagements of the Civil War; escape to exile in 
Holland and France; execution of his father – all before he was sixteen.  Exhibiting an uncontrollable 
temper as a youth, he regarded his period of active military service with and against the French as 
‘…the most enjoyable years of his life’ (Mann 2014: 45).  He displayed an almost-foolhardy personal 
bravery and an enthusiasm for killing (Callow 2000: 81), coupled with a self-publicising disdain for 
comrades (ibid.: 75; Mann 2014: 54)), a disinterest in the welfare of the rank and file and, perhaps 
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significantly, a lack of judgement of strategic issues.  In terms of image ‘… he fitted the traditional 
role of the prince as a warrior perfectly [and] saw the successful pursuit of war as the greatest possible 
service a prince could undertake for his people’ (Callow 200: 127).  As it transpired, the first time he 
led an army into battle was towards defeat at the Boyne (Mann 2014: 47), an outcome to which his 
own political misjudgement had contributed (Speck 2002: 112, 113).  He did not, despite 
encouragement and his forces being in position, engage militarily with William of Orange in 1688. 
James and Roman Catholicism 
James’s personal religious commitment has particular significance.  Although James VI/I had been a 
devout Protestant, Charles I and II had both married Roman Catholics, the latter undergoing death-bed 
conversion from Anglicanism.  James VII/II’s first wife was initially Protestant, but she became a 
Catholic during the 1660s.  She ‘… made the greatest single impact upon [James’s religious] thinking 
… [basing] her case solely on the nature of infallibility [arguing] that … the Anglicans had no right to 
claim authority through apostolic succession’ (Callow 2000: 144).  James seemingly endorsed her 
critique, based on an ecclesiological version of dynastic heredity.  He must have observed Catholic 
rites during his childhood exile in France, close to the royal court, although Mann could cite ‘… no 
evidence that [James] was especially attracted to anything other than Anglicanism’ during his teens 
and early twenties (Mann 2014: 24).  However, during his military service between the ages of 
nineteen and twenty-five, he formed ‘…an intimate friendship, akin to father and son’ with the 
Huguenot marshal of France, Vicomte de Turenne, twenty-two years his senior and an ‘awkward and 
socially isolated individual’ (Callow 2000: 65), whom ‘…in his military memoirs [James] is seen to 
idolise’ (ibid.: 44).  Turenne’s subsequent conversion to Catholicism in 1668 ‘… might have hastened 
James’s move towards Rome’ around the same time (Speck 2002: 24) and prompted him to disregard 
his father’s injunctions to remain devoted to the established Anglican Church. 
However, according to Pincus, James’s personal position on the doctrinal matters that separated the 
different confessions, such as predestination, transubstantiation and the sufficiency of God’s grace for 
salvation, neither directed his personal morality and conduct nor were material to the subsequent 
revolutionary upheavals (Pincus 2009: 92-94).  Instead, James’s main concern was to find in religion 
an external validation for royal absolutism, so that public choices could be made through the royal 
prerogative.  His deep antagonisms towards Presbyterians and Non-conformists were primarily based 
on their distinguishing positions regarding civil governance.  These he regarded as endorsements of 
republicanism and treasonable.  Anglicanism (and thus Episcopacy) could be tolerated, given the 
opportunity to exercise political control through the royal appointment of its bishops – opposed by 
other confessions.  On this interpretation, James’s ambitions lay in the direction of state-building, not 
the spiritual welfare of his subjects.  He adopted – according to Pincus – the model of state-building 
developed by Louis XIV: ‘James was not merely a Roman Catholic.  He was a Roman Catholic 
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deeply convinced by the modern views and concerns developed at the court of Louis XVI [whose] 
Gallicanism, fiercely defended by the Jesuits, and bitterly criticized by [Pope] Innocent XI and the 
rest of Catholic Europe, exalted the power of the prince and insisted on eliminating religious 
pluralism’ (Pincus 2009: 121).  The Gallican denial of the supreme authority of the pope left the king 
as the absolute power, ‘… legitimate by means of divinely guided dynastic succession’ (Bobbitt: 
2002) so that ‘[w]ith Louis XVI the kingly state reached its final apotheosis … shaped [in such a 
manner] that enabled Louis to exploit its resources for war’ (ibid.: 121).  ‘Innocent [XI] himself called 
the French king “the common enemy of West Europe”, while his propagandists accused Louis of 
seeking to be “the Universal Monarch of Europe”’ (Pincus 2009: 123; citations unspecified 
individually, but composited in end-note 9, 516).  Thus, ‘… England had become little better than a 
client state of France’ (ibid.: 314).  It has been argued that James ‘… never tried to lead a separate 
religious faction at Court or to become a champion of English Catholicism’ (Callow 2000: 148, 149) 
and that ‘…James was never formally allied with France’ (Speck 2002: 121).  But it was also the case 
that Charles II – supposedly an Anglican at the time – received substantial subsidies from Louis ‘… in 
return for a promise …to embark on the steady reconversion of England [to Catholicism]’ (Callow 
2000: 153) and had secretly negotiated the Treaty of Dover that, had its intentions succeeded, would 
have involved his own conversion to Catholicism.  Furthermore, ‘[w]ithin weeks of Charles II’s death, 
James created a separate Roman Catholic Cabinet Council [which became] England’s real governing 
body [and] replaced the traditional and cumbersome Privy Council’ (Pincus 2009: 125).  In Scotland, 
James relied heavily on the Drummond brothers James, Earl of Perth, his Lord Chancellor, and John, 
Earl of Melfort, his Secretary for Scottish Affairs. ‘Both …converted to Catholicism …and both owed 
their conversion in part to [the writings of the French] Bishop Bossuet’ (ibid.: 128).  In his view ‘… 
the moment of state formation was engineered by divine grace, not by natural law, contracts or 
covenants’; he had contributed significantly to the Gallican assertion of absolute monarchy (Monod 
1999: 214, 255).  In Ireland, James appointed the Catholic and ‘Francophilic’ Richard Talbot, Earl of 
Tyrconnel, as Lord Lieutenant (Pincus 2009: 142). 
Personal qualities 
For thirteen of his twenty-five years as Duke of York, James occupied the position of Lord High 
Admiral.  Involvements in brief naval engagements again revealed his personal daring but also 
deficiencies bordering on negligence as a team player and as tactician or strategist.  As Callow puts it, 
‘[t]he pattern [is one of] a consistent failure to take responsibility for his actions, and a willingness to 
hide behind his privileged position and to scapegoat others’ (Callow 2000: Chapter 8; 237).  During 
his occupancy of the office, the Royal Navy’s fleet lost its pre-eminence in tonnage over the 
combined fleets of France and the Dutch Republic (Speck 2002: 22), while James exercised his 
privilege by placing inexperienced members of the nobility in positions of command.  This gave him 
continuing personal influence after he had been forced to relinquish his post by the Test Act of 1673, 
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when he moved smoothly into that of Lord High Admiral of Scotland.  Mann notes that ‘… the 
Admiralty Court records of Scotland reveal him mostly obsessed with his right to wrecks and prizes 
from his jurisdiction than the building of ships’, and other concerns ‘suggestive of James’s 
acquisitiveness’ (Mann 2014: 126).  Indeed, Scottish shipbuilding was discouraged by the acquisition 
of prize hulls (Graham 2002: 56). 
Charles II gave James opportunities to improve his personal financial position and so reduce the 
burden on Court: substantial estates in Ireland; international trading opportunities; development 
possibilities in North America.  James pursued these with narrow self-interest, disregarding the 
welfare of others, whether his impoverished Irish tenants, the slaves that became the main trade 
commodity of his Company of Royal Adventurers and Royal African Company, or the colonists of 
New Amsterdam.  This disinterest in the plight of those harmed by his actions revealed a willingness 
to condone this to uphold a rigid conception of sovereignty.  In a similar vein Pincus notes: ‘James’s 
response to Louis XIV’s Revocation of the Edict of Nantes was hardly what one would expect from 
someone committed to the principle of liberty of conscience. … Barillon [the French Ambassador to 
England] reported that James “could not have been more overjoyed” at seeing what Louis XIV had 
done “to destroy heresy in his kingdom” … James celebrated each report of the mass conversions of 
French Huguenots … Following Bossuet’s lead, James chose to deny the existence of violence 
perpetrated by Louis XIV’s dragoons’ (Pincus 2009: 137; citation unspecified, composited in end-
note 42, 522).   
It was noted above that Charles II’s sexual behaviour undermined the emerging concept of natural 
kingship.   The Duke of York was also highly promiscuous and adulterous.  Both had numerous 
mistresses, fathering numbers of illegitimate offspring – a state of ‘[l]urid sexual liberalism’ (Mann: 
92).  During the reign of Charles II a few of the women involved played significant roles in domestic 
and foreign policy; this came to an end with James’s accession.  Mann suggests that the nature of 
James’s sexual appetite provides an insight into his personality, ‘[h]is sullen and aggressive sexuality 
… [involving a] “release of a vicious brutality” … [He] retained an insatiable appetite for sexual 
gratification’ (ibid.: 100, citing Magalotti 1980 [1668]: 36).  In this area of personal relationship 
James apparently exhibited a propensity towards violence, matching his enthusiasm for lethal military 
action and his perennial obsession for blood sports. 
7.4 Revolution and Scotland 
The ‘plot’ of the narrative that emerges from the perspective adopted by Pincus is essentially of 
revolutionary opposition to an absolutist political state (Pincus 2009: 7).  But the Scottish ‘revolution’ 
was fundamentally a religious matter. 
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Religious division 
The restoration of the nominally Anglican Charles II had unexpectedly brought with it a package of 
legislation that not only established the Episcopal Church in Scotland but also initiated a lengthy 
period of bitter persecution and suppression of Presbyterianism.  Episcopalianism offered a 
theological support for absolute monarchy and a form of church government in which the monarch 
was the head of the church, an element of Erastian doctrine.  These were inimical to Presbyterianism, 
which consequently was viewed by the crown as republican in political commitment and thus its 
enemy.  James VII/II’s adopted Roman Catholicism allowed him to claim his kingship was endorsed 
by the authority of apostolic succession, the strongest basis for the divine right of the king.  Previously 
despatched to Scotland in 1679 by Charles II because of strong anti-Catholicism in England, as ‘…the 
most divisive personality in English politics since his father’ (Mann 2014: 137) and ‘… a hate figure 
for a significant proportion of the Protestant nation’ (Callow 2000: 283), James nonetheless made a 
favourable impression there (Macinnes 2007b: 243).  His subsequent accession to the throne was 
similarly warmly received in Scotland.  But while his reign started from a demonstration of strength, 
with the successful suppression of the Argyll and Monmouth rebellions, within three years he had 
been deposed by the Scottish parliament due to his own subsequent actions.  It had proved to be a 
‘reckless reign’ (Stephen 2013: Introduction).  Its reverberations continued: in the political process 
leading to the Treaty of Union, ‘[Squadrone members’] fear of a Jacobite alternative [was] fuelled by 
their memories and experience of life under James VII’ (Harris 2010: 34).  On the other hand, 
Macinnes has argued that ‘[James VII/II’s] governance of Scotland deserves rehabilitation.  For James 
was as much an understated success as a qualified failure’ (Macinnes 2007a: 236). 
James’s pivotal actions in Scotland were the First and Second Scottish Indulgences of 1687, the 
second promptly abandoning unacceptable conditions set in the first.  These were initiated four 
months after his dissolution of the Scottish parliament, following his unsuccessful attempts to obtain 
passage of a pro-Catholic Toleration Act.  These indulgences granted, by royal proclamation, freedom 
of worship indoors to confessions dissenting from Episcopalianism, not just the Roman Catholic 
minority (‘… much less than 5 per cent [of the population]’ (Mann 2014: 187)), but also the 
Presbyterians (possibly as numerous and certainly as geographically concentrated, though differently 
so, as the Episcopalians (Stephen 2013: 48, 49)).  For the Presbyterians, these indulgences ended ‘28 
years of spiritual exile, of hardship and persecution at the hands of what they regarded as a tyrannous 
and arbitrary government’ (ibid.: 20) and set in train efforts to reverse their consequences.  ‘[A] 
sizeable group of exiled [Presbyterian] ministers, tiring perhaps of opposition to the government and 
weary for home, [were encouraged] to return’ (Whatley 2006: 78). 
Several interpretations have been offered of James’s scarcely necessary inclusion of Presbyterians 
within the scope of the indulgences.  It was possibly a weak capitulation, paying any price necessary 
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to promote Catholicism, or possibly an indication that ‘… James regarded his position as strong 
enough to grant what was an extremely unpopular toleration to Catholics on the one hand, and on the 
other …an extremely dangerous one to Presbyterians’ (ibid.: 15).  Mary of Modena’s pregnancy soon 
after, raising hopes of a male heir that were then realised in June 1688, may have supplied reassurance 
that the risk had been worth taking.  But the prospect of a Roman Catholic succession helped trigger 
the already-prepared action of William of Orange – to which Scots Presbyterian exiles of earlier 
persecution, were contributing (ibid.: 28) – that led to James’s deposition.  The exiles’ involvement 
had longer-term consequences in that ‘… virtually all of the more prominent Scots émigrés (or their 
descendants) who landed with William … and who were still in Parliament in 1706 and 1707, voted 
for [an incorporating Union]’ (Whatley 2006: 30).  Or possibly James’s proclamations illustrated ‘… 
his impetuosity [and] lack of forethought’ exemplified at other times during his reign (Callow 2010: 
304).  His capacity for considered judgement had previously been questioned: as Duke of York, 
attending the Scottish Parliament in 1681, it was recorded that although he had ‘“honestie, justice and 
courage enough … he had nather great conduct, nor deep reach in affairs, but was a silly [simple] 
man”’ (Paterson 2001: 55, quoting Lauder 1848: 327).  It was surely obvious that freedom of worship 
tolerated within an Episcopal settlement was insufficient by itself to satisfy the Presbyterians.  Having 
just failed to obtain parliamentary passage for a Toleration Act designed to favour Roman Catholics, 
his proclamations were perhaps hastily conceived in ‘… a charged atmosphere of arrogance followed 
by panic, and of irresolution followed by vengeance’ (Mann 2014: 179).  James’s actions have also 
been interpreted as an expression of a genuine and innovative commitment to religious toleration.  
Certainly, ‘by inaugurating universal religious liberty [he was] the first ruler of England [and of 
Scotland] to do so’ (Jones 1991: 70).  But contrary advocacies have arisen in respect of this view 
(Stephen 2013; 2,3).  A particularly persuasive argument would be necessary to establish that James 
had a sincere interest in the spiritual welfare of those of different confessions to his own, given his 
own firmly held Catholicism, and his expressed criticisms of other confessions.  Moreover, in ‘[t]he 
conduct and policing of religious policy in Scotland after [the Abjuration Act of] 1662 …[which 
became] a bewildering oscillation between repression and conciliation towards Presbyterianism’ 
during his brother’s reign, James himself ‘… as prime manager of Scottish affairs from 1681 to 1688 
must actually take much responsibility for an infamous period of Crown violence’ (Mann 2014: 119, 
154).  Indeed, he typically did not seek to comprehend principled opposition to his own position: 
‘James was prepared to hold fast to his own beliefs, regardless of the consequences [yet] he was 
totally unable to acknowledge that similar, dearly held principles motivated the actions of others’ 
(Callow 2000: 288).  From that point of view his indulgences confirmed ‘that for James 
Presbyterianism was a political not a religious threat.  If only [they] could be depoliticized, they 
represented yet another group of Christian brethren who, in time, … would see their error and return 
to Rome’ (Mann 2014: 155).  But that detachment of the spiritual from the secular was not a tenet of 
Presbyterianism. 
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James’s abiding concern was the nature of kingship, on which the different confessions held 
antagonistic positions: the divine-right conception warranted supreme authority and absolutism, 
whereas natural kingship accommodated a separation of the sacred from the secular.  The latter not 
only precluded the monarch from being head of the church (and thus from claiming, by that role, 
absolute power over all secular matters too) but also admitted the possibility of the monarch’s secular 
powers being constrained by the civil authority of parliament.  However, James’s personal position 
had been made very clear in, for example, the preamble to the Excise Act of 1685, which referred to 
‘… the King’s sacred, supreme, sovereign, absolute power and authority’ (Speck 2002: 86, citing 
Thomson, Innes 1814-75: 459).  James never understood how a Presbyterian could also be a 
monarchist (Mann 2014: 24): Presbyterianism was a variant of the Republicanism that had 
treasonably executed his father, to be rooted out by force. 
Presbyterian settlement 
The Scottish revolution was completed in 1690 with the Presbyterian church settlement. It conformed 
closely to the 1592 act that had originally established Presbyterianism, granting freedom of assembly 
and legitimacy for the church’s courts.  The abolition of patronage followed closely.  The Claim of 
Right of 1689, setting the Presbyterian agenda, had explicitly asserted the ‘contractual and limited 
nature of the Scottish monarchy’ (Stephen 2013: 37).  Given that most of the Scottish Episcopal 
clergy could not adopt ‘… a new theology of kingship … to justify and support the Revolution, and 
the accession of William and Mary’, unlike the Anglicans, ‘Presbyterians were William’s only allies 
in Scotland’ (ibid.: 53, 54).  With his support the path to the settlement was cleared by the 1689 
abolition of prelacy and the 1690 abrogation of the 1669 Act of Supremacy.  The settlement survived 
the electoral gains of the Jacobites under Queen Anne in 1703, while the 1706 Act of Security integral 
to the Act of Union headed off the Kirk’s opposition to Union (Harris 2010: 44) by effecting the 
church’s removal ‘… from the absolute sovereignty of the British Parliament’ based on its claim that 
its ‘… worship, discipline and government … represent the truth’ rather than establishment by the 
word of the sovereign, as in the case of the Church of England; this distinction permitted an element 
of federalism to exist in the Union (Fry, M. 2006: 269-271).  In Macinnes’s view, ‘[With only less 
than ten per cent of presbyteries and parishes petitioning against the Union,] the Kirk stood above all 
for its own institutional interests as the preferred ecclesiastical establishment in Scotland’, a view that 
discounts their ability to assess the secular implications of Union (Macinnes 2007b: 287).  Post-Union 
elements of ‘counter-revolution’ brought the return of lay patronage in 1711 and the Scottish 
Toleration Act of 1712, entangled with the anti-Unionism of the time.  But the unintended 
consequences of James’s contingent action endured. 
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7.5 Illustration: The Role of Graham of Claverhouse 
The actions of Graham of Claverhouse, ennobled by James as Viscount Dundee in 1688, provide a 
subject for ‘what might have been’ speculation.  Had Dundee acted differently during and after the 
meeting of the Scottish Convention of Estates in 1689 – but still appropriately in the circumstances – 
the outcomes could have been very different.  The conjectured reasons for his having failed to do so 
could then form an explanation of what did transpire.  Two plausible courses of action were open to 
Dundee, corresponding to the two roles given to him by James.  The first was for Dundee, as 
commander-in-chief of James’s putative Scottish army, to support his restoration by bringing that 
army into existence as a viable and loyal force, to be supplemented in due course by French or Irish 
allied troops.  The second, given his elevation to the Scottish nobility and thus participation in the 
governance of Scotland, through attendance at the Convention of Estates, was to achieve a Scottish 
constitutional resolution of the problems created by James’s departure and William’s arrival in 
England.  The establishment of a rival convention in a location dominated by those acknowledging 
James’s kingship would restore political authority and authorise his army, with a promised additional 
5,000 troops, to ‘…proclaim war against Hamilton’s Government in Edinburgh’ (Linklater, Hesketh 
1989:192).  Both courses of action would have to be pursued while James was in France, 
subsequently Ireland.  In the event, Dundee failed to do either. 
Whether James had in mind clear-cut plans for Dundee’s post-ennoblement role is a moot point; 
perhaps the ennoblement was merely a reward for the fidelity of a close friend (Chambers 1829: 27).  
Moreover, letters from James during his Irish campaign expressly instructing Dundee to initiate a 
constitutional counter-revolution were intercepted and copies did not reach Dundee for three months.  
He was possibly ignorant of any obligations.  But equally no evidence has been cited of specific 
instructions from James to Dundee to act as he subsequently did. 
First and foremost, Dundee was a professional soldier, initially trained under contract to European 
armies.  He fought for the French against the Dutch under Marshall Turenne, like James himself, and 
was in arms with Hugh MacKay, subsequently his opposite number in William’s Scottish army.  He 
then fought for the Dutch against the French, gaining the recognition of William of Orange, whose 
recommendation to Charles II began his long-standing service for and loyalty to the Stuarts.  During 
his service with the Prince of Orange he was portrayed as an arrogant, impulsive and determined 
individual, inclined to violence against fellow-officers.  His subsequent reputation in Presbyterian 
Scotland as cruel and licentious emerged primarily through his involvement, in 1678-9 and again in 
1682-4, in counter-insurgency operations against Covenanters, particularly the Cameronians, ‘the 
terrorist wing of the Presbyterians’ (Speck 2002: 29).   He became regarded as a ‘… relentlessly 
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brutal individual [a view grounded on] a small number of well-recorded, callous summary 
executions’, admittedly at the time sanctioned by the law, as well as self-confessed acts of pillage and 
cruelty to women and children (Mann 2014: 152).  The truthfulness of these accounts has been 
contested for a long time (cf. Napier 1862; Linklater, Hesketh: 1989, Chapter 11).   
The hundred or so executions of the ‘Killing Times’ may not have been of a scale to register as 
contemporary massacres – although relative to the size of the individual communities affected they 
presumably had that significance – but they do raise several similar issues.  In Section 4.6 of Chapter 
4, under the heading of Killing of Innocents, consideration was given to the mental states that seem to 
be involved in the perpetration of atrocities by humans against humans, outside of the context defined 
by the rules of warfare.  But these states themselves are not peculiarly scale-dependent, and so seem 
entirely relevant to the particular seventeenth-century Scottish context, and conceivably applicable to 
identifiable contemporary perpetrators, such as Graham of Claverhouse.  At their most general level 
these states relate to an epistemological issue that gives distinctiveness to this study: that a human 
person is just that, and not an object.  The objectification of a human is his or her dehumanization, 
whether in terms of physical treatment or in terms of explanation of his or her action.  As noted in 
Section 4.6, Kelman has not only usefully distinguished three factors that can erode self-restraint and 
admit atrocities, but also stressed the reflexivity of the erosion: the perpetrator is also dehumanized in 
the process (Kelman 1973: 35-57).  His three factors were authorization, routinisation and 
dehumanization itself.  Authorization, involving subordination to a superior authority, reduces the 
perpetrator to a functionary, subject not to any moral precept (as discussed in Chapter 5) but only to 
statute or command of the superior.  Graham of Claverhouse occupied that role in respect of the 
enforcement of the Oath of Abjuration of 1684, empowered to execute Covenanters who refused to 
take the Oath, in the field and without trial.  Routinization of an atrocity allows its repetition by the 
functionary, without regard to the intrinsic unique identity of each individual, which otherwise should 
give substantive moral significance to every instance; instead they are merely subsumed into the 
objective category of the condemned.  Dehumanization results in the individual being viewed as a 
negatively valued intrusion into the situation, whose removal will confer a benefit.   According to 
Kelman, by succumbing to these three factors the perpetrator becomes brutalized.  It is conceivable, 
however, that Graham of Claverhouse was already brutalized as a result of earlier active military 
service, where the humanity of enemy combatants could legitimately be disregarded.  Arguably, the 
Scottish Privy Council displayed its own brutalization in framing the Oath to entrap Covenanters into 
a treasonable posture on the basis of their own religious beliefs.  But significantly, perhaps, Graham 
of Claverhouse was a member of the Privy Council at the time. 
A staunch Episcopalian, he rapidly rose to prominence.  ‘[After his actions of 1678-9 Claverhouse] 
was summoned to London and for the next three years was a close companion of James and Charles 
…. With James he travelled …to and fro from Edinburgh to London … He kept regular company with 
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the Duke before going back to Scotland to serve during the ‘Killing Times’ and in connection with the 
Argyll Rebellion. …No military individual was closer to James from 1679 to 1689 than Claverhouse’ 
(Mann 2014: 124, 125).  Within eight years he was promoted from captain under Charles II to major-
general under James VII.  But he was also appointed a Privy Councillor in 1683 (although temporarily 
struck off for having ‘delivered a jealous rant in Queensberry’s face over the military seniority of his 
sons’ (Mann 2014: 158)); sheriff (in SW Scotland); and Provost of Dundee – imposed on the burgh by 
James as part of his attempt to manipulate the composition of a future parliament (Mann 2014: 190).   
Dundee’s appearance at the Convention of Estates in Edinburgh on the 14th March 1689 must have 
evoked mixed reactions.  Though ‘…a minor laird …of no consequence beyond his loyalty to 
[James]’ (Reid 2014: 5), he was nonetheless notorious and potentially powerful.  Rumour had it that 
he and others intended to kidnap Williamite members of the Convention, so the presence of some of 
his own dragoons was a palpable threat (Mackay 1833[1689]: 4).  The circumstances were 
intimidatory.  The Williamites felt menaced by the cannon of Edinburgh Castle, still commanded by 
the Catholic Duke of Gordon despite the king’s departure, with Dundee’s express encouragement 
(Terry 1905: 164).  James had made this controversial appointment ‘“… to make that town have more 
regard for my commands, and civiler to the Catholics by seeing [the Castle] in the hands of one of that 
persuasion”’ (Linklater, Hesketh 1982: 140, no citation given).  For the Jacobites the appearance of 
two thousand or so Cameronians and supporters of Argyll, assembled to provide security, was equally 
oppressive.  ‘Fear encouraged tension and partisanship’ (Mann 2014: 208).  ‘Jacobites were almost as 
numerous at the commencement as their opponents [but] uncertain as to their best course of action … 
[The] initial narrowness of the gap [was] apparent in the relatively close contest for [the 
Convention’s] presidency …the Williamites …winning the day by a majority of 40 among 150 votes’ 
(Cowan 1991: 164) – according to Chambers the majority was fifteen (Chambers 1829: 32).  But 
Dundee’s contribution to the Convention was limited to a failed attempt – albeit ‘eloquent and 
vigorous’ (Drummond 1842: 235) – to have it adjourned and reconvened at Stirling.  Within three 
days he walked out, claiming an attempt was to be made on his life by some Cameronians.  Thereafter 
he provocatively gave further encouragement to the Duke of Gordon (Terry 1905:164), whose refusal 
to relinquish his post precipitated the siege of Edinburgh Castle, commanded by Major-General 
Mackay. 
Dundee’s failure to influence the Convention possibly contributed to the disillusionment and desertion 
from it of numbers of James’s supporters, already demoralised by the dictatorial letter from James to 
the Convention (Mann 2014: 209).  The Williamite element dictated the Convention’s deposition of 
James and its positive response to William’s overtures.  Dundee failed to raise support for an 
alternative convention in Stirling and he was left isolated (ibid.: 210).  But by remaining ‘under arms’ 
with his dragoons, ignoring the dictates of the Convention, he was proclaimed a rebel and became a 
fugitive, ending the legitimacy of his political activity, failing in the role that James had given him.  It 
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is unclear how enthusiastic he was to overcome the apparent reluctance of the Episcopal nobility and 
burgesses to take counter-revolutionary action.  That ‘…even in the neighbourhood of the town of 
Dundee, [where support] might be supposed to have been the strongest, it does not appear that any 
considerable number were induced to follow [his] standard’ (Linklater, Hesketh 1982: 102) must have 
been deeply irritating.  Raising James’s standard, whilst itself seditious, was arguably gesture politics. 
As a professional soldier, Dundee had more prospect of success performing a military role for James, 
creating an alternative Scottish army, to be augmented subsequently by an invasion force.  But instead 
he fomented an insurgency among sympathetic Highland clans.  It is ‘… one of the great paradoxes of 
the Jacobite period that the Stuarts should have come to depend so heavily upon Highland support, 
given that family’s long and virtually unbroken record of brutal repression of the Gaelic peoples’ 
(Reid 1996: 4).  Macinnes claims that ‘… the clans were the military bedrock of Scottish support for 
the House of Stuart from the deposition of James VII/II’ (Macinnes 1996: 159).  Yet James ‘… saw 
the clan system, with its blood feuds, cattle raids and private armies as representing an unacceptable 
challenge to his brother’s authority … [with] MacDonald and Cameron clansmen … conducting their 
own private wars, virtually unchecked (Callow 2000: 288, 289).  Moreover, ‘… there is no evidence 
to suggest that James’s antipathy towards the Highlanders ever lessened during his time in Scotland, 
but if anything it grew stronger with passing months’ (ibid.: 290).  But by deciding to curtail the 
power of – and eventually execute – the Protestant Earl of Argyll, James had effectively taken sides in 
a long-running and bloody Highland struggle.  Whether he understood that ‘… for the Highlanders, 
the Civil War was a struggle against the Campbells rather than for the King’ (Paterson 2001: 142; 
emphasis in original), is unclear.  Consequently, opposition to William accorded with some clans’ 
apprehension at the prospect, under William, of an Argyll returning the Campbells to power.  Some 
also had shared an involvement with Dundee in suppressing extremist Presbyterians in south-west 
Scotland, while Dundee stood high in their estimation through having served on the jury that had 
found the ninth Earl of Argyll guilty of treason.  Moreover, they were no strangers to violence 
themselves.  Accordingly, ‘[Dundee] initiated a guerrilla campaign in the north of Scotland [with] 
some 2,000 men of the western clans … a force as much motivated by a desire for plunders and 
hostility to Clan Campbell, as by religious and political principle’ (Cowan 1991: 165).  But Dundee 
could scarcely expect to overthrow the emergent new Scottish parliament with an irregular army of 
highland insurgents – which was all he was to have at his disposal, given James’s default on his 
promise to send 5,000 troops to Scotland, sparing instead only a few hundred from the ultimately 
unsuccessful siege of Londonderry.  Moreover, they were possibly poorly armed: ‘… by the turn of 
the eighteenth century if not earlier those [clansmen] who owned both a musket and a sword were in a 
minority in large swathes of the Highlands’ (Whatley 2006: 110, citing Mackillop 2000: 7). 
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Dundee – or, for that matter, James – could not have known that less than three weeks after the battle 
of Killiecrankie the Irish component of James’s strategy would start to unravel and that no large and 
experienced Irish invasion force would materialise.  Nonetheless, it seems particularly ill-advised to 
have chosen to risk himself and his modest resources.  However, it is unsurprising given his quick 
temper, impetuosity and arrogant self-confidence that powered his actions and a ‘…conviction that he 
knew best in military matters [which] was never less than total’ (Linklater, Hesketh 1982: 136).  
However, it can plausibly be argued that in acting as he did, Dundee allowed the strategic issues to be 
outweighed by his personal disposition towards his Presbyterian pursuer, Major-General Hugh 
Mackay.  During their shared service under William in the Scots Brigade, when Mackay was 
preferred to himself for promotion to lieutenant-colonel, ‘[it] gave [him] such mortal offence … that 
he instantly quitted the service and returned to Scotland, burning with resentment’ (Mackay n.d. 
[1836]: 11).  Mackay went on to receive subsequent preferment from James – promotion to major-
general and a seat on the Scottish Privy Council – because of the Scots Brigade’s assistance during the 
Monmouth rebellion.  But he fell from royal grace and was refused a pardon from James by choosing 
to remain in William’s service in the lead-up to the Revolution of 1688, thus being available to lead 
one of William’s three divisions in the landing at Torbay – possibly confronting Dundee at the head of 
his own regiment, His Majesty’s Own Regiment of Horse, in the subsequent stand-off on Salisbury 
Plain.  Mackay was then given further preferment to lead William III’s forces in Scotland.  After 
resolving the siege of Edinburgh Castle, Mackay personally took over the hunt for Dundee.  The 
subsequent pursuit through the Scottish Highlands, complicated by the varying allegiances of different 
clans (‘Scottish gaeldom was never united in support for the House of Stuart’ (Macinnes 1996: 189)), 
was brought to a close by Dundee forcing a confrontation at Killiecrankie.  There Dundee’s highland 
irregulars, skilled in close-quarter-combat shock techniques with traditional heavy edged weapons, 
confronted Mackay’s musketeers and cavalry, for whom the terrain was far from ideal.  Of Mackay’s 
troops ‘[l]ittle more … than one half of the whole number could with any propriety be said to be 
disciplined [i.e. fully trained] … [and] one third of his men [were] young soldiers, who had never seen 
the face of an enemy in the field, and even the disciplined portion [was] unaccustomed to the 
Highland mode of fighting’ (Mackay n.d. [1836]: 42, 48).  In the ensuing encounter the ‘Highland 
Charge’ broke the too-thin line of Mackay’s troops and created a confused action which concluded 
with a partial rout of Mackay’s forces and a level of casualties on both sides that, in proportionate 
terms, was worse than the later Battle of the Boyne (Linklater, Hesketh 1982: 222).  ‘The brunt of the 
action fell …especially on Mackay’s own battalion, against which, a dead set seemed to have been 
made by the Macdonalds, some of whom had formerly served with them in Holland … and appear to 
have felt a high degree of excitement on finding themselves opposed to their old comrades, who on 
their part were not wanting in a corresponding emotion, and both, therefore, exerted themselves to the 
utmost’ (Mackay n.d. [1836]: 50).  And, perhaps significantly, Dundee was apparently among the 
leaders of the Macdonalds when he was shot.  This victory was Pyrrhic, not only in so far as Dundee 
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met his death, but also in that a significant proportion of what was at that moment a very limited 
resource of manpower was wasted in a brief encounter.  ‘The death of Viscount Dundee … effectively 
ended any hope of James’s linking up with Jacobites in Scotland’ (Speck 2002: 113).   The strategic 
failure was completed by the defeat of the inadequately led highlanders at Dunkeld and Cromdale, 
and the submission of the clan chiefs to William and Mary at Achallader in 1691. 
In short, consideration of ‘might-have-beens’ in respect of the actions of Viscount Dundee suggests 
that the actual temporal trajectory was driven by Dundee’s pursuit of personal ambition, rather than a 
strategy likely to contribute to the restoration of James VII/II.  Moreover, while the insurgency that 
Dundee raised can reasonably be described as a ‘rebellion’, given that his actions and those of the 
clansmen were directed against the crown, from this point of view the claim that the event was a 
spontaneous popular ‘rising’ in favour of the cause of ‘Jacobitism’ depends more on a rhetoric driven 
by subsequent events. 
The present study has indeed accepted that rhetoric has a place, in so far as a given historical 
explanation is in effect an advocacy derived from a specific value-laden perspective.  Other 
differently grounded advocacies are generally possible, yielding a plurality of histories.  But which of 
these are deemed plausible depends on the prevailing understanding of the dynamic of human activity 
in general, specifically the respective roles of society as an entity (structure) and of the individual 
(agency).  Archer’s social realist interpretation of the relationship between structure and agency – an 
extended outline of which was provided in Chapter 3 – can help award the desired plausibility to 
certain explanations of a specific event.  As was previously noted, this interpretation does not ascribe 
a substantive determining role either to structure or to agency, which accords with the general 
epistemology of this study.  Archer’s interpretation stresses the notion of ‘emergence’ of structural 
and cultural properties, contingent on the composition of the initiatives taken by vested interests in 
response to confronting constraints formed by the actions of others and the subsequent unanticipated 
responses of others to these initiatives.  However, agency in respect of these initiatives and responses 
is not a matter of isolated individual action but the action of plural interest groups, either already 
organized (Archer’s ‘corporate agents’) or not yet organized but nonetheless numerically significant 
(‘primary agents’).  The independently framed initiatives and responses, some protective of a status 
quo, others promoting change, have differential impacts in terms of losses and gains on the various 
communities comprising society, raising the prospect of provoking conflict in specific circumstances.   
A primary source of conflict in seventeenth-century Scotland was the existence of mutually 
antagonistic religious commitments, different Protestant confessions having strong implications for 
what each regarded as acceptable forms of ecclesiastical and civil governance.   The matter was 
exacerbated by their inevitable entanglement with the predilections of largely absentee monarchs with 
not only absolutist tendencies but, in the person of James VII/II, a personal commitment to Roman 
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Catholicism, a minority confession.  However, the radical contextual discontinuity that ensued left the 
elements of Scottish society in Archer’s ‘involuntaristic placement’, a position that engenders the 
emergence of new structural and cultural properties.  This discontinuity involved two substantive 
elements.  The abrupt departure of James VII/II from his thrones had been preceded shortly before by 
his imposed Scottish Indulgences granting freedom of worship to Scottish Presbyterians, despite their 
quasi-republicanism (in James’s eyes). On the one hand, the assumption of the crowns by the firmly 
Protestant William and Mary established a new context for the constituent elements of the Scottish 
Convention and society, both Presbyterian and Episcopalian, with an emergent endorsement of the 
change, particularly among the lowland landed interest and burgesses, in the light of the possibility of 
consequential economic gains (discussed in the following chapter).  On the other hand, James’s 
apparent commitment to freedom of worship, viewed as a possible device to promote Roman 
Catholicism, arguably provoked the emergence among his erstwhile Episcopalian supporters of 
reservations about the desirability of his restoration.  It could then be argued that an explanation of the 
events resulting in the battle at Killiecrankie in terms of a spontaneous popular rising in favour of 
James’s restoration is implausible – a conclusion consistent with the lack of immediate support 
accorded Viscount Dundee at the outset of his personal rebellion.  However, the same contextual 
discontinuity could have been viewed differently by the Highland clans, as noted above: opposition to 
William III was opposition by proxy to the re-ascendancy of Argyll, while assessment of the 
implications of rebellion on their part was conceivably influenced by geographical isolation, a 
distinctive economy and a militaristic tradition, and found to offer net potential benefits.  Given 
Dundee’s reputation and standing in Highland eyes as an experienced military leader with recent 
experience in guerrilla warfare, his assumption of leadership in the insurrection was understandable.  
Thus, both his failure to discharge responsibilities entrusted to him by James VII/II and his enterprise 
in initiating a Highland insurrection can be viewed in terms of the emergence of corresponding social 
propensities of fundamentally incompatible natures. 
7.6 Illustration: L’Entreprise d’Écosse: The Invasion Attempt of 1708 
All human action is an encounter with a physical context.  In some cases, the forces operative there 
can be sufficient to prevent the human action embarked upon, so its failure may be attributed to 
physical necessity, rather than contingency.  If exogenous factors form a binding constraint beyond 
human influence, then, with no alternative courses of action available from the start, there would be 
no might-have-beens to explore.  Thus the failure of the French 1708 seaborne invasion of Scotland 
could simply be attributed to unanticipated weather and sea conditions plus the constraining 
technology of contemporary sailing vessels. 
However, if the physical context were not so determinative then alternative plausible action scenarios 
can be conceived, the actual outcome becoming a contingent matter and not inevitable.  The obvious 
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alternative course of action was for the invasion attempt to have been more effectively pursued.  The 
time seemed right in several respects.  First, the Scottish political context had recently been severely 
disrupted by the Treaty of Union, previously destabilised by the earlier Darien disaster, which ‘… 
contributed much to produce that intolerable situation which made the [Treaty] a necessity (Davidson, 
Gray: 1909: 219), coming in the wake of several years of famine.  Experience was sufficient to 
warrant the ‘widespread popular hostility’ towards the Union, but it was sustained by the ‘intense and 
long-lasting antipathy towards the hoards (sic) of new tax officials who came north after 1707’ (Harris 
2010: 44).  Second, the political volatility was aggravated by the continuing aspirations of James 
VII/II to be restored to the three thrones, actively supported by Jacobites in Britain.  James’s own 
death in exile in 1701 passed the dynastic claim to his son.  His recognition as James VIII/III by Louis 
XIV (possibly a misjudgement ‘… in the face of all ministerial arguments of prudence’, under 
pressure from his wife and James’s widow (Gibson 1988: 19, citing de Torcy via Voltaire)) signalled 
one constant factor in the period: the continuing entanglement of the trajectories of England and 
France.  The deaths of first Queen Mary and then King William, without issue, sustained controversy 
over the matter of succession to the thrones of the three kingdoms.  The likelihood that for the second 
time in successive generations a ‘foreigner’ would be on the throne at least of England added a further 
twist to political concern and debate – but encouraged the Dutch (ibid.: 16).   
This inflammation of public opinion in Scotland, critically both Jacobite and Presbyterian and 
particularly due to the Treaty of Union, helped create an opportunity for French military intervention, 
while the prospect of a Hanoverian succession moved the exiles in St Germain to urgent action 
(Gregg 1972: 367).  But for Louis XIV the opportunity offered a strategic advantage in respect of 
French progress in the War of the Spanish Succession.  Substantial losses had been incurred at 
Blenheim and Ramillies, albeit offset by victory at Almansa.  A diversion of English troops from the 
Low Countries to deal with an invasion of their home territory could possibly allow a revolution by 
pro-French elements in the previously Spanish towns of Belgium and enable French gains there at the 
expense of the Grand Alliance.  Success in that respect could even offset the failure of the 
intervention in Scotland.  This ‘… was France’s last throw of the dice to recoup her losses in the [War 
of the Spanish Succession]’ (Gibson 1988: 108).  Louis himself apparently contemplated the 
possibility of failure: ‘Voltaire wrote [based on information from de Torcy] of the King’s motives in 
assenting to an attempt on Scotland.  “Success was doubtful; but Louis XIV foresaw certain glory in 
the mere undertaking of it.  He confessed himself that he was impelled by this motive, as much as by 
political interests”’ (ibid.: 109, quoting from Voltaire’s History of the Age of Louis XIV).  Yet the 
court diarist duc de Saint-Simon saw ‘… with stark clarity’ ‘… France’s desperate strategic need in 
1708 to set Scotland alight’ (ibid.: 159). 
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A plan to invade Scotland that appeared cogent and coherent from both the Jacobite and the French 
perspectives could be formulated, but it was ambitious.  As Szechi notes, (albeit with the ’15 in mind), 
the tasks the Jacobites were setting themselves, of securing the necessary military support to defeat 
the British army, ‘… went beyond being simply difficult; taken in the round they look nigh 
impossible.  But it had been done once before [in the form of the Revolution of 1688].  All the 
Jacobites wanted to do was reproduce the same result’ (Szechi 2006: 78).  Certainly the military 
resources available in Scotland to oppose invasion were limited in extent and of questionable loyalty: 
effective manpower close to 2,000 and three frigates (Fry 2006: 61).  No unrealistically large French 
invasion force would be required.  Conversely, significant additional British manpower would have to 
be redirected from the European theatre of war to oppose an invasion, thus easing pressure on the 
French.  The original proposal had been put to the French in 1702 by the renegade Simon Fraser.  A 
less exaggerated view of likely Jacobite support was obtained by the Scottish-educated French spy 
Nathaniel Hooke, initially with Fraser’s support, over the ensuing five years, with visits to Scotland 
confirming that ‘[t]he Jacobite movement in Scotland was, unsurprisingly given the dynamics of 
Scottish society, dominated by the landed élite’ (Szechi 2006: 96) although they were involved in 
competitive and duplicitous intrigues among themselves.  Nonetheless, ‘[w]hile the intelligence 
Hooke at length took home to France [in 1707] hardly revealed a Scotland seething with rage at the 
loss of her independence, Louis XIV and his ministers still felt taken by the idea of sending over the 
Pretender, now 19 years old.  At least he could be a nuisance, diverting British men and matériel from 
Europe’ (Fry 2006: 300, 301).  On the other hand, ‘…the English and Welsh Jacobites, who were 
generally very taken with Queen Anne, wanted no part of any uprising against her’ (Szechi 2006: 79).  
Nonetheless, in December 1707 Louis XIV agreed to proceed with L’Entreprise Écossaise.  
In the event, the projected French landing did not happen – although the anticipated diversion of 
British troops did: ten infantry regiments were shipped from Flanders to counter it, via Ostend to the 
Tyne (to protect London’s coal supply); thence to Leith; then – in the absence of the French landing – 
back to Ostend via the Tyne, thirty-five days on board with losses due to exposure and disease 
(Gibson 1988: 131).  (The following relies on Gibson.  Accounts in Fry, M. 2006 and Sinclair-
Stevenson 1971 differ, Fry’s divergently; neither cites sources).  The French fleet of five battleships 
and twenty-three privateer frigates carrying 6,000 men had set off, with James VIII/III aboard the 
flagship, under the reluctant leadership of the experienced Comte de Forbin.  It evaded the British 
fleet off Dunkirk, although disorganised somewhat by bad weather.  The bulk of the fleet overshot the 
intended landfall in the Firth of Forth by a hundred miles and had to turn south, finding no local 
support; it then encountered the pursuing English fleet, anchored at the entrance to the Firth of Forth.  
Escaping from this situation but apparently prevented by adverse winds from attempting an alternative 
landing in the Moray Firth, de Forbin abandoned the invasion.  Weathering severe storms, the 
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invasion fleet returned in disorderly fashion to Dunkirk, the flagship with James VIII/III after twenty-
two days at sea. 
The failure of the invasion could simply be attributed to the adverse weather conditions coupled with 
the constraints on choice of courses imposed by the vessels’ capabilities.  But there is evidence that 
other plausible actions were forgone, resulting in the actual outcome.  First, one French vessel, its 
departure initially delayed for repairs, did in fact reach the agreed landing area in the Firth of Forth 
apparently ahead of the rest of the French fleet, finding the Jacobites in a state of enthusiastic 
readiness to receive the invasion.  But de Forbin did not reach them.  Second, two French vessels 
eventually entered the Moray Firth after the storm had abated, where an alternative beachhead could 
have been established in the Cromarty Firth.  But de Forbin did not enter the Moray Firth.  The 
implication is that different timely actions on Forbin’s part could have led to a successful 
disembarkation in Scotland.  Louis subsequently failed to honour de Forbin in the customary manner, 
a suggestion that he suspected dereliction of duty.  Gibson points out that Hooke’s papers relating 
specifically to the failed invasion attempt were impounded by the French government some thirty-two 
years later and, while some of their contents were subsequently recovered, Hooke’s detailed account 
of the failure is apparently lost (ibid.: 153, 159).  Personal rivalries and animosities on board the 
flagship may have contributed to the eventual outcome. 
The Comte de Forbin was ‘…an outspoken buccaneer’ (Sinclair-Stevenson 1971: 264), with nearly 
forty years’ service in the French navy, including commands in several significant and successful 
engagements.  ‘His were the qualities for the dash through the gun-smoke and cannon roar of an 
English man-of-war’s broadside, … to lead the savage irruption of the boarding party’ (Gibson 1988: 
106).  He had been recently promoted to Chef d’escadre, or commodore.  So escorting what amounted 
to a convoy of troop-ships possibly did not appeal, even with the erstwhile king James VIII/III on the 
manifest.  Nor was he – like Louis – convinced that the entire scheme could succeed.  But a 
complicating factor was the enmity between the Minister for the Navy, Pontchartrain, and the 
Minister for War, Chamillart.  The latter wanted the leadership of the expedition to be given to a 
friend’s brother, Comte de Gacé, rather than to the Earl of Berwick, so that the former could earn 
military promotion in this role.  Berwick, a marshal of France, who had commanded French forces at 
their victory at Almansa, had the confidence of the Scots Jacobites; he was expected to lead the 
invasion and to have a significant role after the landing.  Nonetheless de Gacé was given the position 
by Louis.  In the event, he did not exercise effective leadership on the voyage to ensure that 
appropriate courses were followed.  The personal intrigue surrounding the expedition was 
compounded by the pressure put on Louis by James VII/II’s widow, determined her son should make 
the journey, though his youthfulness also worked against the achievement of success.  It is plausible 
to deny that exogenous factors prevented the invasion; but it is not possible to identify which, among 
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the endogenous factors, the actions actually taken, led to that outcome – or whether conspiracy was 
involved: ‘[The] Jacobites in Scotland suspected that [de] Forbin had been ordered not to land at all’ 
(Sinclair-Stevenson 1971: 270; no source cited).  
Further opportunities to take event-changing action involved the British navy.  The substantial British 
fleet specially assembled under Admiral Sir George Byng had encountered de Forbin’s convoy and 
was in a position to bottle it up in the Firth of Forth.  However, the opportunity was not taken, in 
favour of a limited naval engagement, with the bulk of the French vessels making their escape.  ‘Byng 
seemed strangely reluctant to press home his advantage’ (Sinclair-Stevenson 1971: 269).  Then, as 
they made their eventual return to Dunkirk an incomplete but freshly readied British naval force 
standing off Dunkirk could have engaged with them at the end of their strenuous three-week return 
voyage.  But this opportunity was not taken.  Either of these could have led to the capture – or even 
death – of James VIII/III.  Both decisions could be attributed to strategic judgements of the moment, 
rather than the weather.  But it could also be speculated that the capture (or death) of James would 
have generated an unwanted set of political issues for the British government, so that from its point of 
view the naval decisions might have been entirely appropriate. 
7.7 An Assessment 
The power of a dynast is ordinarily demonstrated by the exercise of prerogative; subordinates must 
comply, given their inferior, powerless and deferential relationship.  Nevertheless, to reduce an 
explanation of an event to a presumed mechanical relationship between exercise of the dynast’s will 
and what happened next lacks justification.  It would disregard not only the possible vagueness and 
ambiguity of the act and the undermining of its applicability by the complexity of circumstances, 
generating unintended consequences, but also the nature of the subordinate as a human agent, 
possessing independence of mind and action, with substantive divergent interests.  The exercise of the 
prerogative inevitably involves a delegation of authority for others to act in specific ways, but in most 
circumstances, there is a residual degree of freedom to act independently.  It seems plausible, if 
initially paradoxical, that a greater degree of freedom to act independently will be possessed by those 
advanced by patronage on the part of the dynast to positions of significant responsibility, particularly 
to becoming privy to the determination of the dynast’s decision or a confidant of or adviser to the 
dynast.  Proximity to power encourages the agent’s presumption that power could be shared or even 
captured, at least in relation to a particular area of responsibility.  The two incidents considered above 
manifest, in different ways, the intrinsic subjectivity of the connections which compose the historical 
event.  This characteristic contributes to its inherent contingent nature and precludes the possibility of 
an ‘objective’ historical explanation, even where the actions are nominally directed by royal 
prerogative with confessional warrant. 
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Chapter 8 Economic and Military Perspectives 
 
Preamble 
The economic and military perspectives on the temporal succession of events focus attention on work, 
the ubiquitous deliberative human activity that transforms materials into products, means to specific 
ends.  Work is either creative, producing means to augment human welfare, or destructive, producing 
means to destroy both humanity’s past production and humanity itself.  Both – not just the latter – 
generate conflict.  Economic change fractures the unity of ‘we’, no longer necessarily based on 
kinship, erodes self-sufficiency and undermines the status quo.  But the sources of the conflict are 
specific complications that stem from the time-dependence of work as a process.  These force 
economic commitments to be made based on uncertain expectations of the future. 
The ‘institutional framework’, which embeds economic production in the wider social context, has 
emerged as a collective response to these complications.  Its provisions increase the mutual trust and 
confidence necessary to form the collaborative relationships that make effective production possible 
under conditions of uncertainty, and set conditions which forms of production must respect to gain 
legitimacy within the system.  The structure of the framework ranges from voluntary agreements to 
specialist institutional bureaucracies as the complexity of production increases, underpinned by the 
legal system.  In effect, the resolution of contingent and morally conflicted actions in the economic 
sphere requires similar support from the authority of the state as it did in the dynastic and religious 
spheres.  However, the same state authority required to facilitate production and so sustain life can 
redirect economic activity towards killing and destroying others’ economic capabilities.  The pursuit 
of economic change can provoke conflict between states, particularly if they accept the premise that 
the competitive gain of one demands loss for the other.  Inter-state rivalry can then provoke lethal 
conflict. 
8.1 Time and Process 
Production, whether biologically or mechanically driven, takes time.  Consequently, working with an 
existing technology to make an immediately useful product requires prior access to the means to meet 
the needs of the producers while they await their share of the output.  This ‘working capital’ must 
already exist as a ‘surplus’, held as accumulated wealth, from some previously productive economic 
activity.  It is only required temporarily, as it could be recovered from the awaited output and 
returned, so working capital is potentially self-liquidating ‘credit’.  Creditors also must wait for 
repayment and share the risk, so expect a share of the output, though they have not worked.  Working 
to produce the technology for future use – the necessary equipment or the ‘fixed capital’ – also 
requires access to working capital, but once produced its specific physical nature means it cannot 
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directly contribute to human welfare and thus is not self-liquidating.  A key function of the 
institutional framework is to facilitate the provision of capital, addressing potential conflict over 
sharing uncertain gains and losses. 
The simplest economies illustrate the issues.  In a subsistence economy, the periodicity of agricultural 
production can only satisfy the continual demand for food if there already exists a stock of preserved 
food (wealth) that can be drawn down (giving credit) during the stages of production, to be replaced 
(the debt repaid) from newly produced output, to meet the community’s intention to be perpetually 
self-sustaining.  In a lithic-using economy the production of usable flints or stone structures represents 
an irrecoverable investment of work; only subsequently does it improve welfare through being used in 
the production of food, accommodation or ceremony.  In a closed kinship group, temporary 
indebtedness will be to itself and it must itself carry the permanent burden of investment.  But a novel 
institutional structure is required for production to become an open activity, to transfer these functions 
to willing others possessing the necessary wealth, creating new relationships for that specific purpose 
– a form of ‘we’ with commercial bonds rather than kinship. 
The origination of economic production involves substantive, conscious and deliberate human actions, 
a category variously identified as ‘projecting’, ‘adventuring’ or entrepreneurship.  The creative 
propensities of specific individuals, stimulated by the imagining of new possibilities for work to 
realise, result in initiatives that bring about change.  The intrusiveness of an initiative, as a challenge 
to the status quo, can provoke conflict, which becomes inherent in the continuing process of economic 
change.  But a successful challenger, aspiring to remain the new status quo, seeks protection against 
similarly motivated ‘interlopers’.  The institutional structure may authorise the award of monopoly 
powers, creating protected property rights, legitimating change and deflecting the conflict. 
8.2 The Institutional Framework and Asset Formation 
Collaborative production requires mutual trust and confidence that promises will be kept over the 
relevant time-period.  Specific institutional developments improved confidence in the provision of 
working capital and the creation of fixed capital.  In both cases, this involved the socially warranted 
construct of an ‘asset’, a financial product comprising a bundle of specific time-related, legal rights 
and obligations, contingent on prior legal provisions. 
Financial assets: Bills of Exchange 
First, the bill of exchange emerged as the standard ‘instrument’ by which to raise working capital (or 
trade credit), legally recognised evidence of a short-term contractual relationship to supply and deliver 
goods in exchange for payment.  This enforceable order to make a payment at a future date could bind 
potentially four parties (seller, buyer and creditors of each) in the set of mutual obligations necessary 
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for them to collaborate in confident expectation of payment.  Arrangements of this kind were 
emerging in Europe in the second half of the twelfth century (Denzel 2006: 4), the bill of exchange 
somewhat later, becoming an essential international credit instrument throughout the Netherlands, 
England and the Baltic by the end of the sixteenth century (ibid.: 3). 
Financial assets: Company shares 
Second, the share in the joint-stock company became the standard instrument for raising fixed capital 
– ships, machinery, equipment and structures – for manufacturing and trade.  The joint-stock company 
improved confidence in investment, addressing the problem of risk to personal wealth otherwise tied 
up indefinitely in the ownership of durable technology with few alternative uses, and liable to total 
loss of commercial value during its life.  By separating ownership from use, it enabled the 
transferability of the former via the negotiability of its shares, permitting investors ready access to 
their personal investment, through their sale.  The East India Company had been formed in 1601; a 
secondary market in its shares existed by the middle of the seventeenth century (Carlos, Neal 
2011:26).  Substantial growth in the number of English joint stock companies and the emergence of 
an appreciable stock market occurred between 1685 and 1695 (Murphy 2009a: 220), stimulated 
latterly by innovations in the production of matériel for the Nine Years’ War (ibid.: 16, 17). 
Financial assets: Coinage 
A further asset, coinage, pre-existed the emergence of bills and shares.  Its general acceptability 
permitted the comprehensive monetisation of value in exchange and facilitated the day-to-day 
operation of markets.  Coupled with standardised weights and measures to permit the pricing of 
fungible goods, a nominal monetary value existed for anything exchangeable.  Uniquely tradeable at 
will and at par in all markets, coinage was acknowledged as the ultimate means of payment to settle 
finally any transaction at any time, defining its ‘liquidity’ as an asset.  A precious-metal commodity 
money integrated the ancient social deference to gold and silver with the monarch’s necessary 
reliance on taxing and purchasing from his subjects to meet the expenses of governance.  Albeit 
alloyed but of designated and assured purity, this money conveyed the durability and authority of the 
monarchic dynasty, underwriting its general acceptability (Denzel 2006: 12).  ‘[T]he absolute 
authority of gold and silver corresponded to the absolutist political authority that the early Stuarts so 
desperately coveted’ (Wennerlind 2011: 38, citing the early-seventeenth-century authority Gerard de 
Malynes).  Taxation to finance the state was unavoidable.  Its functions are, in modern parlance, 
public goods: unapportionable to individual beneficiaries and provided for all as for one, there is no 
individual private incentive to pay for them.   The costs must be met compulsorily. 
The wider consequences 
Together, these three forms of asset generated unforeseen consequences.  First, the emergent 
negotiability of bills of exchange led eventually to the development of an alternative paper money, 
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while their associated clearing procedures, balancing sums owed against sums due, contributed to the 
institution of banking and bank lending.  From the fifteenth century, the widening adoption of 
endorsement by trusted signatories of bills not yet due permitted their assignment by their 
beneficiaries to another party to offset other debt, while the practice of discounting of bills, selling 
them prior to their due date but for less than the due sum, provided prompt access, at a cost, to the 
liquidity of coin.  As continental trade developed, and to avoid the cost (given its weight and bulk) 
and lack of security in transit of moving coinage, international ‘fairs’ developed in continental Europe 
– as in Champagne (late twelfth century), Geneva, Lyons and Bisenzone (late sixteenth century) – 
meeting regularly to clear merchants’ credit transactions.  Loans were also made: the fair in 
Bisenzone financed the Spanish Crown and its military activities in the Low Countries via Genoese 
bankers at the centre of the European financial network (Pezzolo, Tattara 2008).  Negotiable bills 
achieved general marketability as a short-term asset in the open-all-year bourses emerging from the 
sixteenth century onwards, helping to shift the financial centre of gravity from Italy to north-western 
Europe, specifically Bruges, Antwerp (the New Stock Exchange of 1531) and later Amsterdam 
(1585), its exchange bank, the Amsterdam Wisselbank, following in 1603 (Denzel 2006: 15-17).  The 
development of the bill’s successors, the cheque and the banknote, duly followed.  Similarly, in 
Britain the inland bill of exchange contributed to the development of banking in the late seventeenth 
century (Kerridge 1988: 84). 
Second, the marketability of joint-stock company shares allowed their shareholders to regard them as 
alternatives to short-term assets.  The volume of short-term assets was augmented significantly in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries by government borrowing to bridge the temporal gap between 
government expenditure and taxation receipts, a problem aggravated by the nature of the tax base and 
erratic collection procedures.  This negotiable short-term government debt, readily convertible to 
coinage, competed with shares for available funds. 
Third, the numéraire function of money, allowing every good to be expressed in terms of any other, 
applied to financial assets.  Prices are relativities, not absolutes, able to vary faster to attain 
competitive advantage than can physical production.  Changes in personal wealth due to changing 
asset prices prompted both defensive and speculative asset trading, aided by money being storable 
liquidity.  Decisions to purchase either goods or assets could be delayed with no loss of nominal value 
using this store-of-value property; holding money could be an apparent haven from asset price risk.  
However, prices in general were also relativities, in that a precious-metal commodity money was 
necessarily influenced by events in the bullion market, either international by the plundering of New 
World bullion supplies or national through the balance of its international trade – prompted in part by 
the notion that the national objective of international trade should be to acquire bullion.  The general 
level of prices, and thus money’s real value, could change, affecting all markets.  The use of coinage 
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was also endangered by the erosion of its bullion value by clipping and counterfeiting, despite these 
being capital offences (Wennerlind 2011: 141-152).  This prompted the ‘highly disruptive’ recoinage 
of 1696-97 which ‘… precipitated … the gravest economic crisis of the century’ (ibid., citing Jones 
1996: 61).  Significantly, the developing institutional framework provided the necessary substitute 
liquidity to support the public funds in the short term (ibid.: 58).  Moreover, the supply of coinage was 
not strictly controlled: ‘… when more coin was needed, bullion and plate went to be coined, and when 
less, coins were melted down and fashioned into other things’ considered to have intrinsic value 
(Kerridge 1988: 87).    
So, despite nominal state control of the physical coinage, the effective money supply was becoming a 
financial-asset market phenomenon, the market itself having a strong influence on what could 
function as money.  Isaac Newton ‘… argued that “Tis mere opinion that sets a value upon money; we 
value it because with it we can purchase all sorts of commodities and the same opinion sets a like 
value upon paper security”’ (Wennerlind 2011: 156, quoting Shirras, Craig 1945: 231).  In short, trust 
could be put in paper promises made by institutions whose financial probity was unquestioned. 
8.3 The Financial Implications of War 
Military activity resembles peaceful economic activity in its production of goods and capital 
equipment.  It differs in accepting the deliberate, wholesale dissipation of not just what has been 
produced but the human resource itself, in contrast to the voluntary reciprocal exchange of goods for 
goods, typically through the intermediation of money.  The priority is the state’s political advantage, 
not financial gain.  Accordingly, the level of resources to be committed to military purposes and how 
to raise them must be decided on some other basis than the typical economic comparison of 
anticipated costs and benefits from exchange.  Indeed, the costs of specific military actions are not 
knowable in advance, being conditional on the enemy’s responses and therefore on the length and 
intensity of campaigns yet to be conceived.  But whatever the conjectured level of costs, the state can 
only secure the resources by taxation or by borrowing.  Accordingly, the choice of a specific course of 
military action is a contingent decision regarding the public finances. 
A taxation-funded standing army would produce some redistribution from the wealthy, liable to land 
tax and payers of customs and excise duties on luxuries, to the local suppliers of victuals and forage.  
The direct supply of domestically purchased goods to troops serving overseas would have a similar 
effect.  However, remitting funds to enable overseas purchase of supplies had a different financial 
implication, although the creation of a specialised civilian service sector of military contractors was 
required to move goods or funds (Bannerman 2008).  Remitting funds abroad not only depressed 
domestic economic activity, but also reduced bullion stocks to purchase the necessary foreign 
exchange, as remittances had ultimately to be disbursed in local currency.  The availability of the 
  Economic and Military Perspectives 
168 
 
necessary bullion, earned through a balance of trade surplus, could not be guaranteed.  Fortuitously, 
by the seventeenth century ‘[f]oreign trade … was a far more conspicuous element of the English 
economy than domestic manufacturing’ (Murphy 2009: 72).  The English colonies were beginning to 
export substantial quantities of produce, adding to that from the East India Company, Hudson’s Bay 
Company and Royal African Company.  ‘[d]uring the War of the Spanish Succession England’s 
exports boomed … [with] trade surpluses frequently doubling and occasionally nearly tripling 
anything achieved before’ (Jones 1991: 402, 403).  These surpluses ‘… depended to a considerable 
extent on being able to ship in sugars, tobacco, dyestuffs, and East Indian textiles … and then on re-
exporting a substantial proportion of these for sale in Europe’ (Jones 1991: 393). 
8.4 The Financial Revolution and the Fiscal-military State 
Pincus has claimed that the narrative underlying previous interpretations of the Revolution of 1688 
‘… is wrong [as the event was not] a great moment in which the English defended their way of life … 
[Rather] the English revolutionaries created a new kind of modern state’ (ibid.; emphasis in original).  
Echoing Bobbitt, he identified it as ‘… an epochal break in the construction of the state’ (ibid.: 9), and 
not ‘… a conservative revolution … in defense of Protestantism against a Catholic king’ (ibid.: 93, 
94).  The Stuart dynasty’s conviction that the Dutch were ‘…the greatest threat to monarchy, stability, 
commerce and European peace’ had been supplanted by the popular conviction ‘… that absolutist and 
imperialist France represented the greatest threat to European peace’ (ibid.: 307).  Accordingly, ‘… 
the English with an almost united voice called for war against France’ (ibid.: 363), in alliance with the 
economically highly successful, albeit republican, Dutch.  Those with political influence experienced 
a radical shift of perspective, adopting an explicitly military objective.  The resultant financial 
challenge to secure the means to wage war occasioned a similarly revolutionary response. 
Once war had been declared with France, substantial merchant losses appeared: ‘… recent scholarship 
… shows a 25 per cent decline … in England’s trade with southern Europe, a 60 per cent drop in re-
exports to north-west Europe and a massive decline in the trade with West Indies and North America’ 
(Pincus 2009: 352).  Accordingly, it became critical for the English (and subsequently British) 
economy that war with France should be brought quickly to a successful conclusion.  Accordingly, the 
funding of the war effort became a matter of priority and ‘… [that] required some striking financial 
ingenuity’ (Jones 1988: 1). 
The opportunity had been created incidentally in the Revolutionary Settlement: its ‘declaration of 
rights’ radically changed the internal balance of political power: ‘William III was forced to accept a 
strict financial settlement … ensuring he had to govern jointly with Parliament’ (Wennerlind 2011: 
109), which had acquired the power to tax.  The opportunity for parliamentary initiatives in respect of 
the public finances made the years from 1692 to 1695 ‘… a key period in the development of the 
  Economic and Military Perspectives 
169 
 
financial markets’ (Murphy 2009a: 8).  Moreover, ‘Parliament was prevented from … engaging in 
similarly “irresponsible” [that is, arbitrary, like monarchs] behaviour by the development of 
institutions that acted as a check on government’ (ibid.: 54, citing North, Weingast 1989: 804).  The 
military spending of the early years of the Nine Years’ War was met from substantial short-term 
borrowing.  But despite improvements in tax collection and the imposition of new taxes, nonetheless 
‘… spending was far higher than what could currently be collected in taxes’ (Jones 1988: 11).  
Crucially, it was recognised that a volatile short-term credit market could not support the long-run 
financial commitment created by the expanding scale of military expenditure.  Moreover, ‘… the 
necessity of making large remittances in bullion abroad …led to an increasing loss of public 
confidence’ (Murphy 2009a: 56), undermining the trust in all credit instruments denominated in the 
currency. 
The decisive step was the creation of the Bank of England in 1694.  Earlier proposals had appeared in 
1658 and – modelled on the Bank of Amsterdam – in 1677 (Wennerlind 2011: 98, 101).  The Bank of 
England ‘… was initially a temporary wartime device’ (Kerridge 1988: 79) and ‘… an accident of 
King William’s war’ (Murphy 2009a: 48), created by City of London private financiers in alliance 
with parliament and with the encouragement of the king (Neal 2000: 124; Saville 1996: 3).  Its 
primary achievement was to divert funds that could have been used to purchase government short-
term debt into the share capital of the joint-stock Bank of England, which in turn could lend the funds 
to the government on a long-term basis.  This created long-term public debt, while individual 
shareholders of the Bank, with shorter-term horizons, gained the characteristic joint-stock opportunity 
of accessing their personal funds by the sale of their shares.  This contributed a greater stability to the 
value of their investments, strengthened by the fact that its corporate structure ‘… made it far more 
responsive to the economic and financial demands of its customers and especially its shareholders 
than was the case for the Bank of Amsterdam’ (Carlos, Neal 2011: 31, 32).  So, although the Bank ‘… 
was created principally to lend to the state’ it could also conduct ordinary commercial banking 
business, taking deposits as a base for its fractionally backed lending operations and issuing notes.  
Indeed, ‘… the fact that the Bank of England became an issuing bank distinguished it from all 
previous European public banks’ (Murphy 2009a: 47, citing Andréadès 1966: 82).  Its formation did 
not reduce the government’s cost of borrowing in the short run (Sussman, Yafeh 2006: 921). Indeed, 
this was not the most propitious time for an innovative institutional development to emerge: ‘The 
1690s …, culminating with the Recoinage, were a near disaster’ (Jones 1991: 398).  The war-induced 
decline in trade reduced customs-tax revenue and eliminated the favourable trade balance, which, 
given the volume of remittances required to finance military operations, led to depreciating exchange 
rates and an outflow of silver that exacerbated the problem of clipping of the domestic coinage (ibid.: 
400; Wennerlind 2011: 127).  The end of the war, even although it did not mark the total defeat of 
France, fortunately brought a sufficient financial improvement to avoid a complete disaster. 
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The outbreak of the War of the Spanish Succession led to massively increased military expenditure: 
‘…by 1710-11 England was paying for fully 171,000 officers and men (58,000 subjects and 113,750 
foreign) to fight abroad in Europe’ (Jones 1988: 11).  Remittances reached a level equivalent to four 
times the peace-time trade surpluses and to two-fifths of total European earnings achieved at the turn 
of the century (Jones 1991: 395).  ‘With spending averaging £7million per year, the total public debt 
had skyrocketed from £14 million to £36 million in the course of the war’ (Wennerlind 2011: 166).  
The ensuing financial (and party-political) crisis could be regarded as the consequence of the changes 
occasioned by the Revolution: ‘… the move away from an agrarian society in which power and 
stability was vested in land, to a society that gave power to those in possession of intangible and 
inherently unstable forms of wealth’ (Murphy 2009a: 81).   
Public credit became dependent ‘… on how public opinion perceived the state’s current capacity to 
service the interest payments and its imaginary ability to repay the debt in some distant, theoretical 
future’ (Wennerlind 2011: 169).  The crisis of opinion in 1710 was a contingent singular event, 
emerging from how individual hopes and fears regarding future values of personal wealth composed 
in trading positions in the financial assets which now constituted much of that wealth.  Its resolution 
required both an appropriate adjustment to the institutional structure and a transformation of public 
opinion – another radical change of perspective to replace pessimism with optimism, associated with a 
new, persuasively imagined future.  The immediate objective was simply to restore the Treasury’s 
ability to borrow at a reasonable rate.  The vehicle employed was a further equity-for-debt, private-
for-public asset swap through a new joint-stock company, vastly larger in scale to the similar device 
successfully used in the formation of the Bank of England.  However, opinion was transformed by the 
promise of untold wealth to be extracted from the Atlantic slave trade by this innovative addition to 
the institutional structure: The South Sea Company formed in 1711, its shares replacing a substantial 
part of public debt, at lower cost to the government.  Profits would come from a monopoly of trade to 
Spanish South America, including the Assiento, a contract to supply African slaves to Spanish 
colonial ports.  The expected high dividends presented a more attractive scenario than the prospect of 
additional taxes to service an over-extended public debt.  In the event the Assiento was lost in 1718 
due to unanticipated hostilities between Britain and Spain.  Despite the loss of a profit source, further 
conversions of long-term public debt were accommodated in 1720 to bolster the value of the 
Company.  But later that year the consequent bubble in its share values was burst.  Yet crucial to the 
public’s adoption of a hugely optimistic opinion in respect of the South Sea Company’s prospects had 
been the total absence of any acknowledgement of the dreadful human cost of the slave trade (ibid.: 
203-230).  This evaluation applies not just to the specific activities of the South Sea Company (which 
was responsible for no more than a quarter of Britain’s involvement in the slave trade) but to the 
institution of slavery in general.  Blindness to the human cost of slavery, combined with the 
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insensitivity and indifference towards it of the minority of perpetrators, was not peculiar to England 
(Devine 2015). 
8.5 The Economic Perspective and Scotland 
The impoverished economy 
Throughout the seventeenth and well into the eighteenth centuries, the impoverished and unimproved 
condition of the Scottish agricultural economy could not support significant economic progress.  
Natural and man-made factors exacerbated the inherent marginality of its physical endowment.  
Agricultural output was adversely affected by the climatic deterioration of the ‘Little Ice Age’, 
reaching its most extreme between 1645 and 1715 (the ‘Maunder Minimum’), including ‘King 
William’s Seven Lean Years’ of 1695 to 1702.  Famine repeatedly occurred: in the late 1690s in some 
parishes ‘…one-third or even one-half of the inhabitants had either died or fled’ (Smout, Fenton 1965: 
81).  Deaths from military action or disease during twenty years of warfare reduced the agricultural 
labour force and hindered the move towards agricultural improvement, already underway in England.  
Indeed, ‘…standards of farming had deteriorated since the battle of Flodden’ (Handley 1953: 11).  
With subsistence in doubt, rents – a surplus with development potential if invested rather than 
consumed – could not be paid; accumulating arrears led to land being abandoned and going to waste, 
even remotely from the locus of military engagement (Dodgshon 2005: 325; Macinnes 1996: 31).   
The Scottish economy also lost a significant part of its younger population to migration, contributing 
a longer-term impoverishing effect.  ‘[T]he Thirty Years’ War ushered in the Golden Age of the 
Scottish soldier of fortune’ (Insh 1922: 8).  Many young male Scots – frequently ‘…younger or 
illegitimate sons who stood little chance of inheriting any wealth if they stayed at home’ (Miller 2007: 
12) – were recruited to serve other European powers: such as the 3,600 raised in nine weeks in 1626, 
to serve as Mackay’s Regiment in Denmark and in Prussia; more were recruited in 1628. Not all were 
Highlanders with their martial tradition; some were from the North-east and the Lowlands (ibid.: Chs 
9, 10).  A military career could be pursued without becoming a mercenary, by enrolling or obtaining a 
commission in the Scottish or British army.  This was an honourable ambition, again for younger sons 
of landed gentry (Henshaw 2011), frequently serving a long-standing family tradition. 
In addition, as many as 200,000 Scots are estimated to have migrated during the seventeenth century, 
mainly to the European continent (particularly Poland and Scandinavia) (Landsman 1999: 466, citing 
Smout, Landsman, Devine 1994: 76-112).  During the sixteenth century, around 40,000 Scots had 
found their livelihood as merchants and pedlars in the prosperity of northern Prussia, some becoming 
burgesses in Danzig and members of the guild of merchants in Kӧnigsberg (Miller 2007: 66).  The 
desire to escape religious persecution contributed to this outward migration, particularly to the 
Netherlands, ‘… a haven for Calvinist refugees’ (Landsman 1999: 467). 
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While the sea provided a route to better prospects in the east, Scotland failed to exploit it otherwise.  
The absence of a significant fishing industry was a serious lost development opportunity.  The open-
sea fisheries had been largely abandoned to the Dutch – by invitation of James VI (Watson 2003: 51, 
citing NLS 31.2.16 f5r).  Their effective monopoly of the herring fishery from the early sixteenth 
century until the 1630s directly contributed to Dutch development and its emergence as a significant 
colonial power (Davidson, Gray 1909: 158; Watson 2003: 51).  Indeed ‘the “great fishery” [was] 
deemed by many Europeans of the period to hold the “secret ingredient” of Holland’s prosperity’ 
(Whatley 2006: 74, citing Harris 2000: 39-40).  Some 3,000 Dutch fishing boats together with 9,000 
support vessels were engaged around the British Isles (ibid., n.76, citing John Keymer ca 1620).  It 
was estimated that ‘… the trade maintained (when account was taken of the subsidiary industries) no 
less than 450,000 persons’ (Scott 1910-12: 361, citing Anderson 1790: 364).  But Scotland had no 
significant shipbuilding industry, attributed to a shortage of suitable native timber.  The Act of 1493, 
to have fishing vessels built in all burghs and towns, may have failed for the same reason.  Scottish 
seventeenth-century needs were met from Norway (Watson 2003: 166).  James VI was apparently 
advised in 1608 that ‘… the hail country being almost naked and mony yeirs ago spoled of all the 
tymmer’ (ibid.: 166, quoting Records of the Privy Council, first series, 543; also, Davidson, Gray 
1909: 92, 93), so there was no point in him prohibiting timber exports.  In fact, substantial Highland 
forests still existed, such as the Abernethy forest of Speyside, exploited in the 1720s by the York 
Buildings Company, after forfeiture of highland estates (Murray 1883: 60-63).  Such shipping 
capacity as Scotland had was seriously reduced during the Commonwealth.  Monck’s sacking of east-
coast towns led to the destruction of over a hundred vessels; the west coast also lost vessels 
(Davidson, Gray 1909: 210, citing Warden 1872: 11; Graham 2015: 138).  Significant trans-Atlantic 
trade involvement had to wait until the latter part of the seventeenth century and Scottish participation 
in the rapidly developing slave-labour-based sugar plantations of the West Indies, largely using 
vessels built abroad (Devine 2015; Nisbet 2015: 64, 68; Smout 1961: 244, 250, 251).  Nonetheless, by 
the time of the Union 16,000 Scots were serving in the Netherlands’ merchant fleet (Fry 2006: 218, 
citing Defoe 1709: 84).  Some Scots had purchased vessels built abroad (ibid.: 278, 279).   
Evidence of change 
According to such seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Scottish trade statistics as have survived 
(Watson 2003; Rӧssner 2008), Scottish commodity exports doubled during the forty years of the 
seventeenth century prior to the Bishops’ Wars and suggested a ‘…significant structural change’ in 
activity: previously substantial raw wool exports fell and cheap woollen plaiding, coal, salt, fish and 
corn exports rose sharply.  The export of corn was vulnerable to poor harvests and export prohibitions 
triggered when local prices rose above predetermined thresholds (Watson 2003: 103).  Much of the 
two-way trade with the Low Countries passed between Leith, the main port of Scotland, and the 
Scottish staple at Veere: plaiding and coal outwards; linen fabric, silk cloth and flax inwards.  ‘The 
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relatively short sea route to the Low Countries was one the Scots had taken for centuries. … 
Numerous Scottish merchants settled at Rotterdam, the most capable of whom could sell virtually any 
Scottish goods sent to them …  In the second half of the seventeenth century ships were sailing to the 
Low Countries from Leith virtually daily, and frequently from other Scottish ports’ (Whatley 2006: 
73).  French wine featured significantly among Scottish imports.  But ‘[o]f greatest significance … 
was the dramatic development over the early seventeenth century of completely new export wares – 
linen yarn and linen cloth and livestock’ (ibid.:1).  Linen products, using imported flax from the 
southern Baltic area cheapened by Baltic currency devaluation, were to become a critical element in 
the Scottish economy beyond the Union, eventually providing a level of employment ‘…second only 
to agriculture’ (Durie 1973: 47).  Watson claims that growing two-way trade with England, both by 
sea and by land, was ‘… of far greater significance than previous historians have allowed’ (Watson 
2003: 4).  London became the major single market for linen yarn and England in general came to 
absorb about half of all Scotland’s exports, with ‘… the Scottish seaborne trade to England … now 
ranked second to the Netherlands in the nation’s export trade’ (ibid.: 192).  Livestock and linen 
featured significantly in the land-borne English trade, by the 1620s accounting for a third of Scottish 
exports, a trade relationship that would condition future political developments. 
However, the prospect afforded by this was insecure.  Gains from trade, either domestic or foreign, 
are predicated on locational differences, of product or of price, exploited by entrepreneurial merchants 
(the ‘carrying trades’ in Macinnes’s terms) able to weather successfully not just the middleman’s 
implicit double-sided conflict between buyers and sellers but also the more aggressive competition 
from other merchants similarly engaged.  Moreover, the vulnerability of potential gains is 
considerably heightened when they are given political as well as private significance by international 
rivalry, when confrontational states claim possession of markets, routes and transport facilities.  The 
vulnerability is exacerbated further when domestic conflict disrupts internal production and 
distribution chains – although admittedly external and internal conflict can also create market 
opportunities, albeit typically of temporary duration.  Indirect taxation of traded products, altering 
price relativities, and outright prohibitions of import or export of specific goods add to the 
merchanting difficulties.  Scottish trade confronted significant obstacles of all these kinds throughout 
much of the seventeenth century, with environmental shocks (described briefly above at the outset of 
Section 8.5) eventually generating difficulties of crisis proportions in the final decade.  The 
consequences impacted directly on the prolonged debate regarding the long-term viability of the 
Scottish economy within the ‘composite monarchy’ (Whatley 2006: 95) which had been created in 
1603 and the consequent desirability or otherwise of political union.  Whatley and Macinnes agree 
that ‘the economy and economic issues lay at the heart of contemporary thinking and debates about 
union’.  But while the former considers that ‘the effects of the interconnected crises of the 1690s were 
… grave, debilitating and persistent’, the latter concludes that these ‘disguise an underlying economic 
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health and dynamism … already exploiting the opportunities afforded by empire … by stealth’ (Harris 
2010: 35-37).  The practical difficulties of rigorously enforcing restrictions on international trade 
admittedly presented opportunities: ‘Scotland was dependent on … an entrepreneurial willingness to 
circumvent international regulations for its very survival as a distinctive European nation in the later 
seventeenth century’ (Macinnes 2007b: 137).  In this respect, it was successful to the extent that ‘[b]y 
[1685] the Scots were viewed as a greater threat to the operation of the Navigation Acts than either 
the Dutch or even the Caribbean buccaneers’ (ibid.: 163).  However, had Scotland not been treated as 
a trade competitor of England and thus subject to the Navigation Acts and exclusion from English 
plantations in north America, its achievements could have been greater.  The Low Countries and 
France had both been important trading partners of the Scots, but trade was seriously disrupted by war 
between each and England. ‘[The Nine Years War] not only created a hostile maritime environment 
for Scottish merchant ships but also … had damaging and enormously unpopular effects on Scottish 
trade and economic ambitions’ (Whatley 2006: 157).  ‘In this unforgiving international environment, 
Scotland was vulnerable to a degree that is too rarely recognised by political historians in particular’ 
(ibid.: 127).  Whatley is of the view that ‘… optimistic analyses … fail to recognise the harsh realities 
of Scotland’s situation. … [T]he country was ill-prepared for the hammer-blows that would be 
delivered in the 1690s’ (ibid.: 117), of which the Darien ‘fiasco’ (see Section 8.7) was especially 
damaging.  The ill-preparedness, however, arguably stemmed not from inadequate trading 
performance but from the lack of development of manufacturing industry in Scotland: ‘… overall the 
best that can be said of the manufacturing sector in Scotland in the second half of the seventeenth 
century is that other than in the established craft trades in the royal burghs, it was developing weakly’ 
(ibid.: 123).  And even in the craft trades enterprise was hindered by conservatism. 
8.6 Enterprise and the Institutional Framework 
The Scottish economy did provide significant non-agricultural employment in specific, albeit limited, 
extractive activities, evidence of indigenous enterprise.  The owners of coal workings ‘… claimed in 
the early 1630s … [that] the coal and salt industries employed over 10,000 men and that half of all 
Scottish shipping was employed exporting coal and salt’ (ibid.: 26).  Exports of coal (mainly for the 
Low Countries and France) and salt produced from east-coast salt-pans (for English, Baltic and 
latterly German markets) rose sharply in the first quarter of the seventeenth century.  Sir George 
Bruce of Culross, between 1575 and 1625, exemplified the corresponding entrepreneurial capacity 
(Adamson 2008).  He took advantage of a rise in the international price of salt due to war between 
Spain and the Netherlands to develop Culross into ‘…what may be argued to be Scotland’s first 
industrial town’ (ibid.: 162), based on the integration of coastally located coal mining and coal-fired 
salt-panning.  Previous success as a burgess merchant from a land-owning family possibly enabled 
him to raise the necessary capital.  In so far as joint economies were obtained from this integration of 
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the production of coal and salt, typical of the coastal coalfields of Fife and East Lothian, their markets 
became interdependent.  Moreover, not only were Scottish salt production costs higher than those of 
methods employed in other countries, but the quality of the product was lower, inadequate for it to be 
used for salting of fish for export (Whatley 2006: 310).  Nonetheless, by a combination of 
discriminatory differences in tax rates and selective direct prohibitions (Whatley 1987: 28, 29), 
Scottish salt producers were given an effective monopoly of the domestic market, in part to support its 
coal industry: ‘Such were the integrated economics of salt and coal production that without the home 
market for and exports of the former, … manufactured with … the otherwise unsaleable … small 
coal, coal sales, it was feared, would collapse’ (Whatley 2006 193).  Further preferential treatment to 
protect the salt industry was incorporated into the relevant article of the Treaty of Union, extending its 
privileged position (ibid.: 310; Whatley 1987: 40).  In short, the institutional framework provided 
critical support. 
The pursuit of enterprise typically disturbs the configuration of property rights that define the status 
quo, legitimated by the granting of specific privileges for it to exploit by authority of the Crown, 
Parliament, nobles or other land owners – usually as an exception from prevailing prohibitions on 
non-agricultural activities or migration.  A grant of land and rights of residence, as well as to practise 
trades, would effectively create non-agricultural, proto-urban communities.  Skilled immigrant groups 
were ‘planted’ where native initiative was lacking.  In the twelfth century, Scottish east-coast 
settlements had been founded by groups of Flemish tradesmen and merchants, relocated from England 
at the instigation of David II.  These ‘… long continued powerful in directing the development of 
Scottish towns’ and in influencing the geographical orientation of subsequent Scottish trade 
(Davidson, Gray 1909: 6).  Other infusions of craftsmen from the European continent were organised 
by the Crown in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.  These emergent communities were granted 
limited rights of self-determination through the creation by charter of burghs and guilds (or gilds), 
with accompanying financial obligations and powers, as well as internal hierarchical structures.  The 
award of burgh status secured exclusive local rights to augment the privilege of right of residence 
(ibid.: 13, 15). 
The development of the Scottish institutional framework largely followed the English trajectory, with 
separate craft and merchanting communities emerging, reflecting their different skills and relative 
competitive advantage.  Initially in England a single organisation spanned both activities, but by the 
fourteenth century they had become completely separated (Renard 2000 [1918]: 11).  In Scotland, 
despite their common origin, ‘… the division or separation … was simply the natural outcome of their 
conflicting interests. … [Thirteenth century charters showed] that the merchants … had been desirous 
of securing the monopoly of dealing or selling, and of confining craftsmen to the exercise of their 
particular craft, [evidence] of the long-standing conflict between the more plebeian crafts and the 
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more wealthy merchant burgesses’ (Bain 1887: 35, 37).  Thus, development brought a new distinction 
between ‘we’ and ‘they’.  Movement between the two classes was constrained: ‘… a craftsman had to 
renounce his craft before he could become a merchant or a gild brother’ who formed ‘… an 
aristocratic set’ (Davidson, Gray 1909: 30).  However, the craft guilds acquired considerable social 
presence: ‘… [a] large proportion of the [Scottish urban] population … came within [the craft guilds’] 
jurisdiction.  The families, journeymen, apprentices, and servants, as well as the craftsmen 
themselves, were all subject to the [guilds’] authority … and taken at a moderate computation, these 
classes would represent about two-thirds of the whole community’ (Bain 1887: vii, viii).  The conflict 
between and among craftsmen and merchants led to the emergence of rule-bound structures to govern 
the conduct of both guilds and burghs.  Overseeing provisions and sanctions for rule-breaking 
emphasised the fairness of the distribution of the benefits of economic activity among the members 
and encouraged cartel-like practices, as opposed to competition.  But while these rules could mitigate, 
to a degree, individual rivalries within burgh ‘liberties’, they could not do so between burghs, whose 
interests could be directly competitive.  This was left to negotiation between burghs and to the 
judgements of the emergent social institution of the Convention of Royal Burghs. 
Conservative tendencies 
In the Convention of Royal Burghs ‘…Scotland had an institution unique in Europe … [whereby] the 
merchant community [was] organised on a national basis’ (MacDonald 2010: 105), and ‘…the one 
institution of Scottish society with an explicit commercial function’ (Fry 2006: 229).  However, as 
‘[the Scottish] monarchy was neither powerful nor wealthy [so] devolution of administrative, judicial 
and even political power was unavoidable as well as essential for the health of the body politic’ 
(MacDonald 2010: 105).  Consequently, the Convention acquired significant political weight.  It 
eventually appointed the commissioners to represent the ‘Third Estate’ in the Scottish Parliament, 
thereby acquiring influence over commercial policy.  But given their sectional interests, ‘… the 
burghs tended to oppose major political change, sitting on the side-lines … As a result, examples of 
dynamic political action on the part of the burghs are rare’ (ibid.: 113).  Although later seventeenth-
century policy was eventually directed to industrial development and the national interest, the burgh 
merchants, from their position of political power, ‘… persistently put obstacles in the way of 
industrial development at home’ (Davidson, Gray 1909: 67).  The Convention failed to encourage and 
direct innovatory efforts towards development of the Scottish economy.  By precluding active 
craftsmen from becoming free burgesses it discounted industrial development in favour of trade.  The 
foundation of the Scottish sugar industry by merchants of the royal burghs of Glasgow and Leith 
during the last forty years of the century was an exception; it was the only success from a wide range 
of manufacturing innovations that were unable to compete without tariff protection against imports 
from England (Smout 1961: 240, 247).  Furthermore, despite the free burgess merchants’ monopoly 
of participation in international trade from the second half of the fifteenth century, no serious attempts 
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were made to develop the inadequate Scottish shipping industry: ‘… the idea underlying the 
Navigation Acts, the conception of the fundamental importance of the shipping interest to the nation’s 
prosperity, was never realised in Scotland.  The shipping industry was systematically sacrificed to the 
louder claims of the merchants’ (Insh 1922: 71). The ‘… rigid and conservative system of trading 
with the Low Countries’, religiously adhered to by the Convention of Royal Burghs (Insh 1922: 16) 
was arguably one of the main reasons for the particular lack of Scottish enthusiasm to pursue trans-
Atlantic colonial developments.  The trading régime it promoted became rigidly exclusive and 
focused on the maintenance of the staple established in 1541 at Campvere (or Veere) in Zeeland 
(Davidson, Gray 1909: 161-163), where it remained until 1799, but of steadily diminishing 
significance.  This commitment arguably inhibited the development of a wider and inclusive Scottish 
trade with Europe, although tramp trading (speculatively seeking local cargoes abroad) was pursued 
in the Baltic (Macinnes 2008: 113).  
The royal burghs were opposed to an incorporating Union, as distinct from a federal union.  As Fry 
notes, ‘The royal burghs had little to do with the awakening enthusiasm of Scots for free trade. … The 
function of a royal burgh lay in regulating, not deregulating commerce.  It was … a retarded, not a 
progressive element in the life of Scotland’ (Fry 2006: 229).  Superficially it is paradoxical that a 
burgh should inhibit enterprise, given its origin lay in the award of monopoly privilege to encourage 
enterprise.  However, the relationship between monopoly and enterprise is ambiguous.  The 
conclusions deduced from the modern corpus of abstract economic analysis as to the inefficiency of 
monopoly command considerable rhetorical weight, although they lack inductive warrant.  But ever 
since the seventeenth century it has been generally accepted that inventors should be given temporary 
monopoly privileges through the patent system, while the ‘infant industry’ argument for temporary 
protection has been influential at different times and places.  Moreover, the contemporary mercantilist 
‘economic backdrop’ is relevant in assessing the role of monopoly power: public policy objectives 
were given precedence over any supposed ‘efficiency’ of unfettered price competition (Nachbar 2005: 
1318, 1319).  Monopoly did not attract universal approval.  The Monopoly Act of 1624 was prompted 
by the opposition to ‘… prerogative monopoly [which was] frequently used by both Tudor and Stuart 
monarchs to reward favorites at the expense of the economy’ (Stump 1974: 26); the sale of monopoly 
rights was ‘…objectionable as a constitutional matter because [it] provided the crown with a source of 
income without recourse to Parliament’ (Nachbar 2005: 1344).  The crux of the matter is that the 
award of exclusive privilege can reduce the initial risk intrinsic to the pursuit of enterprise, but 
eventually weaken its pursuit once the secure establishment of markets has itself reduced the risk. 
Enterprise nonetheless drives the unsteady temporal trajectory of economic affairs. 
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8.7 Enterprise: The Bank of Scotland and the Darien Scheme  
Both the Bank of Scotland and the Darien Scheme were examples of business enterprise exploiting 
monopoly privilege, under the same legislative provision; both demonstrated the effectiveness of the 
expectation of future financial benefit in mobilising idle capital even within an impoverished 
economy.  While the Restoration of the Stuart dynasty had brought little direct state encouragement of 
the development of the impoverished Scottish economy, the Revolution represented an important 
discontinuity for Scotland.  Whereas ‘Stewart despotism had impeded the accumulation of capital and 
… in particular, the possibilities for joint-stock enterprise were under-explored’ (Saville 1996: xxxiv), 
‘William … gave his permission to have [Charles’s 1663 act restricting trading opportunities] 
rescinded and instructed his commissioners to procure an act for the encouragement of trade’ 
(Bingham 1906a: 34).  However, the response – the Scottish Parliament’s Act for Encouraging of 
Forraign Trade of 1693 – could plausibly be viewed as part of a ‘general scheme’ initiated by a group 
of London merchants and financiers (some of Scottish origin): frustrated by the monopoly held by the 
East India Company, they sought ‘… to find an outlet for their capital in Scotland’ (Insh 1924: 290, 
291).  ‘[A]n extensive promotion of industrial companies in England [led] many men of enterprise [to 
find] Scotland a promising field for investment’ (Scott 1904: 180).  This enabling legislation of 1693 
offered the privilege of monopoly rights to those taking advantage of it.  In 1695 the Scottish 
Parliament passed the Act Establishing the Company of Scotland, followed a few months later by the 
Act Instituting the Bank of Scotland.  Six London/Scottish merchants were among the proposers of 
both. 
The contrast between the two enterprises was in their ambition and execution.  The Bank’s ambition 
was limited to augmenting the provision of credit to facilitate Scottish trade and was prosecuted 
modestly with due attention to maintaining confidence in its activities, despite their innovativeness.  
The Darien Scheme had ambitions that exceeded its capabilities and ignored geopolitical realities, but 
attracted a political endorsement that eclipsed a careful assessment of its potential. 
Bank of Scotland 
The Bank was post-Revolutionary – ‘The Bank would not have been formed under the old Stewart 
regime’ (Saville 1996: xxxii).  It brought together merchants and landowners.  The landowners’ 
concern for the security of their estates predicated political stability, and the military capability to 
support it, so adequate tax revenue was essential, with access to sufficient coinage in which to pay the 
army.  But economic activity was low, exacerbated by bad harvests; there was a general shortage of 
coinage; without significant participation in foreign trade – in part due to retaliation against protective 
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Scottish policies – there was little prospect of earning bullion to remedy the deficiency.  The Bank’s 
proponents concluded that a shortage of credit was restricting production and trade, and that the 
volume of short-term credit could be increased significantly based on available long-term assets. 
The Bank pursued various forms of lending, including foreign bills of exchange moving funds 
between Edinburgh, London and Amsterdam (reflecting the pattern of Scottish trade), inland bills of 
exchange and longer-term lending on bonds.  However, it was the issuance of banknotes only 
fractionally backed by the Bank’s cash reserves that was to be ‘…a distinctive contribution of Scottish 
banking and it was carefully watched elsewhere in Europe’ (ibid.: 21).  These notes provided credit 
for ‘… tax-farmers, landowners in general and their factors, merchants and lawyers, but also others 
who could meet the required remands for adequate security on lands or by guarantee’ (ibid.: 17).  
They had to be regarded as sufficiently equivalent to coinage (with advantages over it regarding 
security and transportability) to be generally acceptable as a means of payment of taxes and for 
subsequent purchases made from that tax revenue, for example.  But that literal fiction depended on 
the confidence of individual acceptors that, were the paper presented to the Bank for payment in coin, 
the Bank could honour its obligation.  The confidence of actual and potential customers in the probity 
of the Bank’s management was courted by distinguished endorsement.  ‘The Bank derived broad 
support from a large number of the nobility, the landed gentry and others active in opposition to 
James VII. … For these families, the victory of the Revolution was a matter of survival …What they 
lacked was not valour but cash’ (ibid.: 18).  The involvement of merchants in the management of the 
Bank, some with experience of international trade, provided appropriate commercial judgement. 
The Bank survived two threats to the confidence required for the success of its fractional reserve 
banking.  The first, soon after its foundation, was a deliberate infringement of the Bank’s legal 
monopoly during the preliminary stages of the Darien Scheme, by its progenitor William Paterson.  It 
was uncontested by the Bank, because ‘The Darien Company was too popular throughout Scotland’ 
(Barbour 1907: 34), with its Jacobite endorsement.  Paterson’s rival note issue sought to displace 
Bank of Scotland notes and to force their collective redemption for cash.  However, his efforts ceased 
when they began to reduce the value of the Company itself and funds were required for the Darien 
venture.  The panic affecting the Bank subsided as it was realised what damage would ensue should 
the Bank fail.  The second occurred between 1702 and 1705 when a variety of national factors 
generated doubts about the general prospects for business.  Loan repayments were delayed and the 
Bank had to stop payments for several months due to a general shortage of cash, even after a call on 
subscribers for additional funds.  This damaged its reputation, but the Bank nonetheless survived as an 
established component of the institutional framework of the economy, contributing significantly to the 
provision of business liquidity. 
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The Darien Scheme 
All human action is future-referenced but the pursuit of enterprise is an extreme instance that 
necessarily deploys the entrepreneur’s imagination and guesswork to ‘project’ into a more distant 
uncertain future the possibilities to be pursued.  As previously noted, the institution of the joint stock 
company facilitates raising fixed capital.  But this engages not just the considered opinion of the 
project’s proposers but the opinions of public subscribers.  This admits the dynamics of collective 
opinion-formation, where individuals believe they may be at a relative disadvantage if they do not 
copy what others are observed to be doing, leading to a wave of speculative enthusiasm.  Moreover, 
there is no assurance that collective opinion relates to the same considerations as those of the 
proposers.  However, that possibility is certainly excluded if the proposers do not share their plans in 
some detail with potential subscribers.  But that need not prevent public enthusiasm becoming driven 
by extraneous factors, if the project is imagined to signify other valued concerns.  The Darien Scheme 
exemplified several of these factors. 
Viewed as no more than a search for new outlets for Scottish produce, the Darien Scheme revealed an 
unenterprising ‘inwardness’ of approach (Scott 1904: 182), in line with past self-inflicted losses due 
to trade protectionism and guild privileges, and few recent new industries (Gulvin 1971: 129; Scott 
1904: 175, 176, 180).  Yet viewed as originally conceived by the London-based merchants, the 
Company of Scotland was an ambitious attempt to challenge the hegemony of the chartered East India 
Company, through a joint-stock trading company with ‘… large privileges and extraordinary 
[corporate] concessions’ (Bingham 1906a: 213) granted by Act of the Scottish Parliament.  ‘[The] 
chief collector of customs in the colonies … was especially vociferous in his critique of the act. …  
The inducement of a tax break for twenty-one years for Scottish adventurers … was … viewed as a 
blatant invitation … to breach the English Navigation Acts’ (Macinnes 2007b: 183, 184).  But there 
followed the withdrawal of the London merchants (and their capital), under pressure from the English 
parliament, its conversion to a purely Scottish venture, and crucially its redirection from trading with 
the East Indies, to establishing a plantation in the Darien Isthmus as William Paterson’s influence 
became ascendant, ‘William Paterson … whom (sic) Lord Macaulay memorably deemed as having 
acquired an influence resembling that of a founder of a new religion’ (Macinnes 2007b: 45).  
Consequently, as actually implemented, the Darien Scheme became a ‘vague chimera’ (Bingham 
1906b: 326).  No basis was provided for a considered financial decision by prospective subscribers.  
The destination was withheld from the public during the promotion of the Company and even from 
the emigrants themselves until during their voyage in 1698.  Subscribers were invited to buy into an 
idea, encouraged only by Paterson’s initial publicity implying general enthusiasm for plantations 
(Bingham 1906a: 214). 
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The fact that the drive for subscriptions took place in a ‘… highly politicised atmosphere’ (Jones 
2001) with ‘the force of an evangelical appeal’ (Hidalgo 2001: 15, citing Lynch 1992), with the 
Church of Scotland contributing to the supportive pamphleteering (Ramsay 1949: 57), reflected the 
Scheme’s emergence as a socio-political ‘cause’, rather than as an investment opportunity.  In 
pressurising the London merchants to withdraw ‘[t]he English Parliament had now endowed [the 
project] with the enthusiastic backing of the whole Scottish nation’ (Bingham 1906c: 447), while 
William III attracted Jacobite accusations of anti-Scottish prejudice in trying to block this entirely 
Scottish project to ameliorate Scotland’s poverty.  ‘[T]he country waited in anticipation of Paterson-
led salvation’ (Whatley 2006: 170).  Little weight was given to the contrary argument, that the king’s 
opposition stemmed from the dereliction of his Scottish officers in failing to refer such proposed acts 
to him (Bingham 1906c: 442), which had left him conceivably obligated by the terms of the Act 
passed in his absence to take military action against any state that impeded the Company. 
Notwithstanding the politically symbolic ‘financial mania’ (Watt 2005: 102), the project was arguably 
undercapitalised from the start.  The authorised capital, set at £400,000 was fully subscribed, with 
some effort and possible subterfuge (Barbour 1907: 24, 25).  However, the total paid-up capital was 
finally just slightly over £153,000, achieved on a 42.5 per cent call on subscribed capital, which 
should have yielded £170,000.  No attempts were made to call up the other 57.5 per cent.  A 
‘considerable balance’ of subscriptions due remained unpaid, despite legal action, even up to the 
cancellation of debts on the eventual dissolution of the Company in 1707: ‘In the extraordinary 
enthusiasm evoked at the time, the Scottish people subscribed for much more stock than they were 
able to pay calls for’ (Barbour 1907: 27).  Possibly some subscribers had no intention of investing.  
Unsuccessful efforts were subsequently made to raise additional capital from Dutch and German 
merchants and the Company had to borrow sums from directors to finalise preparations for the first 
expedition (Watt 2005: 112).  Funds were arguably ill-spent on the construction (rather than 
chartering) of new and particularly expensive vessels, fewer than originally intended and built abroad 
due to the absence of Scottish shipbuilding capacity and access denied to English yards. 
Paterson’s long-held notion of a free-trade ‘emporium’ or entrepôt at Darien to link the Pacific and 
Atlantic trade routes – ‘… one of the greatest commercial ideas of the seventeenth century’ (Scott 
1904: 181) – may have been visionary but the choice of location was impractical.  A Spanish presence 
on the Isthmus of Panama had existed from the early sixteenth century, although the indigenous 
populations ‘… were a constant challenge to the colonial authority … [so] the fragile Spanish control 
of the Isthmus was an irresistible attraction for other impatient colonial speculators’ (Hidalgo 2001: 
5).  The scaled-down Scottish plantation was sufficient to provoke a conflict spanning political, 
dynastic, religious and economic concerns.  Accordingly, ‘[The Spanish] took the Scottish threat 
seriously … [to the extent that it] had little real prospect … of long-term success’ (Storrs 1999: 7,8).  
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The intrusion not only threatened Spain’s reputation and valuable trading assets but also posed – 
particularly as regards the Scots – a serious religious threat.  ‘Indeed, this was [what] most concerned 
Spaniards.  The danger of the introduction and spread of heretical and Protestant (or Reformed) 
opinions among the populations of the Indies was one of the reasons why the Viceroy of New Spain 
gave priority to the expulsion of the Scots in the spring of 1699’ (ibid.: 9).  Given the inconclusive 
first attack on the Darien plantation in early 1699, further attacks were planned, to culminate in the 
deployment of 4,900 troops and crew.  In the event, given delays in preparing and assembling this 
force, it arrived after the Scots’ settlement had been surrendered to a lesser force.  Belatedly, a 
Scottish tract of 1699 challenged Spain’s claim to de jure possession of Darien, argued that the 
plantation could operate successfully to the mutual benefit of Spain, England and Scotland, and 
claimed that the Scots’ Protestantism could coexist with Spain’s Roman Catholicism (Phil-Caledon 
1699). 
Perhaps the most significant misjudgement, given the intention to found a plantation, was the 
expectation that an effective social community could readily be formed from 1200 individuals, drawn 
from among self-selected volunteers from an immiserised agricultural population and a pool of 
officers and men demobilised after the Treaty of Ryswick (Barbour 1907: 47, 48; Insh 1922: 11).  
Their only common purpose was to escape from poverty; they may have been in poor physical 
condition and had no knowledge of tropical agriculture.  The community was to be formed under the 
‘supreme direction’ (Barbour 1907: 49) of just seven ‘councillors’ appointed just before departure by 
the Company’s Directors, none with relevant experience.  Four of them were also masters of the ships 
involved, which proved to be a fundamental mistake.  In Paterson’s words, ‘… our Marine 
Councillors … brow-beat and discouraged every body else, yet we had patience, hoping things would 
mend when we came shore; but we found ourselves mistaken’ (ibid.: 94).  ‘The dissensions among the 
Councillors and their deplorable mismanagement were not least among the contributory causes of 
failure of the settlement, and these rendered quite useless all the efforts of Paterson towards a firm and 
unanimous rule’ (ibid. 95, 96). 
Notwithstanding the fact that ‘… only by a miracle could [its] failure have been escaped’ (Scott 1904: 
182), the opportunity was taken to blame the monarch for engineering the failure by his instruction to 
other Caribbean colonies to withhold assistance from the Darien settlers.  Scott’s assessment suggests 
a double irony – the Darien Scheme was both the creature and the casualty of a conflict-orientated 
‘trade’ policy of restriction and retaliation; the intensity of feeling over its failure heightened 
opposition to the possibility of Union but its failure helped pave the way to it – as foreseen by 
Paterson (Barbour 1907: 176).  In Scott’s words, ‘… the effect of this [restrictive trade] policy 
together with the resulting retaliation was that Scotland virtually, from the commercial point of view, 
[with his apologies to Lord Rosebery] “starved and coerced herself” into such a position that a 
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political union was the best way to escape’ (Scott 1904: 190, emphasis in the original).  From the 
public finance point of view the situation seemed no better: ‘Accumulating demands on the Scottish 
purse on the one hand and on the other a weak economy and the dubious efficiency of the tax-
gathering machinery meant, in the words of one historian – not often quoted – … “an independent 
Scotland was not financially viable” (Whatley 2006: 202, citing Murray 1974: 34).  And given that 
the cash injection into the Scottish economy of almost £400,000 that the Union brought – the 
‘Equivalent’ – included funds for the purchase of the entire share capital of the Company plus 
payment of interest on it at five per cent, ‘… we cannot necessarily assume that the Darien “disaster” 
… was an entirely negative experience’ (Jones 2001: 40) – at least, for the shareholders. 
8.8 The Emergence and Containment of the 1715 Insurrection 
It is plausible to claim that the Darien Scheme should never have happened.  Similarly, according to 
Szechi, the ’15 was ‘… the rebellion that should never have happened.  Any rational assessment of the 
odds against success, given their circumstances, should have persuaded the Jacobites at least to 
postpone, or more prudently, to call off the whole enterprise …’ (Szechi 2006: 251).  However, ‘… 
none of the Jacobites wanted to appear behindhand and so, step by step, they talked themselves into 
rebellion. … A deep unreality had taken hold of the community’ (ibid.: 74, 75).  Nietzsche has made 
the general point somewhat more candidly: ‘Madness is rare in individuals – but in groups, parties, 
nations and ages it is the rule’ (Nietzsche 1966 [1886]: aphorism 156).  Collective dynamics 
contribute significantly to the contingency of temporal succession and where contingency prevails, it 
is perhaps inappropriate to attribute irrationality to agents.  The Jacobites and their government 
opponents each had to conjecture, not just as to how the other might act but how the other would 
respond to their own acts.  Unreality inevitably accompanies any conjectured projection of 
interdependent action into the future.  The initiation of a specific course of action would be a product 
of collective dynamics, not deductive inference. 
Szechi implies that the potential threats to the success of rebellion were obvious to its proponents, 
which accords with the view that ‘… the rebellion [was] by no means inevitable’ (Reid 2014: 1).  But 
it did occur and did make some progress.  Accordingly, the failure of these threats to materialise 
constitutes part of the explanation of the ’15.  Szechi suggests it was due to procrastination by the 
British fiscal-military state (Szechi 2006: 137).  However, an explanation of in terms of inadequate 
judgement and resources also seems plausible. 
Legitimate military action should be more securely resourced as the government can finance its 
military capability through taxation, whereas illegitimate action must be resourced through theft – or 
self-financing from the insurgents’ resources or subventions from some foreign power.  However, the 
enterprise necessary to drive illegitimate military action may be more forthcoming.  On the legitimate 
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side, in a parliamentary context, enterprise is institutionalized, involving a formalised political process 
and the delegation of appropriate authority to pursue only specific, collectively formulated objectives.  
On the illegitimate side, however, enterprise typically comes from a self-appointed individual leader 
with personal control over the determination of strategy.  The leader has both a personal ‘vision’ of 
the new order being sought and the capacity to convince others to commit themselves to the ‘cause’.  
While personal charisma is influential, it is the power to deploy rhetoric, to discredit arguments in 
favour of inaction or some alternative strategy, that will produce results.  Manipulating the collective 
dynamic will be easier the greater the pre-existing disposition in favour of the ‘vision’.  If rhetoric can 
achieve a rapid volte-face, then illegitimate military action could gain the strategic advantage of a 
‘first-strike capability’.  In that respect, there is a resemblance to the enterprise of peaceful economic 
activity, where the attitude towards risk and the timeliness of initiative and innovativeness can achieve 
a crucial and aggressive competitive advantage. 
These considerations do suggest specific ‘might-have-beens’ that contributed to the explanation of the 
1715 insurrection.  The actions of the 6th Earl of Mar and the resourcing of the military efforts of the 
2nd Duke of Argyll are singled out for illustrative purposes. 
8.9 Illustration: The Enterprise of John Erskine, 6th Earl of Mar 
A Recapitulation 
The connecting theme running through the argument being pursued in this study is that 
singularity and contingency characterise the temporal trajectory of human action. The former 
derives from the nature of the human perception of time, which contributes timeliness to the 
distinguishing and critical dimensions of every human action.  Thus, actions are dated and 
actions at different dates are thereby intrinsically different.  The latter derives from the partial 
ignorance time imposes on the agent in respect of the nearer and further consequences of any 
action taken, in the morally and instrumentally conflicted human context of interdependence 
with others.  Thus, actions could have been different from those that were pursued.  These 
characteristics of actions are without prejudice to the perception that their physical outcomes 
display order, either in terms of resemblance or of succession.  So, it is possible for 
description to employ categories of actions (e.g. wars; migrations; economic activities) and 
identify directionality in actions (e.g. progressing technology; enlarging the rule of law; 
changing forms of government).  However, these characteristics are prejudiced against forms 
of explanation which suppress the inherent singularity of action in favour of imposing 
timeless regularities on the temporal succession or diminish the decisiveness of human 
actions within their own particular – in some cases highly restricted – domains in favour of 
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disembodied yet directional ‘forces’ that render human action pointless and insignificant.  
The necessity for an appropriate alternative mode of explanation led to the analogy drawn in 
Chapter 2 between historical explanation (in the widest sense, embracing all human action) 
and legal advocacy before a jury. 
The judicial analogy yields the crucial elements of an alternative mode of explanation: first, 
the adversarial encounter of two rival accounts of an event; second, the dependence on 
persuasive discourse to determine which gains acceptance as authoritative; third, the 
provision of accounts of the event that convey the motives and intentions of the principal 
agents, to answer the question ‘Why?’.  The judicial context is framed by key value 
judgements: that an allegation of guilt should not lead directly to conviction but rather a 
presumption of innocence until guilt is proven should force a contest between rival claims; 
that the states of mind of an independent lay audience, not a party with an interest in the case, 
should be brought to judge in favour one claim or the other; that individual responsibility for 
actions should be affirmed, and its emergence traced.  Framed in this way the inherent 
singularity and contingency of human action are being squarely addressed.  However, while 
the judicial process is designed to deal with an allegation of criminal action, there is nothing 
specific to the approach to restrict its applicability only to such situations.  In short, any 
human action can be subject to this mode of explanation, which is fundamentally different 
from orthodox scientific explanation.  
Inherent in this mode of explanation is its accommodation of more than one account of an 
event.  (Outside of the judicial context, with its binary opposition between guilt and 
innocence, there is no implicit restriction on possibilities).  This arises because of the role of 
the analyst’s subjective judgement in interpreting the available evidence from a chosen 
perspective, drawing abductive inferences from it, imaginatively recovering the lost ‘might-
have-beens’ that contributed to the path of the event, and assembling the parts into a coherent 
and consistent narrative.  These issues have already been discussed in Chapter 6 and at the 
beginning of Part Two, but bear being emphasised, as the prospect of plurality of histories of 
a given event is not widely advertised.  Yet as Megill observes, ‘… a true historian … is 
happy to leave her mind suspended between conflicting attitudes or claims.  It is not the 
historian’s task to articulate a single unequivocal position, let alone a single consistent theory, 
concerning the world as it is’ (Megill 2007: 2).  
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With adoption of this mode of explanation, the pursuit of might-have-beens becomes an 
important component of the historical account. 
The Earl of Mar and the 1715 Insurrection 
The 1715 insurrection can be attributed to the Earl of Mar.  Prior to his involvement, the Scots 
Jacobites’ pragmatic assessment was that they could only succeed against government forces given a 
significant infusion of French troops, matériel and funds; the arrival from France of the Duke of 
Berwick to provide experienced military leadership; and, specifically, the appearance in person of the 
putative King James VIII to act as a focus and to develop a plan of action towards his restoration.  
John, Master of Sinclair, recorded their categorical conclusion, even after Mar’s arrival from London, 
‘We agreed not to rise until we saw the King come’ (MacKnight 1858: 24).  Only the month before, 
Mar had informed James, that ‘… there is no hope in succeeding in [a rebellion] without the 
assistance of a regular force, or without a general raising of the people in all parts of England, 
immediately upon the King’s landing, and the latter of these depends very much on the former’ 
(Szechi 2006: 86, citing contemporary correspondence).  Yet, between August and early September, 
Mar had personally triggered the ’15, none of the prerequisites having been met.  With Berwick 
confined to France, Mar himself – despite his lack of military experience – took the role of military 
commander.  By November, however, in the chaotic and disorderly military action that was the Battle 
of Sherrifmuir and despite a significant numerical advantage ‘… the rebel army was effectively 
shattered. … For the Jacobite rising to succeed, Mar needed to win the battle; for the rising to fail, 
Argyle merely needed to deny Mar that victory.  In that respect the outcome of the battle was clear 
enough’ (Reid 2014: 146, 147).  Mar’s apparent ineptitude as a military commander took a lot of the 
blame.   
There were two ‘might-have-beens’ when a different action by Mar could have changed the course of 
events.  First, he could have rejected the Jacobite invitation to journey to Scotland specifically to 
initiate an insurrection.  Second, on arrival he could have, nonetheless, agreed with local Jacobite 
judgement that a purely Scottish-resourced insurrection, without James VIII, was impractical.  But in 
the spring or early summer of 1715 he instead responded positively to approaches in London from 
English and Scottish Jacobites ‘… that he shou’d immediately go to Scotland and declare publicly for 
King James … [and] to enable him to prosecute his design they gave him 7,000 pounds sterling to 
carry with him’ (Constable 1843: 9).  This action, financed by the English, was to be the ‘convenient 
miracle’ that ‘the great majority of English Jacobites wanted … to come to their rescue’ to trigger 
their own insurgency (Szechi 2006: 94).  Mar left from Gravesend on 1st August, in disguise and in 
the company of Major General George Hamilton and Colonel Hay (and presumably the £7,000), 
working their passage on a coal ship returning to the Tyne, transhipping there to a vessel bound for 
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Elie in Fife, whence by land to his estate at Braemar and Invercauld Castle, as yet unknown to the 
authorities in Edinburgh (Reid 2014: 10) – and, presumably, in London.   
From one perspective Mar’s course of action was a reaction to his summary dismissal by George I, 
after ten years’ highly responsible service to the governments of the day, a casualty of the King’s 
antipathy towards the Tories’ negotiation of the Treaty of Utrecht.  This ‘… precipitated [Mar] into 
truly Jacobite politics’ (Szechi 2006: 40).  However, his ‘… reputation had been destroyed in 
Hanoverian circles by stories of his encouragement of Jacobite intrigues in the Highlands’ (Riley 
1964: 254, citing a documentary source of 1714).  Although ‘… at the time of Anne’s death [he was 
not] amongst Bolingbroke’s clique of active Jacobite plotters’ (ibid.), the Jacobite invitation with its 
significant implicit trust must have been triggered by known sympathies at that time.  His dismissal 
from office occurred while his salary payments were seriously in arrears, so the prospect of ‘financial 
ruin’ (Szechi 2006: 41) has also been suggested as having a bearing on his decision. 
As to the second ‘might-have-been’, Mar did not share the Scottish Jacobites’ reluctance to act 
without French support.  Sufficient of their leadership became persuaded by Mar’s rhetoric.  ‘From 
the outset Mar deliberately manipulated his fellow Jacobites by confidently assuring them of victory 
on whatever grounds he thought would get them to commit themselves’ (Szechi 2006: 99).  Given 
their prior commitments and hopes, he transformed their perspective on what could be achieved with 
already-available resources.  Thus, by mid-September ‘[a]ll over Scotland armed men were on the 
move’ (Szechi 2006: 100).  According to James Keith, ‘[m]any …  thought it an ill omen, and even 
worse policy, to employ the person who had been one of the principal instruments in building the 
fabrick [of the Union] … in the pulling it down; but the great emploiments he had been in, his 
knowledge of the country, and the sincere marks of repentance he gave, made the greater number [of 
the King’s friends] approve the choice’ (Constable 1843: 11; emphasis added).  His experience of the 
administration of Scottish affairs was indeed considerable: joint Secretary of State for Scotland from 
1705; member of the Privy Council of Great Britain; a Commissioner for the Union (a moderately 
popular choice from the Scottish Parliamentary viewpoint (Whatley 2006: 233)); centrally involved in 
the passage of the Treaty of Union; Keeper of the Signet from 1708 to 1709 and third Secretary of 
State with responsibilities for Scotland from 1713, enjoying the confidence of Queen Anne and being 
rewarded by her by being made a Knight of the Thistle (Whatley 2006: 258).. 
An alternative perspective can be offered on Mar’s actions, focusing on his entrepreneurship.  This 
was demonstrated in the political context by his exploitation of patronage, shifting political allegiance 
to secure personal advancement.  The other context for his enterprise was his estates.  Stewart 
summarises Mar’s concurrent activities as an industrial entrepreneur (coal mining and port 
development in the Alloa area) and improving landowner, identifying him as an early Scottish 
exponent of the French seventeenth-century amanégement approach to integrated local development 
  Economic and Military Perspectives 
188 
 
planning (Stewart 2012: 101-111).  His horticultural interests had a sufficiently high priority for him 
to write to the Duke of Argyll on the eve of the battle of Sheriffmuir, ‘… begging him, as “a lover of 
gardens” to order his soldiers not to despoil his gardens’ at Mar’s Alloa estate (Whatley 2006: 76, 
citing National Archives of Scotland, SP, RH2/4/306 10A, earl of Mar to duke of Argyll, 30 Oct. 
1715).  These activities – possibly financed initially from his public offices – reveal Mar as 
imaginative, innovative, decisive and forward-looking.  The loss of his salary should be seen in the 
context of a six-fold increase in the value of the output of his Alloa coal mines between 1714 and 
1715 (Stewart 2012: 101).  A combination of ‘favourable geological circumstances’ and ‘efficient 
colliery management’ possibly accounted for about half of his output being of marketable ‘great coal’ 
(Whatley 1987: 34 n.9).  In Stewart’s view, he was single-mindedly ‘… prepared to support any 
government that would deliver economic and industrial benefits to Scotland’ (ibid.: 98).  By the 
summer of 1711 his initial acquiescence in the establishment of an incorporating Union was subject to 
economic reservations: ‘… though he himself was “not yet weary of the Union” [but] “if our trade be 
no more encouraged than yet it has been … what Scotsman will not be weary of [it] and do all he can 
to get quit of it?”’ (Fry 2006: 304, emphasis added).  At some stage – possibly 1710 (Gregg 1984: 
181) – he had even communicated to the exiled James his willingness to devise an alternative federal 
constitution in the event of James being restored and dissolving the existing union (Stewart 2012: 98).  
This scenario appeared again in the Manifesto that Mar published on the 9th September 1715, as 
reported (Charles 1816), involving restoration of the two parliaments – in short, the status quo ante.  
Thus, his persuasive powers stemmed from his personal commitment to force the change he 
considered necessary to encourage Scottish manufacture and trade. 
A further ‘might-have-been’ concerns the possibility that Mar could have been prevented from acting 
as he did.  The state’s response to the aborted French invasion of 1708 – that ‘almighty fright’ (Reid 
2014: 8) – had already involved new provisions to tighten the law and reduce the threat of further 
insurrection (Riley 1964: 103).  The failure of the authorities to apprehend Mar comes into the frame 
of an explanation of the ’15. 
Mar’s actions indicated he anticipated the possibility of capture.  Precisely when the Scottish 
authorities learned that Mar was a substantive threat is not clear.  The authorities’ window of 
opportunity for action extended from Mar’s initial landing in Scotland around the 5t August, to his 
entry into Perth on 28 September, the assembly point for the emergent Jacobite army.  But he was not 
on a 12t August list of known Jacobites ordered to be apprehended (Szechi 2006: 283, end-note 127).  
Szechi suggests London knew by 18 August.  However, a letter of that date from Secretary of State 
Townshend to the City of Glasgow, declining its offer of 8 August to support a force of 500 loyal 
volunteers (ibid.: 287, end-note 39; Charles 1816: 248), concerned a proposal arising from earlier 
communication among the authorities in Glasgow, Edinburgh, Stirling and Menteith.  They apparently 
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were already aware of Mar’s activity (Charles 1816: 247).  Moreover, Townshend’s reply disclosed 
that Scottish regular forces were being strengthened, suggesting the authorities had already identified 
an emerging threat.  These regiments, significantly drawn from Ireland and northern England, were 
used to create a camp at Stirling to increase the security of its castle, between 24 and 31 August.  
Mar’s prior intention to march on Edinburgh by way of Stirling, may have been known even before 
his council of war at Braemar on 25 August.  Mar was included in a list of those required to surrender 
to the authorities under the terms of an Act for Encouraging Loyalty in Scotland given Royal assent 
on 30 August; by his lack of response, he declared himself a rebel.   
The fact that Mar was not apprehended could be attributed to an unintentional compromising of 
Scotland’s system of local law and order by broader policy decisions.  Treason had been a concern of 
the Scottish Privy Council, ‘… the only executive power in Scotland’ (Riley 1964: 95), but its 
abolition in 1708 left the Scottish Lord Advocate to bring matters to Westminster’s attention and to 
await orders; ‘… a great deal of business was delayed or did not get done’ (ibid.: 98).  Queen Anne’s 
veto of the Scottish Militia Act, also in 1708, to avoid arming potential Jacobite rebels, generated 
confusion as to the extent of local powers to raise a militia (Henshaw 2011: 211).  Movement towards 
the English model of empowering lord lieutenants could not proceed until their appointment to the 
Scottish counties around 19 August 1715; thereafter ‘… the Lord-lieutenants mobilised the fencible 
men in virtually every county under government control’ (Szechi 2006: 119).  Even then tensions 
arose regarding the extent of their powers vis à vis both the heritable jurisdictions and the traditional 
limit of ‘Scottish service’ in arms to forty days in the year (ibid.: 220, 221).  The effectiveness of 
heritable jurisdictions and the lower courts depended on those exercising powers honouring their 
sworn allegiance to the Crown.  However, as the offices of that system (sheriffs, justices of the peace 
and, in the burghs, magistrates) had become heritable opportunities for the landed élite, or within their 
gift, then their dissembling in favour of a Stuart restoration potentially undermined the entire system 
of social order at a community level.  This permitted the perpetration of breaches of the peace, 
seditious conduct, intimidation and the use of actual physical force against civilians.  Legal opposition 
was beyond the modest capabilities of local constables, watchmen, town officers or even magistrates, 
as shown by the ‘capture’ of Perth and Dundee (Szechi 2006: 111-114) – which significantly lacked 
barracks.  Given these deficiencies the failure to apprehend Mar was scarcely unexpected.  But it was 
surprising that it took until 17 February 1716 for the Act of Attainder of the Earl of Mar to receive 
royal assent, virtually two weeks after his voluntary departure into exile. 
8.10 Illustration: Resourcing the Campaign of the 2nd Duke of Argyll 
There is general agreement that the Jacobite army assembled in response to Mar’s enterprise 
numerically exceeded that of the Duke of Argyll by a substantial margin, although the estimates of the 
Jacobite forces vary both necessarily, given the sources and nature of the manpower involved, and 
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interpretatively, given the apparent motives underlying the computations.  Thus, to emphasise the 
popular nature of the insurrection the Jacobite forces have been described as ‘… a vast host, almost 
the maximum size of an army which could be recruited from the nation’s population’ (Pittock 1998: 
42), as though domestic opposition were negligible.  Yet loyalist numbers outside the regular army 
were significant.  For example, Charles notes six thousand armed fencible men assembled at Irvine on 
22 August, five hundred at Nithsdale, three hundred at Clydesdale and an anticipated six hundred at 
Glasgow (Charles 1816: 247, 250-252).  However, at the insistence of George I these, and other 
volunteers of the Association movement, were not all mobilised (Szechi 2006: 107-111).   
The Duke of Argyll was concerned by the disparity.  When Mar proclaimed James VIII at 
Kirkmichael on 6th September, 1715, the number of regular troops available to the government in 
Scotland lay somewhere between 600 and 1000 (Szechi 2006: 119), some located in far-flung castle 
garrisons in the west.  Argyll made numerous requests for additional regular troops, but the support 
provided was limited.  The plausible ‘might-have-been’ is that if the government had provided 
additional, appropriate resources, then the insurrection would have been brought to a more rapid and 
decisive end.  Accordingly, the reasons for the failure to do so had a significant part to play in the 
explanation of the event. 
A domestic standing army can be an ambiguous asset.  Given its allegiance, it can be a defence 
against insurrection fomented by internal political division or foreign invasion.  But under despotic 
control it may become a malign tool of internal oppression or, if control of it is lost, an equally malign 
challenge to the political status quo.  In Britain, the experience of the Civil War left a strong political 
prejudice against the maintenance of a standing army.  ‘The educated elite, unlike their continental 
neighbours … believ[ed] that a standing army would become corrupt and a threat to peace, while a 
militia would foster a sense of [Machiavellian] virtù in its citizen soldiers’ (Henshaw 2011: 242).  
However, that a group of the community’s ‘fencible men’, led by local gentry, could constitute an 
appropriate militia and not an insurgency was premised on that gentry’s allegiance to the Crown.  
Political division undermined this institution as it did the local system of law and order.  Strachan 
points out that ‘… most surprisingly, the militia – the so-called “constitutional force” – actually went 
into decline after 1689, and increasingly became a supplement to the regular army, not a 
counterweight to it’ (Strachan 1997: 48). 
The Bill of Rights of 1689 ‘… made provision for the legal existence of a standing army [in that] it 
accepts rather than rejects the idea that there will be a standing army in time of peace … [and that] 
parliament had to consent to the continued existence of the army, [but] it retained no say over how 
that army would be employed’, that control remaining with the Crown (ibid.).  The broad purposes of 
this standing army were defined in the contemporaneous Mutiny Act.  The original purpose of this 
annually renewable Act was to define the limits of military law in a domestic context (Higham 1972: 
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617).  However, from 1712 it became the convention for the Act to set a specific upper limit to the 
size of the standing army, in terms of numbers of foot-soldiers – 8,000 at that time.  Independently, 
with the Treaty of Union there had ceased to be a separate Scottish army; at the beginning of the 
eighteenth century this had numbered nearly 3,000 men (Childs 2012: 326).  Thereafter the share of 
the British standing army allocated to Scotland became a matter of expediency at the discretion of the 
Crown, driven by its judgement of the overall contemporary political situation.  As of mid-1715, the 
complement of regular troops in Scotland was a matter of expediency. 
An army of 8,000 foot-soldiers was less than half what James VII/II called on to oppose William of 
Orange in 1688, perhaps reflecting an ambiguous political assessment, under Queen Anne, of the 
possibility of foreign invasion.  Many Jacobites considered this necessary to promote the Stuart 
counter-revolution.  It had come close to reality in 1708, pointing up the specific inadequacy of 
Scottish defences.  A generally acknowledged and accepted characteristic of the significant ‘Country’ 
element within the British Tory party was the defining Jacobite aspiration towards the ‘second 
restoration’ of the Stuart dynasty.  It was legitimate, provided it could conceivably be achieved 
through parliamentary means, a possibility encouraged by the opinion that Queen Anne was a ‘closet 
Jacobite’ who would revoke the 1701 Act of Settlement and name her half-brother James as her 
successor before her death (Gregg 1972).  This was reinforced by the hope that James would repudiate 
his Roman Catholic faith, to accord with the 1689 Bill of Rights.  The Tories came into power in the 
1710 general election; sixteen of the forty-five Scottish seats were taken by confirmed Jacobites.  The 
Tory position was further consolidated in the election of 1713.  Pro-Jacobite commitments were thus 
deeply embedded in the contemporary political system, and the ministry’s policies could scarcely be 
totally free from their influence; moreover, significant ministers shared the pro-Stuart aspiration, as 
became evident later with their impeachment.  Tory policies were possibly influenced to varying 
extents by anti-Hanoverian, anti-Union, pro-France sentiment and opposition to involvement in 
expensive continental wars – complementing the long-standing Cavalier opposition to the 
maintenance of a standing army, housed in locally oppressive garrisons (Henshaw 2011: 261).  Thus, 
the reduced size of the British army was conceivably an expeditious accommodation of Jacobite 
views that saw little need for serious preparation to oppose a counter-revolutionary invasion.  But the 
dramatic switch to an anti-Jacobite and Whig administration under George I, by provoking Mar’s 
enterprise, pointed up the inadequate domestic military capability to cope with an insurrection.  
According to Whatley, in 1715 ‘there was mounting alarm among government officers responsible for 
security matters in Scotland, not only about the inadequacy of [available] forces and arms … but also 
as there seemed little likelihood of reinforcements being brought north. … London, where the king 
and ministers had been lulled into a false sense of security over Scotland, seemed unprepared to 
release funds,’ to strengthen [Scottish] defences (Whatley 2006: 354). 
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The overall size of the standing army apart, a higher priority may have been given to the protection of 
parts of Britain other than Scotland.  Centres of population, economic activity and political power had 
priority, although the nature of economic interdependence complicated the matter – for example, the 
northern coalfields of Tyneside warranted specific protection given London’s dependence on coal 
supplies.  Resources were also focused on known centres of disturbance – hence the creation of 
garrisons in southern cities such as Oxford, Bristol and Bath (Szechi 2006: 142).  As Szechi notes, 
‘The bulk of the forces in England and Wales were … concentrated in the south.  This opened the way 
for the northern England rising ‘… opposed [and dealt with] by forces that had to march up from the 
south’, forces that remained in occupation as a precaution (ibid.).  So not only Scotland was under-
defended.  Opposition was potentially growing: Scotland was possibly affected disproportionately 
more than elsewhere by the concurrent demobilisation of some 52,000 troops consequent on the Peace 
of Utrecht (Henshaw 2011: 33).  This flooded British society with experienced ex-soldiers.  Some 
became recruits to the Jacobite cause: ‘[Landed gentry in Fife] had taken into their service additional 
domestics, selecting in preference men who had served in some of the dragoon regiments, which had 
been reduced in consequence of the peace of Utrecht’ (Scott 1833: 94).  However, the clear indication 
given to Argyll that the Scottish theatre was not a government priority suggests confidence that the 
prospect of a French invasion following a decisive Jacobite victory in Scotland was diminishing.  It 
had not occurred during the term of a government with Jacobite leanings and, given the outcome of 
the War of the Spanish Succession and France’s commitments within the Treaty of Utrecht, the 
likelihood of an invasion looked remote.  A different consideration was that the Mutiny Act of 1713 
had abolished capital punishment for mutiny, sedition and desertion, reducing the severity of sentence 
to that for lesser crimes.  The Crown ‘… became powerless to suppress the political activity of the 
Army in favour of the Pretender’ (Clode 1872: 49).  This potentially undermined the reliability and 
effectiveness of the standing army, whatever its size, in anti-Jacobite operations, particularly in 
Scotland.  Capital punishment was restored in the third of three Acts passed within a year of the 
outbreak of Jacobite disturbances in 1715.  In short, the outcome in Scotland was less important than 
maintaining stability in southern England and London specifically.  In that respect, there may have 
been, as Szechi suggests, an inclination to treat Scotland as temporarily ‘expendable’, using limited 
military capability first for higher-priority defence against more damaging insurrection in England 
and then ‘… to reconquer any territory [the government] might lose in the interim’ (Szechi 2006: 
140).   
On the presumption that the government could ultimately call on superior resources than could the 
Jacobites, in the absence of French assistance, the eventual outcome of Mar’s enterprise – even if 
unanticipated – was scarcely in doubt.  However, that its suppression was neither immediate nor 
decisive can be explained in part in terms of a combination of factors: a constraint on military 
resourcing inherited from a previous administration that lacked a committed opposition to Jacobitism 
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and, given that constraint, a recognition that French intervention in support of Jacobitism was no 
longer a threat. 
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Part Three The Nature of Explanation of Historical Conflict 
 
Towards a Conclusion 
 
The foregoing chapters have offered a specific argument concerning the nature of explanation of past 
human action, supported by some illustrations.  Its conceptual starting-point was the claim that an 
awareness of the ‘passage’ of time (using the customary metaphor) is integral to human action.  In this 
respect, any explanation of human action is intrinsically historical in nature.  It is not simply because 
the evidence of human action has been generated in and therefore belongs to the past.  It is rather that 
all action, present and past, is a product of an integration of retrospective and prospective judgements 
by temporally conscious individual minds. 
The implications are significant.  First, in so far as explanation of the temporal succession of the 
‘events’ of human experience is sought, the dated singular account displaces the timeless general 
account.  The supposed epistemological advantages of the latter are irrelevant, given the primacy of 
private subjective judgements, exercised in a context of action that is itself the product of similar 
previous judgements.  Second, by way of a corollary, such explanation can claim contingency, not the 
necessity that might be expected of a reliable explanation – although Chapter 1 suggested that the 
logical concept of necessity may not be an unassailable criterion, even for explanations of the physical 
world.  Third, again following on, as contingency means that things could plausibly have happened 
differently, potentials that previously existed failed to be realised.  But their failure contributed to the 
course of the event as experienced.  However, the reasons for their failure must be largely speculative.  
As explanation is thus obliged to span the ‘what-might-have-beens’, the possibility arises of a 
plurality of legitimate singular historical explanations – co-valid explanations of the same evidence 
set.  Which of these explanations, none directly contradicted by the evidence, is awarded the accolade 
of ‘most persuasive’ is essentially a product of rhetoric – as it has been effectively put, albeit in a 
different context, by a ‘… reliance on the mysterious, subtle and fathomless power of words’ (Shackle 
1974: 75). 
The ubiquity of conflict 
 
However, the argument has not only been concerned with the general nature of historical explanation 
of human action, but also specifically with conflict, which pervades and possibly characterises human 
action.  Conceived as above, human actions possess a sufficient degree of autonomy to warrant the 
attribution of responsibility for them, yet this individual responsibility is qualified.  The autonomy is 
coupled with a consciousness of other individuals presumed similarly capable, such that actions are to 
a greater or lesser extent unavoidably social in nature and, in the limit, collective.  While there is 
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evidence of constructive social engagement, there is also ample evidence of division and destructive 
engagement, to the extent of deliberately killing fellow-humans.  Moreover, a significant part of the 
former is motivated and pursued primarily to prosecute the latter more assiduously.  It is not obvious 
why ‘social’ should necessarily signify harmonious engagement, as conflict seems integral to society. 
The argument has suggested that the presence of conflict results from the same conscious human 
endeavour to cope with this awareness of the ‘passage’ of time.  This endeavour involves the adoption 
of a singular perspective on the apparently ceaseless procession of events from which individuals, as 
reflective participants, cannot detach themselves.  Its adoption may involve the intention to resist that 
change and remain ‘the same’ in both of Davis’s ‘re-identification’ and ‘individuation’ senses 
introduced in Chapter 2 (Davis 2003: 12, 13).  If it is anticipated that change ‘brought’ by time 
inevitably poses a threat to the identity of the self, then the ‘other’, as the agent of change, may be 
viewed as a threat and thus a target for action, violent if thought necessary.  However, at the same 
time, for some individuals that same perspective may change abruptly and a new perspective enable 
them to identify themselves with the active pursuit of change, but of a constructive kind, despite 
opposition from both the erstwhile ‘we’ and the ‘other’.  It remains to consider further the origination 
of these perspectives and how they may change. 
Prior to that, however, the implications of the problem of reflexivity must be considered.  This 
problem permeates the entire enterprise of explanation of human action and might be thought to 
undermine the conclusions reached so far.  It arises here because historical explanation (and 
archaeological explanation) is itself a kind of human action and thus shares its defining 
characteristics.  As observed in Chapter 6, the key issue is whether, if action explains action, the 
distinction between subject and object can be abandoned, when that Cartesian distinction is generally 
presumed to be the prerequisite of sound explanation.  So long as the ‘object’ is literally an object – 
that is, not a person – then there is no problem.  But once minds are admitted and their component 
role acknowledged in the phenomena to be explained, then the problematic prospect follows, of minds 
explaining minds.  And this cannot obviously be immunised by a methodological commitment to 
objectivity, as that would deny the existence of minds – paradoxically, minds would have abolished 
minds.  Moreover, human action – taken to be essentially a matter of purpose, intention and vitally 
conscious of self and others – would then be reduced to physical movement of material substances.  
This inadequate reductionism is arguably a greater problem than the challenge posed by minds 
endeavouring to explain minds – or, as Shackle put it, ‘… thought endeavouring to understand a 
world of action based upon thought’ (Shackle 1992: xii).  Although Shackle had economics 
specifically in mind, his arguments apply to all the human sciences.  The problem of reflexivity 
cannot be circumvented – nor can the plurality of explanations of human action where definitive 
objectivity is not on offer. 
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Chapters 9 and 10 consider respectively the formation and change of perspectives on the passage of 
time, and the specific issue as to how violence can be integral to these perspectives, particularly lethal 
violence.  The former draws on insights provided by the economist George Shackle, previously cited, 
on the premise that these have a much wider currency than only within the discipline of economics.  
The latter addresses the most extreme form of human action, with important moral associations.  This 
presents a distinct challenge to explanation, in so far as this can engage the moral judgement of the 
analyst.  
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Chapter 9 Human Action and Incompatible Perspectives 
 
9.1 Patterns, Perspectives and Explanation 
In the domain of the physical sciences the object of explanation is typically a perceived pattern of 
association exhibited by specific material evidence, possibly in the form of recorded observations 
(including derived measurements) from repeated experimental manipulation, but not excluding (in the 
case of archaeology, for example) distributions of objects in the field, uniquely arrayed where they 
were deposited, to be associated with those uncovered at other locations.  Conditions must be satisfied 
for a specific pattern to be admitted as a legitimate explanandum; these are routinely satisfied in most 
experimental contexts but elsewhere can be more contentious.  The materiality of the evidence and of 
the experimental set-up confer a reasonable objectivity on the several observations.  However, the 
observed pattern of the observations is not a substantive entity but a product of inference.  
Corroborated observation of the pattern, in a simple visual sense or through replication, may give it 
additional significance, but does not alter its inferential status.  It is the adoption of an underlying 
perspective in the mind’s ‘eye’ that warrants the pattern’s legitimacy, worthy of investigation. 
It seems plausible to claim that this process of inference driven by a mental perspective on specific 
evidence and its context is not only the essence of scientific investigation of the physical world; it is 
also the essence of both the investigation of human action and of its actual practice.  In short, it is 
central to human life.  That is, the explanation of human action involves the prior adoption of a 
perspective from which the relevant evidence is viewed in some specific ‘light’.  However, the need 
for the adopted perspective to be plausible can be illustrated by reference to Shackle’s contribution to 
the discipline of economics.  In Shackle’s view the perspective that inspired the orthodoxy of 
economic analysis was implausible.  The orthodox perspective did not only define the domain of 
economics as the activity of exchange, but crucially it also viewed variation in the market price of a 
good as able to wholly resolve the conflict intrinsic to exchange, as each party sought to out-do the 
other – rather than serve their interest.  Then, in combination with various a priori premises, it 
eventually showed that an abstract, closed system of price-forming markets could logically harmonise 
all conflicting demands within the limit set by available resources.  No element of monopoly could 
exist to give an agent superior market power over any other, so only impersonal competitive forces 
remained to drive price formation.  This abstract model gained credibility from the fact that it was in 
effect a simulacrum of a physical mechanism: minds played no part.  While it ignored the actual 
existence of monopoly, either from the granting of privileges or as the dialectical culmination of 
successful competition itself, the implausibility surfaced most prominently in the model’s implication 
that unemployment of labour must therefore be voluntary, due to unwillingness to work – although 
minds were supposed to have no role.  This was an untenable position in the contemporary context of 
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the Great Depression.  John Maynard Keynes argued in the 1930s that a substantive change of 
analytical perspective was required, to recognise that an economic system that employed capital 
goods and financial assets (the two being related, as argued in Chapter 8) could produce ‘involuntary 
unemployment’, illogical from the orthodox perspective.  Broadly speaking, it resulted from economic 
agents coming to terms with their unavoidable ignorance of the collective consequences of their own 
actions, in turn driven by their own perspectives.  In short, minds were relevant.  These perspectives 
were resistant to economic policy and yet prone to be sensitive to changes in what Keynes called ‘the 
news’ – changes in general socio-political circumstances which, though remote from the actual 
contexts of individual agents, had leverage on opinion.  Whereas the orthodox perspective viewed 
exchange as eliminating economic conflict, the market in capital assets required conflict (of opinions 
about their future values) for exchange to occur – that is, price variation signalled conflict, not its 
resolution.  And the presence of monopoly in actual markets involved the aggravation of economic 
conflict, through the exercise of market power, leading towards Bobbitt’s market state.  Shackle spent 
a large part of his academic career explicating the ‘revolutionary’ features of Keynes’s analysis of the 
‘economic process of history’ (Shackle 1974: 42), giving intellectual support to various heterodox 
positions within the discipline.  In so doing he made extended use of his ‘kaleidic’ analogy to explore 
expectations – and he did find some evidence of Keynes’s use of the same analogy (ibid.: 76). 
9.2 The Kaleidic Conception 
The structure of the kaleidoscope – a set of mirrors and a lens providing a reflected view of a given 
set of small objects – supports a useful analogy.  Its applicability to human action arises from the 
assumption that the springs of action are situated in the consciousness of the individual.  The initial 
arrangement of the objects has no apparent pattern.  But through the lens a pattern can be observed, 
generated by the instrument’s structure and disposition.  Any adjustment to the lens, while the objects 
remain in position, instantly creates a significantly different and evidently unrelated pattern.  By 
analogy, the mental process engenders a perspective on the underlying context of life, involving a 
pattern of expectations as to the possible prospects.  However, expectations are qualitative and pertain 
to an unknowable future, one that cannot – as Keynes himself explicitly argued – be brought within 
the compass of quantitative probability.  But expectations are as abruptly changeable as the pattern in 
the kaleidoscope, in response to any adjustment of its lens.  Such is the nature of expectations that 
they are vulnerable to ‘the news’, ‘… something that was in some sense and in some degree 
unguessable … containing an element of novelty, unexpectedness and surprise [and] ideas whose 
possibility was considered and rejected; and some element of the unexpected, the unthought of, the 
unentertained idea, never considered or assigned any degree of possibility, high or low, because it 
never entered into thought.  News may thus disrupt the formal structure of a man’s expectations …’ 
(Shackle 1972: 180, 181).  None of this ‘news’ need be narrowly ‘economic’ in nature.  Its origin, 
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however, is the collective past actions of other agents predicated on their previous but equally 
vulnerable expectations. 
Shackle limited his use of the analogy to the economic context.  However, this ‘kaleidic perspective-
shift’ is applicable to all forms of human action, since they are all intrinsically future-directed and 
thereby contingent on potentially unstable and mutable expectations.  Indeed, the prospect of the 
individual entertaining a bewildering diversity of mental images generated from experience raises the 
question as to how this is simplified or becomes focused in such a way as to enable specific actions to 
be pursued.  As noted in Chapter 1, Shackle offered a distinctive approach to the analysis of 
individual choice within which that narrowing of options would occur.  In the context of an individual 
private business enterprise, the perspective will plausibly be focused on prospective financial gains 
and losses.  Keynes, however, emphasised the collective nature of the perspective in the case of the 
future value of financial assets, heightening its sensitivity to the wide range of considerations in the 
‘news’.  Beyond the economic context, perspectives are likely to be intrinsically social, political and 
religious in nature.  In turn these are likely to be permeated with personal values and awareness of 
rights and obligations.  Concerns pertaining to relationships with others – such as social acceptance or 
rejection, inclusion or exclusion, identification or opposition, social standing and respect, allegiance 
and commitment – seem likely to drive affinities and focus individual expectations on a few discrete 
perspectives.  Human action can then be influenced by collective alliances and crowd behaviour, with 
public opinion exhibiting inertia or momentum divorced from specifically individual rationales.  
Thus, it may be a serious distortion to interpret agents’ actions in terms of substantive individual 
motives, beyond the commitment ‘to join in’ – or not.  The relevance of this for the decision to engage 
in lethal conflict will be considered in the following chapter. 
Reflexivity again 
The possibility of perspective-shifts has implications in respect of the reflexivity of explanation of 
human action, previously introduced.  Just as past human action that left behind an archaeological and 
historical record was contingent on agents’ contemporary perspectives, present human action in 
pursuit of an explanation of that past action must similarly be contingent on the analyst’s perspective.  
This can in turn be presumed to have the same potential to shift as those of the agents whose actions, 
inferred from the physical evidence, are to be explained.  In the context of the physical sciences 
analysts are subject to the discipline of scientific procedure that is intended to isolate the actions of 
analysts as scientists, from the actions of analysts as ordinary human agents, a separation that 
contributes to the claimed objectivity of science.  Whether this voluntary quarantining of the personal 
perspectives and expectations of the agents who assume the role of analysts (that is, scientists) can – 
or indeed should – succeed is an important issue (touched on in Chapter 1), but in the human sciences 
it cannot succeed.  The basic reason for this is partly the inapplicability of the method of the physical 
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sciences, but primarily the necessity to employ the ordinary capacities that constitute existence as a 
human agent to comprehend the actions of other similarly constituted human agents.  The latter’s 
distinctiveness is essentially in terms of mere temporality, not an ‘other’ defined in oppositional 
terms.  But this is difficult to sustain, for reasons that will be considered in the next section.  However, 
the important conclusion at this point is that historical explanation typically involves an inherent 
reliance on a specific perspective to play an instrumental role in ‘observing’ a pattern in the evidence, 
in all its ambiguity.  This commitment to a specific perspective constitutes a ‘meta-explanation’, as it 
generates, in Shackle’s kaleidic sense, the ordered view of the evidence that precedes an explanation 
in conventional understanding.  But obtaining general acceptance of the explanation so derived, when 
the commitment to the meta-explanation may not initially be shared, requires specific effort.  This is 
where the persuasiveness of the discourse used to present the explanation, and the rhetoric therein 
deployed, become of critical importance.  The objective is to produce the necessary change in the 
audience’s perspective – and reinforce the pattern ‘observed’ in the evidence – which is central to 
achieving the addition to understanding of what may have happened. 
9.3 The Limits of Objectivity 
An implication of the claim that it is necessary to employ persuasive discourse to obtain endorsement 
of a given explanation is that initially there must coexist at least two competing explanations of the 
same evidence.  In Chapter 2 and elsewhere it was argued that this was the characteristic of 
adversarial advocacies in a trial by jury.  However, the claim is not based on a presumption that one 
advocacy must be wrong, but on the view that the commitment to any given perspective – on which a 
given explanation ultimately rests – may be difficult to dislodge, because the perspective can be prior 
to the evidence (as considered below).  In contrast, ‘wrongness’ is an evidential matter (as opposed to 
merely un-compelling).  Nonetheless, the plausibility of the coexistence of rival explanations is 
typically attacked on the basis that the singularity of objective evidence surely must warrant a single 
correct objective explanation: agreement as to what had happened should, on that basis, support one 
and only one explanation.  The key question is whether, were this to be successfully argued in 
principle, it would constitute a general case to which all explanation should conform or a special case 
of limited applicability.  Chapters 1 to 3 above have largely subscribed to the latter view.  If the 
objective explanatory domain admits only objects and changes in their location, then either it excludes 
humans or reduces humans to objects that can move.  By ignoring what distinguishes humans from 
other objects – including that only they seek explanations of objective evidence – or by excluding 
them altogether, a special case is defined encompassing only a subset of reality.  The general case is 
the one that includes human agency, not only in terms of agents’ use of material objects but also their 
engagement with one another.  The pursuit of explanations in that wider set unavoidably involves the 
deployment of human perspectives on human agency.  This incidentally emphasises the relevance of 
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the kaleidic view of explanation.  There can only be uncertain expectations of how others may act in 
circumstances which are, in turn, partly uncertain constructions of their imagination, rather than 
narrowly what the material record shows. 
In the course of Chapter 4 it was suggested that empathy (or sympathy) played an important role in 
the establishment of social integration, represented by the concept of the ‘we’.  It might seem 
plausible that this capacity should also have a role in the adoption of an appropriate perspective from 
which to explain an instance of past human action.  This presumes that empathy could be simply 
redirected from the context of actual social engagement among contemporary agents and made to 
drive a retrospective reconstruction of past human action, consistent with the available evidence.  
However, the notion that this specific human capacity and none other might be so deployed is not 
only unjustifiably selective, but also, despite its relevance and value in a contemporary context, liable 
to be impeded by the difficulty of imagining unfamiliar contexts of past action – most particularly that 
of lethal combat or the total failure of social order and the rule of law.  The endorsement of an 
empathetic approach may possibly arise from thinking of it as a proxy for the detached observation 
associated with physicalist scientific method.  A capacity to share, in some phenomenological sense, 
the mind sets of historical agents, penetrating the overlays due to the passage of time and disregarding 
the partial knowledge of both the contemporary context and the identities of the individuals 
concerned, might be thought to yield a clear and undistorted vision of the reasons for past action.  But 
the appeal to sympathy was not originally intended to provide an objective view of the actions of 
others; rather, with its judgemental dimensions it had a significant role in the development of a moral 
philosophy (Raphael 2007).  This raises the critical questions of whether an adopted perspective in 
historical explanation can be value-free or indeed should be.  Affirmative answers to both questions 
are generally understood to be part and parcel of scientific method.  In the material sciences, the issue 
arguably does not arise: the mindless nature of its objects means that their movements are not actions 
and neither they nor their manipulation raise moral considerations.   In the life sciences, the same 
cannot be said; values intrude, both in judging what ought to be subject to intervention or what 
techniques of intervention ought to be employed.  But more generally it may be overlooked that the 
pursuit of a particular orthodox scientific procedure has an implicit evaluative warrant which it claims 
a heterodox procedure lacks – hence the debate between good and bad science, touched on in Chapter 
1, a debate which reveals that science admits at least epistemic values (Putnam 2002: 30).  However, 
given that the explanation of action is focused on the role of ‘doing’ and that this generally impinges 
on others, it raises the prospect that good or bad is thereby done to them.  This admits ethical values 
into the context of action, which in turn permits the explanation of the action to incorporate a 
judgement along with description – a judgement that will reflect the values of an individual analyst 
and so may not coincide with that of another, or the agent.  So, the entanglement of fact and value (as 
opposed to their dichotomous separation) in human action contributes to the coexistence of differing 
  Human Action and Incompatible Perspectives 
202 
 
perspectives on the human action in question, apart from each possessing the distinguishing kaleidic 
propensity to shift.  Accordingly, while it could be argued that an ideal description of human action 
will be purely factual and thus singular – by the device of considering agents as no more than objects 
that change their position – explanation of human action as such will inevitably be plural, value-
driven and potentially unstable. 
9.4 Advocacy and Explanation 
The analogy drawn between different historical explanations of the ‘same’ event offered to interested 
audiences and the adversarial advocacies addressed to a trial jury, was to support two claims.  First, 
one body of evidence could conceivably support conflicting accounts.  Second, it is the 
persuasiveness of one account relative to another – a matter of the choice of language used and thus 
the force of rhetoric – from the hearer’s mental perspective, that leads to the acceptance of one rather 
than another.  Each explanation or advocacy seeks to reconstruct from the variously witnessed actions 
the agents’ underlying perspectives and judgements, the former now understood to be prone to 
kaleidic shifts.  Moreover, the act of reconstruction involved in both necessarily exercises reflexively 
not only the similarly kaleidic perspectives and judgements of the advocate or historical analyst, but 
also engages in a similar way those to whom the accounts are intentionally directed.  Awareness of 
the latter engagement will also bear on those of the advocate or analyst, particularly conditioning the 
language finally employed to convey the account.  The advocate or analyst thus performs a Janus-like 
function, facing back to past action and forward to future understanding of it, custodian of the 
gateway between the two.  However, there are differences between the advocacy and the historical 
explanation, which limit a more extended analogy.  First, a jury is under obligation to decide – and 
within a time constraint – in respect of the alleged guilt of the accused.  But an audience is under no 
such obligation to choose between rival historical explanations, although it is free to do so.  Second, 
members of a jury decide by vote in favour of one advocacy, setting aside – but not necessarily 
invalidating – the other.  An audience, however, is not a forum in which specific historical 
explanations are given special comparative assessment, although individual members may 
independently choose to do so.  Third, that a jury may be offered guidance by the presiding judge 
reveals not only the substantive issue that it is under the authority of the court (and the law), but also 
that their decision should be arrived at in a particular way: that each member should decide as ‘a 
reasonable person’, in favour of the outcome that is considered ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ or that is 
indicated by the ‘balance of probabilities’ (according to the legal context).  The guidance may be 
intended to help convey the notion that the decision is solemn and serious, not frivolous or casual, to 
be based solely on the argument and not prejudice or partiality.  However, the words carry rhetorical 
force towards the notion that the decision is a matter of deductive reason or inference from 
measurable probabilities.  Taken literally it seems almost contrary to the rationale of trial by jury: if 
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reason can decide then there should be no need for contrary advocacies to be resolved by a vote.  An 
alternative construction is possible, however: that in the interest of justice it is important for 
consideration to be given to both advocacies and the inclination resisted to act simply in accordance 
with the juror’s prevailing perspective – even if there has been a switch in perspectives induced by 
counsels’ presentations. 
The preparation and presentation of a particular advocacy or explanation span a specific temporal 
duration of the life of the advocate and the analyst – just as their subject matter concerns a specific 
duration in the lives of others.  It seems inevitable that the perspectives and judgements brought to 
their engagement in these tasks will reflect their personal recollected pasts and their imagined futures, 
precisely as do those that energised the actions of the agents featured in the advocacy or the 
explanation.  As was pointed out above, the kaleidic quality pervades their own perspectives just as it 
does those of the subjects of their work.  They will of course bring relevant training and experience to 
their respective tasks.  But that need not prevent their personal perspectives from affecting the 
processes of inference, of ascribing weights to specific elements of evidence, of selecting syntax and 
vocabulary to achieve the desired reactions to the eventual advocacy or explanation.  Perspectives 
relating to personal reputation and rivalrous ambition, inspiration and creativity, and ideological 
commitments permeating their approach cannot be prevented from influencing what is drawn from the 
evidence and presented to either jury or audience.  But not only are all prone to kaleidic shifts; they 
are the product of previous shifts. 
Nonetheless, an audience still must confront the question of how to respond to the coexistence of 
plural historical explanations of the same event.  On the face of it, time is on the side of the audience 
(unlike a jury) and the plurality may be dismissed as a temporary problem, to be harmonised in due 
course by new evidence.  It is true that, when new evidence comes to light, even a jury’s vote may be 
shown to have promulgated a miscarriage of justice.  Equivalently, hitherto undiscovered 
documentary evidence can emerge, new scholarship can suggest fresh implications of already-known 
sources and new archaeological finds can potentially indicate physical presences and actions that were 
previously unsuspected or erroneously reported (For example, Pollard 2009: Chapter 6).  However, 
the presumption that new physical evidence can necessarily arbitrate between rival explanations must 
be challenged.  A central strand of the argument pursued here is that explanation is a type of non-
deductive inference from physical evidence.  An augmented set of evidence does not eliminate that 
inferential step; at best, it merely alters the evidence from which the inference is drawn.  In the 
judicial context, new evidence may occasion a new trial to re-assess culpability; but the original 
judgement may nevertheless be upheld.  Whether an inference or interpretation is revised is a separate 
issue.  Explanation of human action remains a matter of inference and interpretation.  As outlined 
above, action expresses a kaleidic judgement.  Such is its nature that, while new findings may be 
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noted, they may not be admitted as objects of evidence that would necessarily transform the 
perspective, which accordingly remains unaltered.  On the other hand, if admitted as new evidence 
they may occasion a discontinuous shift to a totally new and unanticipated perspective, from which 
previously existing evidence comes to be seen in an altogether new light.  But the new perspective 
need not be ‘closer’ to some other pre-existing perspective.  In accordance with the proposal at the 
beginning of Part 3, perspectives are discrete and not continuously variable.  The substantive patterns 
the kaleidoscope can generate cannot be combined; they are mutually exclusive.  The notion that there 
can be a unified explanation of an historical event amounts to a commitment to the possibility of a 
‘kaleidic synthesis’.  But this is grounded on a misunderstanding about the expectational nature of 
human judgement – a response to the perpetual ignorance generated by the passage of time – fostered 
by the physicalist notion that one agreed set of evidence must warrant only one true explanation.  The 
mutability of the kaleidic judgement is also heightened by agents’ sensitivity to the expected actions 
of the ‘other’ – those who, for a variety of reasons associated with the fact of their separation from the 
‘we’, are suspected of opposition to the future state of affairs which the agents seek to bring about.  
As Shackle puts it, ‘… practical conscience, the guardian of survival, will insist on attention being 
paid to sequels [of choices] … whose realization would be a disaster, perhaps destroying the 
chooser’s capacity for further action’ (Shackle 1979: 103).  It can be argued that the emergent 
prospect of conflict, and particularly lethal conflict, whether contemplated reactively or proactively, is 
of a different order amongst the factors that can bring about a kaleidic transformation in human 
perspectives.  Accordingly, conflict merits separate consideration. 
   
 
205 
 
Chapter 10 Conflict in Human Perspective: Towards a Conclusion 
 
10.1 The Argument in Summary 
The distinctiveness of historical explanation derives from its task of explaining the singularity and 
contingency of human action.  Historical explanation must confront both the absence of any reliable 
separation between individual and social origins of human action, and the changeable nature of 
relationships among individuals and groups, ranging from concord to conflict, over both space and 
time.  Presuming human action to be willed by consciousness, the argument identified three of its 
aspects that contribute to these features.  First, its inherent temporality – that is, its awareness of and 
engagement with time.  Second, its ignorance of the consequences of the actions that it wills – they lie 
in a future yet to be experienced; they depend on the as-yet-unknown actions of others; they are 
contingent on a limited understanding of the practical relationships in which they are engaged.  Third, 
the commitment to specific values that exist as resistant anchor points of self-identity and collective-
identity in an otherwise uncertain world.  To these the argument has added a rationale for the 
instability of individual human wills: the role of a self-identifying mental perspective, composed from 
internally generated expectations concerning aspects of the future, that is prone to undergoing 
‘kaleidic shifts’ in response to the mutability of expectations.  These expectations are the attempts of 
consciousness to plug the gaps of ignorance identified above and so are sensitive to the acquisition of 
new information and impressions from experience.  Their sudden changes shift the mental 
perspective, which provokes new actions and may radically change relationships with others, now 
‘seen in a new light’, the nature and extent of their impact depending, inter alia, on the position of the 
individuals in the already-conflicted social hierarchy. 
10.2 The Endemic Nature of Conflict 
The prominence given to wars, revolutions and similar violent disturbances can create the impression 
that conflict is peculiarly associated with these discrete events, its emergence demanding a unique 
explanation on each occasion.  The argument developed here has suggested instead that conflict is 
endemic and it is variation in how it manifests itself that distinguishes ‘war’ from ‘peace’.  It is a 
matter of degree, not of kind. 
An aspect of the argument that must be stressed is the centrality of a phenomenological consciousness 
of time to the explanation of the temporal succession of human action.  Implicit in the notion of a 
human action is its timeliness, being anchored to specific moments.  Yet action in the present will 
have plural possible consequences in the future, none of them known, some of them undesirable.  This 
endows actions with intentions and purposes that look beyond their timely physical expression.  The 
necessity to imagine the future in order to act is inescapable and fundamental: as Shackle puts it ‘The 
  Conflict in Human Perspective: Towards a Conclusion 
 
206 
 
very living of conscious life is a thing unthinkable and basically excluded if we suppose the living 
beings to have knowledge of an objective future’ (Shackle 1969: 23).  While the limitless capacity of 
the imagination could confront prospective action with an immense complexity, the individual 
consciousness can abstract from this by reducing it to a single composite perspective in the ‘mind’s 
eye’, focusing on critical expectations of the future, coloured by sentiment and sharpened by hope and 
fear.  Amongst these are expectations that signal the perceived vulnerability of the self, at the hands of 
others.  Individual action inevitably involves engagement with actions of other conscious individuals, 
and it is implausible to assume that these must compose in a coherent, orderly and harmonious 
manner, ensuring that the collective outcome is – and therefore always will be –in some sense optimal 
for all concerned. 
A purely analytical general solution to this problem of disparate expectations has been conceived, but 
its assumptions that time can be collapsed to an instant and that mutual consistency of actions can be 
negotiated instantaneously render this dismissal of time and history no more than an intellectual 
curiosity – but sufficiently influential to be challenged by Keynes and Shackle (Chapter 9).  But time 
cannot be dismissed, so the mutual inconsistencies of expectations, some derivative of irreconcilable 
values, must be addressed, along with the potential they generate for fearfulness, antagonism, 
aggression and conflict in human engagement.  Chapter 3 made it clear that this engagement is 
structured in a complex system of overlapping and interlocking social groups, changing over time.  
Individuals are members of more than one group, such that specific actions can be both consistent 
with the status quo of one group but disruptive of that of another.  Moreover, the entire system is 
hierarchically ordered, so it is plausible to claim that at any given moment within the constellation of 
expectations will be some whose expressions in appropriate action are suppressed or repressed by the 
socio-political system of the moment, in contrast to those permitted to drive the routine business of 
‘ordinary’ life.  To the extent that actions predicated on the former expectations seeking change in the 
status quo, are prevented (a source of the might-have-beens of Chapter 6), the apparent order and 
coherence of human actions at that moment is a matter of form and not substance: it is conflict kept 
under tension. 
In short, the existing socio-political system is effectively conserving the status quo through force.  
Accordingly, ‘order’ is employed there in a sense categorically different from that of a reproducible 
physical process and therefore is not ‘natural’ in that sense.  Moreover, the point has been made that 
the perspective of consciousness may undergo a ‘kaleidic shift’ as experience over time transforms 
expectations.  If so, then the social tension may reach breaking-point and violence ensue.  In a 
fundamental sense, human life is a state of general disorder and conflict, which at times temporarily 
reaches a pitch of intensity that results in deaths.  Drawing physical analogies has obvious risks in the 
circumstances, but these periods of lethal conflict are the tips of an iceberg or the prominent but only 
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periodically appearing fruiting bodies of an extensive, perpetual and otherwise underground fungus.  
Conflict that is endemic may be less apparent than open warfare.  One task of historical explanation of 
any specific event is to expose and represent the underlying conflict integral to any significant change. 
10.3 Conflict, Change and Explanation   
Human affairs change through events.  The problems of explaining physical change – as ‘becoming’ – 
encourage it to be thought of as a process: spontaneous and of endogenous origin, perpetual and 
gradual.  But the present context involves an anthropocentric approach (or the agent’s view, as it was 
put previously), with its distinctive connection between time and change.  The agent’s 
phenomenological awareness of time, for example in Husserl’s combination of retention and 
protention, locates memorable events in a ‘presence’ integral to an ageless (conceivably eternal) self-
identity and lacks resemblance to the temporal dimension of, say, an evolutionary physical process.  
Within this framework, the agent’s personal actions discontinuously originate change, frequently in 
collaboration with others, so it does not necessarily have a unitary source.  Actions give expression to 
conscious, pre-existent expectations of specific outcomes.  Given that conflict is endemic, actions 
may be deliberately contrary to the interests of others and provoke reaction or retaliation, opening or 
foreclosing other opportunities and engendering further revisions of expectations as experience 
unfolds.  Consequently, while change due to human action can legitimately be described as 
endogenous, this is not in the physical causal sense associated with the orthodox antecedent-
consequent relationship, but in the ‘uncaused’ or innovative sense discussed in Chapter 2: once more 
employing Shackle’s words, ‘… when a person decides he innovates’ (Shackle 1969: 3).  Nor can this 
type of change be considered either perpetual or gradual.  Instead it is unpredictable and episodic, and 
at times precipitate, rapidly cumulative and ‘revolutionary’.  This conception applies to all human 
contexts: the personal; the socio-political; the industrial and the scientific – including change 
associated with scientific discovery.  Change initiated through human action shifts the baseline from 
which subsequent change departs, but does not in itself ‘cause’ this subsequent change in any 
mechanical sense.  It may leave an enduring legacy of changed and changing expectations – as 
happens in the case of a prolonged and intense war between nations, supporting the perspective that 
detects the event’s consequences reverberating even up to the present, a possibility effectively 
signalled in part of the title of Furedi’s treatment of the First World War: ‘Still no end in sight’ 
(Furedi 2014) – an interpretation also central to Bobbitt’s thesis (Chapter 4). 
Change propagated by human action in this manner is the source of the contingency of the temporal 
trajectory: actions are not pre-determined or necessitated, but are anticipatory yet initiated in a state of 
partial ignorance – whether in terms of their intended expediency or their consonance with the actions 
of others.  However, these outcomes may well be at variance with expectations and thus disappoint.  
Even so, some consolation may be derived from actions having been consistent with strongly held 
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personal values; these are integral to the consciousnesses of the agents, so actions can express such 
commitments (Chapter 8).  Indeed, it has been claimed that all agents necessarily act with the 
intention of bringing about what they consider to be desirable change, some pragmatists asserting this 
as a fundamental a priori axiom of action (on the basis that it is unthinkable that individuals would act 
otherwise) (von Mises 1962: 2-6).  This may be a tautology, but it certainly is neither sufficient to 
conclude that the present is in any sense the best of all possible worlds so far, nor does it energise a 
teleological impulse to take history in any specific direction.  But most critically, returning to the 
theme of the preceding section, it does not rule out the possibility that the change desired by some 
agents will generate the worst of all conceivable worlds from the standpoint of other agents affected 
by their actions. 
How individual actions compose is influenced by how mutually consistent the actions initially are, 
both in terms of their immediate engagement and the accommodation one agent is prepared to offer 
the ‘other’.  Their relative power and influence – individual, social, political and economic – become 
important means by which control over the ‘other’ can be attained.  Power may be augmented by 
acting in alliance with others, with shared or congruent objectives, the prevailing social structure 
becoming an important factor.  The emergence of divergent perspectives on each other’s existence 
may engender a conception of each ‘other’ as being not just beyond the scope of mutual 
accommodation but a real threat to their welfare.  These perspectives would have associated 
expectations regarding respective future actions and outcomes.  As previously argued, these are 
vulnerable to ‘the news’ and prone to radical change, resulting in the ‘kaleidic shift’ of perspectives.  
In this way, a previously accommodating and even mutually supportive relationship with the ‘other’ 
may be suddenly transformed by fresh suspicions, rumours or propaganda through stages of 
separation, confrontation and ultimately physical conflict, conceivably extending to mutual savagery 
and barbarity (Chapter 4).  The prospect of any resolution may have to await the outcome of 
subsequent violence before a negotiated settlement (possibly involving third-party mediation) can be 
achieved. 
Whether conflict resolution can be achieved is likely to depend on the balance between negotiable and 
the non-negotiable elements embedded in the prevailing perspectives, together with the prospect that 
these perspectives can be changed again, this time in the direction of mutual accommodation.  It is 
quite plausible that the non-negotiable elements will be rooted in ethical and moral values, 
conditioning the socio-political mores that in turn defend accepted patterns of rights and obligations.  
Efforts at conflict resolution may have to disturb these patterns.  But value-driven opposition to this 
will perpetuate physical conflict, conceivably to the extreme point where the seemingly shared right to 
life is forced for the time being into a subordinate position, relative to protection of the substantive 
firmly held values that are apparently under threat from the ‘other’s’ initiatives.  In so far as the 
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attachment to those values – religious, social or political – are common to individuals’ differing 
physical circumstances, then shared commitment to a specific value can be expressed as a common 
cause, multiplying opposition and mobilising public opinion against the proposed change.  Thus 
conflict – the de-composition of human actions – emerges as a product of the opposition of ideas that 
give primacy to values.  When values clash, there is no basis in rationality for one to claim supremacy 
over the other; they are ends, not means (Chapter 3).  But if primacy is not given to a value that 
deprecates the use of physical force and its possibly lethal consequences, then it is quite plausible that 
recourse to physical force will be considered a legitimate means to oppose a perceived external threat 
from the ‘other’ to the values that constitute the ‘we’ (Chapter 5).  This will be even more likely if the 
initiative being confronted is specifically directed towards achieving internal ‘régime change’, the 
supplanting of one set of values, together with its associated power structures, by another. 
The resort to physical force can thus be interpreted as a justified response to the encounter of 
divergent value-infused perspectives, grounded on expectations of mutually exclusive future states of 
affairs and characterising each ‘other’ as the embodiment of a mortal threat.  But it is another matter 
to expect that the resort to physical force will resolve the divergence.  Being non-material, values 
cannot be destroyed, even if all those who presently subscribe to them were to be eliminated – which 
is unlikely, given human mobility – as deprecated values can re-appear through the kaleidic 
transformation of other groups’ perspectives, regarding the form their own futures might take.  
Conflicts of values are likely to be endemic and perpetual, and any cessation of lethal violence only a 
temporary hiatus, to be replaced by a different manifestation at some as-yet undetermined time in the 
future (Chapter 4).  The implication for historical explanation is that it can reasonably be expected to 
interpret events in terms of the contrary and conceivably shifting values held by the influential 
participants.  In that respect, the judicial analogy introduced in Chapter 2 is again appropriate, in so 
far as the determination of culpability in the eyes of the law ultimately concerns a conflict between the 
values it seeks to enforce and the contrary values held by the offender. 
10.4 ‘Emergent’ Jacobitism – A Postscript 
In Chapter 7 it was observed that the lack of a precise meaning of ‘Jacobitism’ presented a challenge 
to its explanation.  Although an examination of this challenge is not the purpose of this study, its use 
of the emergence of Jacobitism to illustrate implications of the main argument (Chapters 7 and 8) 
prompts some reflection on that process.  The important aspect involves the reflexivity implicit in 
historical explanation, raised in Chapter 6: the historian’s actions are not different in kind from the 
actions the historian seeks to explain, as they both emerge from perspectives in their respective 
consciousnesses.  The suggestion was first made in Chapter 2 that a court case heard before a jury 
could be an exemplar of historical explanation of a singular event.  It followed that contrary 
perspectives on the same proven evidence were not only permissible but required, to form the 
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opposed advocacies.  So, analogically, alternative historical perspectives on the evidence might be 
expected.  However, the illustrations made use of only a subset of evidence of ‘Jacobitism’, 
designated its ‘emergence’ (1689-1715).  Accordingly, a perspective addressing a larger evidence set 
(specifically 1689 to 1745) may not yield the most persuasive explanation of this subset.  A 
perspective on that alone might consider several issues.  First, it is not obvious that Scotland’s 
experience, in social, economic or political terms, under the post-Restoration Stuart dynasty and the 
brief reign of the absentee James VII/II should have generated a strong allegiance towards the dynasty 
in general and the person of James specifically, sufficient to view restoration as a justifiable end in its 
own right.  Few had any personal attachment to James.  Second, the reactions of the opponents to the 
invitation to and installation of William of Orange as William III, either at the Convention of 1689 or 
to the subsequent overtures of Viscount Dundee, scarcely revealed a marked enthusiasm on their part 
at that time to employ force to restore the Stuarts a second time, while the Highlanders’ motives had 
other priorities.  Third, by the time of the failed French invasion, twenty years after the Revolution, it 
seems plausible that this later generation’s expectations of the future would have been substantially 
affected by the intervening and radical changes in Scotland’s circumstances (the Claim of Right; the 
legacy of prolonged famine; the failure of the Darien plantation; deaths of Queen Mary, James VII/II 
and William III; accession of Queen Anne; the passage of the Treaty of Union; determination of the 
Hanoverian succession; continuing war with France).  Fourth, the establishment of Presbyterianism 
and the tolerance granted later to other confessions had detached the issue of the restoration from 
value-infused inter-confessional rivalry.  These changed expectations could well have shifted the 
contemporary perspective on the restoration of the Stuart dynasty, now to be in the person of a largely 
unknown James VIII.  Arguably the restoration was by then seen first and foremost as a component 
means to the re-establishment of an independent Scottish parliament, not out of principle but in 
pursuit of economic advantage, even although there existed no evident strategy to connect the two.  
The eventual commitment of some landed élite and their loyal (and not-so-loyal) tenants to armed 
insurgence in 1715 could be viewed as a self-interested though belated attempt to restore their past 
power and influence just when economic development was on the cusp of being driven by capital and 
trade rather than by land, with the necessary capacity for the time being existing in England and 
London specifically.  In that respect the materiality of Jacobite loyalties, comprehensively 
documented by Novotny (Novotny 2013), symbolised not so much a personal association with a 
putative king whom few had ever seen, but a physical representation of the ‘presence’ of a kinship’s 
honourable past.  This perspective on the 1689-1715 period may be more persuasive than one based 
on subsequent events two generations after the Revolution, and projected back to embrace this earlier 
period on the ground of resemblance, in terms of its similar resort to armed insurgence.  ‘Emergence’ 
in this sense is thus potentially a product of presentism, understandable given the persistent efforts of 
successive exiled Stuarts throughout the entire period, supported by the continuing threat posed by the 
French court.  From this point of view Jacobitism is a ‘kaleidic perspective’. 
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